Watt v. Unifirst Corp.

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: December 12, 2007
• Docket: CUMcv-06-510
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION ~ DOCKET NO: CV-06-51 t2A.{' _ ('. Irq,_/", 7f ' \ PrJ ,.-,,7 ('In - -.. ' \ '. cY!...-1 I 0'- I (> j j f LINDA WATT, , ! ' I

Plaintiffs, ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

UNIFIRST CORPORATION,

Defendant.

This case comes before the Court on Defendant UniFirst Corporation's

(UniFirst) Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff Linda Watt (Ms. Watt) claims that UniFirst failed to comply with

the Maine Human Rights Act when it did not remedy a hostile work

environment and subsequently fired Ms. Watt in retaliation for her complaints of

sexual harassment by a coworker. Ms. Watt was sexually harassed by a

coworker, John Hughes (Hughes), while they were employed with UniFirst in

2005.

Ms. Watt began working at UniFirst in the summer of 2004 as a

dockworker. At orientation, Ms. Watt was fully trained in UniFirst's sexual

harassment policies. Sometime during the spring of 2005 she and Hughes began

to have altercations. Neither party disputes that on or about May 16, 2005

Hughes sexually harassed Ms. Watt in the UniFirst breakroom. Ms. Watt

reported that incident to her supervisors and Hughes ultimately received a

"verbal warning" in his file with directions to cease the offensive behavior and

any interactions with Ms. Watt.

1 Subsequent to the May incident (sometime in June) Ms. Watt reported to

her direct supervisor that Hughes was speaking of her derogatorily to others in

the breakroom. UniFirst took no action until they received a letter from Ms.

Watt's attorney detailing a series of allegations of sexual harassment against Ms.

Watt by Hughes. At that point UniFirst undertook an investigation of the

allegations and on June 29, 2005, suspended Hughes for 3 days as a result of the

investigation. Upon his return to work, Hughes was told not to interact with

Ms. Watt in any way.

After the suspension another altercation occurred. On or about July 13,

2005 Ms. Watt entered a work area occupied by Hughes in order to find a

hamper. An argument ensued with name-calling. 1 Hughes reported the incident

to supervisor Smith. Smith met with both parties but did not take any

disciplinary action. Ms. Watt made no further sexual harassment reports to her

supervisors. She asserts in her affidavit, however, that Hughes continued to

sexually harass her when no one was around?

On September 16,2005 a significant physical altercation between Ms. Watt

and Hughes occurred at UniFirst. Ms. Watt, again, left her work area in search of

a hamper. She found a hamper but was stopped from removing it by Hughes

who claimed that he was using it. A physical struggle over the hamper ensued

that injured Ms. Watt. Ms. Watt asserts that Hughes moved toward her

menacingly with a clenched fist and that in response she grabbed a three-foot

metal bar and hit him in self-defense.

I 1 1 Hughes allegedly called Ms. Watt a "black bitch" and threatened "to put her with her 1mother" (who is deceased). Ms. Watt responded by calling Hughes a "yellow bitch." \2 The alleged harassment took the form of menacing stares and derogatory statements such as "black bitch" and" stinky butt."

2 An investigation conducted by William L. Coe (Coe), Director of Human

Resources for UniFirst, resulted. Coe interviewed both parties. In her interview,

Ms. Watt detailed the history of sexual harassment. Coe investigated the

altercation but did not specifically investigate the sexual harassment claims.

Both Ms. Watt and Hughes were fired as a result of the investigation.

Ms. Watt claims that UniFirst failed to remedy the hostile work

environment and subsequently fired her in retaliation for her reports of sexual

harassment against Hughes.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper where there exist no genuine issues of

material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Levine v. RB.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77,

A.2d 653, 655. A genuine issue is raised "when sufficient evidence requires a

fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the truth at trial." Parrish v.

Wright, 2003 ME 90,

potential to affect the outcome of the suit." Burdzel v. Sob us, 2000 ME 84,

A.2d 573, 575. "If material facts are disputed, the dispute must be resolved

through fact-finding." Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158,

a defendant seeks summary judgment, a "plaintiff must establish a prima facie

case for each element of her cause of action." Champagne v. Mid-Maine Med. Ctr.,

1998 ME 87,

light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Lightfoot v. sch. Admin. Dist. No.

35, 2003 ME 24,

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this Court "is to

consider only the portions of the record referred to, and the material facts set

3 forth, in the Rule 7(d) statements." Corey v. Norman, Hanson, & DeTroy, 1999 ME

196, en8, 742 A.2d 933, 938 (quoting Handy Boat Serv., Inc. v. Professional Servs., Inc.,

1998 ME 134, <.1[12,711 A.2d 1306, 1310). Also, the parties may file affidavits in

support of or in opposition to a summary judgment motion, but "[c]onclusions of

fact and law do not properly belong in an affidavit filed in support of a motion

for summary judgment." Town of Orient v. Dwyer, 400 A.2d 660, 662 (Me. 1985).

The affidavits must be "made on personal knowledge [and] shall set forth such

facts as would be admissible in evidence, ... "3 M.R. Civ. P. 56(e).

DISCUSSION

At issue is whether Ms. Watt has put forth sufficient evidence to infer that

UniFirst is in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA). The MHRA

has been interpreted under the same analytical framework as Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). Higgins v. The T]X Cos., Inc., 331 F.5upp. 2d 3,

6 (D. Me. 2004). Under Title VII it is unlawful for an employer to"discriminate

against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,

or national origin." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295, 114 S.

Ct. 367, 370 (1993)(quoting 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a)(I)).

I. Hostile Work Environment Claim

Ms. Watt asserts that UniFirst violated the MHRA by failing to maintain a

non-hostile work environment. The hostility stemmed from the behavior of a

3 Much of the support for Ms. Watt's allegations is found in her affidavit.UniFirst asserts that much of this evidence is not admissible under Rule 56(e). However, Ms. Watt's personal observations and impressions are admissible and to the extent that the affidavit or deposition recounts insults or taunts (words spoken) that contribute to the hostile work environment claim, they are also admissible. See Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 7684-85 (1st Cir. 2005).

4 coworker. In order to hold UniFirst accountable for those behaviors, Ms. Watt

must establish the elements of a sexual harassment hostile work environment

claim and establish a basis for employer liability.

a. Elements of a Sexual Harassment Hostile Work Environment

Claim

The elements of a sexual harassment hostile work environment claim are:

(1) that she (or he) is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based upon sex; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of plaintiff's employment and create an abusive work environment; (5) that sexually objectionable conduct was both objectively and subjectively offensive, such that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive and the victim in fact did perceive it to be so; and (6) that some basis for employer liability has been established.

Crowley v. L.L. Bean Inc., 303 F.3d 387 (1st Cir. 2002). The environment must be

"objectively hostile or abusive" to a reasonable person "as well as the victims

subjective perception that the environment is abusive." Id. (citing Harris, 510 U.s.

at 20). In classifying an environment as hostile or abusive, a court must look at

all of the circumstances including but not limited to the frequency and severity of

discriminatory conduct and whether it is physically threatening or humiliating.

Harris, 510 U.s. at 23. "[A] hostile work environment claim is comprised of a

series of separate acts that collectively constitute one unlawful employment

practice." Crowley, 303 F.3d at 396 (quoting Nat'l RR. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,

536 U.s. 101, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 2074 (2002)).

In this case Ms. Watt alleges a series of hostile interactions with Hughes.

At least one of the incidences (the kiss in the breakroom in May 2005) can be

construed as sexual harassment. Hughes admitted to the incident and UniFirst

was aware of it as is reflected in Hughes's employment file. UniFirst asserts that

5 some of the interactions alleged were not sexually based discrimination and thus

not subject to the MHRA. Whether or not the series of hostile interactions were

sexually based is a material fact in dispute. Considering the proffered facts in a

light most favorable to Ms. Watt and considering the separate hostile acts

collectively, Ms. Watt has established a prima facie case of workplace sexual

harassment by a coworker.

The issue thus becomes the extent to which UniFirst can be held liable for

any of these behaviors.

b. Employer Liability for Harassment by a Coworker

When it is the misconduct of a fellow employee and not an employer that

is at issue, a plaintiff must show that the employer "knew or should have known

of the charged sexual harassment and failed to implement prompt and corrective

action." Higgins, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 6. "The act of discrimination by the

employer in such a case is not the harassment, but rather the inappropriate

response to the charges of harassment." McCombs v. Meijer, Inc., 395 F.3d 346,

353 (6 th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). The sixth circuit has found that:

when the allegations of sexual harassment involve a coworker and the employer has fashioned a response, the employer will only be liable 'if its response manifests indifference or unreasonableness in light of the facts the employer knew or should have known.'

Id. (quoting Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 123 F.3d 868,873 (6 th Cir. 1997»

(emphasis added). Consequently an employer will only be liable under Title VII

"if that remedy exhibits such indifference as to indicate an attitude of

permissiveness that amounts to discrimination." Id.

Employers have been held liable when, after repeated reports of sexual

harassment by coworkers, progressive remedial measures have not been

6 implemented. See generally Crowley, 303 F.3d 387. In that case a female employee

repeatedly reported the stalking behavior of a male coworker. Id. at 392. The

sole remedial measure implemented by the employer was the re-assignment of

the male coworker to another work area. Id. at 404. The company neither

suspended nor fired him until plaintiff got a protection order from the courts. Id.

at 403.4

In contrast, no employer liability was found when a company failed to

remedy a hostile work environment of which it was not aware. See ChalouIt v.

Interstate Brands Corp., 2007 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 6935 (D. Me.). In that case, in spite

of plaintiff's knowledge of the company sexual harassment policy, she reported

allegations of sexual harassment only to a coworker. Id. at 11. Consequently, the

Court concluded that she had failed to give her employers adequate notice to

cure the situation. Id.

In this case UniFirst responded progressively to Ms. Watt's assertions of

harassment by issuing a verbal warning and subsequently suspending Hughes.

With respect to the July 13th incident, UniFirst was made aware of the incident

by Hughes, not by Ms. Watt. Ms. Watt conceded, in the subsequent

investigation, that she entered Hughes's work area. A decision was made not to

sanction either party for the altercation. There is no evidence in the record to

show that Ms. Watt made any reports of harassment of any kind after the July

13th incident and prior to the investigation of the September assault.

4 The Law Court found some merit in employer's argument that, though not effective, the reassignments were prompt and appropriate actions and therefore reasonable. Crowley, 303 F.3d at 403. However, the procedural posture was not a de novo review, consequently the jury verdict was upheld. Id.

7 Ms. Watt contends that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding 1)

the existence of ongoing harassment after Hughes's June 29,2005 suspension, 2)

UniFirst's awareness of the harassment, and 3) the dearth of response by UniFirs

after the June suspension. Ms. Watt has failed to establish, however, that

UniFirst's response was indifferent or unreasonable, or that itindicates an

attitude of permissiveness that amounts to discrimination. Accordingly,

summary judgment should be granted to UniFirst on Count I of the Complaint.

II. Retaliation Claim

In Count II of her Complaint, Ms. Watt asserts that UniFirst impermissibly

terminated her employment in retaliation for her sexual harassment complaints.

In order to establish a retaliatory discharge claim under the MHRA, Ms. Watt

must "show that (1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) her employer

thereafter subjected her to adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link

existed between the two events." Bowen v. Dept. ofHuman Svcs., 606 A.2d 1051,

1054 (Me. 1992) (citations omitted).

A protected activity is any "conduct by [Watt] that is in opposition to an

unlawful employment practice of the defendant." Id. Ms. Watt's complaints

filed regarding the sexual harassment would satisfy this element. "An adverse

employment action is one that materially changes the conditions of plaintiffs'

employ." Id. Watt's employment termination satisfies this element of the claim.

Accordingly the only issue in play is whether there is a causal link

between Ms. Watt's termination from employment and her complaints of sexual

harassment. Ms. Watt "must present sufficient evidence to raise an inference

that her protected activity was the likely reason" for her termination and that

UniFirst "was aware she was engaged in the protected activity. Id. Should she succeed, the burden then shifts to UniFirst to "articulate legitimate, non­

retaliatory reasons for its employment decision." Bishop v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 299

F.3d 53, 58 (1"1 Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). If UniFirst were able to articulate

such reasoning, the burden would revert to Ms. Watt to "show that the legitimate

reason is pretextual and that the adverse employment action resulted from the

defendant's retaliatory animus." Id.

The time lapse between a protected event and an alleged retaliatory

employment action is considered in the analysis of a causal link. Id. at 60.

Twelve months was deemed too long to support a causal link alone. Id. In

contrast, one and one half months between a protected activity and an adverse

action has been deemed sufficient, by itself, to establish causation. Anderson v.

Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10 th Cir. 1999) (citing Ramirez v. Ok. Dept. of

Mental Health, 41 F3d 584, 596 (lOth Cir. 1991). In this case, considering the facts

in a light most favorable to Ms. Watt, less than a month passed between her

report to Coe during the investigation of the September 13th incident and her

firing on September 30,2005. Consequently Ms. Watt has prevailed on her initial

burden of raising a retaliation claim.

The burden then shifts to UniFirst to articulate a legitimate, non­

retaliatory rationale for Ms. Watt's firing. UniFirst asserts that an assault with a

three-foot metal rod is a legitimate reason to fire an employee and is plainly

stated as a basis for employment termination according to UniFirst's policies.

Ms. Watt does not deny that she hit Hughes with the metal rod. The court deems

UniFirst's rationale legitimate.

Consequently the burden rests on Ms. Watt to show that this reasoning

was pretextual. The First Circuit recently held that a plaintiff failed to meet its

9 pretextual burden when it put forth no evidence to show that disciplinary action

imposed was disparate. Azimi v. Jordan's Meats, Inc, 456 F.3d 228, 2243 (1st Cir.

2006). In this case, Ms. Watt attempts to carry the burden by comparing the

alleged fact that Hughes was not fired for assaulting (strangling) a coworker.

She supports that allegation, however, by citing to a deposition that finds that no

such assault occurred.

In addition Ms. Watt argues that she was acting in self-defense when she

struck Hughes with the metal bar. This claim, however, does not raise any

inference of pretext or of discrimination retaliation, consequently, Ms. Watt has

failed to carry her burden on the retaliation claim.

Therefore, the entry is:

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to Count I.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to Count II.

The clerk shall incorporate this Order into the docket by reference pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).

Dated at Portland, Maine this ~ day of ~'---'-""="-='--~

10 F COURTS tnd County lox 287 ne 04112-0287

GUY LORANGER ESQ f/O/f1}/fr 110 MAIN S SACO ME 04~~ET SUITE 1520

F COURTS md County lox 287 ne 04112-0287

ADAM TAYLOR ESQ 4 MILK STREET SUITE 103 PORT LAND ME 04101 'j H~T[ UF b'\ 4l~~, STATE OF MAINE ,·UMBERLANO. SS SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. 'CLERK'S OFFICE CIVIL ACTION W~~~9: CV-~tii-51? / ZOOB JUN 11 A 8: III LINDA WATT,

Plaintiffs, ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S v. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

UNIFIRST CORPORAnON,

This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff Linda Watt's (Ms. Watt)

Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 59(e).1

Motions for reconsideration shall only be filed "to bring to the court's

attention an error, omission or new material that could not previously have been

presented." M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(5).

I. Reconsideration of Hostile Work Environment Claim

Ms. Watt asks this Court to reconsider in light of a subsequently

published case from the First Circuit Court of Appeals that sets a lower standard

1 The advisory committee notes state:

Rule 59 (e) is amended to add a new last sentence making clear that a motion to reconsider the judgment is a motion to alter or amend the judgment, thereby removing confusion as to whether the appeal period is suspended until the court can dispose of the motion. Motions to reconsider should not be filed under Rule 60. A corresponding amendment to Rule 7(b) discourages such motions and permits the court to dispose of motions to reconsider without waiting for opposition to be filed.

M.R. Civ. P 59(e) advisory committee's note May 2000, Alexander, The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure Advisory and Committee Notes, (2006).

1 for employer liability in co-worker sexual harassment cases. See Forrest v.

Brinker International Payroll Company, LP, 511 F.3d 225 (1st Cir. 2007). Decisions of

the First Circuit are not binding on this Court. Moreover, the cited case does not

set a lower standard, it merely states that the facts of that case can be decided on

a less stringent standard? Id. at n. 8. Regardless, even in light of the Crowley

standard, this Court does not believe that a reasonable jury could conclude, in

light of all of the undisputed facts, that UniFirst's response to Ms. Watt's

complaints of sexual harassment was not prompt and appropriate.

II. Reconsideration of Retaliation Claim

Ms. Watt further moves this Court to reconsider the retaliation claim

because it failed to consider an affidavit which was evidence that Ms. Watt's

firing was pretextual. Specifically, she asserts that the Court failed to consider

the deposition of Mr. Lane, who alleges that he assaulted a coworker and was

not fired for the offense; unlike Ms. Watt who was fired for assaulting Hughes.

That fact, however, was not in evidence because the record citation supporting

the fact referred the Court to a deposition that directly contradicted the fact.

This Court has "no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record

not specially referenced in the parties' separate statement of facts." M.R. Civ. P.

56(h)(4).

However, even if the affidavit was in evidence, UniFirst did an

investigation of the alleged incident and found that Mr. Lane did not commit an

assault and therefore employment termination was unnecessary. In contrast,

2The standard applied was derived from Crowley v. L.L. Bean. 303 F.3d 387 (1st Cir. 2002). The Crowley Court stated: "a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer knew or should have known of the charged sexual harassment and failed to implement prompt and appropriate action." Id. at 401 (citations omitted).

2 there is no question that Ms. Watt assaulted Hughes and that, because of the

assault, UniFirst terminated her employment. Thus, there is no evidence of

disparate treatment in the record.

Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration on both counts is DENIED.

The clerk shall incorporate this Order into the docket by reference pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).

Dated at Portland, Maine this 1M day of --,.d~~::::::'J.,,)

3 IF COURTS and County 30x 287 ine 04112-0287

GUY LORANGER ESQ 110 MAIN SACO ME O~~~ET SUITE 1250

=COURTS nd County ox 287 1e 04112-0287

ADAM TAYLOR ESQ 4 MILK STRE PORTLAND ET SUITE 103 ME 04101