Webb v. Duke

211 So. 2d 722, 32 Oil & Gas Rep. 8, 1968 La. App. LEXIS 4733
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 4, 1968
DocketNo. 11027
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 211 So. 2d 722 (Webb v. Duke) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Webb v. Duke, 211 So. 2d 722, 32 Oil & Gas Rep. 8, 1968 La. App. LEXIS 4733 (La. Ct. App. 1968).

Opinion

PRICE, Judge.

This suit was originally brought as a possessory action by plaintiff, who alleged he was the owner and possessor of certain mineral leases and interests and that his possession of same was disturbed by the rec-ordation by defendant of a certain counter letter purporting to vest an undivided one-half interest to these properties in defendant.

On January 30, 1965, plaintiff, Eugene P. Webb, acquired certain oil and ■ gas leases covering property in DeSoto and Caddo Parishes from Great Southern Factors, Inc. These were duly recorded in the respective parishes. On December 10, 1965, and March 1, 1966, multiple copies of a document styled a counter letter were filed of record in DeSoto Parish. This instrument purported to reflect that, at the time Eugene P. Webb purchased the aforementioned mineral properties, he did so on behalf of himself and Louisiana Oil Consultants Association, title having been placed in the name of plaintiff for convenience only. Louisiana Oil Consultants Association was the trade name of the defendant herein. Plaintiff alleges that the recordation of these documents disturbed him in the possession of the mineral properties, and that he or his ancestors in title were in the undisputed possession of these properties for more than one year prior to the date suit was filed.

Defendant in answer and reconventional demand claimed to be the owner of an undivided one-half interest in the mineral leases and interests by virtue of the counter letter executed by the plaintiff and recorded by defendant in the records of De-Soto Parish. By stipulation of the parties it was agreed at the time of trial that the title to the mineral interests in question stood in the name of Eugene P. Webb, and that he had a valid title to same subject to the claims being asserted by David H. Duke in this action. The parties in effect stipulated that the court was to try title to the mineral interests and thereby converted this action into a petitory action. By an [724]*724exception of no cause of action plaintiff challenged the validity of the counter letter as he contended it was never intentionally executed by him. This exception was referred to the merits, and after trial the district court granted judgment in favor of defendant, recognizing him the owner of an undivided one-half interest in the mineral properties. From this judgment plaintiff has perfected this appeal.

The instrument designated as a counter letter is a three-page document. The third page thereof contains a signature line near the top of the page with the name Eugene B. Webb typed underneath it. Appropriate lines are included for witnesses. Underneath the signature line is the usual form for a notarial acknowledgment with the name of Eugene P. Webb again typed under the signature line of the person making the acknowledgment. A multiple carbon of the instrument bears the signature of Eugene P. Webb on the signature line of the acknowledgment only. The signature does not appear on the usual signature line at the end of the last paragraph of the agreement. No witnesses’ signatures are affixed, the instrument is not dated, nor is the acknowledgment subscribed before a Notary Public. Plaintiff’s signature does not appear anywhere on the original.

Plaintiff contends that the document relied on by defendant as a counter letter has not been executed by him. He admitted that the signature on the acknowledgment prepared as a part of the document in his, but testified he had no recollection of having signed same. He denied ever having any intention of executing the written agreement.

Article 2275 of the Revised Civil Code provides the methods of transferring immovable property as follows:

“Every transfer of immovable property must be in writing; but if a verbal sale, or other disposition of such property, be made, it shall be good against the vendor, as well as against the vendee, who confesses it when interrogated on oath, provided actual delivery has been made of the immovable thus sold.”

Plaintiff has denied that any agreement existed between defendant and himself whereby the mineral interests were acquired by him for the joint interests of the parties. Therefore, it is necessary that the defendant prove the transfer to him by written evidence. Plaintiff further contends that because the instrument was not witnessed and bears no acknowledgment of his signature, that it is inadmissible to prove title.

It has been held that written agreements under private signature may be admitted in evidence once the signature thereon has been properly established in open Court. Carona v. McCallum, La.App., 146 So.2d 697 (1st Cir., 1962).

The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the instrument purporting to be a counter letter on which defendant’s claim for ownership is based was sufficiently executed by plaintiff. If it is found that the instrument was adequately executed by plaintiff, there is no question but that under the terms of the instrument the defendant would be vested with title to one-half interest and- entitled to the relief prayed for. On the other hand, if the instrument was not sufficiently executed by plaintiff, the property was not transferred to defendant in writing, and, under the provisions of Article 2275, he may not establish his possession or title by parol evidence.

The circumstances from which this litigation arose, and as found by this Court, are substantially as follows. The parties to this suit occupied joint offices in the City of New Orleans. Defendant was on the board of directors of Great Southern Factors, Inc., which desired to sell the mineral leases and interests in question herein. He advised plaintiff of the availability and desirability of the property for sale. Financial arrangements were made for the purchase price with a bank in Mobile, and the sale was consummated. An assignment of proceeds was made to [725]*725the bank to repay the loan. The note for the loan was executed solely by plaintiff. The defendant did participate somewhat in the negotiations for the loan. Certain exchanges of moneys took place between plaintiff and defendant at about the time_of the purchase of the mineral properties, but the exact nature and purposes of these exchanges is not clearly established by the testimony. Defendant had the document called a counter letter prepared and insisted plaintiff execute it.

Defendant gave the following testimony describing the events which took place at the time he alleged plaintiff signed the agreement, to-wit: ,.

“A After the recordation of the signing and the last names — I had a counter letter drawn up which was in accordance with our earlier agreement from Mr. Webb concerning such a counter letter, and any time I desired assigning one half interest in this property to me. *
“When I brought the counter letter back to the office and gave it to Mr. Webb he fumbled and made every sort of excuse to keep from signing it; he said that he had to go out of town and would sign it later. He said that he was having his accountant, Mr. Doyle Gilliam, prepare a financial statement for him; and that his financial statement had to show the entire value of his property and he had some other deals that he was working on. He said: T will sign this after I get my financial statement made.’
“A I hold him that this was not a part of our deal; that our deal was that he would sign this counter letter immediately or words to that effect.

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Related

Webb v. Duke
214 So. 2d 544 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1968)

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Bluebook (online)
211 So. 2d 722, 32 Oil & Gas Rep. 8, 1968 La. App. LEXIS 4733, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/webb-v-duke-lactapp-1968.