Weatherspoon, Leonard v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: November 13, 2003
• Docket: 01-02-00932-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued November 13, 2003

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-02-00932-CR

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LEONARD WEATHERSPOON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 400th District Court

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 35,426A

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

          A jury convicted appellant, Leonard Weatherspoon, of burglary, found an enhancement allegation in the indictment true, and assessed punishment at 40 years’ confinement. The jury also imposed a $10,000 fine. On appeal, appellant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient and factually insufficient to convict him.

          We affirm.

FACTS

          At around 1:00 a.m., on the morning of October 14, 2002, the complainant, Judy Adamson, looked out her bathroom window to see a man walking in and out of the garage attached to her residence. The man was later identified as appellant. After observing appellant enter and exit the garage two or three times, Ms. Adamson called the police. Officer Jesse Martin and Detective Dixie Brzozowski of the Richmond Police Department responded to Ms. Adamson’s call.

          When the officers arrived at Ms. Adamson’s residence, appellant was standing on the driveway. Upon seeing the officers, however, appellant fled. The officers gave chase, but appellant escaped by running through a wet field. During the chase, Detective Brzozowski was able to see appellant’s face and clothing clearly when he

ran under Ms. Adamson’s porch light. Immediately after the chase, the officers inspected Ms. Adamson’s garage and found several cuts of frozen meat on the garage floor. The meat had come from a freezer in the garage.

          After inspecting the garage, Officer Martin broadcasted appellant’s description over the police radio. Within an hour, the officers were notified that a man meeting appellant’s description was at a nearby gas station. When the officers arrived at the gas station, appellant was sitting inside. Although appellant had changed his jacket, he was otherwise wearing the same clothing as he wore when the officers saw him earlier. Also, the legs of appellant’s pants were wet.

          Detective Brzozowski identified appellant as the man whom she had seen running from Ms. Adamson’s yard. The officers approached appellant, but before the officers could question him about the burglary, appellant motioned towards Ms. Adamson’s house and stated, “if them people saw me, go ahead and take me in.” Appellant was placed under arrest.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

          Appellant asserts that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him because, “a conviction on circumstantial evidence cannot be sustained if the circumstances do not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the guilt of the accused, and proof amounting to only strong suspicion or mere probability is insufficient.”

          The proposition asserted by appellant—known as the reasonable hypothesis of innocence analytical construct standard of review—has been abandoned by Texas courts. Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), overruled in part on other grounds by Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Stoutner v. State, 36 S.W.3d 716,722 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in criminal convictions, we now depend on the following standards of review.

          In a legal-sufficiency review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Howley v. State, 943 S.W.2d 152, 155 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.). If there is evidence to establish that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trier of fact believes that evidence, we cannot reverse the judgment on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Furthermore, although a legal-sufficiency analysis entails a consideration of all evidence presented at trial, we may neither re-weigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for the jury’s. King, 29 S.W.3d at 562. The jury, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Obigbo v. State, 6 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, pet. ref’d).

          In a factual-sufficiency review, we take a neutral view of the evidence, both for and against the finding, to determine (1) if the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury’s determination, or (2) if the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof. King, 29 S.W.3d at 563. In our review, we must consider the most important evidence that the appellant claims undermines the jury’s verdict. Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). It is within the exclusive purview of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given witness testimony. Margraves v. State, 34 S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); In re L.R., 84 S.W.3d 701, 705 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). The jury’s determination may be reversed only upon a finding that a manifest injustice has occurred. King, 29 S.W.3d at 563.

BURGLARY

          A person commits the offense of burglary if that person (1) enters a habitation, or a building (or any portion of a building) not then open to the public, (2) without the effective consent of the owner, (3) with the intent to commit theft. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 30.02 (Vernon 2003). The term “habitation,” as defined by section 30 of the Penal Code, includes a garage attached to a home and under the same roof—even if the garage is open or lacks a door. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 30.01 (Vernon 2003); White v. State, 630 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no pet.). Furthermore, in a prosecution for burglary, an entry made at night and without consent is presumed to have been made with the intent to commit theft. Wilkerson v. State, 927 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.)(citing Mauldin v. State, 628 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)).

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

A.      Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence

          In his first point of error, appellant contends that the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to convict him of burglary.

          The State presented evidence that appellant entered Ms. Adamson’s garage at around 1:00 a.m., on the morning of October 14, 2002. Furthermore, the garage into which appellant entered was attached to and shared a roof with Ms. Adamson’s house. Finally, Ms. Adamson testified that she never gave appellant consent to enter her garage. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, a rational jury could have found the evidence sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to convict appellant of burglary.

          We overrule appellant’s first point of error.

B.      Factual Sufficiency of the Evidence

          In his second point of error, appellant asserts that the evidence presented at trial was factually insufficient to convict him of burglary.

          When appellant saw Officer Martin and Detective Brzozowski, he began to flee, eventually evading arrest by running through a wet field. During the chase, Detective Brzozowski was able to see appellant clearly as he ran under a porch light. Immediately after the chase, the officers inspected the garage to find that appellant

had removed frozen meat from a freezer in the garage, leaving it on the garage floor during his flight.

          Shortly after inspecting the garage, Detective Brzozowski identified appellant as he sat in a gas station, near Ms. Adamson’s house. Except for his jacket, appellant was wearing the same clothes as he was wearing when Detective Brzozowski saw him under the porch light only moments earlier. Furthermore, appellant’s pant legs were still wet from running through the wet field. Before the officers questioned appellant about the burglary, he motioned towards Ms. Adamson’s house and stated “if them people saw me, go ahead and take me in.” We conclude that the evidence of guilt was not so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury’s determination and was not greatly outweighed by contrary proof.

          We overrule appellant’s second point of error.

CONCLUSION

          We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                             Laura Carter Higley

                                                             Justice

Panel consists of Justices Hedges, Nuchia, and Higley.

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).