Wayne Alexander Howlett v. City of Susanville, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WAYNE ALEXANDER HOWLETT, No. 2:25-CV-0729-DAD-DMC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 CITY OF SUSANVILLE, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. Pending before the 18 Court are Defendants’ separate motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. See 19 ECF Nos. 12 and 13. Plaintiff has filed opposition briefs. See ECF Nos. 15, 16, and 19. 20 Defendants have filed replies. See ECF Nos. 20 and 21. 21 In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all allegations of 22 material fact in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The 23 Court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer 24 v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 25 738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All 26 ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 27 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual 28 factual allegations, need not be accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). 1 In addition, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 2 See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement 4 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair 5 notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 6 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order 7 to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain 8 more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 9 allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555-56. The 10 complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 11 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 12 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 13 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but 14 it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting 15 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 16 defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement 17 to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 18 In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court generally may not consider materials 19 outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998); 20 Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court may, however, consider: (1) 21 documents whose contents are alleged in or attached to the complaint and whose authenticity no 22 party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454; (2) documents whose authenticity is not in question, 23 and upon which the complaint necessarily relies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see 24 Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials 25 of which the Court may take judicial notice, see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 26 1994). 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Finally, leave to amend must be granted “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no 2 amendment can cure the defects.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per 3 curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 4 5 I. BACKGROUND 6 A. Procedural History 7 Plaintiff initiated this action with a pro se complaint filed on March 3, 2025. See 8 ECF No. 1. Defendants responded with separate motions to dismiss filed on June 20, 2025. 9 See ECF Nos. 5 and 6. On September 18, 2025, the Court issued findings and 10 recommendations that Defendants’ motions be granted and that Plaintiff be provided an 11 opportunity to file a first amended complaint. See ECF No. 10. Plaintiff prematurely filed his 12 first amended complaint on September 29, 2025, while the findings and recommendations were 13 pending before the District Judge. See ECF No. 11. Defendants filed the pending separate 14 motions to dismiss the first amended complaint on October 14, 2025. See ECF Nos. 12 and 13. 15 Plaintiff filed separate opposition briefs on October 27, 2025. See ECF Nos. 15 and 16. On 16 March 17, 2026, the District Judge adopted the September 18, 2025, findings and 17 recommendations and deemed the September 29, 2025, first amended complaint to be the 18 operative pleading. See ECF No. 17. On April 1, 2026, Plaintiff filed a single brief in 19 opposition to both pending motions to dismiss. See ECF No. 19. Defendants filed their replies 20 on April 13, 2026. See ECF Nos. 20 and 21. 21 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 22 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) City of Susanville; and (2) 23 Susanville Sanitary District. See ECF No. 11, pg. 1. Plaintiff, who is African-American, states 24 that he has suffered water- and sewer-related problems at his address in Susanville since 2023. 25 See id. at 2. Plaintiff repeatedly reported the issues to Defendants and filed a 26 “Water/Environmental complaint” in mid-2024. Id. According to Plaintiff, the main water line 27 broke on July 31, 2024, resulting in insufficient water service to Plaintiff’s home. See id. 28 Plaintiff states that, despite the break occurring on city property, the city informed him that he 1 would be responsible for repairs. See id. Plaintiff claims Defendants’ employees minimized, 2 ignored, and denied his complaints. See id. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that he was treated 3 differently than other water users in Susanville due to discrimination. See id. at 3. 4 Plaintiff raises two claims for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

5 Count I Disparate Treatment in Violation of the Fair Housing Act.

6 Count II Denial of Equal Protection in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 ECF No. 11, pgs. 3-4. 8 9 10 II. DISCUSSION 11 In their separate motions to dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to 12 allege facts sufficient to establish discrimination claims under either the Fair Housing Act or 13 Fourteenth Amendment. See ECF Nos. 12 and 13. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff fails to 14 allege facts sufficient to establish municipal liability. See id. 15 A. Plaintiff’s Substantive Claims 16 1. Fair Housing Act 17 The Fair Housing Act (FHA) states that “[i]t is the policy of the United States to 18 provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.” 42 19 U.S.C. § 3601. Thus, it is unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable 20 or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or 21 national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Specific unlawful practices that have the effect of making 22 a dwelling otherwise unavailable includes discriminating “because of race ‘in the provision of 23 services or facilities” in connection with “the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of 24 a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). This extends to “[r]efusing to provide municipal services or 25 property or hazard insurance for dwellings or providing such services or insurance differently 26 because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.” 24 CFR 27 100.70(d)(4); see also Ojo v. Farmers Grp., 600 F.3d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 28 the FHA prohibits racial discrimination in both the denial and pricing of homeowner's 1 insurance); see also Pac. Shores Props., Ltd. Liab. Co. v. City of Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 2 1142, 1157 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that “a municipality violates [the FHA] if its zoning 3 practices . . . discriminate against disabled individuals . . . [and] contribute to mak[ing] 4 unavailable or deny[ing] housing to those persons”). 5 A plaintiff bringing a claim under the FHA “has the burden of proving that a 6 challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.” 24 CFR 7 §100.500(c)(1) (2014). As it relates to 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), “[f]or a plaintiff to make out a 8 prima facie case of disparate impact, he must demonstrate: (1) the existence of a policy, not a 9 one-time decision, that is outwardly neutral; (2) a significant, adverse, and disproportionate 10 effect on a protected class; and (3) robust causality that shows, beyond mere evidence of a 11 statistical disparity, that the challenged policy, and not some other factor or policy, caused the 12 disproportionate effect.” Sw. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Maricopa Domestic Water 13 Improvement Dist., 17 F.4th 950, 962 (9th Cir. 2021). Once a plaintiff has established a prima 14 facie showing of disparate impact, the burden shifts to the defendant to “prov[e] that the 15 challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, 16 nondiscriminatory interests.” §100.500(c)(2). 17 Plaintiff’s claim as alleged in the first amended complaint suffers the same defect 18 as the original complaint. In addressing the original complaint, the Court previously stated:

19 This Court agrees with Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s FHA claims are deficient. Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to allow 20 the Court to reasonably infer that Defendants intentionally discriminated against him by subjecting him to differential treatment based on his race. 21 Specifically, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to show the causal link between an existing policy and a disproportionate effect on a protected class. Thus, 22 Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination under the FHA. The Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s 23 Fair Housing Act claim be dismissed, and the Plaintiff be directed to file an amended complaint that includes sufficient facts to show disparate-impact 24 discrimination as a result of policy or custom.

25 ECF No. 10, pg. 9. 26 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint does nothing to address the Court’s concerns or otherwise 27 plausibly plead a Fair Housing Act claim. 28 / / / 1 2. Equal Protection 2 Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated 3 individuals are treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 4 See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 5 (1972). Equal protection claims are not necessarily limited to racial and religious 6 discrimination. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying 7 minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim by a disabled plaintiff because the disabled do not 8 constitute a suspect class); see also Harrison v. Kernan, 971 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2020) 9 (applying intermediate scrutiny to claim of discrimination on the basis of gender). 10 In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Equal Protection 11 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that defendants acted with 12 intentional discrimination against the plaintiff, or against a class of individuals which included 13 plaintiff, and that such conduct did not relate to a legitimate government purpose. See Village 14 of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (2000) 15 (holding that equal protection claims may be brought by a “class of one”); Reese v. Jefferson 16 Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 17 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 18 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985). There is, however, no 19 equal protection scrutiny under a "class of one" theory absent a pattern of generally exercising 20 government authority in a particular manner while treating one individual differently and 21 detrimentally. See Tower v. Brewer, 672 F.3d 650, 660-61 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 22 As with Plaintiff’s FHA claim, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint does not 23 move closer to establishing an Equal Protection claim. In addressing this claim previously, the 24 Court stated:

25 Defendants’ arguments, which Plaintiff does not oppose, are well-taken. Most notably, Plaintiff does not allege Defendants treated 26 Plaintiff differently from similarly situated residents on account of his membership in a protected class. In fact, Plaintiff has failed to establish the 27 foundational premise that he is a member of a protected class. Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that Defendants intentionally 28 discriminated against Plaintiff because of his membership in a protected 1 class. With regard to the Fourteenth Amendment claims, Plaintiff alleges that other governmental departments denied him the ability to file 2 complaints and that, “sometimes when [his] sewer line would mysteriously clog, there be someone waiting to laugh and yell racial slurs” at him. ECF 3 No. 1 pg. 6. Based on these allegations, it is unclear whether, and how, 4 the named Defendants were intentionally discriminating against Plaintiff for membership of a protected class. These allegations are vague and 5 conclusory.

6 ECF No. 10, pgs. 7-8. 7 The first amended complaint, again, does not add any detail to address the Court’s concerns or 8 further clarify whether and how Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff. 9 B. Municipal Liability 10 Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to 11 whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 12 Counties and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. 13 at 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local 14 government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials 15 under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 16 397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of 17 the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the 18 plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or 19 custom of the municipality. See id. 20 Here, even if the first amended complaint was sufficient to establish either of 21 Plaintiff’s substantive claims, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to establish that either of the 22 municipal defendants is liable. Specifically, Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of a policy 23 or custom of either the City of Susanville or the Susanville Sanitary District which caused a 24 violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the FHA or Equal Protection Clause. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 IH. CONCLUSION 2 At the hearing on the pending motions to dismiss, Plaintiff recited certain facts 3 || which are not currently alleged in the first amended complaint but, which if alleged in a further 4 || amendment, may cure the defects identified above. The Court will, therefor, recommend that 5 || Plaintiff be provided one final opportunity to amend his complaint. 6 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends as follows: 7 1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss, ECF Nos. 12 and 13, be granted. 8 2. Plaintiff's first amended complaint be dismissed with leave to amend. 9 3. Plaintiff be directed to file a second amended complaint. 10 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 11 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days 12 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections 13 || with the Court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of objections. 14 | Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See Martinez v. 15 Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 16 17 | Dated: June 30, 2026 Co 18 DENNIS M. COTA 19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28