[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.]
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.]
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.]
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.]
OPINION
INTRODUCTION
In the underlying action, Marsh Steward, Jr., M.D. (Dr. Steward), the real party in interest, filed a verified complaint in Orange County Superior Court (respondent) against Barbara Harmer (Harmer) and Thomas D. Weaver (petitioner). That complaint asserted two causes of action. In the first count, Dr. Steward charged both petitioner and Harmer with malicious prosecution based on Harmer's previous filing of a medical malpractice suit against Dr. Steward. Petitioner is the attorney who represented Harmer in those earlier and now-terminated proceedings.
In the second count, Dr. Steward charged that petitioner breached a duty of care owed to both Dr. Steward and the public when, allegedly, without adequate factual investigation and legal research, he advised Harmer that she had a valid medical malpractice claim against Dr. Steward and proceeded to represent her in filing the complaint noted. Dr. Steward contends, as a consequence of the lawsuit's filing, that his insurance carrier cancelled his coverage, causing him to suffer damage to his professional reputation and significant monetary loss.
After petitioner and Harmer answered Dr. Steward's complaint, they both filed motions for summary judgment which the trial court denied. Petitioner is now before us seeking a writ of mandate to compel the respondent trial court to vacate that order and to enter an order in his favor.1 As we shall later explain, it is our view that the trial court
properly exercised its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to the extent that it concerned the first cause of action, i.e., the count for malicious prosecution.
However, the trial court erred in ruling against petitioner with reference to the second cause of action. More particularly, we hold, as a matter of law, that an attorney owes no duty of care to adverse third parties in litigation.2
SYNOPSIS OF THE FACTS
In April of 1973, Harmer, who eventually became petitioner's client, consulted Dr. Steward, a gynecologist, and requested an examination to determine whether she was pregnant. Dr. Steward performed a physical examination and a urinary pregnancy test, the results of which indicated pregnancy. Harmer, on being advised of those results, requested a therapeutic abortion, specifically, a dilation and curettage. Dr. Steward performed this procedure on April 9, 1973, and Harmer's postoperative recuperation was normal. The foregoing events had no direct bearing on the eventual malpractice claim, but they do serve to show the previous physician-patient relationship of Dr. Steward and Harmer.
The events giving rise to the underlying medical malpractice action began in early April 1974. At that time, Harmer consulted Dr. Steward explaining, because she had not had a menstrual period since February 7, 1974, that she believed she was pregnant. After performing a pelvic examination and conducting a pregnancy test, Dr. Steward failed to find any evidence of pregnancy. On May 3, 1974, Harmer returned to Dr. Steward's office because her menstrual cycle had still not returned and requested another pelvic examination. Dr. Steward conducted a second examination, and again he found no evidence of pregnancy. Harmer then requested Dr. Steward to perform a tubal ligation to sterilize her permanently. Dr. Steward agreed to her request and scheduled that surgery for May 23, 1974.
At this juncture, a clear conflict in the facts enters the case. According to Harmer, on May 22, 1974, she went to Dr. Steward's office and again expressed "a real and growing concern" that she was pregnant. Harmer contends, in her declaration filed in support of her motion for summary judgment and relied upon by petitioner, that "I told Dr. Steward that I would like for him to do a D C (dilation and curettage) procedure [in addition to the tubal ligation] to make sure that I was not pregnant." Harmer further stated that Dr. Steward responded that "he did not believe [she] was pregnant and that he did not want to perform a D C. . . ."
Contrastingly, in his declaration opposing petitioner's motion for summary judgment, Dr. Steward recalled the May 22 conversation as follows: "Prior to the operation on May 23, 1974, Mrs. Harmer was given my patient information sheet; surgical consent and my routine sterilization discussion form with a consent to be signed. She specifically requested of this declarant that I avoid any mention of pregnancy or amenorrhea on her history or physical examination or consent forms because if this occurred, her insurance company would not pay the bills. I assured her that this could not happen as there was no medical evidence whatsoever of a pregnancy. Mrs. Harmer then signed all the necessary forms. A dilation curettage (DC) was not recommended, discussed, nor was it included on the operative [sic] forms or the informed consent forms because there was no indication for such a procedure. If Mrs. Harmer had been diagnosed pregnant and had wanted a therapeutic abortion performed at the time of the tubal ligation, this would have had to be requested in writing and the necessary permits and informed consent documents executed."
On May 23, 1974, Dr. Steward performed the tubal ligation, finding Harmer's uterus "to be in a neutral position, the upper limits of normal size, with no evidence of any pathology." Dr. Steward did not perform a D C.
During the two months following that surgery Harmer began feeling "tired, irritable [and] run down." Moreover, her menstrual cycle did not return. On August 21, 1974, Harmer consulted Dr. Steward again, explaining her postoperative symptoms to him. Dr. Steward gave Harmer another pelvic examination and prescribed medicine to prompt a menstrual cycle. The prescription proved ineffective. Dr. Steward also suggested that Harmer see a psychologist and seek a second gynecologist's opinion.
Harmer's condition continued to deteriorate, and by November she was experiencing severe abdominal cramps. At that time she consulted a second gynecologist, Dr. Rainey, and explained her symptoms and past medical history to him. Dr. Rainey, like Dr. Steward, gave Harmer an injection to induce her menstrual cycle which again was ineffective. He then scheduled her for a dilation and curettage to be performed on November 14, 1974.
The dilation and curettage was performed without complication. According to Harmer's discharge summary, during the dilation and curettage, Dr. Rainey removed "[a] large amount of tissue appearing to be an old pregnancy. . . ." In addition, the "pathology report did show products of conception." In other words, Harmer's belief that she was pregnant, communicated on numerous occasions to Dr. Steward proved to be correct. After undergoing the dilation and curettage performed by Dr. Rainey, Harmer's menstrual cycle returned.
Shortly after undergoing the dilation and curettage performed by Dr. Rainey, Harmer contacted Dr. Steward and told him the results of that surgery. According to Harmer, Dr. Steward said he believed the tubal ligation he had performed was successful and consequently she must have been pregnant before the surgery. To determine whether the tubal ligation had been successful, Dr. Steward recommended that Harmer undergo an X-ray procedure called a hystrosalpingography. Harmer consented to the test and its results indicated the tubal ligation had been properly performed. Thus, it was highly improbable if not impossible that Harmer became pregnant after that surgery. Harmer contends, when she met again with Dr. Steward after the X-ray results were known, that he stated "he guessed he had made a mistake [in not earlier diagnosing the pregnancy] and maybe he should do the D C as routine in the future [when performing a tubal ligation]."
Dr. Steward, in his declaration, conceded that Dr. Rainey's findings noted above were correct but attempted to qualify that concession by stating that "[t]he pathology report showed `calcified villi' which means that the patient had at some time previously been pregnant and that some of the elements of the . . . pregnancy . . . were still present and calcified." Dr. Steward further stated, however, that "[c]ontrary to the assertions by . . . Harmer, I never told her that I guessed I made a mistake or that maybe I should do a D C routinely. . . . I informed herthat it appeared possibly that she was pregnant at the time thetubal ligation was done." (Italics added.)
On May 28, 1975, Harmer sent Dr. Steward a letter requesting $671.95 to pay for the doctor and hospital bills she incurred during the second D C surgery performed by Dr. Rainey. In that letter Harmer advanced the following as the primary basis for her claim: "I realize the operation [tubal ligation] was not guaranteed, but I do feel you were extremely negligent in not performing a D C at the time of the operation, since there was every possibility that I was preganat [sic] at the time. If you will recall, I asked you on the evening prior to surgery if you would do so, in order that everything would be alright [sic]. You stated you did not wish to do so. When I had had normal periods for a year and suddenly did not have any, (my last period being in January, 1974) it should have been apparent to you that something was wrong."
In response to Harmer's letter, Dr. Steward denied liability, requested she not contact him further, and directed her to discuss her claim with his lawyers.
The aforementioned facts comprise the basis of what Harmer perceived as a valid claim of medical malpractice against Dr. Steward. With those facts in hand, she consulted petitioner onNovember 12, 1975. According to petitioner, after Harmer related to him all the facts, as above noted, he advised Harmer that she had a legitimate claim for damages. Petitioner, in his supporting declaration, stated further that he believed, because Dr. Rainey performed the D C on November 14, 1974, approximately one year earlier, that Harmer probably became aware that Dr. Steward had misdiagnosed her condition at that time, and that the one year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions would therefore have run in just two days, i.e., on November 14, 1975.3 Petitioner therefore drafted and filed a complaint for medical malpractice against Dr. Steward the very next day. However, a copy of that complaint was never served on Dr. Steward.
The following Monday, four days after filing the complaint, petitioner requested copies of all pertinent medical records from Dr. Steward, Dr. Rainey and the various hospitals involved. He received those records another four days thereafter and, after reviewing them, concluded that the facts, learned from Harmer and which he relied upon in drafting the complaint, were accurate. Ten days later, a representative of Traveler's Insurance Company, Dr. Steward's malpractice carrier, contacted petitioner,
even though Harmer's complaint had not been served on Dr. Steward. Dr. Steward had apparently become aware of the complaint filed against him and had voluntarily contacted Traveler's. As a result of the contact by the insurance company, petitioner notified Traveler's in late January 1976 that he had authority to settle the matter for $1,000. Eventually, on July 27, 1976, after its medical experts completed two reviews of the relevant medical reports, Traveler's advised petitioner that it found no liability on Dr. Steward's part and would not pay Harmer anything for release of her claim.
Between July 27 and August 27, 1976, petitioner discussed with Harmer the possibility of litigating her medical malpractice case against Dr. Steward. Specifically, petitioner told Harmer that he believed trial expenses would approximate $2,000-$3,000, including expert witness fees. Ultimately, Harmer decided that litigation against Dr. Steward for the small sum involved, $671.95, would not be economically feasible. She therefore dismissed the case with prejudice, after first having been substituted in propria persona for petitioner. Finally, according to their declarations, both Harmer and petitioner at all times believed the case against Dr. Steward had merit.
After Harmer dismissed her case, Dr. Steward filed a verified complaint against petitioner and Harmer alleging both malicious prosecution and negligence in bringing the earlier medical malpractice action. In that complaint Dr. Steward prayed that general and special damages be awarded according to proof and for $100,000 in exemplary damages.
After Dr. Steward's suit was at issue, Harmer and petitioner, as already noted, moved for summary judgment. Their motions were denied, and petitioner then instituted the current proceedings leading to our issuance of the alternative writ of mandate which now brings the matter before us for disposition.
ISSUES AND DISCUSSION
Because the petitioner's motion in the trial court was directed at both counts of the complaint, we shall deal separately with the ruling challenged as it relates to each count. Moreover, for reasons of expositional clarity, we shall deal first with the issue raised by the trial court's ruling on the second count.
I (1a) Dr. Steward's second count was pleaded only as to petitioner and charges him with
negligence in filing Harmer's malpractice action. Dr. Steward and the California Medical Association (CMA), amicus curiae, urge that we create a new rule of law granting persons involved in litigation the right to sue their adversary's attorney for negligence when that attorney fails reasonably to investigate the facts and applicable law before filing a lawsuit. Specifically, Dr. Steward contends "that petitioner knowingly filed a frivooous [
sic] and vexatious lawsuit against Dr. Marsh Steward; that petitioner owed a duty to the public and Dr. Steward in particular, to exercise reasonable care to investigate as to the merits and validity of the claim; that failing to investigate the merits of the claim and exercise reasonable care, Petitioner breached said duty; that there is a causal connection between Petitioner's conduct and the damages sustained by Dr. Steward which include cancellation of his malpractice insurance, resulting in severe financial burden; and, that the alleged damages were the proximate result of Petitioner's conduct."
As explained below, we reject the theory that attorneys owe a duty of care to adverse third parties in litigation. In our view, Dr. Steward's sole and adequate remedy is that provided by an action for malicious prosecution. Therefore, we hold Dr. Steward's claim of entitlement to a cause of action against petitioner for alleged negligence in filing a medical malpractice action to be without merit. (See fn. 2, ante.)
In support of his contention, Dr. Steward relies on a number of recent California Supreme Court decisions expanding the duty of care owed to third persons in particular factual situations. Most notably, he cites: Tarasoff v. Regents of University ofCalifornia, 17 Cal.3d 425 [131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 83 A.L.R.3d 1166]; Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal.2d 223 [74 Cal.Rptr. 225,449 P.2d 161]; Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728
[69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912, 29 A.L.R.3d 1316]; and Lucas v. Hamm,56 Cal.2d 583 [15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685], cert. den.368 U.S. 987 [7 L.Ed.2d 525, 82 S.Ct. 603]. In none of those cases was a duty of care imposed upon an attorney in favor of anadverse third party.
Moreover, those cases recognize that numerous policy considerations are involved in determining, on a "case-by-case basis" (Dillon v. Legg, supra, 68 Cal.2d 728, 740) whether a duty of care is owed to a foreseeable third party. Analysis of liability for negligence in terms of duty has been criticized as a question-begging process. The assertion that liability must
be denied because defendant bears no duty to plaintiff begs the essential question, i.e., whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct.(2) Duty is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself. But it should be recognized that duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. (See, e.g., Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Bank of America,57 Cal.App.3d 241, 248 [129 Cal.Rptr. 91].) A cogent discussion of those policy considerations appears in McGarvey v. PacificGas Elec. Co., 18 Cal.App.3d 555 [95 Cal.Rptr. 894]: "No rigid rule can be stated defining when a duty of care owed by a specific defendant to plaintiff does or does not exist. Under modern law the following policy matters have been suggested as those the courts will consider and weigh: [1] foreseeability of harm to plaintiff, [2] degree of certainty of harm to plaintiff, [3] closeness of connection between defendant's conduct and injury suffered, [4] defendant's moral blameworthiness, [5] policy of preventing future harm, [6] the burden of imposing liability upon a defendant versus the consequences to the community if liability for breach is withheld, [7] the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. [Citations.]" (Id., at p. 561; see also Goodman v.Kennedy, 18 Cal.3d 335, 342 [134 Cal.Rptr. 375,556 P.2d 737].)
As demonstrated below, California courts, in refusing to impose a duty of care owed by an attorney to an adverse third party, have recognized that "the burden of imposing liability upon a defendant" attorney outweighs "the consequences to the community if liability . . . is withheld." (McGarvey v. Pacific Gas Elec. Co., supra, 18 Cal.App.3d 555, 561.) (1b) In reaching this result, the decisions acknowledge that to impose such a duty would place an attorney in a position where his own interests would conflict directly with his client's interests. Accordingly, so the rationale runs, a person's right to effective assistance of counsel would be denigrated, simultaneously impairing that person's right of free access to the courts.
Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal.App.3d 917 [123 Cal.Rptr. 237], although not involving an initial medical malpractice suit, is the leading California decision expressly rejecting the proposition that an attorney owes a duty of care to adverse third parties in litigation. In Norton, an adverse third party, Norton, sued an attorney for negligence in advising another person to commence a lawsuit against him (Norton) for inducing a breach of contract. The defendant attorney's general demurrer to that claim was
sustained without leave to amend by the trial court and the appellate court affirmed that result.
On appeal, the plaintiff Norton claimed that "`an attorney owe[s] a duty to a foreseen third person to exercise reasonable care in advising his client to commence a lawsuit against that third person. . . .'" (Id., at p. 919.) Norton relied upon the decisions noted above, particularly Lucas v. Hamm, supra,56 Cal.2d 583, and Heyer v. Flaig, supra, 70 Cal.2d 223, arguing that they provided clear legal support for his argument. After incisively analyzing those cases, the Norton court interpreted the rule of law they established as follows: "`[a]n attorney may be liable for damage caused by his negligence to a personintended to be benefited by his performance irrespective of any lack of privity of contract between the attorney and the party to be benefited. [Citation.] The liability sounds in tort.' (Italics added.) [Fn. omitted.]" (Norton v. Hines, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d 917, 921, citing Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal.App.3d 769, 771 [97 Cal.Rptr. 191, 45 A.L.R.3d 1177].)
Accordingly, the Norton court held that "[i]n the case at bar a former litigant is suing adverse counsel. Clearly, an adverseparty is not an intended beneficiary of the adverse counsel'sclient. If a cause of action exists against attorneys . . . itmust be pleaded as an action for malicious prosecution. We see no reason to extend applicable law now found in cases involving attorneys and third parties when there is sound and recognized public policy for limiting the cause of action to malicious prosecution. . . ." (Norton v. Hines, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d 917, 921, italics added.)
The Norton court placed great weight on the public policy of free access to the courts in refusing to impose a duty of care on the defendant attorney. "[T]he attorney owes a duty to his client to present his case vigorously in a manner as favorable to the client as the rules of law and professional ethics will permit. He is an advocate and an officer of the court. He is cognizant of the public policy that encourages his clients to solve their problems in a court of law. [Fn. omitted.]" (Id., at p. 922.) "[I]f Norton's cause of action against attorneys for negligence [were] permitted, this policy [would] be subverted. The attorneymust have the same freedom in initiating his client's suit as theclient. If he does not, lawsuits now justifiably commenced willbe refused by attorneys, and the client, in most cases, will bedenied his day in court. [Fn. omitted.]" (Id., at p. 923, italics added.)
While the California Supreme Court has not squarely confronted the issue present in Norton, it has, citing Norton with approval, considered the closely analogous issue of whether an attorney owes a duty of care to foreseeable third persons when advising his own client on the legal consequences of certain transactions with those third persons. (Goodman v. Kennedy,supra, 18 Cal.3d 335, 344-345, fn. 5.) In Goodman, plaintiffs sued their contractually legal adversaries' attorney for losses suffered when they purchased shares of stock from that defendant attorney's clients. The clients were principal officers of the corporation issuing the stock. Plaintiffs alleged defendantnegligently advised his clients that the shares involved could be issued to them as stock dividends and sold to third parties (of which plaintiff turned out to be one) without jeopardizing a previously granted exemption from the requirement of registering the corporation's stock. In fact, the defendant attorney erred in giving that advice.
In Goodman, after considering the precedential relevance ofLucas v. Hamm, supra, 56 Cal.2d 583, and Heyer v. Flaig,supra, 70 Cal.2d 223, the California Supreme Court, like theNorton court, characterized those cases as intendedbeneficiary cases, and held: "The present defendant had no relationship to plaintiffs that would give rise to his owing plaintiffs any duty of care in advising his clients that they could sell the stock without adverse consequences. There is no allegation that the advice was ever communicated to plaintiffs and hence no basis for any claim that they relied upon it in purchasing or retaining the stock. [Fn. omitted.] Nor was the advice given for the purpose of enabling defendant's clients to discharge any obligation to plaintiffs. Thus, there is no allegation that plaintiffs had any relationship to defendant's clients or to the corporation as stockholders or otherwise when the advice was given." (Goodman v. Kennedy, supra, 18 Cal.3d 335, 343-344.)
In arriving at its holding, the Supreme Court reasoned inGoodman that "[i]nvoking the policy considerations upon which liability to putative will beneficiaries was recognized in . . .,Lucas and Heyer, supra, plaintiffs argue that defendant's advice was `intended to affect' them as purchasers and that harm to them was foreseeable from the adverse effect of the sale upon the value of the stock contrary to the erroneous assurances embodied in the negligent advice. However, plaintiffs were notpersons upon whom defendant's clients had any wish or obligationto confer a benefit in the transaction. Plaintiffs' onlyrelationship to the proposed transaction was that of parties withwhom defendant's clients might negotiate a bargain at arm'slength. Any buyers' `potential advantage' from the possible
purchase of the stock `was only a collateral consideration of the transaction' [citation] and did not put such potential buyers into any relationship with defendant as `intended beneficiaries' of his clients' anticipated sales [citation]." (Goodman v.Kennedy, supra, 18 Cal.3d 335, 344, italics added.)
(3) We are in complete accord with the Supreme Court's observation that to impose such a duty would seriously jeopardize the attorney-client relationship: "To make an attorney liable for negligent confidential advice not only to the client who enters into a transaction in reliance upon the advice but also to the other parties to the transaction with whom the client deals at arm's length would inject undesirable self-protective reservations into the attorney's counselling role. The attorney's preoccupation or concern with the possibility of claims based on mere negligence (as distinct from fraud or malice) by any with whom his client might deal `would prevent him from devoting his entire energies to his client's interests' [citation]. The result would be both `an undue burden on the profession' [citation] and a diminution in the quality of the legal services received by the client. [Fn. omitted.] [Citation.]" (Goodman v. Kennedy,supra, 18 Cal.3d 335, 344.)
A fortiori, if an attorney owes no duty of care to foreseeable third parties with whom his client might deal in a nonlitigated, arm's length transaction, by no logical stretch of the imagination could such a duty arise in favor of adverse third parties in litigation.4
We note further that appellate courts in other jurisdictions have recently rejected the proposed extension of duty as advanced by Dr. Steward and the California Medical Association. (See, e.g., Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App.3d 815 [372 N.E.2d 685];Spencer v. Burglass (La. App. 1976) 337 So.2d 596; Bickle
v. Mackie (N.D.Iowa 1978) 447 F. Supp. 1376; Brody v. Ruby
(Iowa 1978) 267 N.W.2d 902; Pantone v. Demos, 59 Ill. App.3d 328
[375 N.E.2d 480]; Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App.3d 940
[381 N.E.2d 1367]; Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich. App. 429
[268 N.W.2d 673]; Drago v. Buonagurio, 89 Misc.2d 171 [391 N YS.2d 61].) Each of those decisions viewed the public policy of freedom of access to the courts as
clearly outweighing any argument favoring creation of a duty of care owed by attorneys to adverse third parties in litigation. Moreover, each decision recognized as an adequate remedy, the right of the adverse third party to sue the attorney for malicious prosecution. We view those cases as analytically sound and clearly supportive of the position we have taken with reference to what we see to be the California law on the issue.
II
Turning to the first count of Dr. Steward's complaint, that for malicious prosecution, petitioner's general contention is that the trial court erred in denying his motion because Dr. Steward failed to demonstrate, in his counterdeclarations, the existence of triable issues of material fact. Accordingly, petitioner argues further that the trial court properly should have granted his motion as to count one with the result here that petitioner is entitled to a writ of mandate in terms appropriate to effect the relief sought.
However, petitioner, in his attack on the trial court's ruling, misconceives the nature of the respective showings necessary to prevail on a motion for summary judgment. More particularly, we note again that petitioner contends that the trial court erred because Dr. Steward failed to demonstrate by counter declarations the existence of triable issues of fact. This is not a complete view of the two-step decisional process to be followed in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.
(4) Even before turning to the opposing party's declarations, the trial court must first carefully examine the declarations filed in support of the motion, strictly construing these against the moving party. (Stationers Corp. v. Dun Bradstreet,Inc., 62 Cal.2d 412, 417 [42 Cal.Rptr. 449, 398 P.2d 785].)(5) "Summary judgment is proper only if the affidavits in support of the moving party would be sufficient to sustain a judgment in his favor. . . ." (Id., at p. 417, italics added.) On the other point noted, summary judgment is "a drastic remedy eliminating trial and therefore the moving party's declarations must be strictly construed. . . ." (Hepp v.Lockheed-California Co., 86 Cal.App.3d 714, 717 [150 Cal.Rptr. 408].)
With this the starting point in approaching a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it is necessary in terms of the case before us, to identify the elements of a cause of action for malicious prosecution. (6) A concise statement of those elements is set forth in Tool Research Engineering Corp. v.Henigson, 46 Cal.App.3d 675 [120 Cal.Rptr. 291]:
"[A] cause of action for malicious prosecution of a civil suit is dependent upon the existence of three elements: [1] the prior civil action must have terminated in [Dr. Steward's] favor; [2] [petitioner] must have lacked probable cause in representation of [his] client; and [3] [petitioner] must have acted maliciously. [Citations.]" (Id., at p. 682.)
(7a) As to the first factor, favorable termination, the extrinsic facts are that Harmer, based in part on petitioner's advice, voluntarily dismissed with prejudice her medical malpractice action against Dr. Steward, seemingly because of the expense involved in litigating the case further. As already noted, Harmer originally demanded only $691.95 from Dr. Steward and later told petitioner that she would be willing to settle for $1,000. Alternatively, petitioner advised Harmer that attorney's fees, witness fees and court costs would amount to approximately $2,000-$3,000.
(8) The California Supreme Court in Jaffe v. Stone,18 Cal.2d 146 [114 P.2d 335, 135 A.L.R. 775], provides a thoughtful discussion on the meaning of favorable termination of a prior proceeding as it relates to a malicious prosecution action: "It is not enough, . . . to show that the proceeding was dismissed. The theory underlying the requirement of favorable terminationis that it tends to indicate the innocence of the accused, andcoupled with the other elements of lack of probable cause andmalice, establishes the tort, that is, the malicious and unfounded charge of crime against an innocent person. . . . The same fundamental theory is applied in testing a dismissal or other termination without a complete trial on the merits. If itis of such a nature as to indicate the innocence of the accused,it is a favorable termination sufficient to satisfy therequirement. If, however, the dismissal is on technical grounds,for procedural reasons, or for any other reason not inconsistentwith his guilt, it does not constitute a favorable termination." (Id., at p. 150, italics added.)5
(9) Clearly, then, a defense verdict or a dismissal on the merits equates with a favorable termination and thus establishes the first element of a malicious prosecution case. Similarly, a favorable termination arises from a dismissal for failure to prosecute under Code of Civil Procedure section 583, subdivision (a). (Minasian v. Sapse, 80 Cal.App.3d 823, 827 [145 Cal.Rptr. 829].) Contrastingly, however, when a dismissal results from negotiation, settlement, or consent, a favorable termination is
normally not recognized. (See, Webb v. Youmans, 248 Cal.App.2d 851, 853 [57 Cal.Rptr. 11].) Under these latter circumstances, the dismissal reflects ambiguously on the merits of the action. (Minasian
v. Sapse, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d 823, 827, fn. 4, citing Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 119, p. 840.)
In MacDonald v. Joslyn, 275 Cal.App.2d 282 [79 Cal.Rptr. 707, 35 A.L.R.3d 641], however, the court in affirming a plaintiff's judgment in a malicious prosecution case, squarely held that "[a] voluntary dismissal of a civil action or proceeding by the plaintiff . . . is not ordinarily considered a dismissal `on technical grounds'. . . . Such a voluntary dismissal, though expressly made `without prejudice,' is afavorable termination which will support an action for malicious prosecution. [Citations.]" (Id., at p. 289, italics added.)6
In its opinion, however, the MacDonald court failed to consider whether the underlying reasons for which a defendant voluntarily abandons the earlier suit were relevant in attempting to equate the voluntary abandonment with a favorable termination. That question was recently addressed and answered in Minasian
v. Sapse, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d 823, where the court held that dismissal for failure to prosecute constitutes favorable termination: "Undoubtedly the failure to prosecute mayoccasionally be attributable to other than a complainant'simplicit concession as to the merits of the action. But it is impossible to see how, at least at the pleading stage, the one complaining of the malicious prosecution can do more than to allege the fact that an action was brought against him and subsequently dismissed because it was not pursued. Should aconflict arise as to the circumstances explaining the failure toprosecute, the trier of fact must exercise its traditional rolein deciding the conflict. [Citations.]" (Id., at p. 828, italics added.)
(7b) We believe the rationale of that latter rule must logically apply in assessing petitioner's argument that Harmer's voluntary dismissal with prejudice did not result in a favorable termination. As a consequence, the fact of whether Harmer lacked the financial ability to pursue the litigation and the operational effect of that circumstance on any attempt to equate her voluntary dismissal with prejudice to an unfavorable termination as urged by petitioner, is a question of fact for the jury to decide. Stated otherwise, based solely on the showing made by petitioner
in support of his motion, i.e., the attempt to show termination of the prior action unfavorably to Dr. Steward, the facts such as were offered by petitioner are ambiguous, and, under theMinasian rule noted, are therefore not an adequate predicate for a summary judgment. It is even arguable on these facts, underMacDonald v. Joslyn, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d 282, 289, that there was a termination favorable to Dr. Steward. Either way, as a consequence, petitioner, by means of his supporting declarations which we must strictly construe against him, failed to make a prima facie showing of unfavorable termination of the malpractice action.
Because the moving party, by his own supporting declaration, is required to provide a prima facie factual basis to justify a summary judgment in his favor (Stationers Corp. v. Dun Bradstreet, Inc., supra, 62 Cal.2d 412, 417), if Dr. Steward's action were a one-issue effort, we would have, by the foregoing, demonstrated petitioner's failure to show entitlement to summary judgment on the second count. However, because Dr. Steward's count for malicious prosecution requires that he establish, in addition to a favorable termination, the presence of malice and a lack of probable cause in order to succeed in the main action, we must therefore consider further what the supporting and opposing declarations show by way of triable issues of fact regarding these additional elements. Accordingly, we proceed to an analysis of the showings made for and against the absence of probable cause and the presence of malice as elements of an action for malicious prosecution, these as previously noted in ToolResearch Engineering Corp. v. Henigson, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d 675, 682.)
The papers filed by petitioner in support of the motion for summary judgment were somewhat unusual. Under the heading of "Memorandum of Points and Authorities" petitioner included a tabulation of "key facts" which ran on for about four pages. Then followed an extensive citation and discussion of legal authorities subscribed by the attorneys for petitioner. Then on "page 26" of the filing, petitioner subscribed a one-page declaration under penalty of perjury which, among other things, stated "[e]ach of the facts set forth in the within Declaration is within my direct, personal knowledge and, if called to testify as a witness, I could and would competently testify as to each such action. [¶] I have read the facts set forth in the Introduction to the within Motion at Page 3, Line 14 through and including Page 7, Line I and incorporate such facts herein by reference, as though set forth at length."
Much of the factual material related in the referred-to portions of the document here under discussion occurred after
the complaint was filed. However, paragraph 1 stated, "Mrs. Barbara Harmer first consulted this moving defendant a sole practitioner, on November 12, 1975 — two days before the last possible date within which to file a complaint or be barred by the statute of limitations. The complaint was filed on Thursday, November 13, 1975."
Several pages later, the referenced material stated, "[i]n the initial interview, two days before the statute of limitations would run, MRS. HARMER related the following facts:" Then there followed five paragraphs recounting what we have already set forth in our synopsis of the facts involving Harmer's contacts with Dr. Steward and the eventual procedure performed by Dr. Rainey.
Thereafter, the recitals in the referenced material stated, "[a]ll of the foregoing facts cannot be disputed. Indeed, the medical records confirmed that the facts related to this moving defendant by MRS. HARMER were remarkably accurate. And the conduct of counsel with respect to these facts was fully consonant with the highest traditions, ethics and duties of the profession."
Dr. Steward, in his declaration opposing petitioner's summary judgment motion, pointed solely to the following as raising a triable issue of material fact concerning the existence of malice: "That in initiating [this] action, defendants did not honestly, reasonably or in good faith believe a valid cause of action existed against plaintiff, and there was no prior investigation of facts prior to filing the lawsuit. . . . Ibelieve that the prior lawsuit was filed for the purpose of forming [sic] a settlement which had no relation to the merits of the claim; for the purpose of pressuring this declarant into paying certain medical expenses allegedly incurred by Barbara Harmer; and that neither Mrs. Harmer nor Thomas Weaver had an honest and sincere belief that such action was valid." (Italics added.)
In our view, Dr. Steward's statement attempting thus to import malice is no more than speculation unsupported by any factual reference. Therefore, in and of itself, it is only a conclusion of ultimate fact which fails to raise a triable issue of material fact on this element of the main action. (See, e.g., deEcheguren v. de Echeguren, 210 Cal.App.2d 141, 148 [26 Cal.Rptr. 562].)
(10) We further note, however, that regardless of the absence of malice in the form of actually demonstrated ill will or bad faith, courts uniformly permit malice in malicious prosecution actions to be inferred from a want of probable cause. (Singleton v. Singleton, 68 Cal.App.2d 681, 696 [157 P.2d 886].) As one commentator indicates, "[r]egardless of the theory on which a court relies to find malice, a close factual analysis of the cases suggests that malice is almost always found from the same facts as those which establish lack of probable cause." (Comment, Attorney Liability for Malicious Prosecution and LegalMalpractice: Do They Overlap? 8 Pacific L.J. 897, 904, fn. omitted.)
The question of whether an attorney has probable cause to represent a client in a lawsuit was recently addressed in ToolResearch Engineering Corp. v. Henigson, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d 675. In that decision Justice Thompson stated "[i]t is the attorney's reasonable and honest belief that his client has atenable claim that is the attorney's probable cause for representation [citations], and not the attorney's conviction
that his client must prevail. . . . So long as the attorney does not abuse that duty by prosecuting a claim which a reasonable lawyer would not regard as tenable or by unreasonablyneglecting to investigate the facts and law in making his determination to proceed, his client's adversary has no right to assert malicious prosecution against the attorney if the lawyer's efforts prove unsuccessful." (Id., at pp. 683-684, italics added.)
Petitioner argues that the proper interpretation of the standard for determining probable cause posited in ToolResearch is "that the meaning of `reasonable' in any given case must be construed in light of the existing facts and circumstances." Here, petitioner, a sole practitioner, according to his interpretation of the facts, was faced with a statute of limitations that would run in two days. He asserts that his belief was that no extensions of time could be obtained and failure to file would be totally inexcusable. Stated otherwise, petitioner contends, because he reasonably believed the statute of limitations applicable to Harmer's action would run in just two days, that he was entitled to rely on Harmer's recitation of the facts, and then to draft and file a complaint based on those facts so as to prevent the statute from running. Under those circumstances, according to petitioner, we can hold as a matter of law that he had probable cause to file the action. Accordingly, if we hold that probable cause existed, then Dr. Steward's malicious prosecution action must fail.
(11a) Alternatively, Dr. Steward contends that whether petitioner acted reasonably in filing Harmer's action is a question of fact. Furthermore, he argues that petitioner acted unreasonably in failing to investigate the facts before filing the complaint because the statute of limitations would not have run on November 14, but at a later date. Otherwise, Dr. Steward states, citing Wozniak v. Peninsula Hospital, 1 Cal.App.3d 716
[82 Cal.Rptr. 84], that "[t]he question of when there has been a belated discovery of the cause of action, especially in malpractice cases, is essentially a question of fact." (Id., at p. 725.) Therefore, Dr. Steward argues, because the presence of the elements of probable cause and malice remained unresolved issues of fact, the petitioner was not entitled to summary judgment.
How then was the trial judge to resolve these opposing contentions? We turn again for guidance to Justice Thompson's opinion in Tool Research Engineering Corp. v. Henigson,supra, 46 Cal.App.3d 675.
(12) He observes that "[r]esolution of the question of the existence of a triable issue of fact on the question of probable cause requires the isolation of the factual and legal elements of probable cause itself. The trier of fact must resolve anyconflict in the evidentiary underpinning of the facts of probablecause. Once that conflict has been resolved, the question of whether the facts as they are found to exist constitute probable cause for bringing the former action is a question of law to be resolved by the judge. [Citations.]" (Id., at pp. 682-683, italics added.) Similarly, as noted in Davis v. Local UnionNo. 11, Internat. etc. of Elec. Workers, 16 Cal.App.3d 686
[94 Cal.Rptr. 562], "[a]t the outset, it is not quite correct for the Union [petitioner] to assert that . . . probable cause is not a jury question but one for the court to decide as a matter of law . . . but . . . the question must be determined by the court (as a matter of law) only when there is no dispute concerningthe existence of the facts relied on to establish this particularelement of the tort. . . ." (Id., at p. 692; italics added.)
(11b) Applying the foregoing to the case before us, what remain as unresolved issues of fact are whether petitioner's belief that the statute was about to run was reasonable and whether the investigation of the facts and law leading to that conclusion were also reasonable. While probable cause is finally an issue of law, the question of whether given conduct is reasonable is always one of fact. Fairly read, the filings for and against petitioner's motion did not contest any extrinsicfact; there was no dispute over what actually happened in terms of who said and who did what. The
dispute arose over what interpretation was to be placed on what happened. With this the posture of the matter, these undisputed extrinsic facts gave rise to the possibility of conflicting inferences, i.e., reasonable versus unreasonable. As such the case could not properly have been disposed of by means of summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c; Bispo v. Burton,82 Cal.App.3d 824, 832 [147 Cal.Rptr. 442].) Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied petitioner's motion as to the first count.
Otherwise, whenever the dispute is over an ultimate fact of a highly subjective nature, e.g., reasonableness of behavior, requiring for its resolution a full and complete demonstration of all relevant extrinsic events, an appellate court will rarely mandate the trial court to vacate its ruling denying a party's motion for summary judgment when there has been no discovery, as in the case at bench.
We say this advisedly because Code of Civil Procedure section437c provides in pertinent part that "[i]f it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition . . . that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, then be presented, the court shall deny the motion. . . ." In our view, Dr. Steward has implied that facts may exist which would provide a meritable opposition to petitioner's motion for summary judgment on the issue of probable cause. This possibility exists on the question of whether petitioner's conclusion regarding when the statute was to run was really as obvious as petitioner argues that it was. Whether those facts do exist, however, cannot be fairly established until some discovery has taken place and, as just noted, no discovery has been conducted in the case at bench. As a consequence, with essential facts required to oppose petitioner's motion potentially existing, it is our view that on this alternative ground the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion for summary judgment as to the first count.
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the Superior Court of Orange County to vacate its order of January 17, 1979, and further directing said court to enter a new and different order therein denying the defendant Weaver's motion as to the first count of plaintiff's complaint and striking the second count thereof.
All parties shall bear their own costs.
Gardner, P.J., and Morris, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied on July 23, 1979, and the following opinion was then rendered: