1 The Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein
5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE
7 NO. 24-cv-82-BJR DIANA WATSON, 8 ORDER GRANTING REMAND Plaintiff, 9 v. 10 DEACON CONSTRUCTION, LLC, et al., 11 Defendants. 12
13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff, Diana Watson, originally filed this case in King County Superior Court alleging 15 that Defendant, Deacon Construction, LLC (“Deacon”) had violated a specific provision of 16 Washington State’s Equal Pay and Opportunities Act (“EPOA”), RCW 49.58.110, which requires 17 certain employers to disclose the wage scale or salary range, and a general description of other 18 compensation and benefits, in each posting for an available position. Deacon removed the case to 19 this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 20 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. Now pending before the Court is 21 Plaintiff’s motion to remand this case. Mot., ECF No. 16. Having reviewed the materials1 and the 22
23 1 Including the motion, ECF No. 16; response in opposition, ECF No. 17; and reply, ECF No. 19.
24 ORDER GRANTING REMAND 1 relevant legal authorities, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion and remand this case to King 2 County Superior Court. The reasoning for the Court’s decision follows. 3 II. BACKGROUND 4 On November 29, 2023, Diana Watson applied to work for Deacon in Seattle, Washington. 5 Compl. ¶¶ 8, 14-15; Ex.1, ECF No. 1-2. She alleges that the posting for the job opening did not 6 disclose the wage scale or salary range to be offered. Id. ¶¶ 14-15; Ex.1. Ms. Watson claims to 7 represent more than 40 potential class members who also applied for jobs with Deacon for positions 8 that did not disclose the wage scale or salary range. Id. ¶ 14. Ms. Watson’s complaint was virtually 9 identical to numerous other putative class-action lawsuits filed by multiple plaintiffs represented 10 by Emery Reddy, PLLC, and subsequently removed to this Court by the defendants. In her remand 11 motion, Ms. Watson refers to prior decisions this Court has made in some of these other cases,
12 arguing that similarly, her case must be remanded because this Court lacks subject matter 13 jurisdiction due to her failure to plead Article III standing. Mot. 1-2. She also contends that the 14 Court lacks jurisdiction under CAFA. Id. 15 III. LEGAL STANDARD 16 A defendant may remove to federal court any case filed in state court over which the federal 17 court would have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal question jurisdiction exists 18 over “civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 19 § 1331. “The general rule, referred to as the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ is that a civil action 20 arises under federal law for purposes of § 1331 when a federal question appears on the face of the 21 complaint.” City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Caterpillar
22 Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). Jurisdiction is based on the pleadings filed at the time 23 of removal and is based “solely on the plaintiff’s claims for relief and not on anticipated defenses
24 ORDER GRANTING REMAND 1 to those claims.” Id. (quoting ARCO Env’t Remediation, L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Health & Env’t Quality 2 of Mont., 213 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000)). 3 Removal requirements should be strictly construed. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 4 (9th Cir. 1992). A removing party bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction and must 5 overcome a “strong presumption” against removal. Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 6 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. Federal jurisdiction “must be rejected if there 7 is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. “[T]he court 8 resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 9 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Gaus, 980 F.3d at 566). If at any time before final judgment it 10 appears that the federal district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, “the case shall be remanded” 11 to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996).
12 IV. DISCUSSION 13 Deacon argues at great length why this Court has federal jurisdiction under CAFA. Opp’n 14 1-11, ECF No. 17. However, Deacon does not address Ms. Watson’s argument that her case must 15 be remanded because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to her lack of Article III 16 standing. “Under Article III, the Federal Judiciary is vested with the ‘Power’ to resolve not 17 questions and issues but ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’” Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 18 U.S. 125, 132 (2011). “Among other things, that limitation requires a plaintiff to have standing.” 19 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Cruz, 596 U.S. 289, 295–96 (2022). Whether Plaintiffs have Article III 20 standing to proceed with this lawsuit implicates the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Warth 21 v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (stating that standing is jurisdictional). Even in a class action,
22 “standing is the threshold issue . . . . If the individual plaintiff lacks standing, the court need never 23
24 ORDER GRANTING REMAND 1 reach the class action issue.” Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th 2 Cir. 2003). 3 “[T]o establish standing, a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is 4 concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the 5 defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v. 6 Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021) ((citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 7 (1992)). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.” 8 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; see also Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp., 659 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 9 2011) (“The burden of establishing removal jurisdiction, even in CAFA cases, lies with the 10 defendant seeking removal.”). Further, “each element must be supported in the same way as any 11 other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of
12 evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 13 As Ms.
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1 The Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein
5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE
7 NO. 24-cv-82-BJR DIANA WATSON, 8 ORDER GRANTING REMAND Plaintiff, 9 v. 10 DEACON CONSTRUCTION, LLC, et al., 11 Defendants. 12
13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff, Diana Watson, originally filed this case in King County Superior Court alleging 15 that Defendant, Deacon Construction, LLC (“Deacon”) had violated a specific provision of 16 Washington State’s Equal Pay and Opportunities Act (“EPOA”), RCW 49.58.110, which requires 17 certain employers to disclose the wage scale or salary range, and a general description of other 18 compensation and benefits, in each posting for an available position. Deacon removed the case to 19 this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 20 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. Now pending before the Court is 21 Plaintiff’s motion to remand this case. Mot., ECF No. 16. Having reviewed the materials1 and the 22
23 1 Including the motion, ECF No. 16; response in opposition, ECF No. 17; and reply, ECF No. 19.
24 ORDER GRANTING REMAND 1 relevant legal authorities, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion and remand this case to King 2 County Superior Court. The reasoning for the Court’s decision follows. 3 II. BACKGROUND 4 On November 29, 2023, Diana Watson applied to work for Deacon in Seattle, Washington. 5 Compl. ¶¶ 8, 14-15; Ex.1, ECF No. 1-2. She alleges that the posting for the job opening did not 6 disclose the wage scale or salary range to be offered. Id. ¶¶ 14-15; Ex.1. Ms. Watson claims to 7 represent more than 40 potential class members who also applied for jobs with Deacon for positions 8 that did not disclose the wage scale or salary range. Id. ¶ 14. Ms. Watson’s complaint was virtually 9 identical to numerous other putative class-action lawsuits filed by multiple plaintiffs represented 10 by Emery Reddy, PLLC, and subsequently removed to this Court by the defendants. In her remand 11 motion, Ms. Watson refers to prior decisions this Court has made in some of these other cases,
12 arguing that similarly, her case must be remanded because this Court lacks subject matter 13 jurisdiction due to her failure to plead Article III standing. Mot. 1-2. She also contends that the 14 Court lacks jurisdiction under CAFA. Id. 15 III. LEGAL STANDARD 16 A defendant may remove to federal court any case filed in state court over which the federal 17 court would have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal question jurisdiction exists 18 over “civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 19 § 1331. “The general rule, referred to as the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ is that a civil action 20 arises under federal law for purposes of § 1331 when a federal question appears on the face of the 21 complaint.” City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Caterpillar
22 Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). Jurisdiction is based on the pleadings filed at the time 23 of removal and is based “solely on the plaintiff’s claims for relief and not on anticipated defenses
24 ORDER GRANTING REMAND 1 to those claims.” Id. (quoting ARCO Env’t Remediation, L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Health & Env’t Quality 2 of Mont., 213 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000)). 3 Removal requirements should be strictly construed. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 4 (9th Cir. 1992). A removing party bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction and must 5 overcome a “strong presumption” against removal. Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 6 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. Federal jurisdiction “must be rejected if there 7 is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. “[T]he court 8 resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 9 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Gaus, 980 F.3d at 566). If at any time before final judgment it 10 appears that the federal district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, “the case shall be remanded” 11 to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996).
12 IV. DISCUSSION 13 Deacon argues at great length why this Court has federal jurisdiction under CAFA. Opp’n 14 1-11, ECF No. 17. However, Deacon does not address Ms. Watson’s argument that her case must 15 be remanded because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to her lack of Article III 16 standing. “Under Article III, the Federal Judiciary is vested with the ‘Power’ to resolve not 17 questions and issues but ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’” Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 18 U.S. 125, 132 (2011). “Among other things, that limitation requires a plaintiff to have standing.” 19 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Cruz, 596 U.S. 289, 295–96 (2022). Whether Plaintiffs have Article III 20 standing to proceed with this lawsuit implicates the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Warth 21 v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (stating that standing is jurisdictional). Even in a class action,
22 “standing is the threshold issue . . . . If the individual plaintiff lacks standing, the court need never 23
24 ORDER GRANTING REMAND 1 reach the class action issue.” Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th 2 Cir. 2003). 3 “[T]o establish standing, a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is 4 concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the 5 defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v. 6 Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021) ((citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 7 (1992)). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.” 8 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; see also Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp., 659 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 9 2011) (“The burden of establishing removal jurisdiction, even in CAFA cases, lies with the 10 defendant seeking removal.”). Further, “each element must be supported in the same way as any 11 other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of
12 evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 13 As Ms. Watson argues, this Court has found in similar— virtually identically pleaded— 14 cases, that the plaintiffs failed to allege that they applied for the posted positions in good faith with 15 a genuine interest in employment with the employer. See, e.g., Floyd v. Insight Global, LLC, No. 16 2:23-cv-01680-BJR (W.D. Wash.); Atkinson v. Aaron’s, LLC, No. 2:23-cv-01742-BJR (W.D. 17 Wash.); David v. Herc Rentals Inc., No. 2:24-cv-00175-BJR (W.D. Wash.). The Court concluded 18 that a violation of the statutory provision at issue here—a job posting with no compensation 19 information included—is a technical or procedural violation that by itself does not manifest 20 concrete injury but requires a bona fide applicant before there is a risk of harm. Consequently, there 21 was no allegation of injury sufficiently concrete for the purposes of Article III standing. See Robins
22 v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017)). 23
24 ORDER GRANTING REMAND 1 When a plaintiff lacks Article III standing, the district court must remand the case. See Polo 2 v. Innoventions Int’l, LLC, 833 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The rule that a removed case in 3 which the plaintiff lacks Article III standing must be remanded to state court under § 1447(c) applies 4 as well to a case removed pursuant to CAFA as to any other type of removed case.”). Here, Deacon, 5 as the “party invoking federal jurisdiction,” has not met its burden of demonstrating a case or 6 controversy under Article III standing at this stage of litigation. Indeed, Deacon appears to agree 7 that Ms. Watson, like the plaintiffs in those cases, was not a bona fide applicant for the job at issue. 8 Opp’n 1-2. Because Plaintiff’s lack of Article III standing implicates the Court’s subject matter 9 jurisdiction, see Warth, 422 U.S. at 498, this case will be remanded to King County Superior Court 10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). As such, the Court need not address the arguments relating to 11 CAFA jurisdiction.
12 V. CONCLUSION 13 For the foregoing reasons, 14 1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, ECF No. 16, is GRANTED. 15 2. This case is remanded to King County Superior Court. 16 DATED this 30th day of July 2024. A 17 18 B arbara Jacobs Rothstein U.S. District Court Judge 19 20 21 22 23
24 ORDER GRANTING REMAND