WATSON v. 1019 LINDA LANE, VINELAND NJ 08360

• Court: District Court, D. New Jersey
• Decided: December 31, 2024
• Docket: 1:24-cv-11020
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY CAMDEN VICINAGE HONORABLE KAREN M., WILLIAMS RUTH WATSON, Plaintiff, No, 24-11020 (RAMW-MJS) Vv. MEMORANDUM OPINION 1019 LINDA LANE, VINELAND NJ 08360 AND ORDER Defendant.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court by way of pro se Plaintiff Ruth Watson’s (“Plaintiff’) Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“IFP Application”) (ECF No. 1-1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); and

THE COURT NOTING that, having reviewed Plaintiff’s IFP Application, Plaintiff declares that her average monthly income is $39,840.00 and her average monthly expenses are approximately $4,750.00. IFP Application 9 1, 8. Plaintiff does not have other liquid assets, nor does she list a spouse to contribute income or share in expenses, {J 1-8; and

WHEREAS, the Third Cireutt has held that an application to proceed without paying filing fees is “based on a showing of indigence,” Douris vy. Newtown Borough, Inc., 207 F. App’x 242, 243 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted);

WHERAS, the Court observes that pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(A), “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—(A) the allegation of poverty is

untrue,” i#./ (emphasis added); see also Kachur v. WMC Mortg. Corp., No. 18-15111, 2018 WL 5634007, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2018) (dismissing the complaint swa@ spente upon denial of in forma pauperis application where the court found that, “[c]onsidering Plaintiffs’ monthly income, savings, and expenses, Plaintiffs ha[{d] not established that they [could not] pay the costs of litigation.”); and

WHERAS, the Court notes that although a “person need not be absolutely destitute to proceed in forma pauperis,” Plaintiff must nonetheless “establish that [she] is unable to pay the costs of [her] suit,” Hurst v. Shalk, 659 F. App’x 133, 134 (3d Cir. 2016); and

WHEREAS, here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s monthly income, savings, and expenses fail to establish that Plaintiff cannot pay the costs of litigation; therefore,

IT IS this 31° day of December, 2024 ORDERED that:

{1) Plaintiff's application is DENIED without prejudice. {2) Plaintiff may submit the required $405.00 filing fee or file a renewed Application to Proceed without Prepaying Fees or Costs by January 31, 2025. (3) The Clerk of the Court shall close this matter and serve a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order upon Plaintiff by regular U.S. mail. ! 4 o™ 48 VA ooo Berk M. WILLIAMS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE ' Although the Court does not reach the merits of Plaintiff application for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) or screen the Complaint for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 191S(e)(2)(B), the Court notes that to the extent Plaintiff seeks relief that would disrupt a state court foreclosure judgment, the district court cannot provide such relief. See Kachur, 2018 WL 5634007, at n.1; Nest v Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 16-4282, 2016 WL 4541871, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2016) (citations omitted) (“The Third Circuit has specifically held that the Rooker-Feldinan doctrine bars federal courts from providing relief that would invalidate a state comt foreclosure decision”). “Should Plaintiff] demonstrate [her] entitlement to proceed IFP or pay the filing fee, the Cowt would then evaluate the merits of Plaintiff's application for a TRO.” Kachur, 2018 WL 5634007, at *1 n.]