Home/Superior Court of Pennsylvania/Waxman v. Loranger Plastics Corp.

Waxman v. Loranger Plastics Corp.

493 A.2d 713, 342 Pa. Super. 524, 1985 Pa. Super. LEXIS 7846
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 17, 1985
DocketNo. 1173
StatusPublished

This text of 493 A.2d 713 (Waxman v. Loranger Plastics Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Waxman v. Loranger Plastics Corp., 493 A.2d 713, 342 Pa. Super. 524, 1985 Pa. Super. LEXIS 7846 (Pa. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinion

HOFFMAN, Judge:

The basic issue on appeal is: “[W]hat is the appropriate method of allocating, between adjoining riparian owners, property situate between the high water mark and the low water mark where the deeds contain descriptions terminating at the top of the bank, and accordingly offer no guidance whatsoever as to how such allocation should be accomplished.” (Brief for Appellant at 8). For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the order below.

The relevant facts are as follows (see Diagrams A and B for illustration): The parties own adjoining parcels of land situated along a riverfront in Warren County. Each parcel is roughly rectangular in shape and, according to their respective deeds, each is bounded on the north by Clark Street and on the south by the Allegheny River. However, the stated distances in the deeds cause the southern bound[526]*526ary of each parcel to terminate at or about the original location of the top of the river bank. Thus, because the respective sidelines of each parcel run at angles oblique to one another, if the sidelines were extended to the water’s edge, they would intersect within the expanse of land lying between the original top of the bank and the low water mark. This expanse of land had once been subjected to seasonal flooding with resultant changes in the river level but by 1977 had become high, dry and usable land. The common boundary line between the two parcels was created by James Clark and his wife when they conveyed their lot (now owned by defendant-appellee) to M. Beecher in 1885. Beecher, in turn, conveyed the lot to defendant-appellee in 1976. Plaintiff-appellant claims title to two adjoining parcels of land, namely, the “Carlson” and “Bacon” lots, which he acquired from James L. Sturdevant and his wife in 1979. These lots had been created in 1905 and 1903, respectively, as part of a subdivision by the Helping Hand Building and Loan Association. Helping Hand had received its title by sheriff’s deed from William Kline and his wife in 1896.

In 1977, defendant-appellee constructed a building which extended beyond the southern boundary of the original deed description of its parcel and onto the disputed area lying between the original top of the bank and the water’s edge. Consequently, plaintiff-appellant filed an action in ejectment with a demand for damages against defendant-appellee, alleging that this building encroached upon his land. On September 9, 1982, the lower court entered an Opinion and Decree Nisi granting ejectment relief to plaintiff-appellant. Upon defendant-appellee’s filing exceptions, the court took testimony on August 8, 1983, and granted the exception concerning the proper rule of shoreline apportionment. Plaintiff-appellant then filed a supplemental brief in opposition to the exceptions. On September 15, 1983, the lower court entered an order (1) granting defendant-appellee’s exceptions to the September 9, 1982 Decree Nisi, (2) dividing the disputed land between the parties in accordance with defendant-appellee’s Exhibit A-13, see Diagram A, and [527]*527(3) entering Final Decree in favor of defendant-appellee. This appeal followed.

The parties each espouse a different rule of shoreline apportionment. Under appellant’s rule, appellee’s building would be an encroachment upon appellant’s land thereby entitling appellant to ejectment relief; but under appellee’s rule, the building would properly be situated on appellee’s land. See Lakeside Park Co. v. Forsmark, 396 Pa. 389, 395, 153 A.2d 486, 489 (1959) (patentee of land bordering river takes to middle of nonnavigable river and to low water mark of navigable river).

Appellant contends that the lower court erred in failing to apply the rule of shoreline apportionment set forth in Wood v. Appal, 63 Pa. 210 (1869), as follows:

The serpentine course of the stream, or its relative distances from the bank at different points, can make no serious difference as to the line of approach to the water’s edge. Starting from the bank, a direct course to the stream, or at right angles to the stream, must always afford the shortest and most certain boundary of river frontage. Of course the rule as now laid down applies only to a case where no other intention is disclosed by the return of survey, or the deed.

Id. at 225 (emphasis added). Appellant therefore argues that, where as here, the sidelines of the competing parcels converge drastically so as to come to an apex before the water’s edge, allocation must be had by lines running from the top of the bank on a direct and perpendicular course to the thread of the stream. See Diagram B.

Appellee, however, argues that the lower court properly applied the proportional shoreline method in dividing the disputed river frontage according to appellee’s Exhibit A-13. Under this method, adjoining landowners would receive river frontage on the new water’s edge (low water mark) proportional to their frontage on the original top of the bank (high water mark). See Diagram A. Appellee distinguishes Wood v. Appal, supra, on the ground that, in that case, the high water mark and low water mark were rough[528]*528ly parallel and therefore a line drawn perpendicular to the stream awarded the parties equal frontage on both the old and new banks. Here, however, the width between the high water mark and low water mark narrows and then widens as the river bends; therefore, a perpendicular line division would not yield proportional frontage on the old and new banks, but, instead, would create an inequitable, random apportionment along the shoreline, e.g., appellee’s access to the river may be completely, cut off whereas a large triangular portion of the frontage upstream from the parties’ parcels may be left unapportioned.

After careful consideration of these competing claims, we find appellee’s arguments more persuasive and therefore conclude that the proportional shoreline method applied by the lower court is the most equitable and reasonable resolution of the dispute. We also find Wood v. Appal, supra, distinguishable for two reasons. First, subsequent to that case, our Supreme Court emphasized that the “rule” set forth therein should be limited to the facts of that case and that each particular case must be decided with regard to its own circumstances, rather than following any inflexible rule of law. Kreiter v. Bigler, 101 Pa. 94, 101 (1882). Additionally, we agree with appellee that, where the low water mark and high water mark are not parallel along the shoreline, applying the “right-angle” method of apportionment would produce absurd divisions of river frontage. Our position is further supported by modern precedent:

[I]n apportioning and dividing the bed of a river or the riparian rights areas in the river, as between two or more riparian tracts fronting on the same bank, in the absence of an agreement, specification, or statute, or other definitely controlling factor, the court should apportion and divide the area equitably in such a way that each of the riparian tracts will be assigned an extended frontage in the river based on and generally proportionate to the length of such tract’s frontage along the riverbank or shore. For the most part the authorities are in agreement that in the apportionment of appurtenant areas of [529]

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Lakeside Park Co. v. Forsmark
153 A.2d 486 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1959)
Wood v. Appal
63 Pa. 210 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1870)
Kreiter v. Bigler
101 Pa. 94 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1882)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
493 A.2d 713, 342 Pa. Super. 524, 1985 Pa. Super. LEXIS 7846, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/waxman-v-loranger-plastics-corp-pasuperct-1985.