Webber v. Gillies

112 N.Y.S. 397
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJune 11, 1908
StatusPublished

This text of 112 N.Y.S. 397 (Webber v. Gillies) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Webber v. Gillies, 112 N.Y.S. 397 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1908).

Opinion

FORD, J.

This action is brought for the ejectment of the defendants from the triangular piece of land beginning on the northwesterly side of Twelfth avenue at a point 52 feet southwesterly from the corner formed by the southwesterly side of One Hundred and Thirty-Second street and the northwesterly side of Twelfth avenue. The base of the triangle is 11% feet, and the sides of the triangle meet at a point 15 feet southwesterly from the southwesterly side of One Hundred and Thirty-Second street (as shown on Plaintiff’s Exhibit 16 and on Defendant’s Exhibit P). The total area of said triangular piece of land is 40 square feet, and its reasonable value is given at $302.19. The defendant Homer R. Gillies neither occupied nor had any ownership in said land at the time of the commencement of this action, and the complaint was dismissed as to him. On the strip of land in question is built part of an independent wall, the whole thickness of which is about 16 inches, and against that wall another independent wall of about the same thickness has been built. Buildings are built on both sides o-f said walls, of which said walls are parts. The titles of both the plaintiff and of the defendant Wright Gillies (who will hereafter be called the defendant) to the property south and north of -this triangular plot were derived from the city of New York, and from the mayor, aldermen, and commonalty of the city of New York, respectively. The title to both pieces vested in the said mayor, aldermen, and [398]*398commonalty of the city of New York and the city of New' York through the colonial charters and through letters patent issued by this state. On July 15, 1855, the mayor, aldermen, and commonalty of the city of New York deeded property described as follows to one Peter Lynch:

“Beginning at a point of intersection of the southerly line of One Hundred and Thirty-Second street with the westerly line of Twelfth avenue; running thence westerly, along the southerly line of One Hundred and Thirty-Second street, seventy-four feet; thence southerly twenty-five feet along the line of original low-water mark; thence easterly eighty-three feet to Twelfth avenue; thence northerly, along the westerly line of Twelfth avenue, fifty-two feet to the place of beginning, as shown on a map hereto annexed, the premises hereby conveyed being colored pink.”

A map was annexed to said deed and referred to therein. Through mesne conveyances said property came to the defendant herein. In each of the deeds subsequent to the deed from, the municipality to Lynch, the course along the low-water mark is made to run to a strip of land formerly called Schieffelin street, and thence along said strip of land to the point on Twelfth avenue, and all the interest of the grantors in said strip is conveyed to the respective grantees in the subsequent deeds. Nothing was said in the deed to Lynch about Schieffelin street, nor was said street shown on the annexed map. In 1890 the building and wall on defendant’s property were built by one of his remote grantors then in possession. The building was made only 15 feet wide in the rear. In the same year the other independent wall and building were built against the wall on plaintiff’s property by a sublessee of the city. The defendant’s wall runs about 2 feet further back than plaintiff’s wall. The city had been the owner of the piece south of defendant’s property from a time long previous to the Lynch deed in 1855. The New York Central Railroad claimed it, and for some years previous to 1886 rented it to Charles B. Morris. It was then discovered that the city had owned it all the time, and from that date (1886) the city leased it to said Morris, and his possession under leases from the city continued down to February 24, 1906, when the city, after due formalities, deeded said property south to the plaintiff. The deed from the city to the plaintiff contains the following description :

“Beginning at the point of intersection of the northerly side of West One Hundred and Thirty-First street with the westerly side of Twelfth avenue, and running thence westerly, along the northerly side of West One Hundred and Thirty-First street, 87 feet 7 inches to land of the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company; thence southeasterly 83 feet to the westerly side of Twelfth avenue at a point in said westerly side of Twelfth avenue distant 52 feet southerly from the southwesterly corner of Twelfth avenue and West One Hundred and Thirty-Second street; running thence southwesterly 68 feet 5 inches; thence northwesterly 28 feet 11 inches; thence again southwesterly 58 feet 6 inches; thence again southeasterly 39 feet 9 inches to the westerly side of Twelfth avenue; and thence southerly, along the westerly side of Twelfth avenue, 17 feet 1 inch, to the point or place of beginning.” "

The direction of the -186-foot course is not given; but by reference to the Morris lease it is shown to be along the railroad.

There is a preliminary objection. The defendant claims that the plaintiff has no right to bring this suit because of the provisions of [399]*399section 1501 of the Code and section 225 of the real property law (Laws 1896, p. 603, c. 547). I do not think the point is well taken, as the dispute is about a boundary. Danziger v. Boyd, 120 N. Y. 628, 24 N. E. 482. The defendant claims that this is not a boundary dispute, but that 10 feet to the rear of defendant’s land are in question. The pleadings confine the issue to the boundary, and even if the dispute concerned the 10 feet the principle of the above, case would apply, as by far the largest part of the plaintiff’s property was put in his possession by the city at the time his deed was given. Jones v. Hoyt, 85 Hun, 35, 32 N. Y. Supp. 625. There are two questions which are to be decided :

Eirst. As to the location of Schieffelin street. If the proof showed that the southern boundary of defendant’s land ran as a matter of fact along Schieffelin street, his remote grantor, Lynch, would have taken to the center of the strip, in case the original deed had come from a private individual. This presumption does not hold in the case of a grant by municipal authorities, where the fee to the street is in such authorities. Graham v. Stern, 168 N. Y. 517, 61 N. E. 891, 85 Am. St. Rep. 694. But this presumption does apply to the case of an old city street in New York City, in which the fee was not in the city. Paige v. Schenectady R. Co.; 178 N. Y. 102, 70 N. E. 213. The proof adduced by the defendant is insufficient to locate Schieffelin street, or to show how it was held, or when or how it was given up. The deeds to defendant’s remote grantors subsequent to the Lynch deed do not help the defendant. Any presumption as to the location of Schieffelin street through those subsequent deeds under section 955 of the Code is rebutted by plaintiff’s proof. The plaintiff having made out a prima facie case, the burden, as in any other case, was on defendant to prove his affirmative defense. The rule insisted on by the defendant, that plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title, does not help defendant in this branch of the case.

Second. Where did the line along low water run? There is testimony that the 25 feet ran along the original low-water line, as shown in the so-called Doty map, which was made in the year 1845 and is recognized by all surveyors as authoritative.

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Related

Paige v. . Schenectady Railway Co.
70 N.E. 213 (New York Court of Appeals, 1904)
Tillinghast v. . Walton
24 N.E. 482 (New York Court of Appeals, 1890)
Graham v. . Stern
61 N.E. 891 (New York Court of Appeals, 1901)
Willis v. . McKinnon
70 N.E. 962 (New York Court of Appeals, 1904)
Fagan v. McDonnell
115 A.D. 89 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1906)
Danziger v. Boyd
120 N.Y. 628 (New York Court of Appeals, 1890)
Jones v. Hoyt
32 N.Y.S. 625 (New York Supreme Court, 1895)
Jackson, ex dem. Bowen v. Burton
1 Wend. 341 (New York Supreme Court, 1828)

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Bluebook (online)
112 N.Y.S. 397, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/webber-v-gillies-nysupct-1908.