Watson v. Richardson

80 N.W. 407, 110 Iowa 673
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedOctober 14, 1899
StatusPublished
Cited by49 cases

This text of 80 N.W. 407 (Watson v. Richardson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Watson v. Richardson, 80 N.W. 407, 110 Iowa 673 (iowa 1899).

Opinions

Ladd, J.

[676]*6761 [675]*675Mott Watson died August 26, 1¿95, intestate, at the age of sixty-seven years, leaving' property esti[676]*676mated to be worth two hundred and seventy thousand dollars. He had never been married. His estate is claimed, on the one hand, by a sister, and the children and a grandchild of deceased brothers and sisters, and, on the other, by George-D. Niles, styling himself George Niles Watson, as the natural son of the deceased. At the common law a child born out of wedlock could not inherit, as he was the son of .nobody, the blood of no ancestor coursed in his veins, and property by descent was transmitted only through the issue of his-own body. Norman v. Heist, 5 Watts & S. 171; Cooley v. Dewey, 4 Pick. 93; McDonald v. Railway Co., 144 Ind. 459, 55 Am. St. 185 (43 N. E. Rep. 447) 1 Blackstone Commentaries, 569; Van Horn v. Van Horn, 107 Iowa, 247. The civil law was more indulgent, as the illegitimate might inherit from the mother, and succeed to the inheritance of the father in event the parents married; and, if the father left no wife or lawful issue, he took one-twelfth of his estate: The greater leniency of the civil law has triumphed, through our statutes, over the harsher restrictions of the common law, apparently favoring matrimony; and now illegitimate children become legitimate by the marriage of their parents (Code, section 3150), inherit from the mother, and she from them (Code, section 3384), and “inherit from the father when the paternity is proven during his life, or they have been recognized by him as his children; but such recognition must have been general and notorious, or else in writing. Hnder such circumstances, if the recognition has been mutual, the father may inherit from his illegitimate children.” Code, section 3385. The written recognition contemplated by the statute need not be formal, nor for that express purpose. Crane v. Crane, 31 Iowa, 296. See contra, Pina v. Peck, 31 Cal. 359. It is sufficient if the writing, whether letter, contract, or other instrument, clearly acknowledges the parentage of the putative father. Brown v. Legion of Honor, 107 Iowa, 439. As the law indulges the presumption of innocence in all cases, the bur[677]*677den o-f proof necessarily rests on the claimant to establish (1) that he is the son of Mott Watson, deceased; (2) that during life he was recognized by him in writing as such; or (3) that Watson so did generally and notoriously.

2 3 II. Before considering the case on its merits, some preliminary questions should be disposed of. The appellees insist that proof of the contents of an alleged letter and contract, upon which recognition is predicated, must be excluded because o-f the failure to lay the proper foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence. . If the letter was written by Watson shortly before his death, and placed in an envelope-, duly stamped, and addressed to George D. Niles at Sam Antonio-, Tex., his then place of residence-, as related by Mrs. Wright, and by her mailed on the train by being handed to a.United States mail agent, in the absence of any showing to the contrary it will be presumed to have reached its destination. This is because of the probability that the officers of the government have performed their duty. Pennypacker v. Insurance Co., 80 Iowa, 56; Cushman v. Hassler, 82 Iowa, 295, 13 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 261. As the claimant is presumed to have received the letter, and no showing o-f its lo-ss. or dés-truction has been made, evidence of its contents was not admissible-. The claimant bases his action, in part, on an alleged written agreement for his maintenance made by Watson with Mrs. Niles. Even if this was in duplicate, that of Mrs. Niles belonged to her, and not to her adopted son, and might well be sought among the papers left by her at her decease in 1888. However much it may have concerned the claimant, he had no right to its possession. Niles testified that, after diligent search where his wife’s papers were usually kept, he was unable to find it. No such contract was found among the papers o-f Watson. We think this showing quite sufficient to warrant the- introduction of secondary evidence of its contents.

[678]*6784 III. In the very nature of things, the issues must be determined, largely upon the evidence introduced by the claimant. The collateral heirs can be. expected to do little else than insist upon due proof of what he avers. Much of the testimony is not subject to direct contradiction. Eór example, that of a witness alone with Watson to the effect that he referred to the claimant as his son. Such declaraions of the putative father concerning, the parentage of an illegitimate child are admissible. Niles v. Sprague, 13 Iowa, 207; Tyler v. Flanders, 57 N. H. 618; Barnum v. Barnum, 42 Md. 252; Crouch v. Hooper, 16 Beav. 182; Webb v. Haycock, 19 Beav. 342. But these cannot, in the nature of things be controverted, and for this reason must be carefully scrutinized, and received, if at all, with caution. As said in Grouch v. Hooper, supra: “It is also always necessary to remember that in these cases, from the nature of the evidence given, it is not subject to any worldly sanction; it being obviously impossible that any witness should be convicted of perjury for speaking of what he remembers to have been said in a conversation with a deceased person.” See Laurence v. Laurence, 164 Ill. Sup. 367 (45 N. E. Rep. 1073); Markey v. Markey, 108 Iowa, 373. Such testimony must necessarily be tested by its own inherent probability or improbability, by comparison with the other evidence in the case, and by the ordinary rules of human conduct under similar circumstances. The collateral heirs, in affirmative proof, are necessarily limited to that of collateral facts and circumstances, and to matters affecting the credibility of the witnesses whose evidence may tend to establish the claimant’s, right to inherit.

[679]*6795 [678]*678IY. That George D. Niles was born at the poor farm in Jackson county, Iowa, in the latter part of December, 1869, and that his mother went by the name of Mary Jones, are put beyond controversy by this record. In March, 1870, he was adopted by Mrs. Niles, whose husband was. then proprietor of the Decker House, at Maquoketa. Niles and [679]*679his wife moved to Nebraska in 1873, and from thence to Abilene, Kan., in 1876. Mrs. Niles died in 1888, and in 1889 the claimant enlisted in the regular army, in which service he continued till the fall of 1895. In 1890 he married, and after about a month separated from his wife. After leaving Maquoketa in 1873 with Mrs. Niles, he did not return until after the death of Watson. As appears from a letter written by him September 15, 1895, he “never had an idea who his own parents were, and never gave the matter much thought.” The suggestion that he was the son of Mott Watson, made by Cravens, to which this was an answer, evidently came to him as a surprise, though he did not hesitate to seize the opportunity of becoming the heir of a fortune.

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Bluebook (online)
80 N.W. 407, 110 Iowa 673, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/watson-v-richardson-iowa-1899.