Wavelength Film Co. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.

631 F. Supp. 305, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 714, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27772
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedMarch 24, 1986
Docket85 C 5106
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 631 F. Supp. 305 (Wavelength Film Co. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wavelength Film Co. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 305, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 714, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27772 (N.D. Ill. 1986).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ORDER

BUA, District Judge.

Before this Court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). For the reasons stated herein, this Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment in defendants’ favor.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff Wavelength Film Company’s cause of action arises out of an alleged copyright infringement. An action for copyright infringement requires the plaintiff to prove the following four elements: (1) ownership of the copyright in the complaining work; (2) originality of the work; (3) copying of the work by the defendant; and (4) a substantial degree of similarity between defendant’s and plaintiff’s work. Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir.1984).

The issue before this Court is whether the motion pictures produced by plaintiff, “Wavelength,” and by defendants, “Star-man,” are sufficiently similar to raise a *306 genuine issue of copyright infringement. This Court believes that no genuine issue of copyright infringement exists. This Court holds no reasonable jury could find the two motion pictures to be substantially similar.

It is well accepted that the purpose of summary judgment is to prevent an unnecessary trial where, on the basis of the pleadings and supporting documents, there remains no material issue of fact to be tried. Kirk v. Home Indemnity Co., 431 F.2d 554, 559 (7th Cir.1970). Summary judgment is appropriate only if it appears that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fitzsimmons v. Best, 528 F.2d 692, 694 (7th Cir.1976); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The burden is upon the moving party to show that there is no issue of material fact in dispute. All doubts as to the existence of an issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party.

The issue of whether two motion pictures are substantially similar in a copyright action normally presents a factual issue that cannot be resolved by summary judgment. Zambito v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 613 F.Supp. 1107, 1110 (E.D.N.Y.1985). However, summary judgment is appropriate when a court concludes either that any similarity between the works concerns only noncopyrightable elements or that no reasonable jury could find the works substantially similar. Id.; Warner Brothers, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir.1983).

The test for substantial similarity is “whether an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.” Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F.Supp. 1297, 1302 (S.D.N.Y.1984). Before assessing whether a properly instructed jury would find two motion pictures substantially similar, this Court must review a few basic principles delineating the scope of copyright protection.

The courts have long agreed that a copyright protects only an author’s original expression of an idea. The idea itself remains unprotected. Id. at 1301. In addition, a copyright affords no protection to so-called “scenes a faire.” Scenes a faire consist of characters, settings, or events which necessarily follow from a certain theme or plot situation. Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.1976).

Plaintiff contends a genuine issue of copyright infringement exists. Plaintiff presents 33 actionable similarities in the characters, setting, and action employed in expressing each film’s theme. Defendants argue that any alleged similarities existing between the two works are either noncopyrightable “scenes a faire” or insufficiently similar to raise an issue of substantial similarity.

This Court need not discuss every alleged similarity in the two works. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 615 F.Supp. 430 (E.D.N.Y.1985). A brief discussion of the salient portions of plaintiff’s argument is illustrative and sufficient to demonstrate the lack of similarity.

First, the alien characters in both motion pictures are portrayed differently. The age of the aliens differ in both films. In “Starman,” the alien is a man approximately 35 years old. In contrast, the aliens in “Wavelength” are portrayed by children approximately nine years old. The number of aliens also differs in both films. The “Starman” alien is the only alien on earth, whereas the “Wavelength” aliens are three in number. The mode of alien communication differs in both films. The “Starman” alien speaks through his mouth like an ordinary man and can speak in 52 languages. However, the “Wavelength” aliens never speak; they communicate solely through mental telepathy. A review of plaintiff's claim of character infringement reveals that no jury could reasonably find the alien characters substantially similar.

Second, the aliens’ relationship with the lead protagonists in each film is dissimilar. The “Starman” alien and the earth protagonist develop a mature love relationship. The “Starman” producer expresses an inti *307 mate, caring, and sexual relationship between the two characters. In sharp contrast, the “Wavelength” producer develops a parent-child relationship between the earth protagonists and the aliens. No intimate or sexual relationship exists between the protagonist earth people and the three youthful “Wavelength” aliens. The “Wavelength” earth people merely attempt to protect the aliens from the film’s antagonist, the military, as a mother would protect her children.

Third, substantial similarity in the settings of the two works does not exist. Although the action in both films takes place in the United States, this similarity of locale is simply too insignificant to warrant copyright protection. All scenes in “Wavelength” are located in California, with the film ending in California’s Mojave Desert. The “Starman” setting comprises half of the United States. The adventure begins in the deep woods of northern Wisconsin. Then, the “Starman” alien travels across the western region of the United States to his destination in Arizona.

Fourth, the aliens’ disposition towards earth people differs dramatically in both films. The multiple “Wavelength” aliens murder numerous civilian and military personnel. These aliens “suck the energy and life” out of many earth people. In sharp contrast, the “Starman” alien restores life to a dead animal and to his dead earth lover, the protagonist. At no time does the “Starman” alien murder an earth person.

Finally, plaintiff argues that the spaceship that rescues the aliens from earth in each film is substantially similar. This Court disagrees.

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631 F. Supp. 305, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 714, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27772, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wavelength-film-co-v-columbia-pictures-industries-inc-ilnd-1986.