In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-24-00196-CR
WAYLON CORD WHITE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 102nd District Court Bowie County, Texas Trial Court No. 23F1257-102
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef MEMORANDUM OPINION
A Bowie County jury convicted Waylon Cord White of aggravated sexual assault of a
child.1 He now appeals, claiming that (1) the trial court should have granted his motion for a
directed verdict and (2) the admission of testimony and evidence from a sexual assault nursing
examiner should not have been admitted. We overrule both points of error and affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
I. Trial Evidence
Dolly Ann2 was five years old when she testified that she often stayed at the home of her
mother’s friend, Tiffany White. Tiffany is White’s mother, and White lived with her. Dolly Ann
described an occasion when she was staying at Tiffany’s house and White “put his hand down
[her] butt and [her] front area” as she was sleeping on the couch. As he was doing that, he said,
“I’m just loving on you.” She said it hurt when White touched her. Though she had regularly
stayed with Tiffany, Dolly Ann quit going to Tiffany’s house, where she might encounter White.
She testified, “I stopped when [White] putted (sic) his hands down there.” Dolly Ann was four
when she made her outcry. She told Tiffany the morning the assault occurred.
Dolly Ann’s mother, Linda, learned about the allegation when she received a telephone
call from Tiffany that morning. Tiffany took Dolly Ann to daycare and called Linda to tell her
what Dolly Ann had said. Both Linda and Tiffany were skeptical that White would do such a
1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(f)(1). 2 This is a pseudonym used at trial. We use pseudonyms to protect the identity of “any person who was a minor at the time the offense was committed.” TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(a)(3). We have also obscured the familial relations between some witnesses and used a pseudonym for the child’s mother to protect the complainant’s identity. 2 thing and thought that any touching must have been inadvertent. Linda decided to check on
Dolly Ann at daycare. While describing Dolly Ann’s demeanor, Linda stated, “And at first she
was like nothing happened and then she started getting teary-eyed and I could see something was
wrong. . . . I could see it in her eyes.” She continued, “It took her a little bit to get it out because
she was scared. I think she thought she was gonna get in trouble at first. . . . [S]he literally said
that he stuck his fingers up her bobo.” Linda explained that “bobo” meant Dolly Ann’s “butt
hole, her hole.” When asked if Dolly Ann identified which body parts White touched, Linda
answered, “She said her bobo first. She kept saying her bobo and then I -- and then she said her
front also, her front hole. She kept saying inside basically is what she said.” Linda told the jury
that Dolly Ann differentiated her orifices as “pee pee, poo poo. . . . [S]he will say pee pee, poo
poo, or front or butt, her bottom.” Dolly Ann told her mother the touching hurt. Katy Lach, the
sexual assault nursing examiner (SANE) who examined Dolly Ann, testified that the child told
her, “[White] stuck his hand inside my tutu and my bottom. I was on the couch sleeping and
[White] put his finger in my tutu and my bottom on purpose.” Lach noted that there was no
trauma, which she said was not uncommon.
II. No Error in Denial of Motion for Directed Verdict
A. Standard of Review
After the State rested its case, White moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court
denied.3 White claims there was no evidence he intentionally or knowingly penetrated Dolly
Ann’s vagina. We disagree and overrule this point of error. “We treat a point of error
3 After presenting testimony from Tiffany, White re-urged his motion, which the trial court again denied. 3 complaining about a trial court’s failure to grant a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to
the legal sufficiency of the evidence.” Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996) (citing Cook v. State, 858 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); see Smith v. State,
499 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if any
rational trier of fact could have found each of the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979); Whatley v. State, 445
S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).4
B. Application
Dolly Ann testified that White put his hand down her butt and front area. Linda and
Tiffany confirmed that she made the outcry around the time of the allegation. Linda testified that
when Dolly Ann described the event to her, Dolly Ann said the touching was “inside.”
“The testimony of a child victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated
sexual assault or indecency with a child.” Scott v. State, 202 S.W.3d 405, 408 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2006, pet. ref’d) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07). Also, “[i]t is not
necessary that the sexual assault complainant be able to testify as to penetration. Penetration
may be proved by circumstantial evidence.” Belt v. State, 227 S.W.3d 339, 342 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (citing Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 133 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990)).5
4 The indictment alleged White penetrated Dolly Ann’s sexual organ with his finger or fingers. 5 Villalon recognized
the important public policy that we cannot expect the child victims of violent crimes to testify with the same clarity and ability as is expected of mature and capable adults. To expect such 4 The requisite intent can be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused.
Turner v. State, 600 S.W.2d 927, 929–30 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Wyatt v. State, 23
S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“A reasonable person could infer that appellant
murdered the child and faked the drowning in an attempt to cover up the sexual assault.”). “By
its nature, a culpable mental state must generally be inferred from the circumstances.” Romano
v. State, 610 S.W.3d 30, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 267
(Tex. Crim. App. 2018)). Dolly Ann told the jury that, while White was engaged in touching
her, he said, “I’m just loving on you.” That is compelling evidence that White intended to do
what he was doing, i.e., touching Dolly Ann’s female sexual organ. Also, Lach testified that
Dolly Ann told her White “put his finger in [her] tutu and [her] bottom on purpose.”
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In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-24-00196-CR
WAYLON CORD WHITE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 102nd District Court Bowie County, Texas Trial Court No. 23F1257-102
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef MEMORANDUM OPINION
A Bowie County jury convicted Waylon Cord White of aggravated sexual assault of a
child.1 He now appeals, claiming that (1) the trial court should have granted his motion for a
directed verdict and (2) the admission of testimony and evidence from a sexual assault nursing
examiner should not have been admitted. We overrule both points of error and affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
I. Trial Evidence
Dolly Ann2 was five years old when she testified that she often stayed at the home of her
mother’s friend, Tiffany White. Tiffany is White’s mother, and White lived with her. Dolly Ann
described an occasion when she was staying at Tiffany’s house and White “put his hand down
[her] butt and [her] front area” as she was sleeping on the couch. As he was doing that, he said,
“I’m just loving on you.” She said it hurt when White touched her. Though she had regularly
stayed with Tiffany, Dolly Ann quit going to Tiffany’s house, where she might encounter White.
She testified, “I stopped when [White] putted (sic) his hands down there.” Dolly Ann was four
when she made her outcry. She told Tiffany the morning the assault occurred.
Dolly Ann’s mother, Linda, learned about the allegation when she received a telephone
call from Tiffany that morning. Tiffany took Dolly Ann to daycare and called Linda to tell her
what Dolly Ann had said. Both Linda and Tiffany were skeptical that White would do such a
1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(f)(1). 2 This is a pseudonym used at trial. We use pseudonyms to protect the identity of “any person who was a minor at the time the offense was committed.” TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(a)(3). We have also obscured the familial relations between some witnesses and used a pseudonym for the child’s mother to protect the complainant’s identity. 2 thing and thought that any touching must have been inadvertent. Linda decided to check on
Dolly Ann at daycare. While describing Dolly Ann’s demeanor, Linda stated, “And at first she
was like nothing happened and then she started getting teary-eyed and I could see something was
wrong. . . . I could see it in her eyes.” She continued, “It took her a little bit to get it out because
she was scared. I think she thought she was gonna get in trouble at first. . . . [S]he literally said
that he stuck his fingers up her bobo.” Linda explained that “bobo” meant Dolly Ann’s “butt
hole, her hole.” When asked if Dolly Ann identified which body parts White touched, Linda
answered, “She said her bobo first. She kept saying her bobo and then I -- and then she said her
front also, her front hole. She kept saying inside basically is what she said.” Linda told the jury
that Dolly Ann differentiated her orifices as “pee pee, poo poo. . . . [S]he will say pee pee, poo
poo, or front or butt, her bottom.” Dolly Ann told her mother the touching hurt. Katy Lach, the
sexual assault nursing examiner (SANE) who examined Dolly Ann, testified that the child told
her, “[White] stuck his hand inside my tutu and my bottom. I was on the couch sleeping and
[White] put his finger in my tutu and my bottom on purpose.” Lach noted that there was no
trauma, which she said was not uncommon.
II. No Error in Denial of Motion for Directed Verdict
A. Standard of Review
After the State rested its case, White moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court
denied.3 White claims there was no evidence he intentionally or knowingly penetrated Dolly
Ann’s vagina. We disagree and overrule this point of error. “We treat a point of error
3 After presenting testimony from Tiffany, White re-urged his motion, which the trial court again denied. 3 complaining about a trial court’s failure to grant a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to
the legal sufficiency of the evidence.” Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996) (citing Cook v. State, 858 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); see Smith v. State,
499 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if any
rational trier of fact could have found each of the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979); Whatley v. State, 445
S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).4
B. Application
Dolly Ann testified that White put his hand down her butt and front area. Linda and
Tiffany confirmed that she made the outcry around the time of the allegation. Linda testified that
when Dolly Ann described the event to her, Dolly Ann said the touching was “inside.”
“The testimony of a child victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated
sexual assault or indecency with a child.” Scott v. State, 202 S.W.3d 405, 408 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2006, pet. ref’d) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07). Also, “[i]t is not
necessary that the sexual assault complainant be able to testify as to penetration. Penetration
may be proved by circumstantial evidence.” Belt v. State, 227 S.W.3d 339, 342 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (citing Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 133 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990)).5
4 The indictment alleged White penetrated Dolly Ann’s sexual organ with his finger or fingers. 5 Villalon recognized
the important public policy that we cannot expect the child victims of violent crimes to testify with the same clarity and ability as is expected of mature and capable adults. To expect such 4 The requisite intent can be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused.
Turner v. State, 600 S.W.2d 927, 929–30 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Wyatt v. State, 23
S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“A reasonable person could infer that appellant
murdered the child and faked the drowning in an attempt to cover up the sexual assault.”). “By
its nature, a culpable mental state must generally be inferred from the circumstances.” Romano
v. State, 610 S.W.3d 30, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 267
(Tex. Crim. App. 2018)). Dolly Ann told the jury that, while White was engaged in touching
her, he said, “I’m just loving on you.” That is compelling evidence that White intended to do
what he was doing, i.e., touching Dolly Ann’s female sexual organ. Also, Lach testified that
Dolly Ann told her White “put his finger in [her] tutu and [her] bottom on purpose.”
A rational jury could have found the required elements of aggravated sexual assault of a
child beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court did not err in denying White’s motion for a
directed verdict. We overrule the first point of error.
III. SANE Argument Not Preserved
In his second point of error, White complains the trial court erred by admitting testimony
and records from Lach. According to White, Dolly Ann’s reported statements were not reliable,
or were false, and hence admission of evidence from Lach was error. White made no objection
to the trial court regarding Lach’s records, either concerning reliability or falsity. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 33.1; Auld v. State, 652 S.W.3d 95, 109 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2022, no pet.). In fact,
testimonial capabilities of children would be to condone, if not encourage, the searching out of children to be the victims of crimes such as the instant offense in order to evade successful prosecution.
Villalon, 791 S.W.2d at 134; see Mosley v. State, 141 S.W.3d 816, 823 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, pet. ref’d). 5 at trial, White expressed “[n]o objection” to the records, which were included in State’s exhibit 1
and admitted into evidence by the trial court. White does not direct us to any particular
testimony of Lach, nor any particular objection to Lach’s testimony.
Because this claim was not preserved in the trial court, we will not review it.6
White’s second point of error is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
We overrule both points of error. However, we observe an inaccuracy in the trial court’s
judgment nunc pro tunc.7 The judgment states that the statute for the offense of conviction is
Section 22.021(a)(2)(B) of the Texas Penal Code. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.021(a)(2)(B). However, White was convicted of violating Section 22.021(f)(1) of the Texas
Penal Code, assaulting a victim younger than six years old, subjecting White to an increased
penalty range. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(f)(1). As a result, we modify the judgment
of conviction nunc pro tunc to reflect that the “Statute for Offense” is Section 22.021(f)(1) of the
Texas Penal Code.
6 In his brief, White states, “While there was no objection to the State’s use of false statements in an attempt to secure convictions in this case, where the resolution of merits is straightforward, a Court may consider such due process arguments.” Elsewhere in his brief, he argues that Dolly Ann was not credible, and this seems to be the source of his claim that false testimony was presented by the State. The jury was responsible for weighing the credibility of the witnesses. See Schmidt v. State, 232 S.W.3d 66, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Testimony that is weak, contradicted, or made by a young child does not render the testimony false. 7 “This Court has the power to correct and modify the judgment of the trial court for accuracy when the necessary data and information are part of the record.” Anthony v. State, 531 S.W.3d 739, 743 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (en banc)). “The authority of an appellate court to reform incorrect judgments is not dependent upon the request of any party, nor does it turn on the question of whether a party has or has not objected in the trial court.” Id. (quoting Asberry, 813 S.W.2d at 529–30). 6 As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Charles van Cleef Justice Date Submitted: July 22, 2025 Date Decided: September 15, 2025
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