Watts v. Praeger

93 F.2d 904, 25 C.C.P.A. 807, 1938 CCPA LEXIS 33
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJanuary 24, 1938
DocketNo. 3842; No. 3843
StatusPublished

This text of 93 F.2d 904 (Watts v. Praeger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Watts v. Praeger, 93 F.2d 904, 25 C.C.P.A. 807, 1938 CCPA LEXIS 33 (ccpa 1938).

Opinion

Garrett, Presiding Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

We have here an interference proceeding in which appeals have been taken by both parties from the decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office. Seven counts, numbered 1 to 7, inclusive are involved. Priority was awarded the party Watts by both the Examiner of Interferences and the board as to counts 1, 4,, 5, 6 and 7. The Examiner of Interferences awarded priority to-Watts as to counts 2 and 3 also, but this .part of his decision was reversed by the board and priority as to them awarded to the party Praeger.

Watts is the senior party. His application was filed February 2, 1928. The application of Praeger was filed November 22, 1930. Originally the Praeger application was filed as a joint application of Praeger and a party named Alcorn, but subsequently it was amended and Praeger was left as the sole claimant.

In the course of the proceedings in the Patent Office both applications became involved in a series of interferences to several of which there were, at times, other parties. Counts 1 and 2 of the issue before us were involved before the Examiner of Interferences in Interference 65,623, count 3 in Interference 65,624, and counts 4, 5, 6 and 7 in Interference 65,625. When these three cases reached the board all [808]*808parties except Watts and Praeger bad been eliminated. Upon motion of the party Watts the three interferences were consolidated and all the issues presented and decided in Interference 65,623.

. Of the several preliminary statements it need only be said of each that Praeger’s claimed date of conception was more than a year subsequent to the filing date of the Watts application.

Praeger was placed under order to show cause why judgment of record should not be entered against him. He thereupon moved to dissolve on the ground that Watts was not entitled to make the counts. The respective tribunals of the Patent Office held as has been indicated, the Examiner of Interferences denying the motion with an award of priority to Watts on all the counts and the Board of Appeals affirming as to counts 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 but reversing as to counts 2 and 3 with an award of priority as to them to Praeger.

As the issue is presented here the question of priority is solely dependent upon the ancillary question of the right of Watts to make the counts.

All the counts are claims for an apparatus, or furnace, used in the oil refining industry. ' The application of Praeger is entitled “For Heat Transfer Systems”; that of Watts for “improvement in Pipe Still.”

As illustrative we quote counts 1 and 2:

1. Oil heating apparatus comprising a chamber containing a source of heat, a second chamber in communication with and. traversed by hot gases from said first chamber, tubes in said second chamber containing oil to be heated and absorbing heat substantially solely by convection, tubes in said first chamber connected to said first tubes and absorbing heat by radiation and convection, and tubes connected to said other tubes and disposed adjacent the bottom of said first chamber below the path of said hot gases for absorbing heat substantially solely by radiation.
2. Oil heating apparatus comprising a heating chamber traversed by hot gases or products of combustion, roof tubes disposed within said heating Chamber and absorbing heat by radiation and convection, and floor tubes disposed below the currents of hot gases or products of combustion for absorbing heat preponderantly by radiation, said tubes connected so that the oil therein flows through the said roof tubes and floor tubes in the order named.

It will be seen that the counts describe a structure which includes a combustion chamber and an additional chamber into which the products of combustion are led from the combustion chamber, certain banks of tubes being located in the respective chambers, those in the second chamber to be heated substantially solely by convection and one of those (the lower bank) in the first, or combustion chamber, to be heated substantially solely, or preponderantly by radiation.

As to all the counts we have the question of whether Watts discloses, as expressed in count 1, a bank of tubes connected with other tubes, with the first bank disposed adjacent the bottom of the com[809]*809bination chamber of the furnace “below the path of said hot gases: for absorbing heat substantially solely by radiation,” or, as expressed in many of the counts, “preponderantly by radiation.”

Throughout the proceedings “substantially solely” and “preponderantly,” we think properly, have been treated as having the same meaning, so far as this case is concerned. As to counts 2 and 3 an additional question is whether the disclosure of Watts supports the respective limitations requiring (in count 2) that the sets of tubes be connected “so that the oil therein flows through the said roof tubes and floor tubes in the order named,” and (in count 3) “so that the oil therein flows through the said roof tubes, wall tubes, and floor tubes in the order named.”

It was because of the particular limitations quoted from counts 2 and 3 that the board held Watts not entitled to make those counts.

For disclosure the party Watts is compelled, in our opinion, to rely upon the showing made in his drawings, particularly in Figure 1, together with such description thereof as his specification affords. The board states:

* * * The Watts specification briefly describes the structure and relationship of the parts but has nothing to say with respect to. the heating principles involved in the utilization of his structure. Praeger’s disclosure, on the contrary, dwells at great length on the principles of heat transfer, of which his organization makes use. These principles are somewhat involved in the counts on appeal. Watts’ right to make the counts depends on whether or not heat transfer inherently takes place in his apparatus when used as contemplated in accordance with the principles recited in the claims. [Italics ours.]
Appellant apparently does not question the readability of count 1 upon the Watts disclosure, in so far as it defines structure and relationship of the various: sets of tubes, except the last. Appellant contends that the last set of tubes is. not “below the path of the hot gases” and that it does not absorb heat “substantially solely by radiation” or as set forth in other counts, “preponderantly by radiation.”

Figure 1 of the Watts drawing discloses a furnace having a combustion chamber divided from another chamber by a partition wall extending from tire bottom of the structure to a point near its top, or roof. At the bottom of the combustion chamber is shown a triangular depression which is described in his specification as an ash pit, and much of the controversy here grows out of the existence of this element. Above the ash pit is a bank of tubes, designated by the letter A, which, were there no ash pit, would clearly be adjacent the bottom floor.

Another bank of tubes, indicated by the letter B, is shown higher up in the combustion chamber, apparently not separated by any wall or partition from the path of the fuel flames. Two banks of tubes are shown in the second chamber, and tubes also are shown in the [810]*810roof and walls of the combustion chamber. Our concern is with the set of tubes designated by the letter A.

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93 F.2d 904, 25 C.C.P.A. 807, 1938 CCPA LEXIS 33, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/watts-v-praeger-ccpa-1938.