Watson v. Law Enforcement Alliance of America, Inc.

451 F. Supp. 2d 870, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65243, 2006 WL 2570230
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Texas
DecidedSeptember 5, 2006
Docket2:04-cr-00691
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 451 F. Supp. 2d 870 (Watson v. Law Enforcement Alliance of America, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Watson v. Law Enforcement Alliance of America, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 2d 870, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65243, 2006 WL 2570230 (W.D. Tex. 2006).

Opinion

ORDER

YEAKEL, District Judge.

Before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motion to Join John Colyandro as an Additional Defendant (Doc. # 34); Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Join John Colyandro as an Additional Defendant (Doc. # 39); Defendant LEAA’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 38); Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant LEAA’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #40); and Defendant LEAA’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #41). A hearing on the motions was held before the Court on March 27, 2006. Following the hearing, the parties filed the following post-hearing submissions for the Court’s consideration: Plaintiffs’ Post-Hearing Brief (Doc. # 46); Defendant LEAA’s Post-Hearing Brief (Doc. # 49); Defendant LEAA’s Notice of Supplemental Authority (Doc. # 52); Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant LEAA’s Notice of Supplemental Authority (doc. # 53); Defendant LEAA’s Reply Regarding Supplemental Authority (Doc. # 54); Defendant LEAA’s [Second] Notice of Supplemental Authority (Doc. # 56); and *872 Defendant LEAA’s [Third] Notice of Supplemental Authority (Doc. # 57). On August 17, 2006, Plaintiffs’ filed their Third Amended Complaint. In response, Defendant LEAA filed its Supplemental Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Join John Co-lyandro as an Additional Defendant on August 31, 2006. After reviewing the motions, responses, replies, post-hearing submissions, relevant case law, arguments of counsel, and the record in this cause, the Court makes the following findings.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 27, 2004, Plaintiffs Kirk Watson (“Watson”) and Mike Head (“Head”) filed a petition in the 200th Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas, alleging that Defendants Law Enforcement Alliance of America, Inc. (“LEAA”), the Undisclosed Corporate Contributor John Does, John Doe Conspirators, and John Colyandro (“Colyandro”) violated the Texas Election Code by using corporate funds to influence election contests in which Plaintiffs were engaged. 1 In their petition, Plaintiffs claimed that LEAA, Co-lyandro, and other John Doe Conspirators violated section 253.094(a) of the Texas Election Code, which prohibits political expenditures and campaign contributions made from corporate funds. TEX. ELEC. CODE § 253.094(a) (West 2003). Plaintiffs alleged that LEAA accepted contributions from the treasuries of for-profit corporations to use to finance political advertising intended to oppose Plaintiffs’ candidacies and to support Plaintiffs’ opponents. Plaintiffs further alleged that a major purpose of LEAA was to elect certain Texas Republican candidates during the 2002 general election that would further the interests of the for-profit corporations that contributed money to it, and that the specific political advertisements that are the subject of the lawsuit were illegally funded with these corporate profits.

On October 25, 2004, LEAA removed the cause to this Court on the ground of diversity, alleging that Defendant Colyan-dro was improperly joined to defeat diversity. Plaintiffs Watson and Head filed a motion to remand, which the Court denied on the ground that the allegations in Plaintiffs’ petition fell short of what is required for notice pleading under Texas law. Watson v. Law Enforcement Alliance of America, Inc., 386 F.Supp.2d 874 (W.D.Tex.2005). The Court subsequently granted LEAA’s motion to dismiss Colyandro as a party and ordered Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint in compliance with the Court’s Order.

Now before the Court are Plaintiffs’ motion to join Colyandro as an additional defendant and Defendant LEAA’s motion to dismiss. In response to the Court’s Order of August 15, 2006, Plaintiffs have filed a Third Amended Complaint for the Court’s consideration in ruling on their motion to join Colyandro.

II. DISCUSSION

When a plaintiff seeks joinder of a non-diverse defendant after removal, the Court has two options (1) deny the joinder, or (2) permit the joinder and destroy diversity of citizenship of the parties requiring remand to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). Subsection (e) of section 1447 provides: “If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). The Fifth Circuit has *873 advised district courts to closely scrutinize an amendment which would destroy subject-matter jurisdiction and that justice requires the consideration of a number of factors to determine if the amendment should be permitted. See Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir.1987); see also Doleac v. Michalson, 264 F.3d 470, 474 (5th Cir.2001); Cobb v. Delta Exports, Inc., 186 F.3d 675, 677 (5th Cir.1999).

In Hensgens, the Fifth Circuit outlined four factors that the district court should, in its discretion, consider when a plaintiff seeks joinder of a nondiverse defendant after removal: (1) the extent to which the purpose of the amendment of the complaint is to defeat federal jurisdiction; (2) the degree of dilatory conduct on the part of the plaintiff; (3) the risk of significant injury to the plaintiff if the amendment is not allowed; and (4) any other equitable considerations. 833 F.2d at 1182. The purpose of weighing these factors, according to Hensgens, is to balance the defendants’ interest in maintaining a federal forum against the plaintiffs interest in avoiding multiple and parallel litigation. Id.

The first Hensgens factor is the extent to which joinder of Colyandro, a nondiverse party, is sought to defeat diversity jurisdiction. Id. It is clear that Plaintiffs sought to include Colyandro in this litigation from the beginning. At the time of removal, Colyandro was a named defendant in this action. He was dismissed on the ground that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege a claim against him. Watson, 386 F.Supp.2d at 878. Defendant LEAA asserts that had Plaintiffs been serious about imposing liability on Colyandro, their original petition would have sufficiently alleged a claim. Thus, LEAA argues, the present motion is simply a part of a continuing effort to destroy diversity jurisdiction. The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs have consistently attempted to assert claims against Colyandro. Their Third Amended Complaint, submitted in response to this Court’s Order, specifically alleges facts against Colyandro sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Court concludes that the first factor weighs in favor of joinder.

The second Hensgens factor is whether Plaintiffs have been dilatory in seeking the amendment. 833 F.2d at 1182.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Ekberg v. Polytec Inc
W.D. Texas, 2024
Martinez v. HOLZKNECHT
701 F. Supp. 2d 886 (S.D. Texas, 2010)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
451 F. Supp. 2d 870, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65243, 2006 WL 2570230, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/watson-v-law-enforcement-alliance-of-america-inc-txwd-2006.