NOTICE 2019 IL App (4th) 190118-U This order was filed under Supreme FILED NO. 4-19-0118 November 22, 2019 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in Carla Bender the limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
CAROLYN WEBB, ) Appeal from Petitioner-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Sangamon County RICHARD LIGHTSEY, ) No. 12F524 Respondent-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Jack D. Davis II, ) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Knecht and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.
ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in recalculating respondent’s income and ordering retroactive child support to the date the petition to modify was filed.
¶2 In January 2017, the trial court entered an order increasing the child support
obligation owed by respondent, Richard Lightsey. The January 2017 order also resolved a
request for retroactive child support made by petitioner, Carolyn Webb. On appeal, this court
found mathematical errors in the trial court’s calculations that required remand for a
recalculation of respondent’s income. Following a September 2018 hearing on remand, the trial
court recalculated respondent’s income, found a downward deviation appropriate, and entered an
order setting respondent’s child support obligation and ordering retroactive support to the filing
of petitioner’s motion to modify child support. ¶3 Respondent appeals, arguing the trial court erred by (1) ignoring this court’s
mandate to recalculate respondent’s income, (2) awarding retroactive child support in amounts
not supported by the evidence or applicable law, and (3) interpreting this court’s mandate as
depriving the trial court of discretion in awarding retroactive child support. For the following
reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In September 2014, petitioner filed a petition for modification of child support,
alleging respondent was employed and paying significantly less than the statutory child support
minimum guidelines.
¶6 A. Hearing on Petition for Modification of Child Support
¶7 The trial court held a hearing on the petition for modification on three
nonconsecutive days in 2016. In the first appeal, this court summarized the relevant evidence as
follows:
“Respondent testified he retired from 3M in August 2012,
after working for the company for 32 years. As part of his
severance package, respondent received $400,000, of which
$100,000 was placed in an account maintained at Wells Fargo.
While still employed with 3M, respondent earned a base annual
salary of approximately $250,000 plus an additional performance-
based bonus. Respondent testified he was also awarded stock
options in his last 15 years at 3M because he met his targets.
There were two different types of stock options: restricted stock
and general stock. According to respondent, restricted stock had to
-2- mature before it could be sold. Petitioner’s exhibit No. 22
contained copies of respondent’s long-term incentive plan,
including (1) general stock options granted in 2010, 2011, and
2012, which vested in 2011 through 2015; and (2) restricted stock
options granted in 2010, 2011, and 2012, which vested in 2013
through 2015.
Respondent acknowledged he signed a financial affidavit
prior to the trial court’s October 2013 order. In the 2013 affidavit,
respondent identified his pension as the source of his $6643 gross
monthly income and testified it was ‘[t]he only source of
reoccurring income.’ The affidavit further disclosed a Fidelity
Investments (Fidelity) brokerage account in the amount of
$554,000. However, the affidavit did not list any income from
investments or withdrawals from the Fidelity account. Counsel for
petitioner asked whether it was true respondent had withdrawn
$230,000 from the Fidelity account in 2013. Although respondent
could not recall the precise amount, he acknowledged he sold some
stock to cover his monthly expenses.
Respondent’s 2013 tax return identified approximately
$230,000 in wages, salaries, and tips. According to respondent,
that income was from his 3M stock options. The 2013 tax return
also identified $3424 in dividends, $18,915 in capital gains, and
$79,716 from his pension. Respondent’s gross income in 2013
-3- was $332,911. Other than identifying the Fidelity brokerage
account, the 2013 financial affidavit did not disclose the $230,000
withdrawn from the Fidelity account to cover respondent’s
expenses.
A November 2014 financial affidavit also listed only the
$6643 monthly pension as respondent’s gross income. However,
respondent acknowledged he continued to withdraw between
$10,000 and $30,000 per month from his Fidelity account, which
he did not list as income on his financial affidavit because it was
not ‘reoccurring.’ The 2014 affidavit indicated respondent had no
employment at the time. Respondent was working as a consultant
for Catalyst, a start-up founded by two personal friends.
Respondent did not receive compensation for this consulting work,
but Catalyst reimbursed him for any expenses he incurred. Bank
records show respondent withdrew $61,494 from his Fidelity
account from September through December 2014.
Respondent’s 2015 federal income tax return shows an
adjusted gross income of $289,881. The tax return showed
respondent received $182,188 in wages and salary from his
‘Fidelity stock options from 3M.’ Bank records show respondent
withdrew $221,659 from his Fidelity account from February 2015
through December 2015.
-4- According to respondent, on March 1, 2016, he received an
offer of employment with Catalyst, including an annual salary of
$150,000 and an annual sales incentive bonus. When he began
receiving this salary, respondent voluntarily wrote additional child-
support checks for approximately $1400 per month. Respondent
testified he withdrew $23,000 from his Fidelity account in March
2016 and bank records show one additional $5000 withdrawal
from his Fidelity account in February 2016. No other withdrawals
were made from the Fidelity account during this time period.” In
re K.L., 2018 IL App (4th) 170294-U, ¶¶ 11-16.
¶8 Petitioner’s exhibits Nos. 4 and 5 contained respondent’s 2014 and 2015 tax
returns. Respondent testified his 2014 income tax return showed a gross income from 3M stock
options of $436,618 and a gross adjusted income of $529,400. Respondent testified his 2015
income tax return accurately reflected $182,188 in wages and salary from his 3M stock options.
Respondent agreed his total 2015 income was $289,881.
¶9 B. Trial Court’s January 2017 Order
¶ 10 In January 2017, the trial court entered a lengthy written order modifying
respondent’s child support obligation. The court found a substantial change in circumstances
required modification of the 2013 order, which was based on respondent’s pension as his only
source of income. The court found a change in circumstances based on respondent’s March
2016 offer of employment with Catalyst paying an annual salary of $150,000. The court further
noted there was a change in circumstances because respondent “ha[d] received income from his
exercise of stock distributions.”
-5- ¶ 11 The trial court addressed the parties’ arguments regarding respondent’s exercise
of his 3M stock options. The trial court made specific findings as to respondent’s income for
2014 and 2015 based on respondent’s tax returns. In pertinent part, the court’s order stated,
“[Respondent]’s 2015 tax returns indicate his income was $289,881. [Respondent]’s 2014 tax
return shows $436,618 in stock options was received that year. [Respondent]’s gross income in
2014 was $529,400, exclusive of the reimbursement checks he received from Catalyst.” The
court made an explicit finding that respondent was receiving gains from his exercise of stock
options and rejected respondent’s argument that the stock options and withdrawals should not be
considered income because they were non-recurring and were essentially a cash exchange. The
court determined “distributions of previously unvested stock options which vest and result in a
gain to the holder” should be included in calculating a child support obligation.
¶ 12 In calculating respondent’s guideline child support obligation, the trial court
found respondent’s income included an annual salary of $150,000 and a pension of $79,716.
Additionally, the court found the evidence showed respondent would continue to draw income
from his sale of stock. The court’s calculations show respondent had a gross monthly income of
$30,207, to which the court added $320 in dividends and $6643 from his pension. The court
then deducted $16,428 to reach a net monthly income of $20,742. Finally, the court calculated
guideline support of $4149 per month.
¶ 13 The trial court found a downward deviation appropriate and ordered respondent to
pay $3000 per month for child support. The court further ordered support retroactive to April 1,
2016, which was the first full month of respondent’s employment with Catalyst.
¶ 14 C. Appeal
-6- ¶ 15 Petitioner appealed the court’s January 2017 order and, in pertinent part,
challenged the court’s determination of respondent’s child-support obligation and the court’s
refusal to order retroactive child support to the date she filed her petition to modify child support.
On appeal, this court addressed mathematical errors in the trial court’s January 2017 judgment as
“The trial court adopted petitioner’s position regarding
respondent’s ‘average income from exercise of stock January
through April 2016.’ Petitioner’s written closing argument
included the following relevant language calculating respondent’s
2016 income: ‘$150,000 (Catalyst Employment); $111,600
(average stock income based on withdrawals from January through
April of 2016); $3,840 (dividends); $17,328 (average three year
capital gains); $79,716 (pension).’ The court’s calculations show
all these amounts were added together and divided by 12 to reach
respondent’s monthly ‘salary’ of $30,207. The trial court took
$30,207 as respondent’s gross monthly salary and added $320 in
interest and dividends and $6643 from respondent’s monthly
pension to reach a gross monthly income of $37,170. This was an
error because the monthly salary already took into account the
annual pension amount of $79,716 and $3840 in dividends.
Accordingly, the court essentially double-counted respondent’s
income from his pension and dividends and those additional
amounts should be disregarded. Disregarding these additional
-7- amounts leaves respondent with a gross monthly income of
$30,207.
Moreover, our review of the record reveals an error in
petitioner’s calculation of respondent’s average stock income
based on withdrawals from January through April 2016. The
record shows respondent deposited $28,000 into his Wells Fargo
account from his Fidelity account from January through April
2016. This averages out to $84,000 for the entire year, not
$111,600, as calculated by petitioner. Although we make no
finding as to the propriety of this method of calculating
respondent’s income from stock options, using this properly
calculated average results in a gross monthly income of $27,907.
After $16,428 in deductions, respondent’s net monthly income was
$11,479, which works out to a guideline support minimum of
$2295.80. This amount is substantially lower than the $3000 per
month the court ordered and almost $2000 lower than the amount
the court calculated as guideline support.
Given the disparity between our calculation of guideline
support and the trial court’s calculations, we conclude the court’s
child-support modification order must be vacated and the matter
must be remanded for further proceedings. The trial court was
concerned about the potential windfall to petitioner if it ordered
guideline support, child support retroactive to the date the petition
-8- to modify was filed, contribution to childcare expenses, and 20%
of respondent’s annual bonus. Because the guideline minimum
support is substantially lower than the court originally thought, the
trial court should have the opportunity to revisit these decisions.
On remand, we encourage the trial court to engage in a global
recalculation of respondent’s income following the filing of the
petition to modify support.” In re K.L., 2018 IL App (4th) 170294-
U, ¶¶ 39-41.
¶ 16 This court further addressed the trial court’s refusal to award child support
retroactive to the filing of the petition to modify. The record showed respondent was receiving
income from his stock distributions before the filing of the petition to modify and throughout the
pendency of the matter. This court noted the inherent inconsistency in the court’s decision to
award retroactive child support for the period between March 2016 and the January 2017 order
based on respondent’s salary from Catalyst and on his income from stock distributions, but not to
award retroactive support for the period between the filing of the petition to modify and March
2016 when he was receiving income from stock distributions. This court remanded the matter to
the trial court for further proceedings.
¶ 17 D. Proceedings on Remand
¶ 18 On remand, the parties filed briefs and petitioner argued this court erred in
calculating respondent’s net income because it did not reduce the federal, state, and social
security deductions based on our finding of respondent’s lower gross monthly income.
Petitioner argued that “a properly calculated Fin Plan using the Appellate Court’s gross monthly
income calculation of $27,907 results in [respondent]’s net monthly income as $18,772.”
-9- Respondent argued the court had discretion to reverse its prior ruling that the full amount of his
income identified in his tax returns was income for child-support purposes. Respondent argued
the use of the income listed in “box 1” of respondent’s W-2 was improper because it included
costs respondent clearly paid to the stock issuer company.
¶ 19 In September 2018, the trial court held a hearing on these matters. At the outset,
the parties agreed no further evidence was necessary and only legal arguments were needed.
Petitioner argued the trial court should use this court’s calculation for respondent’s 2016 gross
income and then apply the deductions applicable to that lower income. Petitioner further argued
that respondent’s argument that his stock options should not be considered income should not be
considered on remand because he failed to file a cross-appeal raising the issue.
¶ 20 Respondent argued this court’s mandate gave the trial court discretion to revisit
the determination that his exercise of stock options produced income for the purposes of
determining child support. Respondent further argued the trial court should interpret specific
portions of respondent’s tax returns to conclude he did not earn income from the exercise of his
stock options or earned substantially less than the court’s previous calculations. Counsel argued
respondent “did not get $436,618, his Box 1 W-2 income for 2014.” The trial court noted it had
made specific findings as to respondent’s 2014 and 2015 income, which respondent did not
appeal. Respondent again argued this court’s mandate allowed the trial court to revisit its
decisions regarding income from stock options on remand. In response, the trial court asked, “if
the [appellate] [c]ourt is directing me to conduct a global recalculation of child support, don’t
you think the [c]ourt would have said don’t use his stock income as it’s nonrecurring?” The
court further noted this court recognized the trial court’s finding that respondent’s exercise of his
- 10 - stock options produced income and remanded for a recalculation after identifying a different
error.
¶ 21 The trial court entered a written order addressing the calculation of respondent’s
income and the issue of retroactive child support. The court first acknowledged respondent
again argued his stock distributions were not income because it was non-recurring income. The
court again rejected this argument for the same reasons set forth in its January 2017 order. The
court further addressed respondent’s argument that specific portions of respondent’s tax returns
should be examined to conclude respondent was not earning income from the exercise of his
stock options. The court rejected this argument as well, finding the exercise of his stock options
constituted income for the purposes of calculating support. The court adopted petitioner’s
proposed calculations of respondent’s income taken from respondent’s income tax returns. The
court determined a downward deviation remained appropriate.
¶ 22 The trial court further found a change in circumstances existed at the time
petitioner filed the petition to modify child support and ordered retroactive support to September
2014. The court noted respondent began earning a salary from Catalyst in March 2016 but
possessed enough means to justify an increase of support retroactive to September 2014. Based
on respondent’s income tax returns and petitioner’s calculations, the court concluded the
following child support obligations were appropriate: from September 24, 2014, to December 31,
2014, respondent was obligated to pay $4535.68 per month; from January 1, 2015, to December
31, 2015, respondent was obligated to pay $2585.28 per month; and from January 1, 2016, and
thereafter, respondent was obligated to pay $2901.44 per month.
¶ 23 This appeal followed.
¶ 24 II. ANALYSIS
- 11 - ¶ 25 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred by (1) ignoring this court’s
mandate to recalculate respondent’s income, (2) awarding retroactive child support in amounts
not supported by the evidence or applicable law, and (3) interpreting this court’s mandate as
depriving the trial court of discretion in awarding retroactive child support.
¶ 26 A. Respondent’s Child Support Obligation
¶ 27 Respondent first contends the trial court erred by ignoring this court’s mandate to
recalculate his income for a determination of his child support obligation. Specifically,
respondent argues the trial court ignored this court’s calculation of guideline support of $2295.80
per month. Alternatively, if this court did not in fact determine respondent’s income, respondent
argues the trial court erred in ignoring evidence of respondent’s income from stock options.
¶ 28 1. Standard of Review
¶ 29 “The findings of the trial court as to net income and the award of child support are
within its sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” In
re Marriage of Breitenfeldt, 362 Ill. App. 3d 668, 675, 840 N.E.2d 694, 700 (2005). Following
remand, the tribunal must exercise its discretion within the bounds of remand and whether it has
done so is a question of law. Clemons v. Mechanical Devices Co., 202 Ill. 2d 344, 351-52, 781
N.E.2d 1072, 1078 (2002). There are two different standards of review applicable to two distinct
issues in this case. The first issue is whether our mandate required the trial court to accept our
calculation of respondent’s income. This is a question of law we review de novo. Id. at 352. If
this question of law is answered in the negative—that is, if the trial court had discretion to
determine respondent’s income on remand—we then consider whether the trial court abused its
discretion in determining respondent’s income. Id. We will find an abuse of discretion only
- 12 - where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. In re Marriage of
Pratt, 2014 IL App (1st) 130465, ¶ 22, 17 N.E.3d 678.
¶ 30 2. Scope of Remand
¶ 31 “Where the reviewing court’s directives are specific, the court to which a cause is
remanded is under a positive duty to enter an order or decree in accordance with the directions
contained in the mandate; precise and unambiguous directions in a mandate must be obeyed.”
Ertl v. City of De Kalb, 2013 IL App (2d) 110199, ¶ 21, 39 N.E.3d 15. However, if the
reviewing court does not give specific directions the court to which the cause is remanded must
examine the reviewing court’s opinion and proceed in accordance with the views expressed. Id.
¶ 32 Respondent argues this court’s directive was specific and his child support should
have been set at $2295.80 in accordance with this court’s calculations in the first appeal.
Petitioner asserts this court’s remand instructions were general and allowed the trial court to
exercise its discretion in calculating respondent’s income on remand.
¶ 33 In the first appeal in this case, this court discovered two mathematical errors in
the trial court’s original calculation of respondent’s income. Although this court made an
independent calculation and determined the resulting child support obligation was significantly
lower than the trial court’s calculation, this court did not specifically require the trial court to
accept our numbers. Instead, this court ruled as follows:
“Given the disparity between our calculation of guideline
support and the trial court’s calculations, we conclude the court’s
child-support modification order must be vacated and the matter
must be remanded for further proceedings. The trial court was
concerned about the potential windfall to petitioner if it ordered
- 13 - guideline support, child support retroactive to the date the petition
to modify was filed, contribution to childcare expenses, and 20%
support is substantially lower than the court originally thought, the
trial court should have the opportunity to revisit these decisions.
On remand, we encourage the trial court to engage in a global
recalculation of respondent’s income following the filing of the
petition to modify support.” (Emphases added.) In re K.L., 2018
IL App (4th) 170294-U, ¶ 41.
This language was intended to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion in recalculating
respondent’s income on remand. Nothing in the order remanding the matter to the trial court
required the trial court to accept our calculations. Indeed, petitioner filed a petition for rehearing
that raised this court’s use of an erroneous deduction which we denied because our order
contemplated the trial court addressing such claims. The trial court was in a better position to
assess petitioner’s claim and make findings of fact as to the proper deductions to be taken from
the lower income calculation. Our calculations were made only to determine whether the
disparity in guideline support was so great that the trial court should have the opportunity to
revisit its decisions considering its concerns about the potential windfall to petitioner.
¶ 34 Accordingly, we conclude our remand did not require the trial court to accept our
calculation of respondent’s income. The trial court, therefore, properly exercised its discretion
within the bounds of our remand. Clemons, 202 Ill. 2d at 352. We now turn to consider whether
the trial court abused its discretion in recalculating respondent’s income.
¶ 35 3. Calculation of Respondent’s Income
- 14 - ¶ 36 Respondent asserts the trial court erred by using his income tax returns to
determine his gross income for 2014 and 2015. Specifically, respondent argues the income he
received from his stock options should be offset by the exercise price of the stock options.
Respondent contends the trial court erred by ignoring his arguments as to valuing his income
from stock options. Respondent further contends the trial court refused to consider this
argument. Finally, respondent argues petitioner made new arguments regarding the valuation of
his stock income on remand because she argued the trial court should use respondent’s income
tax returns to determine his income. Petitioner argues respondent has forfeited this argument
because he failed to file a cross-appeal challenging the trial court’s determination that respondent
received income from his stock options. Petitioner argues the court’s prior determination that
respondent received income from his stock options was the law of the case and could not be
challenged on remand.
¶ 37 We first address respondent’s argument that petitioner set forth new arguments on
remand and his related complaint that it was unfair for the trial court to refuse to consider the
new arguments respondent raised on remand. As an initial matter, we note that at the outset of
the hearing the trial court explicitly asked counsel for both parties whether the record was
sufficiently complete for the court to resolve the remaining issues on remand. The parties
stipulated that no further evidence was necessary and the court could resolve the issues on the
record before it. Respondent claims petitioner raised a new argument that respondent’s income
should be based on his tax returns. However, the record contradicts this argument. In her
closing argument before the trial court entered its January 2017 order, petitioner set forth
calculations of income based on respondent’s 2014 and 2015 tax returns. Only respondent’s
2016 income was based on average withdrawals because, at the time of the close of evidence,
- 15 - respondent had not yet filed his 2016 income tax return. Therefore, petitioner’s assertion on
remand that the trial court should look to respondent’s income tax returns to determine his
income for 2014 and 2015 was not a new argument. The only “new” argument petitioner raised
on remand was to point out this court’s calculation was inaccurate because we neglected to
recognize a lower deduction based on the reduced monthly income for the 2016 income
calculation. As petitioner points out, this “new” argument could only be raised once this court
calculated a lower income for 2016.
¶ 38 Respondent also argues the trial court erred by ignoring his assertion that his
income from stock options must be offset by the exercise price. Respondent contends the trial
court repeatedly cut his counsel off and declined to consider this argument. This is a misleading
characterization of the record. Although the trial court occasionally interrupted respondent’s
counsel to ask questions, the transcript shows the court listened to counsel’s lengthy argument.
Although the court ultimately rejected this argument, it does not follow that the court violated
this court’s remand by refusing to consider it. We agree with the trial court and petitioner that
this court’s remand was to address the mathematical errors identified on appeal. While the trial
court had discretion to address those mathematical issues as it saw fit, it was not required to
entertain or accept respondent’s attempt to revisit the question of whether his stock options
constituted income for the purposes of support.
¶ 39 The trial court made specific findings as to respondent’s income for 2014 and
2015 based on respondent’s tax returns. In pertinent part, the court’s order stated,
“[Respondent]’s 2015 tax returns indicate his income was $289,881. [Respondent]’s 2014 tax
return shows $436,618 in stock options was received that year. [Respondent]’s gross income in
2014 was $529,400, exclusive of the reimbursement checks he received from Catalyst.” The
- 16 - court made an explicit finding that respondent was receiving gains from his exercise of stock
options and rejected respondent’s argument that the stock options and withdrawals should not be
considered income because they were non-recurring and were essentially a cash exchange.
¶ 40 Respondent argues the trial court should not have relied solely on his tax returns
to determine his income. In support, respondent relies on In re Marriages of Rogers, 213 Ill. 2d
129, 820 N.E.2d 386 (2004). In Rogers, the supreme court concluded the circuit court was
correct to include in the father’s “income” annual gifts he received from his parents, even though
the gifts were not considered income for tax purposes. Id. at 137. In so holding, the supreme
court noted the Internal Revenue Code did not govern the determination of what constitutes
income for child support purposes. Id. This case, unlike Rogers, does not involve income that is
not subject to taxation by the government.
¶ 41 Here, the trial court conducted a lengthy hearing and considered the parties briefs
on remand. The court recalculated respondent’s income as directed by this court’s mandate. In
so doing, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept respondent’s argument
regarding his income from stock options. Nor did the trial court ignore this court’s mandate by
refusing to adopt respondent’s position. The trial court properly determined respondent’s
income from stock options was income and recalculated respondent’s net income from the
evidence in the record. Accordingly, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in
determining respondent’s child support obligation.
¶ 42 B. Retroactive Child Support
¶ 43 Respondent argues the trial court erred by ignoring this court’s mandate by
awarding retroactive child support in amounts not supported by the evidence. Respondent
- 17 - further argues the trial court erred in interpreting this court’s mandate to deprive it of discretion
in awarding retroactive child support.
¶ 44 Respondent raises many of the same arguments raised in the first issue in his
brief. As discussed above, we have concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to accept respondent’s arguments on remand. The record shows the court carefully
considered all the arguments made at the September 2018 hearing and in the parties’ extensive
briefs on remand. The court rejected respondent’s arguments and adopted petitioner’s
calculations based on evidence in the record. The parties agreed no additional evidence was
necessary for the resolution of the issues on remand, and the trial court relied on that evidence.
Indeed, we note the court’s order carefully considered the relevant time periods adjusting based
on the evidence of respondent’s income during that time. Accordingly, we conclude the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in determining respondent’s income for the time period
following the filing of the petition to modify and award retroactive support to that date.
¶ 45 Finally, respondent contends the trial court erred in interpreting this court’s
mandate as depriving it of discretion to award retroactive support. Nothing in the record
supports respondent’s argument. The trial court never stated it felt compelled to award
retroactive support to the date of the petition and it asked both parties to discuss the factors it
should consider in making the determination. As noted above, the court also carefully fashioned
its award of support to reflect respondent’s fluctuating income during the period at issue.
Moreover, this court did not compel the trial court to award retroactive support to the date of
filing. This court merely noted what appeared to be an inconsistency in the trial court’s original
order and remanded, in part, for the trial court to reconsider that inconsistency. The court did not
abuse its discretion in finding a retroactive award appropriate to the September 2014 filing of the
- 18 - petition to modify, particularly in light of its explicit finding that respondent had sufficient
income to justify a modification of child support at the time of the filing of the petition.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 46 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 47 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 48 Affirmed.
- 19 -