The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY March 12, 2026
2026COA11
No. 23CA1172, Weatherill v. State Farm — Insurance — Regulation of Insurance Companies — Required Disclosures; Limitation of Actions — General Limitation of Actions Two Years
Under section 10-3-1117(2)(a), C.R.S. 2025, a person who has
a potential automobile liability claim against an insured is entitled
to obtain relevant policy coverage information from the insured’s
insurance company. If the insurance company fails to respond to
the person’s request for information within thirty days, the insurer
is liable for damages in an amount of $100 for every day of
noncompliance. § 10-3-1117(3).
The questions presented on appeal are when a claim under
section 10-3-1117(3) accrues and which statute of limitations
applies. Declining to follow Reynolds v. Great Northern Insurance
Co., 2023 COA 77, a division of the court of appeals concludes that section 10-3-1117 is not a penalty statute subject to a one-year
statute of limitations because the accrual provision for a cause of
action for penalties, section 13-80-108(9), C.R.S. 2025, does not
apply. Therefore, a section 10-3-1117 claim is subject to the two-
year catchall statute of limitations in section 13-80-102(1)(i), C.R.S.
2025, and accrues when the conduct giving rise to the cause of
action — i.e., the insurance company’s alleged noncompliance — is
discovered or should have been discovered. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026COA11
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1172 City and County of Denver District Court No. 22CV33310 Honorable Jill D. Dorancy, Judge
Joshua Weatherill and Wendy Weatherill,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Yun and Kuhn, JJ., concur
Announced March 12, 2026
Robinson & Henry P.C., Matthew W. Hamblin, Jon M. Topolewski, Denver, Colorado; Singleton Shreiber P.C., Nelson Boyle, Denver, Colorado for Plaintiffs-Appellants
Patterson Ripplinger, P.C, Franklin D. Patterson, Hillary D. Patterson, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
Ken Fiedler Injury Law, James R. Anderson, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Association ¶1 Under section 10-3-1117(2)(a), C.R.S. 2025, a person who has
a potential automobile liability claim against an insured may
request relevant policy coverage information from the insured’s
insurance company. The insurer must respond within thirty days
by providing the claimant with all known insurance policies of the
insured, including any umbrella policies. Id. An insurer that
violates this obligation is liable to the requesting claimant for
damages in an amount of $100 for every day of noncompliance.
§ 10-3-1117(3).
¶2 In November 2022, plaintiffs, Joshua and Wendy Weatherill,
sued defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, after they discovered that State Farm had provided them
with incomplete information in response to section 10-3-1117
requests they made on January 21, 2021, and February 16, 2021.
State Farm moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the
statute of limitations barred their claim. According to State Farm,
section 10-3-1117 imposes a penalty when an insurer fails to
comply with the statutory obligation, so the Weatherills’ claim was
subject to a one-year statute of limitations that began accruing
1 thirty-one days after State Farm received their requests. The
district court agreed with State Farm and dismissed the complaint.
¶3 Construing the relevant statutes and statutory scheme, we
conclude that section 10-3-1117 is not a penalty statute and,
therefore, is not subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Rather,
a claim against an insurer for violating section 10-3-1117 is subject
to the two-year catchall statute of limitations, § 13-80-102(1)(i),
C.R.S. 2025, and it accrues when the “conduct giving rise to the
cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered,” § 13-
80-108(8), C.R.S. 2025. In reaching this conclusion, we decline to
follow Reynolds v. Great Northern Insurance Co., 2023 COA 77.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand
the case with directions to reinstate the Weatherills’ complaint.
I. Background
¶4 The Weatherills were involved in a car accident with Keli
Ortega, who was insured by State Farm.1 On January 21, 2021,
the Weatherills’ counsel sent State Farm a request for information
on Ortega’s policy coverage under section 10-3-1117(2)(a). On
1 The facts are taken from the Weatherills’ amended complaint.
2 January 29, 2021, a State Farm claims specialist responded to the
request by email, attaching a copy of Ortega’s automobile liability
policy and declaration. That policy showed that Ortega had liability
coverage of $250,000. The response did not disclose an umbrella
policy for Ortega.
¶5 On February 16, 2021, the Weatherills’ counsel sent State
Farm’s registered agent a second, substantially identical section 10-
3-1117(2)(a) request. State Farm did not further respond.
¶6 Over a year after State Farm’s response, the Weatherills sued
Ortega. On October 31, 2022, and in connection with that
litigation, Ortega produced a confirmation of coverage document
from State Farm that showed she had an additional $1,000,000
umbrella policy at the time of the car accident.
¶7 In November 2022, the Weatherills filed this action against
State Farm. They asserted that State Farm had violated section 10-
3-1117 by failing to disclose Ortega’s umbrella policy in response to
their section 10-3-1117(2)(a) requests, and they sought damages of
$100 per day for each day that State Farm had not complied with
its obligation, plus attorney fees and costs.
3 ¶8 State Farm moved to dismiss the Weatherills’ complaint under
C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). It argued that section 10-3-1117 is a penalty
statute, and that a claim under the statute accrues at the time of
the violation, which, in this case, was March 19, 2021 — thirty-one
days after the Weatherills’ February 16, 2021, request to State
Farm’s registered agent. According to State Farm, because the
Weatherills sought a penalty, their claim was governed by a one-
year statute of limitations, and therefore the November 2022
complaint was barred because the statute of limitations had run.
The district court adopted State Farm’s argument and dismissed
the complaint.
II. Statute of Limitations for a Section 10-3-1117 Claim
¶9 To review the propriety of the district court’s ruling, we must
determine when a claim under section 10-3-1117 accrues and the
statute of limitations applicable to it. The parties’ initial briefing did
not address accrual, however. After oral argument, we granted the
parties’ request to submit supplemental briefing on the issue of
when a section 10-3-1117 claim accrues.
¶ 10 Considering the parties’ arguments and reviewing the plain
language of the relevant statutes, we conclude that because the
4 accrual provision for a cause of action for penalties, § 13-80-108(9),
does not apply to a section 10-3-1117 claim, such a claim is not for
a penalty and therefore not subject to a one-year statute of
limitations. Consequently, a claim against an insurer for violating
section 10-3-1117 accrues under section 13-80-108(8) — when the
“conduct giving rise to the cause of action is discovered or should
have been discovered” — and is subject to a two-year statute of
limitations as set forth in section 13-80-102(1)(i).
¶ 11 The district court therefore erred by applying the one-year
statute of limitations to the Weatherills’ claim and dismissing their
November 2022 complaint.
A. Relevant Legal Principles
1. C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) Standards
¶ 12 A C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss tests the formal
sufficiency of a plaintiff’s complaint. Norton v. Rocky Mountain
Planned Parenthood, Inc., 2016 COA 3, ¶ 12, aff’d, 2018 CO 3.
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true
all factual allegations in the complaint and view the allegations in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Williams v. Rock-Tenn
Servs., Inc., 2016 COA 18, ¶ 11.
5 ¶ 13 A court generally may not grant a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion
based on a statute of limitations defense unless the bare allegations
of the complaint reveal that the plaintiff filed the action after the
applicable statute of limitations had expired. Wagner v. Grange Ins.
Ass’n, 166 P.3d 304, 307 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 14 We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a claim based
on a statute of limitations defense. Gomez v. Walker, 2023 COA 79,
¶ 7. When the court’s dismissal raises a question of statutory
interpretation, we review that issue de novo as well. See Rooftop
Restoration, Inc. v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 2018 CO 44, ¶ 5; see
also Gunderson v. Weidner Holdings, LLC, 2019 COA 186, ¶ 9
(determining the applicable statute of limitations presents a
question of law).
¶ 15 Our aim when interpreting a statute is to effectuate the
legislature’s intent. Goodman v. Heritage Builders, Inc., 2017 CO
13, ¶ 7. We begin with the statutory language itself, giving the text
its “ordinary and commonly accepted meaning.” Rooftop, ¶ 12. We
then consider the statutory framework as a whole, giving
“consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts and
avoiding constructions that would render any words or phrases
6 superfluous or lead to illogical or absurd results.” Pineda-Liberato
v. People, 2017 CO 95, ¶ 22. If the statutory language is “clear and
unambiguous,” the analysis ends. Hernandez v. Ray Domenico
Farms, Inc., 2018 CO 15, ¶ 6.
2. Statutes of Limitation
¶ 16 Statutes of limitation prescribe the time during which a party
may assert a cause of action. Gunderson, ¶ 9. Their purpose is to
promote justice, discourage unnecessary delay, and prevent the
pursuit of stale claims. Hickerson v. Vessels, 2014 CO 2, ¶ 13.
¶ 17 In title 13, article 80, of the Colorado Revised Statutes, the
General Assembly established the statutes of limitation for personal
actions. See §§ 13-80-101 to -119, C.R.S. 2025. As relevant here,
there is a one-year statute of limitations applicable to “[a]ll actions
for any penalty or forfeiture of any penal statutes,” § 13-80-
103(1)(d), C.R.S. 2025, and a two-year catchall statute of limitations
applicable to “[a]ll other actions of every kind for which no other
period of limitation is provided,” § 13-80-102(1)(i).
¶ 18 “Integral to any statute of limitations is the time of accrual: the
time when the proverbial clock starts ticking and the statute of
limitations begins to run.” Rooftop, ¶ 13. The legislature has
7 established “a handful of separate dates of accrual which apply in
particular circumstances.” Id. A cause of action for penalties
accrues “when the determination of overpayment or delinquency for
which such penalties are assessed is no longer subject to appeal.”
§ 13-80-108(9). An action for losses or damages not otherwise
addressed in section 13-80-108 accrues “when the injury, loss,
damage, or conduct giving rise to the cause of action is discovered
or should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable
diligence.” § 13-80-108(8).
3. Section 10-3-1117
¶ 19 Section 10-3-1117(2)(a) requires that when a prospective
claimant sends a request for policy information to a personal
automobile insurer, the insurer must respond within thirty days.
And the insurer’s response must include
the following information with regard to each known policy of insurance of the named insured, including excess or umbrella insurance, that is or may be relevant to the claim:
(I) The name of the insurer;
(II) The name of each insured party, as the name appears on the declarations page of the policy;
8 (III) The limits of the liability coverage; and
(IV) A copy of the policy.
Id.
¶ 20 An insurer that “violates this section is liable to the requesting
claimant for damages in an amount of one hundred dollars per day,
beginning on and including the thirty-first day following the receipt
of the claimant’s written request.” § 10-3-1117(3). “The penalty
accrues until the insurer provides the information required by this
section.” Id.
¶ 21 When enacting section 10-3-1117, the legislature also
amended its legislative declaration regarding insurance companies’
trade practices to clarify the statute’s purpose — to increase
“transparency in the insurance claims process to further the public
policy of encouraging settlement and preventing unnecessary
litigation” and to provide a claimant with “accurate and reliable
information about the amount of legal liability coverage available for
a claim.” Ch. 250, secs. 1, 2, §§ 10-3-1101, 10-3-1117, 2019 Colo.
Sess. Laws 2426-28.
9 B. Application
¶ 22 We turn first to the plain statutory text to determine whether
the legislature intended section 10-3-1117 to be a statutory
penalty. See Rooftop, ¶¶ 9, 14. Section 10-3-1117(3) states that a
claimant may recover “damages” for an insurer’s violation. And
“damages” generally means “[m]oney claimed by, or ordered to be
paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 488 (12th ed. 2024). But section 10-3-1117(3) also
refers to the damages as a “penalty.” The word “penalty,” as
commonly used, means “[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer,
usu[ally] in the form of imprisonment or fine; esp[ecially] a sum of
money exacted as punishment for either a wrong to the state or a
civil wrong (as distinguished from compensation for the injured
party’s loss).” Black’s Law Dictionary at 1365. A penalty is “often
something imposed by the state.” Rooftop, ¶ 14. Section 10-3-1117
damages are not a fine imposed by the state, suggesting that the
provision does not amount to a penalty.
¶ 23 Section 10-3-1117 has other features consistent with a
penalty, though. In particular, the statute punishes an insurer for
not complying with its statutory obligation, and the punishment is
10 based on the number of days it takes the insurer to comply, not the
claimant’s actual damages. See Kruse v. McKenna, 178 P.3d 1198,
1201 (Colo. 2008) (a statute is penal if “the statute asserted a new
and distinct cause of action,” the claim allows recovery without
proof of actual damages, and the claim allows an award in excess of
actual damages), overruled on other grounds by, Guarantee Tr. Life
Ins. Co. v. Est. of Casper, 2018 CO 43. But even if these features
suggest that the statute is penal, “that result would be meaningless
if the legislature explicitly determined that the statute was not
penal for the purposes of applying the appropriate statute of
limitations.” Rooftop, ¶ 9.
¶ 24 Therefore, we focus instead on section 10-3-1117 in the
context of “the interplay between the one-year statute of limitations,
section 13-80-103(1)(d), and the accrual statute, section 13-80-
108.” Id. at ¶ 15. In Rooftop, the supreme court conducted this
analysis in relation to section 10-3-1116(1), C.R.S. 2025, which
governs claims for unreasonable delay or denial of insurance
11 benefits.2 Rooftop, ¶ 1. To determine whether the statute was
penal and subject to a one-year statute of limitations, the court first
looked to the accrual provision for penalties, which, as noted,
provides that the cause of action accrues when the determination of
overpayment or delinquency for which such penalties are assessed
is no longer subject to appeal, § 13-80-108(9). Based on the
accrual provision, the court determined that “the legislature
considered a defining feature of a cause of action for penalties to be
a determination of either overpayment or delinquency.” Rooftop,
¶ 15. The court explained that this defining feature was absent
from a cause of action under section 10-3-1116(1), where a
claimant “must only file a complaint” to support its claim against
the insurer. Rooftop, ¶ 15. And because a claim under the statute
“never leads to a determination of overpayment or delinquency[,]
. . . the claim would never accrue, and the statute of limitations
would be rendered meaningless.” Id. Accordingly, the supreme
2 If an insurer “unreasonably delay[s] or denie[s]” a claim for
payment of benefits, the claimant may bring an action “to recover reasonable attorney fees and court costs and two times the covered benefit.” § 10-3-1116(1), C.R.S. 2025.
12 court held that a section 10-3-1116(1) claim is not a cause of action
for penalties subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Id. at ¶ 16.
¶ 25 In our view, the Rooftop analysis controls here. The “defining
feature” of a claim for penalties is likewise absent from a cause of
action under section 10-3-1117. A claimant asserting a section 10-
3-1117 cause of action need only file a complaint to support a claim
against the insurer. See § 10-3-1117(3). And there is no
determination of overpayment or delinquency before the cause of
action is filed, nor does the claim lead to a determination of
overpayment or delinquency that is “no longer subject to appeal.”
§ 13-80-108(9).
¶ 26 This is where we part ways with Reynolds. See In re Marriage
of Aragon, 2019 COA 76, ¶ 13 (acknowledging that a division of this
court is not bound by another division’s decision). In Reynolds,
another division of this court considered the statute of limitations
applicable to a section 10-3-1117 cause of action. In that case, the
claimant asserted a claim against the insurer because, for over
seventeen months, the insurer did not provide a response to a
section 10-3-1117(2)(a) request. Reynolds, ¶ 2. Relying on the
reference to a “penalty” in section 10-3-1117(3), the Reynolds
13 division determined that section 10-3-1117 imposes a statutory
penalty, and that, as a penalty, the cause of action was subject to a
one-year statute of limitations under section 13-80-103(1)(d).
Reynolds, ¶¶ 13-14. The division then determined that (1) section
13-80-108(9) governs the accrual of a cause of action for penalties;
(2) “[t]he determination of delinquency” — i.e., “not providing the
insurance policy” — is “statutorily established as the thirty-first day
after the written request is received by the insurer’s registered
agent”; and (3) “a cause of action requesting the penalty imposed by
section 10-3-1117(3) accrues on the thirty-first day after the insurer
receives the written request for information.” Id. at ¶ 16.
¶ 27 We cannot agree with the Reynolds division’s conclusion that,
under section 10-3-1117, a “determination of delinquency” is
“statutorily established” as the thirty-first day after the insurer
receives the claimant’s request. Id. The plain language of section
10-3-1117 does not mention a determination of delinquency; rather,
it provides that “damages” begin to accrue thirty-one days after the
insurer receives the request. § 10-3-1117(3). Equating this date
with the accrual date for the statute of limitations conflates the
penalty and damages accrual standards in a way that is
14 inconsistent with the supreme court’s analysis in Rooftop. Cf. King
Soopers Inc. v. Indus. Claims Appeals Off., 2023 COA 73, ¶ 34 (“We
are bound to follow Colorado Supreme Court precedent.”). Indeed,
Rooftop rejected the proposition that a cause of action could
simultaneously be “a cause of action ‘for penalty or forfeiture of any
penal statute’ (under section 13-80-103(1)(d)) and a ‘cause of action
for losses or damages’ (under section 13-80-108(8)).” Rooftop, ¶ 16.
¶ 28 Moreover, nothing in section 10-3-1117 identifies who would
make the determination of delinquency and start the clock on the
statute of limitations. Reynolds, ¶ 16, suggests that the claimant
makes that determination when the insurer fails to respond within
the thirty-day deadline. But the claimant does not make a
determination of delinquency; the claimant discovers the “conduct
giving rise to the cause of action.” § 13-80-108(8).
¶ 29 In Reynolds, the claimant could readily ascertain within thirty
days that the insurer violated section 10-3-1117 because the
insurer did not respond to the claimant’s request. But the
conclusion that section 10-3-1117 is a penalty becomes problematic
when, as alleged here, the insurer responds to a section 10-3-
1117(2)(a) request within thirty days but fails to provide the
15 claimant with all the statutorily required information. In that
circumstance, the claimant may have no knowledge that the
insurer’s response violated section 10-3-1117 within the thirty-day
deadline. The claimant therefore cannot determine a deficiency in
the insurer’s response until the claimant “discover[s]” the violation.
§ 13-80-108(8). Under Reynolds’ holding, though, the statute of
limitations would nonetheless begin to accrue thirty-one days after
the claimant’s section 10-3-1117(2)(a) request. See id.
Consequently, a claimant’s section 10-3-1117 cause of action could
be barred by the one-year statute of limitations even though the
claimant did not know, and could not reasonably discover, that an
insurer had violated its obligation under the statute. Such an
interpretation appears incongruous with the legislature’s purpose
when enacting section 10-3-1117. See § 10-3-1101(2), C.R.S. 2025;
Pineda-Liberato, ¶ 22; cf. Owens v. Brochner, 474 P.2d 603, 606
(Colo. 1970) (“To say that a cause of action accrues to a person
when she may maintain an action thereon and, at the same time,
that it accrues before she has or can reasonably be expected to
have knowledge of any wrong inflicted upon her is patently
inconsistent and unrealistic. . . . To say to one who has been
16 wronged, ‘You had a remedy, but before the wrong was
ascertainable to you, the law stripped you of your remedy,’ makes a
mockery of the law.” (citation omitted)).
¶ 30 Even if, in light of Reynolds, section 10-3-1117 could be
considered ambiguous, we think the legislative history supports our
interpretation. See Nieto v. Clark’s Mkt., Inc., 2021 CO 48, ¶ 13 (if a
statute is ambiguous, reviewing courts turn to “other interpretive
aids to discern the legislature’s intent,” including “any relevant
legislative history”). In 1986, the legislature enacted the current
scheme on the statutes of limitation and accompanying accrual
provisions. Ch. 114, sec. 1, §§ 13-80-101 to -118, 1986 Colo. Sess.
Laws 695-701. During a hearing before the House Judiciary
Committee, a committee member asked for an example of what
causes of action would constitute a penalty subject to the one-year
statute of limitations. Hearing on S.B. 69 before the H. Judiciary
Comm., 55th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mar. 13, 1986). In
response, an attorney who assisted in drafting the bill testified that
it could refer to taxes: “if somebody failed to pay their taxes within a
certain time and the penalty is assessed.” Id. (statement of Richard
W. Laugesen). He further explained that additional examples were
17 provided in the bill through the “cross-references” to section 13-80-
103. Id. The titles of these cross-referenced statutes identify them
as penalties, and the assessment of a penalty in those statutes
includes, as mentioned by section 13-80-108(9), a predicate
regulatory or adjudicative finding of delinquency or overpayment.
See § 8-72-107(1), (3), C.R.S. 1990 (allowing the division of
insurance to fine or imprison employers for each failure to provide
tax records);3 § 8-79-104(1)(a)(II)(A), (1)(d), C.R.S. 2025 (allowing the
division of insurance to fine employers for their failure to comply
with reporting requirements); § 8-81-101, C.R.S. 2025 (setting out
fines and other consequences for entities making false
representations or willfully failing to disclose material facts to the
division of unemployment insurance).
¶ 31 Construing the plain language of section 10-3-1117 and the
relevant statutory scheme, we conclude that section 10-3-1117 is
not an action for a penalty or forfeiture for purposes of determining
the statute of limitations. See Rooftop, ¶ 9 (“[I]f the legislature even
3 The cross-reference to section 13-80-108(9) was later removed
from this statute in 1991. Ch. 226, sec. 2, § 8-72-107(3), 1991 Colo. Sess. Laws 1360.
18 implicitly indicates that a statute is not penal for the purposes of
identifying the correct statute of limitations, then [the court] must
yield to the intent of the legislature.”). A cause of action brought
under section 10-3-1117, therefore, is not subject to a one-year
statute of limitations.
¶ 32 Then, because a section 10-3-1117 claim is not otherwise
enumerated in another statute of limitations, we conclude that such
a claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitations under the
catchall provision for “[a]ll other actions of every kind for which no
other period of limitation is provided.” § 13-80-102(1)(i). And
because the claim must accrue under some provision of section 13-
80-108, see Rooftop, ¶ 13 (The statute of limitations is “necessarily
connect[ed]” to “one of the dates of accrual laid out in section 13-
80-108.”), we further conclude that this cause of action “shall be
deemed to accrue when the . . . conduct giving rise to the cause of
action is discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise
of reasonable diligence.” § 13-80-108(8).
¶ 33 Having determined the applicable statute of limitations and
accrual period, we conclude that the district court erred by granting
19 State Farm’s C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion and dismissing the
Weatherills’ section 10-3-1117 claim.
¶ 34 As alleged in the complaint, the Weatherills sent requests to
State Farm on January 21, 2021, and February 16, 2021, for
insurance coverage information on Ortega under section 10-3-
1117(2)(a). On January 29, 2021, State Farm responded to the
Weatherills’ January request, and it did not provide any further
response to the February request. In its response, State Farm
provided Ortega’s automobile liability policy and declaration,
showing liability coverage of $250,000, but it did not disclose
Ortega’s $1,000,000 umbrella policy. The Weatherills did not
discover State Farm’s failure to disclose the umbrella policy until
October 31, 2022.
¶ 35 Accepting these factual allegations as true, see Williams, ¶ 11,
the bare allegations of the complaint do not reveal that the statute
of limitations had run before the Weatherills filed their complaint,
see Wagner, 166 P.3d at 307. Regardless of whether we view the
Weatherills’ two section 10-3-1117(2)(a) requests in isolation
(because, as State Farm alleged, only the February 16, 2021,
request was sent to the registered agent as directed by section 10-3-
20 1117) or if we consider them together, the two-year statute of
limitations had not run before the Weatherills filed their November
2022 complaint. See § 13-80-102(1)(i); § 13-80-108(8). The
Weatherills alleged that they did not learn that State Farm’s
response to the January 21, 2021, request failed to disclose the
umbrella policy until October 31, 2022. The Weatherills filed their
complaint within two years of this discovery, and they filed their
complaint within two years of State Farm’s alleged failure to
respond to the February 16, 2021, request within thirty days.
¶ 36 The Weatherills therefore were not barred from bringing their
section 10-3-1117 claim against State Farm.
III. Disposition
¶ 37 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
district court with directions to reinstate the complaint.
JUDGE YUN and JUDGE KUHN concur.