Weaver Landfill, Inc. v. Eastman Environmental Transportation Services

Fairfax County Circuit Court

Weaver Landfill, Inc. v. Eastman Environmental Transportation Services

46 Va. Cir. 372, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 342, 1998 Va. Cir. LEXIS 243

CourtFairfax County Circuit Court

DecidedSeptember 15, 1998

DocketCase No. (Law) 163821

StatusPublished

This text of 46 Va. Cir. 372 (Weaver Landfill, Inc. v. Eastman Environmental Transportation Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Fairfax County Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Weaver Landfill, Inc. v. Eastman Environmental Transportation Services, 46 Va. Cir. 372, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 342, 1998 Va. Cir. LEXIS 243 (Va. Super. Ct. 1998).

Pincite

Opinion

BY JUDGE MICHAEL P. MCWEENY

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment. The issue is whether Plaintiff may enforce a promissory note when Plaintiff never received the original. After considering the issue, the Court rules that Plaintiff may not enforce the note.

Possession of the original instrument is required for Plaintiff to enforce a promissory note. Under Virginia Code § 8.3A-301, those entitled to enforce the instrument include “the (i) holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to § 8.3A-309.” According to § 8.1-201(20), the holder of an instrument “means the person in possession of the instrument (i) if the instrument is payable to bearer or, (ii) in the case of an instrument payable to an identified person, if the identified person is in possession.” Since Plaintiff, according to their own affidavit, never possessed the original promissory note, Plaintiff is not able to enforce the promissory note under subsections (i) and (ii) above.

Plaintiff is also unable to enforce the promissory note under subsection (iii) above because Virginia Code § 8.3A-309 also requires initial possession of the instrument. Virginia Code § 8.3A-309(b) states that “[a] person seeking enforcement of an instrument under subsection (a) must prove the terms of the instrument and the person’s right to enforce the instrument.” Since the right to [373]*373enforce the instrument is contingent upon initial possession, Plaintiff fails to meet the requirement of subsection (iii) as well.

As the intended holder was never in possession of the original promissory note, Plaintiff does not meet the statutory definition of a holder and may not, therefore, bring suit on the note itself. While this ruling bars Plaintiff from an action on the note under the statutes above, it does not prevent a suit on the underlying obligation between the parties.

For the above-stated reasons, the Court orders the dismissal without prejudice of this action.

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BY JUDGE MICHAEL P. MCWEENY

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment. The issue is whether Plaintiff may enforce a promissory note when Plaintiff never received the original. After considering the issue, the Court rules that Plaintiff may not enforce the note.

Possession of the original instrument is required for Plaintiff to enforce a promissory note. Under Virginia Code § 8.3A-301, those entitled to enforce the instrument include “the (i) holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to § 8.3A-309.” According to § 8.1-201(20), the holder of an instrument “means the person in possession of the instrument (i) if the instrument is payable to bearer or, (ii) in the case of an instrument payable to an identified person, if the identified person is in possession.” Since Plaintiff, according to their own affidavit, never possessed the original promissory note, Plaintiff is not able to enforce the promissory note under subsections (i) and (ii) above.

Plaintiff is also unable to enforce the promissory note under subsection (iii) above because Virginia Code § 8.3A-309 also requires initial possession of the instrument. Virginia Code § 8.3A-309(b) states that “[a] person seeking enforcement of an instrument under subsection (a) must prove the terms of the instrument and the person’s right to enforce the instrument.” Since the right to [373]*373enforce the instrument is contingent upon initial possession, Plaintiff fails to meet the requirement of subsection (iii) as well.

As the intended holder was never in possession of the original promissory note, Plaintiff does not meet the statutory definition of a holder and may not, therefore, bring suit on the note itself. While this ruling bars Plaintiff from an action on the note under the statutes above, it does not prevent a suit on the underlying obligation between the parties.

For the above-stated reasons, the Court orders the dismissal without prejudice of this action.

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Bluebook (online)

46 Va. Cir. 372, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 342, 1998 Va. Cir. LEXIS 243, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/weaver-landfill-inc-v-eastman-environmental-transportation-services-vaccfairfax-1998.