Watson v. Weitekamp

2020 IL App (4th) 190192-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 6, 2020
• Docket: 4-19-0192
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE FILED This order was filed under Supreme 2020 IL App (4th) 190192-U May 6, 2020 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited Carla Bender as precedent by any party except in NO. 4-19-0192 4th District Appellate the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

NOLAN WATSON, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Sangamon County LISA WEITEKAMP, in Her Official Capacity as ) No. 18MR689 Freedom of Information Officer for the Department of ) Corrections, ) Honorable ) Jack D. Davis II, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Knecht concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, holding the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to dismiss because plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under Illinois’s Freedom of Information Act.

¶2 In September 2018, plaintiff filed pro se a motion for preliminary injunctive

relief, naming as individual defendants: Lisa Weitekamp, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

Officer for the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC); Melinda Graves, Medical Records

Director for Western Illinois Correctional Center; and Mark Stephenson, an employee of

Western Illinois Correctional Center’s records office. In later court filings, plaintiff named only

one defendant: Lisa Weitekamp. Plaintiff alleged four claims: (1) Weitekamp improperly denied

his FOIA requests; (2) by denying his FOIA requests Weitekamp violated his due process and

equal protection rights under the federal and state constitutions; (3) by improperly denying his

FOIA requests Weitekamp converted his personal property, i.e., the public records he rightly requested; and (4) by denying his FOIA requests Weitekamp inflicted upon him cruel and

unusual punishment and intentional emotional distress. In November 2018, defendant filed a

motion to dismiss under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-

619.1 (West 2018)), arguing plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief under FOIA and sovereign

immunity barred plaintiff’s remaining three claims. Plaintiff responded to defendant’s section 2-

619.1 motion by filing three motions of his own: Motion for leave to File an Amended

Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Motion to Issue a Specific Order, and Motion for Costs and

Civil Penalties. Following a telephonic hearing on March 5, 2019, the trial court granted

defendant’s motion, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. The court also denied

plaintiff’s other pending motions.

¶3 On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erroneously granted defendant’s motion

to dismiss. Interestingly, plaintiff limits his argument on appeal to his FOIA claim only,

conceding in his reply brief: “Plaintiff’s non-FOIA claims are no longer relevant in this cause

and all arguments may be deemed moot in Defendant’s brief pages 20-27.” In accordance with

plaintiff’s concession, we limit our review to only his FOIA argument—i.e., the trial court

mistakenly granted defendant’s motion to dismiss because defendant errantly denied his FOIA

requests thereby entitling plaintiff to relief. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 In July 2018, though he designated his requests by letter we designate them by

number, plaintiff submitted this verbatim FOIA request to DOC:

1. Books: Black’s Law Dictionary, ILCS statutory citations books,

and books on how to draft all legal forms.

-2- 2. Statutory and procedural rules for job assignments restrictions,

based of specific sex offenses charged with. And all persons or number of

persons that presently work and have worked at any IDOC institution with

a sex offense case, distinguish between the two.

3. The names of each ILL. Prison that allows people charged with

sex offense cases to work jobs.

4. Number of times a person convicted of a sex offense violated

law while working at Western IL. C.C.

5. Policy of clothing distribution annually or semi annually to

inmates, based off legislative intent and fiscal obligations, including how

much money is allocated per year for each inmate, for the following items:

T-shirts, underwear, socks, coats, state blues, shoes, bedding, hygiene,

sanitary cleaning supplies. And an itemized list of all items allocated to be

distributed annually, semi annually, monthly, weekly, or daily for Western

Illinois Correctional Center.

6. Guidelines on denials of law library access to necessary books,

notarizations, attendance copies.

7. Guidelines on denial of access to hot water, for cleaning,

washing, sanitizing, bathing, and drinking.

8. Legislative intent and guidelines for state pay.

9. The amount of cleaning and sanitation supplies allotted to

inmates each week, or day for cell cleaning only.

-3- 10. The names of supervising Authority of the records office and

Business office at Western ILL. Correctional Center.

¶6 In her official capacity as DOC’s Freedom of Information officer, defendant

labeled plaintiff’s request as Freedom of Information Request #180723266 and issued a response

denying the request on July 24, 2018. Defendant provided responses to plaintiff’s individual

requests. For request 1, defendant responded: “IDOC does not maintain or possess records

responsive to your request.” For requests 2-4 and 6-10, defendant responded: “You have not

submitted a request for records. A reasonable description requires the requested records to be

reasonably identified as a record, not as a general request for data, information, and statistics.

(Krohn v. Department of Justice, 628 F.2d 195 (D.D.Cir. 1980).” For request 5, defendant

responded:

“Clothing policies are maintained in your facility’s library and are denied

pursuant to Section 7(1)(e-5) of the FOIA, which exempts the release of “records

requested by persons committed to the Department of Corrections if those

materials are available in the library of the correctional facility where the inmate

is confined. The remainder of your request is not a request for records. A

reasonable description requires the requested records to be reasonably identified

as a record, not as a general request for data, information, and statistics. (Krohn v.

Department of Justice, 628 F.2d 195 (D.D.Cir. 1980).”

¶7 On August 10, 2018, plaintiff appealed the denial of his FOIA requests to

Illinois’s Public Access Counselor. The same day, plaintiff submitted additional FOIA requests

to defendant, asking for the following: his medical records; records explaining why it is free to

get materials from the law library at Pontiac Correctional Center; an itemized list of all legal

-4- books available at the Pontiac Correctional Center library; and procedures for obtaining

shepardizations, case law, and notarizations and any restrictions for all DOC institutions. After

plaintiff narrowed this latter request, defendant responded by granting it in part and denying it in

part. Defendant granted plaintiff’s request for records explaining why Pontiac Correctional

Center provides shepardizations and case law for free, but denied the remaining requests for one

of two reasons; either DOC did not possess or maintain responsive records or plaintiff requested

information and failed to reasonably describe a record.

¶8 Plaintiff filed a complaint he styled a “Motion for Preliminary Injunction Relief,”

in September 2018. Plaintiff initially named several defendants, but in later court filings plaintiff

identified one defendant, Lisa Weitekamp, in her official capacity as DOC’s Freedom of

Information officer. As is relevant to this appeal, plaintiff alleged defendant cited improper

exemptions and reasons for denying his FOIA requests. In November 2018, defendant moved to

dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Illinois’s Code of Civil Procedure section 2-619.1,

arguing, in relevant part here, plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim for relief. And in a

subsequent objection to plaintiff’s motion to file an amended complaint, defendant argued for

dismissal because FOIA does not provide a cause of action against individuals, but only against a

“public body.” Following a telephonic hearing in March 2019, the trial court granted defendant’s

motion to dismiss with prejudice, finding: “Plaintiff’s complaint fails as a matter of law.”

¶9 This appeal followed.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Specifically, plaintiff argues “the allegations of plaintiff’s amended complaint, and his reply to

defendant’s motion to dismiss, when construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff was

-5- sufficient to establish a cause of action upon which relief could be granted.” We disagree and

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 12 Section 2-619.1 of the Code permits combining into one motion those motions

regarding the pleadings under section 2-615 of the Code and motions for involuntary dismissal or

other relief under section 2-619. 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2018). Here, defendant’s section 2-

619.1 motion to dismiss included an argument that “plaintiff’s FOIA claim should be dismissed

pursuant to [section] 2-615 because he cannot state a claim for relief.” Since plaintiff deemed his

non-FOIA claims “no longer relevant in this cause,” we will consider defendant’s section 2-615

argument for dismissal only.

¶ 13 “A section 2-615(a) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint

based on defects apparent on its face.” Reynolds v. Jimmy John’s Enterprises, LLC, 2013 IL App

(4th) 120139, ¶ 25, 988 N.E.2d 984. In plainest terms, a defendant filing a section 2-615 motion

to dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint asks, “So what? The facts the plaintiff has pleaded do not state

a cause of action against me.” Winters v. Wangler, 386 Ill. App. 3d 788, 792, 989 N.E.2d 776,

779 (2008). When presented with a section 2-615 motion, a court must consider “whether the

facts alleged in the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to

entitle the plaintiff to relief as a matter of law.” Winters, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 793. If the alleged

facts prove insufficient to warrant relief for the plaintiff, the trial court should dismiss the action.

Put differently, dismissal under section 2-615 is proper if a complaint does not establish a cause

of action upon which relief may be granted. Sweeney v. City of Decatur, 2017 IL App (4th)

160492, ¶ 13, 79 N.E.3d 184. We review de novo a trial court’s order granting a motion to

dismiss under section 2-615. Grant v. State, 2018 IL App (4th) 170920, ¶ 12, 110 N.E.3d 1089.

-6- ¶ 14 On appeal, defendant reinforces her section 2-615 argument against plaintiff’s

complaint, essentially saying—“So What? The facts the plaintiff has pleaded do not state a cause

of action against me.” (Emphasis added) Winters, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 792. Specifically, defendant

argues that she, even in her official capacity as DOC’s FOIA officer, is not a proper defendant to

plaintiff’s action because she is not a “public body” under Illinois’ Freedom of Information Act

(5 ILCS 140/1.1 et seq. (West 2018)) (FOIA or the Act). We agree with defendant and affirm the

trial court’s dismissal under section 2-615.

¶ 15 We have recognized “the purpose of FOIA ‘is to open governmental records to

the light of public scrutiny.’ ” City of Champaign v. Madigan, 2013 IL App (4th) 120662, ¶ 29,

992 N.E.2d 629 (quoting Stern v. Wheaton-Warrenville Community Unit School District 200,

233 Ill. 2d 396, 405, 910 N.E.2d 85, 91 (2009)). In furthering that purpose, FOIA “mandates that

‘each public body shall make available to any person for inspection or copying all public records,

except as otherwise provided in [the Act].’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Stern, 233 Ill. 2d at 405

(quoting 5 ILCS 140/3(a) (West 2006)). As mandated providers of public records requested

pursuant to FOIA, “public bodies” play the central role in effectuating the Act. For example,

requests must be submitted and directed to a “public body,” (5 ILCS 140/3(c) (West 2018)); a

“public body” must “designate [a] *** Freedom of Information officer or officers *** [to]

receive requests submitted to the public body under this Act, ensure that the public body

responds to the request in a timely fashion, and issue responses,” (5 ILCS 140/3.5(a) (West

2018)); and a “public body” must promptly respond to requests for public records. 5 ILCS

140/3(b), (d) (responding to requests generally), 3.1 (responding to requests for commercial

purposes), 3.2 (responding to recurrent requester), 3.6 (responding to voluminous requests)

(West 2018).

-7- ¶ 16 Since the burden of responding to public records requests under FOIA falls upon

the public body, when it fails to produce the requested records, the requester may seek to enforce

the Act against the public body. Indeed, FOIA provides that “any person denied access to inspect

or copy any public record by a public body may file suit for injunctive relief or declaratory

relief,” (5 ILCS 140/11(a) (West 2018)); and “[t]he circuit court shall have the jurisdiction to

enjoin the public body from withholding public records and to order the production of any public

records improperly withheld from the person seeking access.” 5 ILCS 140/11(d) (West 2018);

see also 5 ILCS 140/11(b), (c) (West 2018). Moreover, the trial court may enforce its order

against the public body by imposing civil penalties on the public body. 5 ILCS 140/11(j) (West

2018). Taken together, these FOIA sections provide two reasons why petitioners, like plaintiff

here, may only prosecute a legal action to enforce the Act against a public body. First, as we

have said, it is the public body—not the individual—who is tasked with receiving and

responding to FOIA requests. Second, FOIA gives the circuit court jurisdiction over the public

body.

¶ 17 FOIA defines a “public body” as follows:

“[A]ll legislative, executive, administrative, or advisory bodies of

the State, state universities and colleges, counties, townships,

cities, villages, incorporated towns, school districts and all other

municipal corporations, boards, bureaus, committees, or

commissions of this State, any subsidiary bodies of any of the

foregoing including but not limited to committees and

subcommittees thereof, and a School Finance Authority created

-8- under Article 1E of the School code.” 5 ILCS 140/2(a) (West

2018).

We previously observed that “section 2(a) does not include individual members of those bodies

in its definition of ‘public body.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) City of Champaign, 2013 IL 120662,

¶ 33. It is neither a logical nor jurisprudential leap, then, to observe now that section 2(a)’s

definition of “public body” does not include employees in those bodies, like Freedom of

Information officers or other individuals acting in their official capacities. Indeed, the First

District twice reached the same conclusion in Korner v. Madigan, 2016 IL App (1st) 153366, 69

N.E.3d 892 and Quinn v. Stone, 211 Ill. App. 3d 809, 570 N.E.2d 676 (1991). We find Korner

particularly instructive.

¶ 18 There, the plaintiff filed a complaint naming as defendants several public officers

acting in their official capacities and alleging those defendants “violated [her] rights under the

Illinois FOIA by withholding the documents she sought.” Korner, 2016 IL 153366, ¶ 6. The

defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing “the Illinois FOIA applies only to public bodies,

and not to individual public officers,” but the trial court denied their motion. Korner, 2016 IL

153366, ¶ 6. On appeal, the First District explained our “General Assembly patterned the Illinois

FOIA after the federal FOIA,” (Korner, 2016 IL 153366, ¶ 10), and “[f]ederal courts have

consistently held that ‘the Freedom of Information Act authorizes suit against federal agencies,

not against individuals.’ ” Korner, 2016 IL 153366, ¶ 1 (quoting Morpurgo v. Board of Higher

Education, 423 F. Supp. 704, 714 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)). Consequently, the First District

concluded: “Because Korner named as defendants only individuals, and not any public body, the

trial court should have dismissed the complaint on the basis of the failure to name a proper

defendant.” Korner, 2016 IL 153366, ¶ 11 (citing Quinn v. Stone, 211 Ill. App. 3d 809, 811, 570

-9- N.E.2d 676 (1991) (holding “[t]he trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s complaint *** on the

basis that defendant is not a ‘public body’ as defined under the FOIA”)).

¶ 19 In light of FOIA’s provisions and the Korner opinion, we conclude that in order

to state a FOIA cause of action that would entitle the plaintiff to relief, the plaintiff must name a

public body as a defendant, not an individual as a defendant—even if that individual is a public

officer acting in her official capacity. And this is where the rubber meets the road in this case.

Plaintiff failed to name a public body in his complaint. He named several individuals—including

defendant Lisa Weitekamp—in their official capacities. Later, he limited his action to one

defendant, Lisa Weitekamp, and averred the following in his motion for leave to file an amended

complaint: “This complaint for injunctive relief, does not seek to control or enjoin the actions of,

or impose sanctions on the I.D.O.C, only the actions of Lisa Weitekamp, the FOIA officer for the

I.D.O.C. No other defendants are named in this action, nor were any served any summons.” Not

only did plaintiff fail to name a “public body” as defendant, but he eschewed any implication

that he sought to enjoin a “public body” through Weitekamp. This is not a mere oversight that

we can now overlook or excuse because FOIA and Korner make clear that plaintiffs can only sue

a public body to enforce FOIA claims. Since plaintiff failed to name a “public body” as a

defendant to his FOIA claim, he failed to plead a cause of action that would entitle him to relief

from a court and the trial court properly dismissed his complaint under section 2-615.

¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 21 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 22 Affirmed.

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