BUCHANAN, Chief Judge.
CASE SUMMARY
Defendants David Watt (Watt) and Donna Senteney (Senteney) appeal their convictions for possession of a controlled substance (marijuana),1 challenging the trial court’s denial of their Motion to Suppress, admission of certain testimony, and sufficiency of the evidence.
We affirm.
FACTS
The facts most favorable to the State are:
In January, 1978, the Indianapolis police sent a “confidential informer” to Watt’s home at 3050 Meredith Avenue, to make a “controlled buy” of marijuana. The informer was searched and given money prior to his entrance into Watt’s home, and he returned with the controlled substance. Police Officer Gary Walton (Walton) then prepared an affidavit which read:
[Tjhat [Walton] believes and has good cause to believe that Marihuana Cannabis Sativa, the possession of which is unlawful, is in the possession and under the control of Dave Watt living at 3050 Meredith Ave., Indianapolis, Marion County, Indiana. The basis for this affi-ants belief is that a controlled buy of Marihuana Cannabis Sativa was made by a confidential informant from Dave Watt at the above address with in [sic] the past (72) hours form [sic] January 4, 1978. The informant was searched and given U.S. Currency by myself and observed knocking on the front door and the door opened from the inside and the informant walk inside, of the above address. Approximately five minutes later the informant returned with a quanity [sic] of Marihuana Cannabis Sativa. A preliminary field test by myself found the substance to be Marihuana Cannabis Sativa.
Based on the above information I request this search warrant be issued or [sic] 3050 Meredith Ave., Indianapolis, Marion County, Indiana which is described as a one story double dwelling, white frame with a white roof and orange brick front porch. 3050 is the residence on the west side of double. The residence consists of Liveing [sic] room, dining room, kitchen, bedrooms, bathroom. I request this search to include all rooms, closets, drawers, storage areas, and any place Marihuana Cannabis Sativa can be hidden or concealed also for the person of Dave Watt.
Based upon this affidavit, a search warrant was issued.
[93]*93The search was conducted on January 4, 1978. Walton and other police knocked at the door of the residence and were admitted by Senteney. The police found Watt in the kitchen and asked him to come to the living room, where the search warrant was read to both defendants. A search of the entire residence revealed marijuana in a dresser drawer and in a box on top of the dresser in the single bedroom; the dresser drawer also contained male underclothing. Clothes of both defendants were in the bedroom. Ly-sergic acid diethylamide (LSD) was found in the refrigerator, but a count for possession of LSD was later dismissed. The police arrested the two defendants and read them their Miranda rights. After obtaining clothes from the single bedroom, the defendants were taken to the police station, where each gave an address of “3050 Meredith” during the “booking” procedure.
Defendants filed a Motion to Suppress the evidence as illegally seized. After a hearing, the motion was denied. Subsequently they filed a motion to reconsider the motion to suppress, and, after another hearing, the trial judge again denied the motion. The defendants were tried by the court without intervention of a jury and were convicted.
ISSUES
Watt and Senteney present three issues: 2
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to suppress the evidence as illegally seized?
2. Did the court err in admitting into evidence the statements defendants gave regarding their address when they were “booked”?
3. Was the conviction of each defendant supported by sufficient evidence?
DECISION
ISSUE ONE — -Did the court err in refusing to suppress the evidence as illegally seized?
PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS — Watt and Senteney claim the evidence should have been suppressed because the search warrant affidavit stated facts based on hearsay, yet the affidavit does not disclose any proof of the credibility of the hearsay informant; thus, they contend, the warrant was invalid and the search was illegal. They further contend that the police informant’s conduct in the home was itself a “search” unsupported by a warrant and hence illegal, rendering the subsequent search illegal.
The State counters that the warrant was properly issued, being supported by probable cause, so the police search was legal. Although arguing that the evidence was purchased rather than seized, the State does not respond to the contention that the original contact with the home constituted a warrantless search.
CONCLUSION— The initial entry of the informant was apparently a “controlled buy” and therefore not a search; the subsequent search by police was pursuant to a warrant adequately supported by probable cause. Defendants made no showing that the initial entry was illegal. Therefore, the court did not err in refusing to suppress the evidence seized.
The defendants’ argument is seductive at first blush, but a closer scrutiny shows it bespeaks a misunderstanding of several basic principles of law.
What must be shown to secure a search warrant is probable cause. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. IV; Ind. Const. Art. I, § 11; Pirtle v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 16, 323 N.E.2d 634; Ferry v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 27, 262 N.E.2d 523; Johns v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 172, 240 N.E.2d 60. “Probable cause” for a search warrant, as for an arrest warrant, does not mean a prima facie case against any defendant. Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142. Accord, United States v. Ventresca (1965), 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684; Ferry, supra 262 N.E.2d at 529 (Givan, [94]*94J., dissenting). Moreover, the probable cause which must be shown for a search warrant is not the same as the probable cause which must be shown for an arrest warrant. See generally Berner, Search and Seizure : Status and Methodology, 8 Val.U. L.Rev. 471, 493-94 (1974). What must be “probable” for a search warrant is that (1) the item for which the search is conducted is in a particular place, and (2) the item is crime-related. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily (1978), 436 U.S. 547, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525. See also Snedegar v. State (1926), 198 Ind. 182, 150 N.E. 367, 368. See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn.L.Rev. 349 (1974); Comment, 28 U.Chi.L.Rev. 664, 687 (1961). Obviously, when the item is contraband it is definitionally crime-related. It is “property, the possession of which is unlawful” as contemplated by Ind.Code § 35-1-6-1.
How probable cause is to be shown is dictated by statute. Ind.Code § 35-1-6-2 [as amended, 1977] states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, no warrant for search or arrest shall be issued until there is filed with the judge an affidavit, particularly describing the house or place to be searched and the things to be searched for, or particularly describing the person to be arrested, and alleging substantially the offense in relation thereto, and that the affiant believes and has good cause to believe that such things as are to be searched for are there concealed, or that the person to be arrested committed said offense, and setting forth the facts then in knowledge of the affiant or information based on credible hearsay, constituting the probable cause. When based on hearsay, the affidavit shall contain reliable information establishing the credibility of the source and of each of the declar-ants of the hearsay and establishing that there is a factual basis for the information furnished.
(c) In lieu of an affidavit or in addition thereto, a search or arrest warrant may be issued upon sworn testimony of the same facts required for affidavits in a nonadversary hearing before a judge; the proceeding shall be recorded or transcribed by a court reporter or recording device.
Id. Thus, as the statute makes clear, there are alternative ways of showing probable cause. Cf. State ex rel. French v. Hendricks Superior Court (1969), 252 Ind. 213, 247 N.E.2d 519, 526 (arrest warrant). If the facts are known to the affiant, he need not establish the credibility of any person. However, facts obtained through illegal procedures violating constitutional rights may not form the basis of probable cause. Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; Ashley v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 359, 241 N.E.2d 264, 268;. Manson v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 53, 229 N.E.2d 801, cert. den. 390 U.S. 995, 88 S.Ct. 1198, 20 L.Ed.2d 95. See also Rohlfing v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 619, 88 N.E.2d 148, 149.
In determining whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant, the court asked to grant the warrant must make its decision based upon the facts stated and the rational inferences to be drawn therefrom. Berner, supra at 495; LaFave, Search and Seizure: The Course of True Law . .. Has Not .. . Run Smooth, 1966 U.Ill.L.F. 255, 259, n. 40. It is to make a “common-sense” reading of the entire affidavit. Spinelli v. United States (1969), 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637; United States v. Ventresca (1965), 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684.
A common-sense approach means that the magistrate is not required to speculate as to every conceivable possibility that the facts stated were somehow obtained through illegal measures. Were the rule otherwise, no search warrant would ever issue if the judge had any imagination whatsoever. Similarly, the State by its af-fiant is not required to formulate the affidavit in such a way as to rule out every conceivable scenario which might be envisioned by an imaginative court. See Ven-tresca, supra, 85 S.Ct. at 746. The affidavit [95]*95is made upon oath. Ind.Code § 35-1-6-1. This provides some assurance that the facts stated are true, see Riddle v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 501, 275 N.E.2d 788, and the court asked to issue the warrant is to give them a reasonable interpretation in rendering its decision. The magistrate is not required to assume the police committed perjury. See McCray v. Illinois (1967), 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 1063, 18 L.Ed.2d 62.
This is not to say, however, that the affidavit may not later be attacked. See Franks v. Delaware (1978), 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667; Phelan v. State (1980), Ind., 406 N.E.2d 237; Mata v. State (1932), 203 Ind. 291, 179 N.E. 916. Because the request for a warrant is necessarily made ex parte, the most basic notions of due process require that such an attack be permitted. See Franks, supra. A defendant may attack the affidavit as not showing probable cause on its face, as tainted by illegality, or as containing false statements made knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth.3 And when the affidavit is so attacked, the State may not introduce other evidence to support its contention that probable cause existed at the time of the decision on the affidavit. Ashley, supra 241 N.E.2d at 268. If the affidavit is found to be defective, evidence gained as the result of the search must be suppressed. McCurry v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 191, 231 N.E.2d 227.
Nonetheless, once the State has obtained a magistrate’s determination of probable cause, a presumption of validity obtains. Franks, supra. See generally, 2 J. Varón, Searches, Seizures and Immunities 876 (1974). It is therefore incumbent upon the defendant to make some showing that the facts stated were untrue or tainted by illegality, if the reasonable inferences to be derived from the common-sense reading of the affidavit are that no such falsehood or illegality exists. Reviewing courts, including the trial court on a motion to suppress, must pay substantial deference to the magistrate’s determination of probable cause. Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723; Riddle, supra. Thus, it is entirely proper to require of one challenging the legality of a search, in order to suppress evidence, that he establish an invasion of his rights. Jones v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 731, 4 L.Ed.2d 697.
In light of these principles, we turn to this case. The facts stated in the affidavit provided reasonable cause for the issuance of the warrant to search the house, inasmuch as they showed it was probable that (1) the item for which the search was to be conducted was in the house, and (2) the item, marijuana, was crime-related. Furthermore, the affidavit is not defective as facially containing false statements, made knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth.
Watt and Senteney do contend the affidavit is otherwise defective because it is tainted by illegality-the statements made therein were the product of an initial unlawful seizure.
Watt and Senteney cast their lot with Stinchfield v. State (1977), Ind.App., 367 N.E.2d 1150. This case and Stinchfield are distinguishable. In the latter this court concluded the record before it revealed “a warrantless seizure occurred on the defendant’s premises.” ' Stinchfield at 1154. Therefore, as a warrantless seizure, the burden fell upon the State to present evidence to justify the warrantless seizure. In this case a warrantless seizure also occurred in the sense that a controlled substance was obtained without a warrant. However, [96]*96there the similarity between this case and Stinchfield ends. Rather, this record falls within those cases, discussed in Stinchfield,
“wherein the informant, or undercover agent, enters a suspect’s house on the latter’s invitation, and then purchases, or otherwise acquires contraband with the consent of the suspect (whether or not the suspect is cognizant of the informant’s subterfuge). In such cases the informant usually delivers the acquired substance to an officer who then might procure a search warrant for the suspect’s home. See Mills v. State (1975), Ind.App., 325 N.E.2d 472, and cases therein cited. However, the record of the instant case, in contrast to Mills, supplies no information regarding the propriety of the informant’s conduct while within Stinchfield’s home, and we will not speculate on his manner of obtaining the drugs in question.”
367 N.E.2d at 1153. (Emphasis in original).
The record supplies the information regarding the propriety of the informant’s conduct while within the home of Watt and Sente-ney by asserting the “seizure” occurred pursuant to a controlled buy, a circumstance not appearing in the Stinchfield affidavit. A seizure resulting from a controlled buy is not an illegal seizure. Schwartz v. State (1978), Ind.App., 379 N.E.2d 480. Thus, Watt and Senteney failed to mount a successful attack against the warrant.
Placing the burden upon the defendant to attack a warrant is in line with the Supreme Court of the United States, which on countless occasions has safeguarded fourth-amendment rights by invalidating searches. Franks stands for the proposition that when the affidavit on its face, together with all reasonable inferences, shows valid probable cause, a defendant bears the burden of attacking it by evidence outside the affidavit. Placing this burden on the defendant is consonant with the Supreme Court’s dictate that “it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search .. . that he establish that he was the victim of an invasion of privacy.” Jones, 80 S.Ct. at 731. Accord, Chin Kay v. United States (9th Cir. 1972), 311 F.2d 317; Batten v. United States (5th Cir. 1951), 188 F.2d 75. They did shift the burden of going forward by showing the initial seizure was warrantless. However, the evidence of the controlled buy fulfilled the State’s responsibility of going forward by showing a seizure without the protection of the 4th Amendment. Watt and Senteney were, therefore, unable to meet their ultimate burden of showing an illegal search.
Defendants further argue that the acts of the informant as they are stated in the affidavit constituted non-verbal hearsay, or conduct as hearsay, and therefore the affiant, Walton, was required to establish the credibility of the informant. The argument is misconceived, as this was not conduct as hearsay. Conduct as hearsay involves an implied assertion by the out-of-court asserter. See generally McCormick, Evidence § 250; Finman, Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 14 Stan.L.Rev. 682 (1962). It means that the conduct is the result of a thought, and through such conduct, that thought is being used as proof of the matter impliedly asserted. See generally Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 957 (1974). The facts stated by Walton regarding the informant’s conduct here were not premised on any implied assertion by the informant. See Mills v. State (1978), Ind.App., 379 N.E.2d 1023, 1026.
Moreover, it was not the conduct of the informant that was relevant to a determination of probable cause here. The relevant facts — that the item was in the house and was crime-related — were established by the presence of marijuana on the person of the informant when he returned from the house, it having been absent when he entered the house. Therefore, Walton stated probable cause within the statute based on facts known to him personally. He did not have to establish the credibility of the [97]*97informant.4 See Mills, supra. See also Ind. Code 35-l-6-2(a).
For these reasons the affidavit, though not exemplary, was adequate to show probable cause for a search of the Watt residence. On the basis of the affidavit’s stated facts, reasonable inferences and presumption of validity, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
ISSUE TWO — Did the court err in admitting into evidence the statements defendants gave regarding their address when they were “booked”?
PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS — Watt and Senteney claim that because their declarations as to their address constituted substantive evidence of possession, and the only evidence of such possession, the court erred in admitting the testimony because the defendants were not given Miranda warnings immediately prior to the booking questions, nor did they have counsel at that time. The State responds that the court did not so err because (1) preliminary information is not subject to Miranda requirements; (2) Defendants had been given Miranda warnings at the time of arrest at the residence; and (3) Defendants’ connection with the premises was shown by other evidence.
CONCLUSION — The court did not err in admitting the testimony.
Defendants’ right -to-counsel argument is unavailing. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, apart from the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, attaches only after a “critical stage” of the proceedings has been reached. Kirby v. Illinois (1972), 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411; Edwards v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 239, 352 N.E.2d 730. No such critical stage had been reached in this case; no formal charge had yet been filed. We therefore turn to the question of Miranda application.
Various courts have considered the question whether the dictates of Miranda pertain to booking questions, and have determined that they do not. E. g., United States v. Prewitt (7th Cir. 1977), 553 F.2d 1082; United States v. LaVallee (2d Cir. 1975), 521 F.2d 1109 (holding harmless error, alternatively); Hill v. State (1978), Ind., 371 N.E.2d 1303.
Seeking to distinguish such holdings, however, Watt and Senteney contend their case presents a more serious imperative for Miranda application. They point out that the evidence they divulged was substantive evidence of guilt. Yet this question appears to have been decided by the Indiana Supreme Court in Hill, supra. That case represents a strong declaration of admissibility, for the defendant’s information there was his age — an essential element of the crime charged, and the only evidence presented on that element. The Court in Hill stated that Miranda is applicable only to “custodial interrogation.” Booking procedure does occur while the defendant is in “custody,” but it does not constitute “interrogation.” See Mallory v. United States (1957), 354 U.S. 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479.5 Such information is comparable to the giving of fingerprints, handwriting exemplars, and blood samples. Id., 91 S.Ct. at 1540; LaVallee, supra at 1112.
For these reasons we find no error in admitting the testimony.
[98]*98ISSUE THREE — Was the conviction of each defendant supported by sufficient evidence?
PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS — Defendants’ sufficiency argument is a three-pronged attack on (1) proof that 3050 Meredith was their residence; (2) proof of constructive possession; and (3) proof that the substance seized was “marijuana” within the meaning of the statute. The State contends the evidence was sufficient to establish all elements of guilt.
CONCLUSION — The evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.
In reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence, we will not reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Jones v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 640, 377 N.E.2d 1349. We will look only to the evidence most favorable to the State, along with all reasonable inferences to be derived therefrom. Poindexter v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 167, 374 N.E.2d 509.
As discussed earlier, the evidence shows that both defendants lived at 3050 Meredith. Defendants’ argument regarding proof that the substance seized was marijuana was not included in either the Motion to Correct Errors or the Appellants’ Brief; it was raised only in their Reply Brief. That argument is therefore waived pursuant to Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 59 and Ind.R.App.P. 8.3(A). Consequently, we address only the remaining argument concerning proof of constructive possession.
In order to establish possession of a controlled substance, proof of actual possession is not required. Johnson v. State (1978), Ind.App., 376 N.E.2d 542; Phillips v. State (1974), 160 Ind.App. 647, 313 N.E.2d 101. Nor must the possession be exclusive. Ludlow v. State (1973), Ind.App., 302 N.E.2d 838, 843, rev’d on other grds, 262 Ind. 266, 314 N.E.2d 750. Non-exclusive, constructive possession is sufficient. See Martin v. State (1978), Ind.App., 372 N.E.2d 1194.
Our Supreme Court has defined constructive possession as “an intent and capability to maintain control and dominion” over the contraband. Thomas v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 1, 291 N.E.2d 557, 558. Accord, Edwards v. State (1979), Ind.App., 385 N.E.2d 496; Hutcherson v. State (1978), Ind.App., 381 N.E.2d 877; Mills v. State (1978), Ind.App., 379 N.E.2d 1023.
Proof of a possessory interest in the premises in which a controlled substance is found is adequate to show the capability to maintain control and dominion over the substance. Hutcherson, supra; Mills, supra; Corrao v. State (1972), 154 Ind.App. 525, 290 N.E.2d 484. However, when a person does not have exclusive possession of the premises, “mere presence” in the place is not sufficient proof of intent to possess the substance. See Ledcke v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 382, 296 N.E.2d 412. The element of intent is proved by evidence of the accused’s knowledge of the nature of the substance and its presence. Thomas, supra; Mills, supra; Hutcherson, supra. Although such intent may be inferred when possession of the premises is exclusive, the inference must be supported by additional circumstances if possession of the premises is not exclusive. Martin, supra ; Hutcherson, supra.
Among the additional circumstances that will support an inference of intent to control the contraband is close proximity of the contraband to items owned by the accused. See Martin, supra at 1201 (Buchanan, J., concurring). In this case, police testified that the drawer in which some of the marijuana was found also contained male underclothing, and it is reasonable to infer that these items belonged to Watt. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to prove Watt’s possession.
A more formidable question is posed by the issue of Senteney’s possession. We conclude that to reverse her conviction would require us to reweigh the evidence.
The drawer in which the marijuana was found was partially open. The box in which more marijuana was found was not the least way concealed; it was atop the dresser in the bedroom occupied by each [99]*99defendant. While Walton testified that the clothes in the drawer were those of a male, he also testified that, where he found the marijuana, he “found clothing for a male and clothing for a female.” This testimony does provide an additional circumstance supporting an inference of Senteney’s possession, and makes this case distinguishable from Martin, supra, in which there was no evidence of proximity of the accused’s clothing to the contraband found in a bureau. In contrast to Martin, also, there is no evidence of any other person’s having access to the joint bedroom.
In Martin we observed that joint possession of a bedroom, without more, does not compel conviction. Martin, supra at 1199. Left open was the question of “whether the marital relationship would support an inference of knowledge under different circumstances.” Id. at n. 8. The cases cited included a common-law marriage and a cohabitation situation. Id. at n. 9. Under the facts here, a different conclusion is warranted, not only because of the proximity of Senteney’s clothing, but for another reason as well.
In Ledcke v. State, supra, our Supreme Court held that in a manufacturing situation, the accused’s knowledge of the presence of the substance could be inferred, even though he was not a tenant of the premises. The reasoning behind the decision, as explained by Justice Hunter, was that illegal activity may be obvious enough to support that inference. Ledcke, supra, 296 N.E.2d at 416. The instant case is not a “manufacturing” situation, but does involve a residence in which marijuana was being sold. The testimony regarding the activity of the informant does not show whether Senteney was present when the controlled buy was made, but it does show that the residence was used to conduct illegal business. This circumstance renders the present case distinguishable from those in which only the private, secret possession of marijuana by one resident can be inferred.
Ledcke concluded that in a place where illegal activity occurs, a rebuttable inference of knowledge arises. If this is true as to a non-resident, as in Ledcke, then surely it should apply to a resident such as Sente-ney. We comment that our Supreme Court in Thomas, supra, emphasized the fact that the accused was in her own home when police found the contraband there. More recently, in Pier v. State (1980), Ind.App., 400 N.E.2d 209, the Fourth District noted the “common thread” running through Indiana decisions upholding findings of constructive possession was the presence of the defendant when the contraband was found. Id. at 210-211. And certainly it is one factor to be considered. Ledcke, supra, 296 N.E.2d at 417. Here we have presence, residency, proximity of clothing, and a place where a controlled buy was made earlier. We also have testimony that a box containing marijuana was on top of a dresser, not concealed. The sum of these circumstances buttresses an inference of knowledge on Senteney’s part.
The convictions are affirmed.
SULLIVAN, J., concurs, with opinion.
SHIELDS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.