Weaver v. Florida Exploration Co.

608 So. 2d 1034, 1992 La. App. LEXIS 2856, 1992 WL 275418
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 6, 1992
DocketNo. 91-328
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 608 So. 2d 1034 (Weaver v. Florida Exploration Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Weaver v. Florida Exploration Co., 608 So. 2d 1034, 1992 La. App. LEXIS 2856, 1992 WL 275418 (La. Ct. App. 1992).

Opinions

JOSEPH E. COREIL, Judge Pro Tem.

The dispute in this case focuses on an agreement entitled “Assignment of Oil, Gas and Mineral Leases” entered into between Carnes W. Weaver and his wife, Lorraine Weaver, (hereinafter collectively referred to as Weaver), assignors and Florida Exploration Company, assignee 1. This appeal is taken by Carnes W. Weaver, Lorraine Weaver, and Elizabeth L. Barnett2, plaintiffs and appellants herein, from a judgment in their favor which they wish to have modified. Defendant-appellee, Florida Exploration Company (Florida), answered the appeal, setting forth several assignments of error. We find no error in the judgment of the trial court and thus, we affirm.

[1036]*1036FACTS

On November 1, 1981, Weaver entered into an agreement with Florida. The agreement covered fifty-eight oil, gas, and mineral leases and established certain requirements that Florida would have to fulfill to earn an interest in the leases. Florida paid Weaver $1,000,000 in exchange for the right to earn leasehold rights in the leases.

In May of 1985, plaintiffs filed this proceeding, alleging that Florida had failed to fulfill its obligations under the agreement and that Weaver was entitled to a reassignment of the subject leases. After trial, the court directed Florida to reassign the subject leases to Weaver effective July 31, 1989, the date of judgment. Insofar as reassignment proved an impossibility, a new trial was held in March of 1990, to allow Weaver the right to present further proof as to damages. The trial court awarded Weaver $36,564.72, representing the sum necessary for the reacquisition of the subject leases.

By this appeal, Weaver contends that the trial court erred in denying his claim for lost net revenue caused by Florida’s failure to reassign the acreage and by denying Weaver’s claim for damages caused by the alleged negligence of Florida in destroying the wellbore in the Homer Haber No. 1 well. Additionally, Weaver contends that the trial court incorrectly calculated and assessed damages for the cost of reacquisition of leases by Weaver.

By answer to the appeal, Florida essentially contends that the trial court erred in defining “commercial producers” in the agreement and in finding that the Caffery No. 1, Rayne Heirs No. 5, and Rayne Heirs No. 6 wells were not commercial producers. For the same reason, Florida contends that the trial court erred in finding that Florida did not earn any acreage under the partial earning provision of the agreement.

Florida also contends that Weaver’s claim for negligent loss of the Homer Haber No. 1 Wellbore was not properly raised either by the pleadings or by amendment and thus, the trial court erred in permitting Weaver to introduce evidence on this issue.

Finally, Florida contends that the judgment appealed from should be reversed insofar as it held Florida liable for damages for failure to reassign all acreage covered by the agreement. Alternatively, Florida contends that because the obligation to reassign acreage was held to be due and ascertainable on the date of judgment, the trial court erred in awarding interest on Weaver’s damage award from the date of judicial demand.

“COMMERCIAL PRODUCERS”

We must first determine whether the trial court erred in its determination that the terms “commercial producer” did not mean the same as the terms “wells producing or capable of producing in paying quantities.”

The trial court, in finding that Florida had earned no lease interest under the agreement and as such, was obligated to reassign all of the acreage contained within the agreement, stated in its written reasons for ruling, in pertinent part, as follows:

“On November 1, 1981, Plaintiff Weaver assigned the Defendant Florida Exploration Company certain lease interests (Plaintiff Exhibit No. 1) covering three different areas or strata, to-wit: (2) The Clement Sand Wells, (2) A Marg Tex Well, and (3) Shallow wells of 6,000 feet or less. Of these, the only one essentially at issue is the Clement Sand Wells.
“Pursuant to such Assignment, Florida drilled or reentered seven (7) wells.
“Under the Assignment, Florida had to meet both (1) a drilling requirement (Paragraph 2 of the Assignment) and (2) a requirement of completing four (4) ‘... earning wells as commercial producers of oil or gas ... ’ in order to acquire the interest as provided for in the Assignment. (Paragraph 4 of the Assignment.)
“A well to be an earning well requires that it meet a two tier test — i.e.:
1. Drilling requirement must be met.
2. The well must be a commercial producer.
[1037]*1037“When the specific language of Section I, Paragraph 2 of the Assignment is considered, the first alternative method by which Florida could fulfill the requirement was to drill . to a depth sufficient TO TEST the stratigraphic equivalent of the Clement SAND ... ’ (emphasis added) which appears to the Court to necessarily envision and require that the well would have to be drilled to a sand that was the stratigraphic equivalent of the Clement Sand, and that the drilling be sufficient so that the sand could be tested. Merely drilling to a particular depth without a testable sand which was the equivalent of the Clement Sand would not fulfill this requirement.
“As to the second alternative method of fulfilling the drilling requirement of this paragraph, it would be sufficient to drill to a depth whose pressure would require the setting of protective casing whether or not a testable sand was actually present.
“It therefore appears that to fulfill the requirements of Paragraph 2, Florida would have had to either drill to a testable sand as defined or to a depth where high pressure required the setting of protective casing. This standard will now be applied to the wells the Defendant submits as fulfilling this Paragraph 2 requirement, to wit: the Caffery No. 1, the Rayne Heirs No. 5, and the Rayne Heirs No. 6.
“Therefore, in summary, Florida meets the first tier of the two-tier test in that the drilling requirements of Paragraph 2 have been met. Having met the first tier test, we must now consider whether the second tier test of four (4) ‘... earning wells as commercial producers ... ’ was met.

Earning Wells as Commercial Producers of Oil or Gas (Sec. I Par. 4)

“In addition to meeting the drilling requirements of Section I, Paragraph 2, Defendant must complete four (4) ‘... earning wells as COMMERCIAL PRODUCERS of oil or gas ... ’ into order to acquire the ownership interest as therein specified. Therefore, this ‘... commercial producer ...’ standard must be applied to the three wells Defendant submits as actually ‘... earning wells ...’ under the agreement — i.e., the Caffery No. 1, the Rayne Heirs No. 5, and the Rayne Heirs No. 6.
“However, before this standard can be rationally applied, there must be a determination made as to the meaning of ‘... commercial producer ...’. Such term is not defined in the agreement with specificity. It would, however, be of benefit to examine other related terms in the Assignment.

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Bluebook (online)
608 So. 2d 1034, 1992 La. App. LEXIS 2856, 1992 WL 275418, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/weaver-v-florida-exploration-co-lactapp-1992.