Wayne Alexander Howlett v. City of Susanville, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: September 18, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00729
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WAYNE ALEXANDER HOWLETT, No. 2:25-CV-00729-DAD-DMC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMEDATIONS 14 CITY OF SUSANVILLE, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. Pending before the 18 Court is Defendants’ motions to dismiss. See ECF Nos. 5 and 6. Plaintiff has not filed an 19 opposition. 20 In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all allegations of 21 material fact in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The 22 Court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer 23 v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 24 738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All 25 ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 26 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual 27 factual allegations, need not be accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). 28 1 In addition, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 2 See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement 4 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair 5 notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 6 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order 7 to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain 8 more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 9 allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555-56. The 10 complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 11 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 12 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 13 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but 14 it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting 15 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 16 defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement 17 to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 18 In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court generally may not consider materials 19 outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998); 20 Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court may, however, consider: (1) 21 documents whose contents are alleged in or attached to the complaint and whose authenticity no 22 party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454; (2) documents whose authenticity is not in question, 23 and upon which the complaint necessarily relies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see 24 Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials 25 of which the court may take judicial notice, see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 26 1994). 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 “The Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the 2 inartful pleading of pro se litigants. It is settled that the allegations of [a pro se litigant’s 3 complaint] however inartfully pleaded are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 4 drafted by lawyers.” See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation and 5 internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in original). The rule, however, “applies only to a 6 plaintiff’s factual allegations.” See Neitzke v.Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). ‘“[A] 7 liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim 8 that were not initially pled.”’ See Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th 9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 10 Further, leave to amend must be granted “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no 11 amendment can cure the defects.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per 12 curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 13 14 I. BACKGROUND 15 A. Procedural History 16 Plaintiff filed his complaint on March 3, 2025. See ECF No. 1. On May 29, 2025, 17 summonses were executed and served on Defendant Susanville Sanitary District and Defendant 18 City of Susanville requiring an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint due June 20, 2025. Defendants 19 Susanville Sanitary District and City of Susanville filed their respective motions to dismiss on 20 June 20, 2025. See ECF Nos. 5 and 6. 21 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 22 Plaintiff brings 42 U.S.C. Section 198 claims against Defendants City of 23 Susanville and Susanville Sanitary District alleging violations of the 1986 Fair Housing Act and 24 Fourteenth Amendment. See ECF No. 1 at 2-4. Plaintiff contends that Defendant City of 25 Susanville attempted to “force [Plaintiff] out of [his] home” in violation of the Fair Housing Act. 26 See id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant City of Susanville contaminated his drinking water by 27 putting “solvents” in his sewer and drain lines and intentionally caused “property damage with 28 uncontrolled water pressure.” Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff further contends that, after filing complaints 1 “with local authorities,” he was harassed with racial slurs. Id. at 6. 2 According to Plaintiff, when he attempted to file a complaint with the police 3 department regarding the chemicals “being pumped into [his] house by the Susanville Water and 4 Gas Department,” he was told that he could not file a complaint because of a conflict of interest 5 with the city. Id. Similarly, Plaintiff states that he was not allowed to file a complaint with the 6 Lassen County Seriff’s Department regarding “video evidence of someone waiting outside my 7 house yelling racial slurs.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that this conduct violates “equal protection under 8 the law.” Id. 9 Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Susanville Sanitary District, in a “concerted 10 effort with the Susanville Water Department,” violated his rights under the Fair Housing Act by 11 “trying to get [him] to sell [his] house.” Id. Plaintiff states that Defendant Susanville Sanitary 12 District intentionally caused sewer lines to clog on properties adjacent to Plaintiff’s. Id. Plaintiff 13 states that when his “sewer line would mysteriously clog, there would be someone waiting to 14 laugh or yell a racial slur.” Id. Finally, Plaintiff states that he has been “without water since July 15 31, 2024” because of a broken water line on city property. Id. at 7. Plaintiff alleges that the city 16 “says [Plaintiff] has to pay” for the water line to be fixed. Id. 17 18 II. DISCUSSION 19 In their motion to dismiss, Defendant Susanville Sanitary District raises two 20 arguments: first, Plaintiff fails to adequately plead Monell liability for all claims and second, all 21 the claims asserted in the complaint fail to meet the “plausible statement of facts required under 22 Ashcroft v. Iqbal.” See ECF No. 5, pg. 3. 23 Similarly, Defendant City of Susanville argues that in both claims, Plaintiff failed 24 to adequately allege liability pursuant to Monell and “adequately allege facts giving rise to a 25 violation.” ECF No. 6, pgs. 1-2. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 A. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claims 2 1. Monell Liability 3 Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to 4 whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 5 Counties and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. 6 at 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local 7 government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials 8 under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 9 397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of 10 the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the 11 plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or 12 custom of the municipality. See id. 13 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are liable under the Fourteenth Amendment for 14 harm suffered from racially motivated harassment and the denial of complaints filed with local 15 authorities. See ECF No. 1, pg. 6. Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege any factual basis 16 that Plaintiff was discriminated against based on membership of a protected class, or that 17 Defendants had a policy or custom amounting to deliberate indifference as required for a Monell 18 claim. See ECF No. 6, pg. 7. Specifically, Defendant Susanville Sanitary District argues that 19 Plaintiff’s claims arise from alleged racial slurs and laughing committed by unidentified persons 20 “not alleged to be employees or officers of the Susanville Sanitary District, and their alleged 21 conduct is not fairly attributed to the District nor can it be tied back to racial discriminatory 22 motivation on the part of the District.” ECF No. 5, pg. 7. Defendant City of Susanville states that 23 “the only basis for Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim against the City is that the City’s police 24 department refused to take a complaint due to a conflict of interest.” ECF No. 6, pg. 7. 25 Defendants are correct in asserting that municipal liability requires that the 26 County's policy, custom, or practice is what gives rise to the alleged constitutional 27 violations. Plaintiff’s claims do not adequately assert that Plaintiff is a member of a protected 28 group and that the harassment and denial of filing complaints are the result of a municipal policy 1 or custom let alone that the conduct causing the harassment and denial was committed by 2 employees of the Defendants. Thus, the Court will recommend that Defendants' motions to 3 dismiss under Monell be granted and that Plaintiff be directed to file an amended complaint to 4 provide sufficient facts to show a county policy, custom, or practice that resulted in the alleged 5 constitutional violations. 6 2. Compliance with Rule 8 7 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short 8 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. 10 Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are 11 satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds 12 upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff 13 must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which 14 support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. 15 Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated 16 individuals are treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state 17 purpose. See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 18 16 (1972). Equal protection claims are not necessarily limited to racial and religious 19 discrimination. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying 20 minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim by a disabled plaintiff because the disabled do not 21 constitute a suspect class); see also Harrison v. Kernan, 971 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2020) (applying 22 intermediate scrutiny to claim of discrimination on the basis of gender). 23 In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 24 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that defendants acted with intentional 25 discrimination against plaintiff, or against a class of individuals which included plaintiff, and that 26 such conduct did not relate to a legitimate government purpose. See Village of Willowbrook v. 27 Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (2000) (holding that equal 28 protection claims may be brought by a “class of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 1 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal 2 Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 3 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985). There is, however, no equal protection scrutiny under a "class 4 of one" theory absent a pattern of generally exercising government authority in a particular 5 manner while treating one individual differently and detrimentally. See Tower v. Brewer, 672 6 F.3d 650, 660-61 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 7 Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims fall below the standard required by 8 Iqbal and Twombly. Defendant City of Susanville argues that “the complaint does not contain 9 factual allegations showing that Plaintiff was treated differently from other similarly situated 10 individuals because of racial prejudice or other illegal discrimination.” ECF No. 6, pg. 7. 11 Defendant Susanville Sanitary District states “Plaintiff does not allege membership of a protected 12 racial class” nor “that he was denied service by the Susanville Sanitary District.” ECF No. 5, pg. 13 6. 14 Defendants’ arguments, which Plaintiff does not oppose, are well-taken. Most 15 notably, Plaintiff does not allege Defendants treated Plaintiff differently from similarly situated 16 residents on account of his membership in a protected class. In fact, Plaintiff has failed to 17 establish the foundational premise that he is a member of a protected class. Furthermore, Plaintiff 18 fails to allege facts showing that Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff because 19 of his membership in a protected class. With regard to the Fourteenth Amendment claims, 20 Plaintiff alleges that other governmental departments denied him the ability to file complaints and 21 that, “sometimes when [his] sewer line would mysteriously clog, there be someone waiting to 22 laugh and yell racial slurs” at him. ECF No. 1 pg. 6. 23 Based on these allegations, it is unclear whether, and how, the named Defendants 24 were intentionally discriminating against Plaintiff for membership of a protected class. These 25 allegations are vague and conclusory. Therefore, the Court will recommend that 26 Defendants’ motions to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) be granted, and 27 that Plaintiff be directed to file an amended complaint that includes sufficient facts to show 28 conduct of intentional discrimination against plaintiff that does not relate to a legitimate 1 government purpose. 2 B. Fair Housing Act Claims 3 The Fair Housing Act (FHA) states that “[i]t is the policy of the United States to 4 provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.” 42 5 U.S.C. § 3601. Thus, it is unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or 6 deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national 7 origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Specific unlawful practices that have the effect of making a 8 dwelling otherwise unavailable includes discriminating “because of race ‘in the provision of 9 services or facilities” in connection with “the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a 10 dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). This extends to “[r]efusing to provide municipal services or 11 property or hazard insurance for dwellings or providing such services or insurance differently 12 because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.” 24 CFR 13 100.70(d)(4); see also Ojo v. Farmers Grp., 600 F.3d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the 14 FHA prohibits racial discrimination in both the denial and pricing of homeowner's insurance); see 15 also Pac. Shores Props., Ltd. Liab. Co. v. City of Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1157 (9th Cir. 16 2013) (holding that “a municipality violates [the FHA] if its zoning practices . . . discriminate 17 against disabled individuals . . . [and] contribute to mak[ing] unavailable or deny[ing] housing to 18 those persons”). 19 A plaintiff bringing a claim under the FHA “has the burden of proving that a 20 challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.” 24 CFR 21 §100.500(c)(1) (2014). As it relates to 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), “[f]or a plaintiff to make out a prima 22 facie case of disparate impact, he must demonstrate: (1) the existence of a policy, not a one-time 23 decision, that is outwardly neutral; (2) a significant, adverse, and disproportionate effect on a 24 protected class; and (3) robust causality that shows, beyond mere evidence of a statistical 25 disparity, that the challenged policy, and not some other factor or policy, caused the 26 disproportionate effect.” Sw. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Maricopa Domestic Water Improvement 27 Dist., 17 F.4th 950, 962 (9th Cir. 2021). Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie showing of 28 disparate impact, the burden shifts to the defendant to “prov[e] that the challenged practice is 1 necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests.” 2 §100.500(c)(2). 3 Defendants argue that “Plaintiff’s complaint contains no factual allegations to 4 support a Fair Housing Act Claim for intentional discrimination.” ECF No. 6, pg. 6. Specifically, 5 Defendant Susanville Sanitary District argues that Plaintiff did not allege membership in a protect 6 racial class nor that he was denied service by the Susanville Sanitary District. See ECF No. 5, 7 pgs. 5-6. Instead, Defendant Susanville Sanitary District argues, Plaintiff only alleges that his 8 neighbor’s sewer lines were intentionally clogged. See id. Further, Defendant Susanville Sanitary 9 District states that Plaintiffs claims of an unidentified person engaging in racial slurs and laughing 10 “are not alleged to be employees or officers of the Susanville Sanitary District.” Id. at 6. 11 Defendant City of Susanville argues more broadly that, because “there is no allegation that 12 Plaintiff purchased the property from the city, was a tenant of the City, or that the City financed 13 the property, or denied Plaintiff any of those things based on Plaintiff’s membership in a 14 protected class,” “the Fair Housing Act simply does not cover Plaintiff’s claims.” ECF No. 6, pg. 15 6. 16 This Court agrees with Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s FHA claims are 17 deficient. Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to allow the Court to reasonably infer that 18 Defendants intentionally discriminated against him by subjecting him to differential treatment 19 based on his race. Specifically, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to show the causal link between an 20 existing policy and a disproportionate effect on a protected class. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to 21 establish a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination under the FHA. The Court will 22 recommend that Plaintiff’s Fair Housing Act claim be dismissed, and the Plaintiff be directed to 23 file an amended complaint that includes sufficient facts to show disparate-impact discrimination 24 as a result of policy or custom. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Ill. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends as follows: 3 1. It is RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ unopposed motion to dismiss, 4 | ECF No. 5 and 6, be GRANTED and that Plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED with leave to 5 || amend. 6 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 7 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days 8 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 9 || objections with the Court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of 10 || objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See 11 | Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 12 13 | Dated: September 17, 2025 Ss..c0_, M4 DENNIS M. COTA 15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10