Weaver v. Commonwealth

513 S.E.2d 423, 29 Va. App. 487, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 204
CourtCourt of Appeals of Virginia
DecidedApril 13, 1999
Docket0555983
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 513 S.E.2d 423 (Weaver v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Weaver v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 423, 29 Va. App. 487, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 204 (Va. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

COLEMAN, Judge.

Billy Roger Weaver was convicted in a bench trial of driving while intoxicated in violation of Code § 18.2-266. On appeal, Weaver contends that his arrest, which occurred approximately 150 feet inside the North Carolina border, was invalid and therefore, the trial judge erred by admitting into evidence the results of his breath analysis. Weaver asserts that the arrest was invalid because the Virginia police officer failed to comply with North Carolina Gen.Stat. § 15A-403, 1 which requires that a person pursued and arrested in North Carolina for an offense committed in a neighboring state be taken before a North Carolina magistrate. Weaver asks us to hold, in this case of first impression, that the trial court should have suppressed the breath analysis because it was obtained as the result of an invalid arrest. We find that the arrest was valid; therefore, we affirm the conviction.

BACKGROUND

When State Trooper R.R. Campbell passed Weaver’s oncoming vehicle at night in Carroll County, Weaver did not dim his high beam lights. Campbell turned, activated his blue lights and overtook Weaver’s vehicle about a quarter mile from the North Carolina border. Initially, Weaver made no attempt to stop. When Weaver did stop his vehicle, he was *490 approximately 150 feet into North Carolina. As Trooper Campbell approached the driver’s window of the vehicle, he detected a strong odor of alcohol. Campbell noticed that Weaver’s eyes were watery and glassy and he observed open beer containers in the car. Weaver stated that he had consumed three or four beers, the last of which had been about thirty minutes earlier.

After Weaver failed several field sobriety tests, Campbell arrested him at 10:20 p.m. for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Code § 18.2-266. Campbell returned to Virginia and took Weaver before a Virginia magistrate in Carroll County at 11:10 p.m. where he obtained a warrant for Weaver’s arrest. After explaining to Weaver his rights under the Virginia implied consent statute, Code § 18.2-268.2, Campbell administered a breath test at 11:27 p.m., which registered a .11 percent alcohol level.

At trial, the court refused to suppress the breathalyzer certificate of alcohol analysis. The motion to suppress was based on Weaver’s assertion that Trooper Campbell was required by the North Carolina statute to take Weaver before a North Carolina magistrate and because he failed to do so, the arrest was invalid.

ANALYSIS

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a suppression motion, we assess the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and we refrain from disturbing the trial judge’s decision unless plainly wrong. See Bynum v. Commonwealth, 23 Va.App. 412, 415, 477 S.E.2d 750, 752 (1996).

A police officer has authority to arrest within the jurisdiction in which the officer serves or within statutorily defined extensions of that area. See Neiss v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.App. 807, 809, 433 S.E.2d 262, 264 (1993). Campbell, a Virginia State Trooper, arrested Weaver in North Carolina, outside the jurisdiction of Virginia. However, a North Carolina statute specifically authorizes a Virginia officer who is in *491 “hot pursuit” of a person suspected of committing a crime to arrest the suspect in North Carolina.

Any law-enforcement officer of a state contiguous to the State of North Carolina who enters this State in fresh pursuit and continues in this State in such pursuit of a person who is in immediate and continuous flight from the commission of a criminal offense, has the same authority to arrest and hold in custody such person on the ground that he has committed a criminal offense in another state which is a criminal offense under the laws of the State of North Carolina as law-enforcement officers of this State have to arrest and hold in custody a person on the ground that he has committed a criminal offense in this State.

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-403(a) (1997). Trooper Campbell began pursuing Weaver in Virginia for failing to dim his headlights, a traffic infraction proscribed by Code § 46.2-1034. North Carolina GemStat. § 20-131 makes failing to dim headlights when meeting on-coming traffic an infraction in North Carolina. Virginia Code § 46.2-937 provides that traffic infractions in Virginia are treated as misdemeanors for purposes of arrest. 2 Thus, because Campbell was pursuing Weaver for an offense deemed to be a criminal offense for arrest purposes in both Virginia and North Carolina, Campbell was acting within his authority as a police officer, and he had the right to stop and arrest Weaver in North Carolina. Campbell’s investigation also revealed probable cause to arrest Weaver for driving while intoxicated, a criminal offense in violation of Code § 18.2-266 et seq. 3 Accordingly, Weaver’s arrest for driving while intoxicated was valid.

*492 The North Carolina statute, which appellant claims Trooper Campbell violated, further requires that the arresting out-of-state officer take the arrestee before a North Carolina judicial officer for a probable cause hearing to determine the lawfulness of the arrest. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-403(b). 4 Upon a finding that an arrest is lawful, the statute directs the judicial officer to release the arrestee on bail or to commit the arrestee to custody to await extradition. See id. Although Trooper Campbell failed to take Weaver before a North Carolina magistrate for a probable cause hearing, as required by North Carolina law, the irregularity in complying with that portion of the North Carolina statute does not invalidate Weaver’s arrest and, thus, does not render the results of a blood or breath test inadmissible in a Virginia trial.

The admissibility of evidence is a procedural issue and is, therefore, governed by the law of the forum state. See Jackson v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 414, 416, 417 S.E.2d 5, 6 (1992). “ ‘Evidence obtained in violation of constitutional proscriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures may not be used against an accused. However, our Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to extend that rule to encompass evidence seized pursuant to statutory violations, absent an express statutory provision for suppression.’ ” See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 646, 651, 472 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1996) (quoting Troncoso v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 942, 944, 407 S.E.2d 349, 350 (1991)).

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Bluebook (online)
513 S.E.2d 423, 29 Va. App. 487, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 204, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/weaver-v-commonwealth-vactapp-1999.