Weaver v. Checkr Inc.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: December 27, 2022
• Docket: 3:22-cv-04135
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8

10 VICTOR L. WEAVER, 11 Plaintiff, No. C 22-04135 WHA

12 v.

13 CHECKR INC., ORDER DISMISSING CASE 14 Defendant.

15 16 INTRODUCTION 17 In this action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, plaintiff, who appears pro se, alleges 18 that defendant, a consumer reporting agency, provided an inaccurate background check to a 19 potential employer. Plaintiff had previously raised a virtually identical suit in the United States 20 District Court for the District of Arizona, which was dismissed after plaintiff was compelled to 21 arbitration. Defendant now moves to dismiss this suit under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 22 For the reasons stated below, defendant’s motion is GRANTED. 23 STATEMENT 24 The following facts are taken from the allegations set forth in plaintiff’s complaint (Dkt. 25 No. 1). In August 2019, plaintiff was charged in Maricopa County, Arizona, with certain state 26 crimes related to the illegal distribution of prescription drugs. In February 2022, plaintiff 27 represented himself in a jury trial and was acquitted of all charges. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff 1 background check through defendant Checkr Inc.’s reporting service. Plaintiff alleges that 2 defendant provided an “outdated, inaccurate” report to UberEats that stated that the charges 3 against plaintiff remained pending. As a result, plaintiff was “denied the opportunity to work 4 for UberEats” (Compl. ¶¶ 6–7, 10, 20–21). 5 Plaintiff filed suit against defendant in the United States District Court for the District of 6 Arizona on June 27, 2022, raising a claim under the FCRA. See Weaver v. Checkr Inc., No. C 7 22-01090 (D. Ariz. filed June 27, 2022) (Judge Susan M. Brnovich). Plaintiff then filed a 8 virtually identical suit here two weeks later. Meanwhile, defendant filed a motion to compel 9 arbitration in Arizona. Plaintiff never responded to the motion. Judge Brnovich then granted 10 the motion and dismissed the Arizona suit on September 12, 2022 (Dkt. No. 14-5). 11 Defendant now moves to dismiss our suit under the doctrine of collateral estoppel (Dkt. 12 No. 14). Plaintiff opposes, arguing, in effect, that he never actually litigated against 13 defendant’s motion in the Arizona proceeding. This order follows a round of supplemental 14 briefing and oral argument. 15 ANALYSIS 16 A party may invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel to avoid relitigating an issue in a 17 subsequent proceeding when: “(1) the issue at stake was identical in both proceedings; (2) the 18 issue was actually litigated and decided in the prior proceedings; (3) there was a full and fair 19 opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the issue was necessary to decide the merits.” 20 Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. Washington, 8 F.4th 853, 864 (9th Cir. 2021). 21 Here, the issue that defendant seeks to avoid relitigating — whether plaintiff should be 22 compelled to arbitrate — is identical to the issue that was at stake before Judge Brnovich. The 23 issue was also necessary to decide the merits. Further, Plaintiff admitted at oral argument that 24 he received notice of defendant’s motion when it was filed and had the opportunity to file an 25 opposition brief. He thus had a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate the issue. See Maciel v. 26 Comm'r, 489 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2007). Our only concern, then, is whether the issue 27 was “actually litigated.” 1 Plaintiff explained at oral argument that he received notice that the Arizona case would 2 be dismissed without prejudice if defendant was not served within ninety days. He understood 3 that to mean that the case would be dismissed if he did nothing. He then decided to file in 4 California. His intent was to abandon his Arizona suit in favor of his suit here. Defendant, 5 meanwhile, appeared voluntarily in the Arizona proceeding and exercised its right to file a 6 motion to compel arbitration. 7 Plaintiff, however, never communicated his intent with the Arizona district court. Judge 8 Brnovich then decided the issue without a hearing on account of not receiving opposition 9 papers. Notably, Judge Brnovich did not merely grant the motion as unopposed, but instead 10 decided the issue on the merits (Dkt. No. 14-5). 11 These circumstances satisfy the “actually litigated” prong of the collateral estoppel test. 12 “[A]n issue is actually litigated when an issue is raised, contested, and submitted for 13 determination.” Janjua v. Neufeld, 933 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2019). The Janjua decision 14 did not expressly elaborate on whether a decision on an unopposed motion qualifies as 15 “contested” for the purposes of collateral estoppel. It did, however, suggest that whether an 16 issue is “actually litigated” depends on the circumstances of the case. Id. at 1065 (“[W]hen 17 applying issue preclusion, we have consistently looked to the record of the prior proceeding to 18 determine whether an issue was in fact raised, contested, and submitted for determination.”). 19 In In re Gottheiner, for example, our court of appeals affirmed the doctrine’s application to a 20 decision made on an unopposed motion for summary judgment. See 703 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th 21 Cir. 1983). Our court of appeals explained that “some types of judgments are not given 22 collateral estoppel effect because the court did not get the benefit of deciding the issue in an 23 adversarial context” but that collateral estoppel was nonetheless warranted there because the 24 losing party had “actively participated” in the litigation and accordingly “had his day in court.” 25 Ibid. 26 So too here. Plaintiff made the decision to initiate a lawsuit in Arizona. He had notice 27 that defendant had appeared to defend itself and had notice of the motion to compel arbitration. 1 this district. As a result, Judge Brnovich issued an order on the merits. The complaint here is 2 virtually identical to that in Arizona. Therefore, this Court has no choice but to respect and 3 honor the Arizona judgment, where the arbitration issue was already in hand. 4 This conclusion is consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which was 5 cited prominently in the Janjua decision. See 933 F.3d at 1066 (citing Restatement (Second) 6 of Judgments § 27, cmt. (d) (1982) (“When an issue is properly raised, by the pleadings or 7 otherwise, and is submitted for determination and is determined, the issue is actually litigated 8 ....)). This conclusion also aligns with the basic purpose of the doctrine. See Montana v. U.S., 9 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979) (“To preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had 10 a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation 11 attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action 12 by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.”). 5 13 Plaintiffs further arguments made at the motion hearing about prejudice and error should 14 be raised on appeal rather than through a collateral attack here. Defendant’s motion is 3 15 accordingly GRANTED. 16 CONCLUSION 3 17 Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs motions to amend (Dkt. Nos. 19, 18 24) do not correct the deficiencies identified herein and are therefore DENIED. Plaintiff's 19 motions to compel discovery (Dkt. Nos. 22, 40) and motion to reconsider (Dkt. No. 42) are 20 DENIED AS MooT. This case is DISMISSED without leave to amend. The clerk shall close the 21 file. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated: December 27, 2022. Pee 24 A - WILLIAM ALSUP 25 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 26 27 28