Wayne Allen Stuckey v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 6, 2008
• Docket: 10-08-00176-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

 

No. 10-08-00176-CR

No. 10-08-00177-CR

Wayne Allen Stuckey,

                                                                                    Appellant

 v.

The State of Texas,

                                                                                    Appellee

From the 82nd District Court

Robertson County, Texas

Trial Court Nos. 03-06-17492-CR and 03-10-17578-CR

memorandum  Opinion

In these two appeals, judgments revoking Appellant’s community supervision were rendered on January 12, 2005.  Appellant’s notices of appeal in each case were filed on May 21, 2008.  Each notice states that it is an appeal of the trial court’s April 17, 2008 “Order Denying Motion to Return Seized Property” regarding the collection of court costs, fees and/or fines by having them withdrawn from Appellant’s inmate trust account under Government Code section 501.014(e).  See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 501.014(e) (Vernon 2004).

            We have held that such an order in a criminal cause is not an appealable order.  See Zink v. State, 244 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, no pet.) (holding that appellate court lacked jurisdiction because order to withdraw money from inmate trust account was not appealable order); Philips v. State, 244 S.W.3d 510 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, no pet.) (same); see also Gross v. State, --- S.W.3d ---, 2007 WL 2089365 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 23, 2007, no pet. h.) (same); Abdullah v. State, 211 S.W.3d 938 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (treating appeal of similar order as civil appeal); cf. In re Keeling, 227 S.W.3d 391, 395 (Tex. App.—Waco June 6, 2007, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief on similar order for payment of court costs out of inmate trust fund account).  We thus reject Appellant’s assertion that his appeals are civil appeals.  See, e.g., Abdullah, 211 S.W.3d at 940-43 (treating appeal of similar order as civil appeal).

We have jurisdiction in a criminal case only when expressly provided by law.  Kelly v. State, 151 S.W.3d 683, 685 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.).  No statute appears to authorize an appeal from an order denying a postjudgment motion to return funds acquired by the State under a section 501.014(e) order.  We thus lack jurisdiction.  These appeals are dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM

Before Chief Justice Gray,

            Justice Vance, and

            Justice Reyna

Appeals dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed August 6, 2008

Do not publish

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nt-weight:normal'>, Texas,

                                                                      Appellants

John Ray Tullous,

Trial Court # 03-07-16727-CV

MEMORANDUM  Opinion

      This interlocutory appeal concerns a suit for false imprisonment and other state claims and for the deprivation of civil rights under Section 1983.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).  Appellants filed a plea to the jurisdiction.  The trial court denied the plea.  We will affirm.

      Appellee contends that we lack jurisdiction over Sheriff Kirk’s appeal.  The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides, “A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court . . . that . . . grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit . . . .”  Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2004).  Section 51.014 has been interpreted to permit interlocutory appeals by government officials, including sheriffs.  Cornyn v. Fifty-Two Members of Schoppa Family, 70 S.W.3d 895, 898 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.); Perry v. Del Rio, 53 S.W.3d 818, 822-24 (Tex. App.—Austin), pet. dism’d, 66 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. 2001); see Nueces County v. Ferguson, 97 S.W.3d 205, 210 n.2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).  We have jurisdiction over Sheriff Kirk’s appeal.

      Appellants argue that state sovereign immunity bars Appellee’s suit against them.  We will overrule Appellants’ issue.

      If a trial court has jurisdiction over any part of a suit, then the court does not err to deny a plea to the jurisdiction.  Aledo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Choctaw Props., 17 S.W.3d 260, 262 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, no pet.).

      Defenses to a Section 1983 claim are governed by federal law, and state law immunity defenses do not control.  Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 376 (1990); Thomas v. Allen, 837 S.W.2d 631, 632 (Tex. 1992).  Under federal law, state political subdivisions are persons subject to suit under Section 1983.  Howlett at 376; see Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47 (1994); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. McKinney, 936 S.W.2d 279, 283 (Tex. 1996).  State sovereign immunity thus does not bar Appellee’s Section 1983 claim.

      Appellants also argue that Appellee failed to plead facts that established the trial court’s jurisdiction over his Section 1983 claim.  See County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002).  Section 1983 provides for a cause of action for the deprivation of constitutional rights “under color of any . . . custom[] or usage[] of any State.”  42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Appellants argue that Appellee failed to allege “a policy, practice or custom” that caused his injuries (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).  Appellee’s petition alleged, “Defendants, in this case and historically through course of conduct, have had an ulterior motive or purpose in exercising . . . illegal, perverted, or improper use of . . . process.”  Appellee thus alleges injury under color of state custom.

      Accordingly, the trial court had jurisdiction over Appellee’s Section 1983 claim.  The trial court did not err in denying the plea to the jurisdiction.  We overrule Appellants’ issue.  We affirm.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

      Justice Vance, and

      Justice Reyna

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed July 7, 2004

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