COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 0246-25-1
WEBB’S TRUCK LEASING CORP. v. CHKD THRIFT STORES, LLC
Present: Judges AtLee, Chaney and Bernhard Argued at Norfolk, Virginia Opinion Issued July 21, 2026*
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK Lawson Wayne Farmer, Judge
Rachel L. Yates (Yates Appellate Law, on briefs), for appellant.
Angela Boice Axselle (Joel M. McCray; Wimbish Gentile McCray & Roeber PLLC, on brief), for appellee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE VERNIDA R. CHANEY
Webb’s Truck Leasing Corp. (“Webb”) appeals the circuit court’s judgment granting
CHKD Thrift Stores, LLC’s (“CHKD”) warrant in detinue and dismissing Webb’s claims for
quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. Webb also challenges the court’s exclusion of evidence
concerning the parties’ prior course of dealing, historical rates, and certain out-of-court statements.
Webb contends that, even without an enforceable post-termination agreement, it was entitled to
compensation for post-termination storage, delivery, and related services and could retain CHKD’s
property until paid. Finding no reversible error, this Court affirms.
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). BACKGROUND1
CHKD Thrift Stores “receive[s] donated goods, sell[s] those goods and remit[s] the net
proceeds to” benefit the Children’s Hospital of the King’s Daughters. For years, CHKD and
Webb operated under an oral agreement under which Webb stored and transported trailers
containing CHKD’s excess charitable-donation inventory as directed by CHKD. R. 496, 499,
580.
In March 2018, CHKD notified Webb that the arrangement was terminated and
demanded return of CHKD’s charitable donations. Webb did not return the donations, and in
July 2018, CHKD again notified Webb that the arrangement was terminated, requested access to
Webb’s trailers to retrieve the donations, and paid Webb’s outstanding invoices totaling
$60,694.76 in an effort to make a “clean break.” R. 511-13, 752-55. Webb still did not permit
CHKD to retrieve the donations nor did Webb make efforts to return the trailers.
On July 1, 2019, CHKD, through counsel, sent Webb another letter documenting the
prior termination letters, declaring that all agreements between the parties would conclude on
August 31, 2019, and demanding return of the charitable donations by that date. R. 515-17,
756-58. The letter enclosed payment of $73,425 and stated that the payment “represent[ed]
CHKD’s payment in full and satisfie[d] any and all obligations” of CHKD to Webb. R. 757.
The letter added that, after August 31, 2019, CHKD and Webb would have “no further
agreement or professional relationship,” that CHKD would “not pay any additional money” to
Webb, and that CHKD would have “[n]o obligation of any kind” to Webb after that date. R.
757. Webb admitted that it cashed the check and that, as of August 31, 2019, CHKD did not
owe Webb any debt related to the CHKD donations. R. 521-22, 641.
1 On appeal from a bench trial, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Congdon v. Congdon, 40 Va. App. 255, 258 (2003). -2- At the time of the termination of the parties’ agreement, Webb had 75 trailers containing
CHKD’s charitable donations. R. 519, 544. For a 60-day return window, CHKD offered to pay
a fixed transportation fee of $165 per trailer for returned donations. R. 557, 757. Webb returned
none of the donations within that period.
On August 23, 2019, Ms. Webb, who testified on Webb’s behalf, Dennis Ryan, the
retired Chief Financial Officer for Children’s Health System and former CHKD corporate
manager, and Buzz Heidt, chairman of the CHKD Board, met to discuss the return of the trailers.
The parties agreed that CHKD wanted all of its charitable donations returned as soon as possible.
Ms. Webb acknowledged that after termination she had not sent a monthly bill and had “never
sent any lien notices to CHKD Thrift.” R. 573, 639.
Between October 2019 and March 2020, Webb returned approximately 40 of the 75
trailers to CHKD. R. 543-44, 550, 552, 556. During that same period, Ryan sent an email in
December 2019 stating that CHKD was “prepared to pay two months, as discussed, at $7,000 a
month flat fee, plus the transportation costs of those deliveries.” R. 545. CHKD then paid Webb
$21,260 by check dated January 5, 2020. R. 544. Ryan testified that the payment was a
“generous gesture” and not for storage because the “whole arrangement was for delivery, not
storage.” R. 545, 570. He explained that CHKD’s prior offer had been $42,000 for full delivery
of all trailers, that the trailers returned by the time of the January payment represented roughly
one-third of that total, and that $21,260 reflected approximately one-third of the $42,000 plus
$7,000 in delivery fees. R. 544-45. Webb stopped returning donations in March 2020 and still
retained 35 trailers at trial.
This appeal arises from two related suits tried together in the circuit court. In the first,
CHKD sought return of its charitable donations through a warrant in detinue. In the second,
-3- Webb sued CHKD for breach of contract,2 quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment, alleging that
the parties had entered into a new oral agreement for continued storage and delivery beginning in
September 2019.
After a bench trial, the circuit court found that CHKD had terminated the parties’
arrangement, paid what it owed, and demanded return of its property. R. 710-12, 717-18. The
court found that there was no post-termination agreement, observing that the testimony
concerning the alleged material terms was “all over the place.” R. 712. The court stated, “You
know why you don’t have a written agreement when both sides want a written agreement? It’s
because both sides haven’t agreed.” R. 715. The court also found that CHKD had been
“screaming from the rooftops since 2018[:] We don’t want to do business with you anymore.
Give us our stuff back.” R. 712. The court granted CHKD’s warrant in detinue and dismissed
Webb’s claims.
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
A circuit court’s factual findings following a bench trial are “entitled to the same weight
as a jury verdict.” Dunbar Grp., LLC v. Tignor, 267 Va. 361, 366-67 (2004). This Court defers
to those findings and will not set them aside unless they are plainly wrong or without evidence to
support them. Id. at 367. We also presume that the circuit court resolved factual ambiguities and
conflicting inferences in favor of the prevailing party. See Hill v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 804,
808 (2019).
To the extent that this appeal presents questions of law, we review those issues de novo.
Pae Nat’l Sec. Sols., LLC v. Constellis, LLC, 83 Va. App. 252, 264 (2025). We review
2 Webb does not challenge the dismissal of its breach of contract claim on appeal. Its assignments of error challenge the detinue ruling, the dismissal of the quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims, and the exclusion of evidence. -4- evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Proffitt, 292 Va. 626, 634 (2016).
Even if an evidentiary ruling is erroneous, reversal is not required when the error is harmless.
Barkley v. Wallace, 267 Va. 369, 374 (2004); Code § 8.01-678.
II. Webb’s Equitable Theories and Warrant in Detinue
Webb primarily argues that, once the circuit court found no binding post-termination
agreement, the law required CHKD to pay reasonable compensation for post-termination storage,
delivery, and related wind-down services. At oral argument, Webb emphasized that returning
the donations was not merely a matter of making the trailers available; return required labor,
drivers, transportation, unloading, storage, land rent, tolls, and other costs. Webb also argues
that CHKD’s January 2020 payment and prior offers showed that CHKD recognized an
obligation to compensate Webb for those wind-down services. Webb further argues that because
CHKD owed additional compensation, Webb had a warehouseman’s lien and could retain
CHKD’s property until paid. These arguments depend on treating the post-termination period as
one in which CHKD requested or accepted compensable continued storage, delivery, or other
wind-down services while the parties disputed price. The court found otherwise. It found that
CHKD terminated the arrangement, paid what it owed, demanded return of its property, and did
not agree that Webb could continue storing, delivering, or retaining CHKD’s donations on
Webb’s terms. R. 710-12, 717-18.
A. The circuit court was entitled to reject Webb’s equitable theories.
The circuit court rejected the factual predicates underlying Webb’s quantum meruit and
unjust enrichment claims. CHKD’s July 1, 2019, letter expressly stated that the enclosed
payment “represent[ed] CHKD’s payment in full and satisfie[d] any and all obligations” and that,
after August 31, 2019, CHKD would have “no further agreement or professional relationship.”
R. 757. The same letter stated that CHKD would “not pay any additional money” and would
-5- have “[n]o obligation of any kind” to Webb after August 31, 2019. R. 757. Webb admitted that,
as of August 31, 2019, CHKD had “paid what they owed” and did not owe Webb any debt
related to the CHKD donations. R. 641. Based on that evidence, the court found that “[t]he slate
was clean” and Webb “had one option and that was to return the property.” R. 710-11.
Webb argues that the post-termination course of conduct required a different result.
Webb contends that CHKD did not merely ask Webb to make the trailers available for pickup,
but instead requested a wind-down of a decades-long commercial arrangement involving 75
loaded trailers. Webb emphasizes that returning the donations required labor, drivers,
transportation, unloading, storage, land rent, tolls, and other costs. Webb also relies on the fact
that it returned approximately 40 trailers between October 2019 and March 2020 and that CHKD
paid $21,260 in January 2020 after Ryan had referred to two months at a $7,000 monthly flat fee
plus transportation costs. From that evidence, Webb concludes that CHKD accepted and
benefited from Webb’s post-termination storage, delivery, and wind-down services and that the
circuit court should have determined reasonable compensation rather than treating those services
as uncompensated.
The circuit court was not required to accept Webb’s characterization, and its factual
findings matter because quantum meruit and unjust enrichment do not arise merely because a
claimant performed work or incurred costs. Quantum meruit applies when services are
performed at the request of another, without agreed terms, and the law implies a promise to pay
the reasonable value of the services. See Mongold v. Woods, 278 Va. 196, 204 (2009). Unjust
enrichment requires proof that the plaintiff conferred a benefit on the defendant, that the
defendant knew of the benefit and should reasonably have expected to repay it, and that the
defendant accepted or retained the benefit without paying for its value. See Schmidt v.
Household Fin. Corp., II, 276 Va. 108, 116 (2008). Thus, Webb had to establish more than the
-6- value of storage or delivery. It had to establish that CHKD requested the services, or accepted
and retained a benefit under circumstances making nonpayment unjust.
The circuit court was entitled to find that Webb failed to make that showing. CHKD
wanted its donations returned. CHKD did not agree that Webb could continue storing or
delivering the donations on Webb’s terms, or withhold them until CHKD paid additional
amounts. The court made that point directly when it asked: “What is it? That she kept their
property for five years when they kept asking for it back? That’s how they’ve been unjustly
enriched? She had one option in July. Give it back.” R. 717. The court further explained that
CHKD may have had to pay someone “to store it or to move it or whatever,” but that was
CHKD’s decision to make, not Webb’s. R. 718.
The court’s factual findings also defeat Webb’s efforts to characterize this case as one
about unpaid wind-down compensation. The court did not find that CHKD requested continuing
storage, delivery, or other wind-down services while leaving only the price unresolved. Rather,
the court found that CHKD demanded return of its property and that Webb had no right to
continue to hold it. Webb’s post-termination deliveries did not require the circuit court to find an
implied promise to pay for continued storage, delivery, or wind-down services. Nor did the
presence of the post-termination deliveries require the court to find that CHKD accepted or
retained the benefit of Webb’s continued possession. The court could reasonably distinguish
between CHKD’s willingness to facilitate the return of its donations and Webb’s claimed right to
keep storing those donations at whatever rate Webb deemed appropriate. And to the extent that
Webb performed delivery services that CHKD requested, the court was entitled to find them
compensated. CHKD paid Webb $21,260 for the returns it accepted, a sum that Ryan tied to the
parties’ contemplated delivery figure and delivery fees rather than to continued storage. R. 544-
-7- 45, 570. Returning property Webb was obligated to return once the slate was cleaned conferred
no benefit on CHKD for which the law implies a promise to pay.
Webb’s reliance on T. Musgrove Constr. Co. v. Young, 298 Va. 480 (2020), does not
compel a different result. Musgrove recognizes that, absent an enforceable contract, equitable
principles may require payment for a benefit conferred or retained. Id. at 485-86. However,
Musgrove does not require compensation where the circuit court, as factfinder, determines that
the defendant did not request the alleged services and did not accept or retain the asserted
benefit. Id. The circuit court here found that CHKD ended the relationship, paid what it owed,
and demanded return of its own property. Those findings are owed deference on appeal and
support the court’s rejection of Webb’s quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims.
B. CHKD’s January 2020 payment did not establish an implied payment obligation, and Webb had no right to retain the donations under a warehouseman’s lien.
Webb argues that CHKD’s January 2020 payment of $21,260 shows that CHKD
recognized an implied obligation to pay for post-termination wind-down services. Webb
emphasizes that the payment followed Ryan’s December 2019 email stating CHKD was
“prepared to pay two months, as discussed, at $7,000 a month flat fee, plus the transportation
costs of those deliveries.” However, the circuit court was not required to draw that inference.
CHKD characterized the payment as a “generous gesture,” and Ryan testified that “the whole
arrangement was for delivery, not storage.” Given the court’s factual findings, it could
reasonably view CHKD’s payment as an effort to facilitate return of the donations, not as
evidence of a new agreement or an implied obligation to continue paying Webb for
post-termination storage, delivery, or possession of CHKD’s property. That the parties were still
discussing rates in early 2020 reflects the absence of any agreement, not CHKD’s
acknowledgment of an obligation; ongoing negotiation is the antithesis of a meeting of the
minds. The payment amount is consistent with that view. Ryan testified that the $21,260 -8- reflected approximately one-third of CHKD’s contemplated $42,000 delivery payment,
corresponding to the roughly one-third of the trailers that had been returned at the time, plus
delivery fees, not compensation for ongoing storage of the remaining trailers. R. 544-45.
The court’s factual findings also undermine Webb’s warehouseman’s lien argument.
Code § 8.7-102 defines a “[w]arehouseman” as “a person engaged in the business of storing
goods for hire.” Code § 8.7-209(1) provides that a warehouseman has a lien on goods covered
by a warehouse receipt or storage agreement for charges including “storage or transportation,”
“labor.” The lien thus secures charges and attaches to goods held under a receipt or storage
agreement. Neither predicate is present here: Webb admitted that CHKD owed no debt as of
termination, and the court found no storage agreement between the parties. No warehouseman’s
lien arose. R. 641. Even if one had, Code § 8.7-209(5) provides that “[a] warehouseman loses
his lien on any goods that he voluntarily delivers or unjustifiably refuses to deliver.”
Assuming without deciding that Webb otherwise qualified as a warehouseman, the record
supports the circuit court’s conclusion that Webb had no right to retain CHKD’s property. Webb
did not send post-termination monthly bills, lien notices, or similar notices. Ryan testified that
CHKD never received “any kind of lien notice or anything like that” after termination. R. 573.
Ms. Webb likewise acknowledged that Webb did not send a bill and had “never sent any lien
notices to CHKD Thrift.” R. 639. The circuit court also found that once CHKD paid the
outstanding balance, Webb “had one option and that was to return the property.” R. 711, 717.
Given those factual findings, which are not plainly wrong, Webb cannot rely on Code § 8.7-209
to justify continued retention of CHKD’s charitable donations. The court thus did not err in
granting CHKD’s warrant in detinue.
-9- III. The Circuit Court’s Evidentiary Rulings
Webb also challenges the circuit court’s exclusion of evidence on the parties’ prior
course of dealing, historical rates, the unsigned 2016 contract, and certain out-of-court
statements.
A. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the unsigned 2016 contract, and any exclusion of additional course-of-dealing evidence was harmless.
Webb argues that the circuit court improperly excluded evidence of the parties’ historical
course of dealing and prior rates. “On appeal, a court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Coleman v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. App. 160, 169 (2026)
(quoting Drexel v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. App. 720, 739 (2024)). “A court has abused its
discretion if its decision was affected by an error of law or was one with which no reasonable
jurist could agree.” R.T. v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. App. 293, 299-300 (2025) (quoting Tomlin v.
Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 392, 409 (2022)). “[T]he abuse of discretion standard requires a
reviewing court to show enough deference to a primary decisionmaker’s judgment that the
[reviewing] court does not reverse merely because it would have come to a different result in the
first instance.” Id. at 300 (alterations in original) (quoting Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285
Va. 187, 212 (2013)).
The record does not support the broad exclusion Webb describes. When Webb sought to
ask about older written contracts, the circuit court questioned the relevance of agreements
predating the alleged 2019 oral agreement, explaining that Webb’s claim concerned a “new
agreement entered into in 2019.” R. 584-87. The court stated, “For quantum meruit, the only
expectations are what was the agreement in 2019. It’s not what we have done in the last -- since
1989.” R. 585. However, when Webb referred to “historical rates,” the court stated, “I don’t
disagree that that’s relevant.” R. 586. The court thus did not categorically exclude all historical
rate evidence. - 10 - Webb also argues that the circuit court erred by excluding the unsigned 2016 contract.
Assuming without deciding that Webb preserved this issue for appeal, the circuit court did not
abuse its discretion. Webb’s theory at trial was that the parties entered into a new oral agreement
after termination in 2019. The court could reasonably conclude that an unsigned contract from
2016 had limited relevance to whether the parties reached a post-termination agreement in 2019
or whether CHKD requested continued storage or delivery after terminating the prior
arrangement. The court stated that Webb claimed the parties “reached a different agreement in
2019” and that Webb had already “told [the court] what the costs [were].” R. 617. It then
sustained CHKD’s objection “as to some contract that was drafted but not signed in 2016.” R.
617. The court also could treat the document as cumulative because Webb testified about
historical terms it considered relevant.
In any event, any exclusion was harmless. Non-constitutional error is harmless “[w]hen
it plainly appears from the record and the evidence given at the trial that the parties have had a
fair trial on the merits and substantial justice has been reached.” Code § 8.01-678. “In a civil
case, the erroneous exclusion of evidence is reversible error when the record fails to show plainly
that the excluded evidence could not have affected the [result].” Barkley, 267 Va. at 374. “If,
when all is said and done, [it is clear] that the error did not influence the [factfinder], or had but
slight effect, . . . the judgment should stand.” Driscoll v. Hunter, 59 Va. App. 22, 36 (2011)
(alterations in original) (quoting Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 260 (2001)).
Here, the excluded evidence concerned historical dealings and valuation. However,
Webb’s equitable claims did not fail because the circuit court lacked historical valuation
evidence. They failed because the court found CHKD terminated the arrangement, paid what it
owed, repeatedly demanded return of its donations, and did not request continued storage,
delivery, or possession under Webb’s terms. Even if additional historical evidence might have
- 11 - assisted Webb on valuation in the abstract, it would not undermine the dispositive factual
findings that CHKD wanted its property returned and that Webb had no basis to continue to hold
it.
At oral argument, Webb argued that the historical rate evidence was the best evidence of
reasonable value, but the circuit court’s ruling did not rely on the amount of a reasonable charge;
it depended on the court’s finding that CHKD demanded return of its property and did not
request continued storage, delivery, or possession on Webb’s terms. Thus, any exclusion of
additional historical evidence did not affect the outcome.
B. The excluded out-of-court statements do not warrant reversal.
Webb next argues that the circuit court improperly excluded statements that were
admissible as admissions by a party opponent. Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:803(0) provides that
certain statements are “not excluded by the hearsay rule,” including “[a] statement offered
against a party” that is “the party’s own statement,” “a statement by a person authorized by the
party to make a statement concerning the subject,” or “a statement by the party’s agent or
employee, made during the term of the agency or employment, concerning a matter within the
scope of such agency or employment.”
Webb’s appellate argument is broader than the single Ryan exchange addressed below.
Webb argues that the excluded testimony concerned statements by CHKD representatives or
agents, including Ryan, Heidt, and Paul Sharp.3 Webb contends that those statements were
admissible under Rule 2:803(0) as party-opponent admissions. It also argues that the excluded
statements would have supported its version of the August 2019 negotiations, including the time
needed to unload and return trailers, whether CHKD could accept only a limited number of
trailers at a time, whether CHKD requested or accepted continued storage and delivery during
3 Paul Sharp represented SYR Inc., the company that managed CHKD. - 12 - the wind-down, and whether the parties discussed additional trailers or future business as part of
negotiating a more favorable rate. Webb maintains that it preserved the issue by invoking the
“party representative” ground and that, under Code § 8.01-384, it was not required to repeat the
same argument after the circuit court had ruled.
However, Rule 5A:18 provides that “[n]o ruling of the [circuit] court . . . will be
considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the
time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of
justice.” “Rule 5A:18 requires a litigant to make timely and specific objections, so that the
[circuit] court has ‘an opportunity to rule intelligently on the issues presented, thus avoiding
unnecessary appeals and reversals.’” Brown v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 210, 217 (2010)
(quoting West v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 327, 337 (2004)).
Webb’s hearsay argument focuses on excluded testimony about discussions with CHKD
or SYR representatives, including statements attributed to Ryan, Heidt, Sharp, and unidentified
speakers referred to as “they.” R. 583-84, 587-91, 596-98. However, in the earlier challenged
exchanges, Webb did not invoke the party-opponent exception, or any hearsay exception, when
CHKD objected. R. 583-84, 587-91, 596-98. The court also instructed counsel to avoid vague
references to “we” and “they” and to “be specific about who [Webb was] speaking with.” R.
588-91. Since Webb did not make the party-opponent argument to the circuit court during those
exchanges, Rule 5A:18 bars Webb from relying on that argument for the first time on appeal.
Webb further argues that the substance of the excluded testimony was adequately
presented in its proffer to the circuit court. We assume without deciding that the substance of the
excluded testimony was sufficiently proffered. See McGinnis v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 489,
501 (2018) (“[I]n cases where the ability of the Court to review an issue on appeal is in doubt,
we may ‘assume without deciding’ that the issue can be reviewed provided that this permits us to
- 13 - resolve the appeal on the best and narrowest grounds.”). However, that does not cure Webb’s
failure to preserve its hearsay argument. Webb did not present its “party-opponent” argument in
its proffer or during the earlier challenged exchanges. Nor did it obtain a ruling from the circuit
court on the hearsay exception or give the court a chance to rule intelligently on the issue. A
proffer of substance does not substitute for the adequate preservation of the admissibility
argument.
Code § 8.01-384 also does not alter our conclusion. Although a party generally need not
repeat an objection once the court has ruled, Webb did not state the party-opponent ground
during the earlier challenged exchanges. The one clearer instance in which Webb raised a “party
representative” argument occurred later in trial, when Webb asked Ms. Webb about Ryan’s
response to her assertion that September and October 2019 storage fees were due. At that point,
CHKD objected on hearsay grounds, and Webb responded that Ryan was a “party
representative.” R. 648. That later argument preserved, at most, the ruling made in that
exchange; it did not retroactively preserve a different theory for earlier excluded statements.
Assuming without deciding that the court erred by excluding Ryan’s testimony, any error
was harmless. See Code § 8.01-678; Barkley, 267 Va. at 374; Driscoll, 59 Va. App. at 36. Here,
the substance of the September and October 2019 payment dispute came in through other
evidence. Webb read the relevant emails into evidence, testified that she told Ryan that CHKD
owed September and October 2019 storage fees, and later elicited from Ryan that Ms. Webb had
asked CHKD to pay storage fees for those months. R. 558-59, 648-50. Ryan explained CHKD’s
position that there were no “prior months” because “[t]hat agreement was terminated effective
August 31st.” Ms. Webb also testified that CHKD did not pay her for those months, though she
acknowledged that she “got a check eventually.”
- 14 - Moreover, the circuit court’s ruling did not depend on the excluded statements. The court
relied on its factual findings that CHKD terminated the relationship, paid what it owed,
repeatedly demanded return of its donations, and did not request continued storage, delivery, or
possession on Webb’s terms. Since the same relevant information came in through other
evidence and the excluded testimony did not affect the court’s core reasoning that the contract
obligations had ceased, any error was harmless. See Driscoll, 59 Va. App. at 36.
CONCLUSION
The circuit court’s judgment rests on factual findings supported by the record: CHKD
terminated the parties’ arrangement, paid what it owed, demanded return of its charitable
donations, and did not agree to continued storage, delivery, or possession on Webb’s terms.
Those findings defeat Webb’s detinue defense, warehouseman’s lien argument, and equitable
claims for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. The challenged evidentiary rulings likewise
do not require reversal because Webb has not shown reversible error or prejudice affecting the
outcome.
For these reasons, this Court affirms the circuit court’s judgment.
Affirmed.
- 15 -