The burden then shifts to Plaintiff to show why the statute of limitations does not
3 bar his claims. Id. Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations has not yet run its
six years. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that if the six years has run, equitable
estoppel and equitable tolling prevent his claims from being time-barred.
A. When Statute of Limitations Began Running
First, for a breach of contract claim, the cause of action accrues when the
defendant breaches the contract. Gile v. Albert, 2008 ME 58, cir 8, 943 A.2d 599.
Second, a cause of action for fraud accrues when the plaintiff discovers he or she
has a cause of action. Drilling and Blasting Rock Specialists, Inc. v. Rheaume, 2016 ME
131, cir 10, 147 A.3d 824. Third, under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act
("UTPA"), the cause of action accrues "at the time a judicially cognizable injury is
sustained," not when the plaintiff realizes the scope of the injury. Campbell v.
Machias Sav. Bank, 865 F.Supp 26, 34 (Me. 1994); Dugan v. Martel, 588 A.2d 744, 746
(Me. 1991) (citing Chiapetta v. Clark Assocs., 521 A.2d 697, 699 (Me. 1987)).
Plaintiff's three causes of action accrued by 1998 at the latest, when
Defendant sold off three acres of the land promised to Ms. Watson. First1
Defendant sold to other persons the majority of the land he contracted to sell to
Plaintiff's mother. This is certainly a breach of contract, since he could no longer
perform by selling Plaintiff's mother the four acres promised. Second, one of the
elements of fraud is that Defendant made a representation to Plaintiff with
knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it was true or false.
Barr v. Dyke1 2012 ME 108, cir 16, 49 A.3d 1280. At the time the three acres were sold
to other persons, Plaintiff should have known that further reassurances from
Defendant that he would make good on the entire promise were false, because
Defendant could not convey the entire four acres. Therefore1 a cause of action for
fraud accrued at least in 1998 when the three acres had been sold off. Third, the
4 UTPA claim also accrued when the three acres were sold off, because that was a
legally cognizable injury related to the promise to sell four acres.
Plaintiff argues that when Defendant sold the three acres, it was only a
partial breach of contract, and the remainder of the contract was still enforceable. 1
(PL' s Opp. 5). It is unclear whether Plaintiff makes this point solely for the purpose
of remedies, because immediately after asserting the partial breach, he argues that
damages can be ordered on the enforceable portion. Indeed, the term "partial
breach" is one frequently used in the context of damages. 10 Corbin on Contracts
§ 53.4. 2 Thus, the usage of the term "partial breach" indicates that Plaintiff is
making this point for the purpose of remedies, and not does not necessarily
contend that he has claims for breach, fraud, and UTPA under the alleged
remaining, partially enforceable contract. Nonetheless, any partial payments or
actions which Plaintiff contends created a cause of action in 2007 occurred over six
years ago, so the statute of limitations has run on those claims.
B. Tolling the Statute of Limitations
Although, as determined above, the statute of limitations has run, Plaintiff
argues that the doctrines of equitable estoppel and equitable tolling allow his claim
to be brought now. Plaintiff asserts that the distinction between equitable estoppel
1 As Defendant argues in his reply, the terms in this remaining, partial contract that he seeks to enforce are unclear. It is unclear whether Plaintiff seeks to purchase the remaining one acre for the remainder of the original $4500 p ur chase price, whether Plaintiff seeks to purchase the remaining one acre for the $1 agreed upon in 2017, or whether Plaintiff only seeks to purchase the land underneath the trailer (See Pl.'s Opp 5 where Plaintiff seeks that Defendant "at least transfer the land containing the home"). 2 Plaintiff only cites Restatement 2d of Contracts for his allegations. It is fitting, therefore, to also cite secondary material for purposes of interpreting his arguments.
5 and equitable tolling is merely academic. However, a distinction does exist3 •
Additionally, as described below, the two doctrines contain different elements.
Therefore, they are considered separately.
a. Equitable Estoppel
Equitable estoppel prevents a party "from asserting rights which might
perhaps have otherwise existed against another person who has in good faith
relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the
worse, and who on his part acquires some corresponding right." HHS v. Pelletier,
2009 ME 11, 'JI 17, 964 A.2d 630 (citing Waterville Homes, Inc. v. Maine Dep't of
Transp., 589 A.2d 455,457 (Me. 1991)).
The Law Court has stated that the doctrine of equitable estoppel "should
be carefully and sparingly applied." Vacuum Sys. V. Bridge Constr. Co., 632 A.2d
442,444 (Me. 1993). This may be evidenced by the fact that neither party has cited
a case where the Law Court decided to apply equitable estoppel.
To succeed in an equitable estoppel claim, Plaintiff must show by clear and
convincing evidence that (1) Defendant's statements induced him to act, or fail to
act; (2) reliance on Defendant's statements was detrimental; and (3) the reliance
was reasonable. John F. Murphy Homes, Inc. v. State, 2017 ME 67, 'fI 23, 158 A.3d 921;
Tarason v. Town of S. Berwick, 2005 ME 30, 'fI 15, 868 A.2d 230.
3 "The doctrine of equitable estoppel is distinct from the doctrine of equitable tolling. In cases of equitable estoppel, the statute of limitations has expired and the defendant asserts the running of the statute of limitations as a defense. The defendant, however, is estopped from benefitting from the statute of limitations as a defense because the defendant has acted in such a way as to cause the claimant to forego filing a timely cause of action. In contrast, in cases involving the doctrine of equitable tolling, the defendant does not have the statute of limitations as a valid defense because it has not yet run. Rather, the statute of limitations is tolled when strict application of the statute of limitations would be inequitable." Dasha by Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 993, 995 n.2 (Me. 1995).
6 i. Induced him to act
Under the first element, Defendant's misleading conduct must have
induced Plaintiff to act, or fail to act. Pino v. Maplewood Packing Co., 375 A.2d 534,
539 (Me. 1977). However, Defendant's statements need not be knowingly or
intentionally misleading. Id. Thus, whether Defendant truly intended for the land
deal to go through does not preclude the application of equitable estoppel, as
Defendant contends. (Def.'s Reply 4).
However, as relayed in Townsend v. Appel:
The gist of an estoppel barring the defendant from invoking the defense of the statute of limitations is that the defendant has conducted himself in a manner which actually induces the plaintiff not to take timely legal action on a claim.
446 A.2d 1132, 1134 (Me. 1982) (internal citations omitted, emphasis added). The
Complaint does not expressly state that Plaintiff would have sought legal redress
if he had believed Defendant would not close the transaction. Plaintiff's
Opposition to Defendant's Motion states that if necessary, Plaintiff would seek to
amend the Complaint to allege as such. (Pl.'s Opp. 5). Since a motion to dismiss
must be based on facts as alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff's willingness to amend
does not itself allow the fact to be considered in a decision on this Motion. He
would indeed have to amend the Complaint, and has not done so.
The facts at hand are similar to those in Townsend. 446 A.2d 1132 (Me. 1982).
In Townsend, the plaintiff worked for his father while a minor and was led to
believe he would eventually be paid, based on his father's statements. Id. at 1132.
His father continually acknowledged the money owed. Id. at 1133. The plaintiff
sought to enforce payment more than 6 years after reaching majority, after the
statute of limitations had run. Id. The court determined, based upon the quoted
7 portion above, that there was insufficient evidence that the plaintiff contemplated
filing suit during the statute of limitations period. Id. at 1134. Here, since it is not
alleged in the Complaint, there is similarly insufficient evidence that Defendant's
statements kept Plaintiff from seeking legal remedies during the statute of
limitations period.
ii. Reliance
Reliance must be objectively reasonable in both duration and scope.
Hanusek v. Southern. Maine. Med. Ctr., 584 A.2d 634, 637 (Me. 1990). Two cases
illustrate reasonableness of reliance: Hanusek and Murphy Homes. In Hanusek, the
plaintiffs filed for medical malpractice three years after the incident, when the
statute of limitations was one year. 584 A.2d at 635. In delaying suit, the plaintiffs
relied on a single statement made by a nurse on the day of the alleged negligence,
inferring that if they spoke to an attorney, they would not receive quality medical
care. Id. at 637. The court found that the plaintiffs' decision to not even
confidentially speak with an attorney, based on one statement made three years
prior, was objectively unreasonable. Id. In Murphy Homes, the plaintiff relied on
isolated statements by two different state workers to reconcile its books with the
MaineCare program. John F. Murphy Homes, Inc. v. State, 2017 ME 67, CJ[ 12, 158
A.3d 921. More than ten years after these statements were made, and after the
limitations period, the plaintiff asserted that it had not been reimbursed properly
from MaineCare, claiming that it relied on those statements in believing that it did
not have a cause of action. Id. at CJ[CJI 20, 24. The court found that relying on two
statements made over ten years prior was not reasonable. Id. at CJ[ 24.
Here, unlike in Hanusek and Murphy Homes, Plaintiff relied on multiple
statements over many years. However, the time period between accrual of the
8 cause of action and the Complaint is at least 19 years, from the time three of the
four acres were sold off, which is much longer than either Hanusek or Murphy
Homes. This is long time period to rely on those statements. And, as in Hanusek, it
is objectively unreasonable for Plaintiff to rely on Defendant's statements and
actions in deciding not to even confidentially consult an attorney.
Additionally, it is not reasonable to rely on a promise by a man who was
known for making "loose, unwritten land deals on a regular basis" because "he
liked to work in cash and without the confines of a written agreement." When
such a person sold off 75% of the land that he promised to sell to Plaintiff's mother,
and did so to avoid subdivision regulations (both dishonest transactions), it is not
reasonable to rely on his further promises to properly convey the remaining acre.
b. Equitable Tolling
Plaintiff's last contention is that equitable tolling prevented the statute of
limitations from running, and therefore, his claim is not time-barred. A
fundamental principle of equitable tolling is that it is "only appropriate when the
circumstances that cause a party to miss a filing deadline are out of his hands."
Jobe v. Immigration and Naturalization Services, 238 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 2001)
(internal citations omitted). Like equitable estoppel, equitable tolling is a
"sparingly invoked doctrine," and "is available only in compelling circumstances
which justify a departure from established principles." Id.; Puckett v. Tennessee
Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481 (6th Cir. 1989). This may be evidenced by the fact that
neither party cites a case in which equitable tolling has properly been applied.
9 Additionally, there are only three Maine Supreme Judicial Court cases mentioning
the equitable tolling doctrine, none of which apply it. 4
To prove equitable tolling, Plaintiff must show (A) that he has been
reasonably diligent in pursuing his rights, and (B) that some "extraordinary
circumstance" stood in his way, both of which are assessed based on the totality
of the circumstances. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 410, 411 (2005); Holland v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 631,653 (2010) (finding that diligence must be reasonable); Ramos
Martinex v. United States, 638 UF.3d 315, 324 (1st Cir 2011) (discussing totality of
the circumstances). Here, Plaintiff and his mother had offered several times to pay
for the land, but were refused. This may be diligence in asking Defendant about
the transaction. However, it is not diligence in pursuing their legal rights. As
discussed above, there is no evidence that Plaintiff or his mother would have
spoken to an attorney or sued Defendant for specific performance years ago, while
the limitations period was still running. Therefore, it cannot be said that Plaintiff
was reasonably diligent in pursuing his legal rights. Moreover, this case likely
does not have the requisite "extraordinary circumstances," since one person's
reliance on another's statements to his detriment is not uncommon, and there are
no other outstandingly unusual facts in this case.
The First Circuit has delineated five factors that aid it in evaluating an
equitable tolling claim: "(1) a lack of actual notice of a time limit; (2) a lack of
constructive notice of a time limit; (3) diligence in the pursuit of one's rights; (4) an
4 See Dasha by Dasha v. Meaine Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 993. 335 n.2 (Me. 1995) (discussed equitable tolling only to distinguish it from equitable estoppel); Miller v. Miller, 2017 ME 155, <][1[ 14-19, _ A.3d _ (discussed equitable estoppel but refused to apply it); an d Kobritz v. Severance, 2007 ME 3, CJ[ 16-18, 912 A.2d 1237 (discussed equitable tolling but determined there was an issue of material fact and summary judgment was denied before a finding on equitable tolling was made).
10 absence of prejudice to a party opponent; and (5) the claimant's reasonableness in
remaining ignorant of the time limit." Jobe, 238 F.3d at 100. Here, it is unknown
whether Plaintiff or his mother actually knew there was a six-year limitations
period. However, it would be unreasonable for Plaintiff or his mother to believe
they would be able to wait at least 19 years from the sale of three of the four
promised acres before first asserting their rights. Lack of diligence has been
discussed above. Thus, the factors point away from applying equitable estoppel.
Lastly, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that cases where equitable
tolling may be available include where the plaintiff received inadequate notice;
where there is a motion for appointment of counsel pending and equity justifies
tolling until the motion is acted upon; where the court has led the plaintiff to
believe he has done everything required of him; or where the defendant's
affirmative misconduct lulled the plaintiff into inaction. Baldwin Cty. Welcome Ctr.
v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984). Clearly only the last circumstance could apply
here. While Defendant affirmatively stated that the deal would be closed and
accepted the partial payments, again, there is no evidence that this lulled Plaintiff
into not asserting his legal rights. Looking at this last circumstance in relation to
the other listed in Baldwin Cty., it appears that equitable tolling would apply in a
situation in which a defendant has led the plaintiff to believe that he did not have
a claim. This is not the case here. Plaintiff's mother could have brought a claim as
early as 1975 when Defendant refused to take her payment and deed over the land.
Back to the fundamental principle of equitable tolling, this is not a case
where compliance with the statute of limitations was out of Plaintiff's hands. He
and his mother sat on their rights for at least 19 years, with nothing impeding the
filing of suit all those years ago. For this reason, as well those described
11 •
immediately above, coupled with the rarity with which the doctrine should be
applied, Plaintiff's claim of equitable estoppel is denied.
IV. Conclusion
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. This matter is dismissed
with prejudice.
DATE: November 6, 2017 ~ ! ~J Daniel I. Billings Justice, Maine Superior Court