Wearable Shoe Tree, LLC v. Does 1-601

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedJuly 3, 2024
Docket4:24-cv-00334
StatusUnknown

This text of Wearable Shoe Tree, LLC v. Does 1-601 (Wearable Shoe Tree, LLC v. Does 1-601) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wearable Shoe Tree, LLC v. Does 1-601, (E.D. Tex. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SHERMAN DIVISION WEARABLE SHOE TREE, LLC § § v. § CIVIL NO. 4:24-CV-334-SDJ § DOES 1-601 § ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Before the Court is Plaintiff Wearable Shoe Tree, LLC’s (“Wearable Shoe Tree”) motion for entry of a preliminary injunction. (Dkt. #7). After considering the filings, evidence, and applicable law, the Court finds that the motion should be granted. I. BACKGROUND Wearable Shoe Tree makes “innovative shoe care and preservation products.” (Dkt. #7 at 5). Its primary product is a plastic insert designed to slip into the toe of a sneaker and prevent “creasing,” called a “sneaker shield.” Wearable Shoe Tree holds a patent for the plastic insert: Patent No. D970,203 S. Wearable Shoe Tree also holds three trademarks: U.S. Trademark Registration No. 4686931 for the SNEAKER SHIELDS composite mark, U.S. Trademark Registration No. 6220820 for the SHIELDS standard character mark, and U.S. Trademark Serial No. 88750733 for the SNEAKER SHIELDS standard character mark. (Dkt. #3-11). Wearable Shoe Tree claims that Defendants, individuals and business entities likely operating in China, (Dkt. #42-1), are illegally selling products that infringe on Wearable Shoe Tree’s patent and trademarks. All Defendants operate webstores on various online marketplaces, such as Amazon, Alibaba, eBay, Etsy, Temu, and Wish, and offer their allegedly infringing goods for sale in the United States, including Texas.

Wearable Shoe Tree moved for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”), (Dkt. #7), and motion for alternative service of process. (Dkt. #9). The Court held a hearing on May 3, 2024, and subsequently granted both motions. (Dkt. #17). The initial TRO was set to expire at 6:30 p.m. on May 21, 2024. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, the Court approved one extension of the TRO to 6:30 p.m. on June 4, 2024. (Dkt. #18, #19). The Court also set a hearing on the entry of a

Preliminary Injunction for June 3, 2024. (Dkt. #19). However, on the day of the Preliminary Injunction hearing it was unclear whether the Defendants had been properly served. Accordingly, the Preliminary Injunction hearing was reset for June 24, 2024, to allow Wearable Shoe Tree more time to identify and properly serve the Defendants. Wearable Shoe Tree has since shown that all Defendants were served via email in accordance with the Court’s order on alternative service of process. (Dkt. #17); (Dkt. #40 ¶ 5); (Dkt. #40-1).1 Defendants were permitted to file responses

to Wearable Shoe Tree’s motion for a TRO and Preliminary Injunction no later than June 18, 2024, and appear in person, via phone, or via video. The TRO expired as scheduled at 6:30 p.m. on June 4, 2024.

1 The Fifth Circuit has approved this method of service for Preliminary Injunctions. Whirlpool Corp. v. Shenzhen Sanlida Elec. Tech. Co., Ltd., 80 F.4th 536 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. denied sub nom. Shenzen Sanlida Elec. Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Whirlpool Corp., 144 S. Ct. 807, 218 L. Ed. 2d 23 (2024); see also Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen faced with an international e-business scofflaw, playing hide-and- seek with the federal court, email may be the only means of effecting service of process.”). At the scheduled hearing on June 24, 2024, Wearable Shoe Tree presented evidence in support of a Preliminary Injunction and filed supplemental briefing in support of the Preliminary Injunction. (Dkt. #42). Attorney He Cheng appeared on

behalf of Defendant Does 519, 522, and 523, but did not present any evidence in opposition to Wearable Shoe Tree’s motion for a Preliminary Injunction. (Dkt. #41). No other Defendant appeared at the hearing, and the Court has not received written responses from any Defendants prior to or following the hearing. Since the hearing, a number of Defendants have been voluntarily dismissed. (Dkt. #44). The complete list of active Defendants at the time of this order is attached hereto (hereinafter

Table 1). II. LEGAL STANDARD Preliminary injunctions are governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must demonstrate, “(1) a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) his threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party whom he seeks to enjoin, and (4)

granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Google, Inc. v. Hood, 822 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2016). “A preliminary injunction is an ‘extraordinary remedy’ and should only be granted if the plaintiffs have clearly carried the burden of persuasion on all four requirements.” Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 372 (5th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). But the party “is not required to prove [its] case in full at a preliminary injunction hearing.” Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 558 (5th Cir. 1987) (cleaned up). A district court has discretion to grant or deny a preliminary injunction. See House the Homeless, Inc. v. Widnall, 94 F.3d 176, 180 (5th Cir. 1996).

III. DISCUSSION A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits Wearable Shoe Tree asserts three claims: (1) Trademark Infringement, (2) Unfair Competition & False Designation of Origin, and (3) Patent Infringement. The Court addresses the likelihood of success for each claim in turn. i. Trademark Infringement

15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) provides the remedies for a claim of trademark infringement.2 “A prima facie trademark infringement case is made out by proof of two elements: that the plaintiff owns a legally protected mark, and there is a likelihood of confusion between her mark and the defendant’s mark.” Pennzoil- Quaker State Co. v. Miller Oil & Gas Operations, 779 F.3d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Denbra IP Holdings, LLC v. Thornton, 521 F. Supp. 3d 677, 684 (E.D. Tex. 2021). Likelihood of confusion is determined by considering eight factors, “none of

which is either necessary or sufficient.” Pennzoil-Quaker, 779 F.3d at 294 n.9. The factors are “(1) strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) similarity of design between the marks; (3) similarity of the products; (4) identity of retail outlets and purchasers; (5)

2 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) states, “[a]ny person who shall, without the consent of the registrant (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive[] . . .

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