Webber v. Police Jury

48 F. Supp. 350, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3030
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedJanuary 6, 1943
DocketCivil Action No. 330
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 48 F. Supp. 350 (Webber v. Police Jury) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Webber v. Police Jury, 48 F. Supp. 350, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3030 (W.D. La. 1943).

Opinion

DAWKINS, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, residents of Michigan, sued the police jury for the Parish of Vermilion, the Board of Commissioners of the Gueydan Drainage District and certain individuals, alleging ownership of 3,053 acres of land situated in said parish, designated on the map attached to the bill of complaint as the “Florence Club”; that this property, with-other lands, totalling 5,536.-95 acres, had been included in Sub-District No. 1 of the said Gueydan Drainage District, and that certain portions thereof had been dedicated “for * * * canals, roads and levee purposes”, and improved accordingly, by funds derived from the sale of bonds to be paid by taxes levied upon said property; that said sub-district was later dissolved and the property “particularly canals, streets and roads” became the property of the inhabitants of said district; that plaintiffs acquired their interest in said lands and improvements, subject to the use by other property owners in said sub-district of the servitudes of roads, canals, streets, etc.; and that no other persons have any right to use same; that among improvements so made was “a certain canal and levee * * * known as Canal and Levee No. 1 of said sub-district No. 1”, which served to drain all lands in said sub-district; that the levee constructed on the east side of said Canal No. 1 was the main protection against flood waters from the lands to the east and southeast, and during low water, to retain a supply necessary and vital to the proper enjoyment of the property of plaintiffs.

Further, that at a cost of some $60,000 plaintiffs acquired the land and improvements, and also owned all the outstanding bonds originally issued to construct the canals and other improvements; that plaintiffs now maintain a private game preserve, at their own expense, in this and adjoining sub-district No. 2, and also carry on farming operations thereon, maintain tenant houses, etc., and the large two-story house known as the Florence Qub; that the said levees, canals, roads, etc., are necessary to their operations.

Further, that there is another sub-district known as No. 5 immediately east of said sub-district No. 1, which voted its own taxes and made its own improvements but has no connection whatever with sub-district No. 1, nor are the property owners in said district No. 5 entitled to share or in any way utilize the improvements in sub-district No. 1.

Further, that on March 20, 1939, the Board of Commissioners of the Gueydan [352]*352Drainage District (of which No. 1 is a sub-district), in consideration of plaintiffs agreeing to cancel and surrender all outstanding bonds, passed a resolution for the liquidation of the said District No. 1 and authorized its president to quit claim and deed over to the landowners of sub-District No. 1 all the canals, levees, roads, rights of way and lands underlying the same, and in other property of the said sub-district; and that on said date, the said president carried out the said resolution “save and except that he failed to include within the conveyance one-half of the Canal No. 1 and the levee on the east side thereof”, which plaintiffs contend “form and constitute part of the improvements of said sub-District No. 1 and should be deeded to the landowners” in said sub-district; that the said Board has refused to deed or recognize the title of plaintiffs and the other landowners in said sub-District No. 1 to the east one-half of the canal and the levee on its east bank thereof but has authorized others, who have no right or interest therein to take possession and use said canal and levee.

Further, that on April 3, 1939, the said Board by resolution undertook to grant to the police jury of the Parish of Vermilion a servitude or right of way along the canal or a part of the Levee No. 1, which grant was immediately accepted by the police jury, which immediately started construction of said road, in total disregard of plaintiffs’ rights.

Further, that the defendants Bonin and Gooch own properties in said sub-District No. 5 to the east of said Canal and Levee No. 1, along its north end, and that defendant B. E. Sirmon also owns lands in sub-District No. 5 east of the south end of the said canal and levee; that each and all of these defendants, through their agents and employees, have cut the levee and permitted excessive waters to flow on the property of plaintiffs, and they have also erected pumps to pump the waters from the east on to the lands of the plaintiffs in high water, but that in low water, they drain the water from the canal for the use of their property by cutting the levee and deprive the plaintiffs thereof.

Plaintiffs prayed for a preliminary injunction, finally that it be made permanent and for judgment recognizing them as ■“owners in full legal title to the east half of said Canal and Levee No. 1.”

In the alternative plaintiffs prayed that in event the full legal title to the said portions of said canal and the levee be not recognized in plaintiffs, they, together with all other property owners in said sub-District, be decreed the owners in indivisión of the whole said Canal No. 1 with exclusive right to use, supervise and control the same, and to enjoy to the exclusion of all others the privileges and benefits to be derived therefrom, and finally for a mandatory injunction, commanding the defendants “to immediately repair the’ cuts made in said levee.”

The application for the preliminary injunction was heard and granted without opposition on the 18th of September, 1940. All the defendants filed joint answers, admitting some of the allegations, but denying others, the principal points of denial being that the Canal No. 1, although it served sub-District No. 1, “has been incorporated into the general drainage system” and the levee on its east side gives no protection to plaintiffs’ alleged property, because waters from the east “drain naturally into Canal No. 1”; that the levee was broken by natural causes about 1923, and can not serve to retain waters for the reason it is open at the south and connects with a large drainage ditch which flows through other lands, to the Intercoastal Canal; and that'the principal purpose of plaintiffs was to establish a private hunting and fishing club. They denied that the lands east of the Canal No. 1 belonged in sub drainage District No. 5 but were a part of the original “parent Gueydan Drainage District” and that defendants as the owners of the property in sub-District No. S are entitled to utilize all drainage and protection systems in each district.

Further, that the quit claim deed of the president of the Board of Commissioners of the Gueydan Drainage District, in accord with the intent and purposes of the resolution by it, declined to include the eastern half of the canal and the levee on the east bank thereof; they denied that they pumped any water on the -lands of plaintiff, but because of the fact that defendants’ lands are situated in the parent Gueydan Drainage District and the natural drainage of their lands in a southwesterly direction, they are entitled to have the benefit of the said Canal No. 1; that conditions along the said canal have not changed materially since 1923 except during the [353]*353flood of 1940 when waters from the south backed up in the canal and onto all property in that area.

Further, that on May 19, 1932, the plaintiffs herein and all other property owners of said sub-District No. 1, along with respondent Board of Commissioners, declared that Canal No.

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Related

Webber v. Police Jury, Vermillion Parish
141 F.2d 495 (Fifth Circuit, 1944)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
48 F. Supp. 350, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3030, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/webber-v-police-jury-lawd-1943.