Watson, T. v. Brown, V.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: February 7, 2025
• Docket: 539 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S43045-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

TAMMI WATSON AND THOMAS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF WATSON : PENNSYLVANIA : Appellants : : v. : : CLAIR G. BROWN, JR., AND : VIRGINIA BROWN, AS THE : EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF : CLAIR G. BROWN, JR. : No. 539 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered January 10, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at No(s): 2018-28498

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 7, 2025

In this car-accident case, Plaintiffs, Tammi and Thomas Watson, appeal

from the order sustaining a preliminary objection of Virginia Brown (as the

Executrix of her husband’s estate) and dismissing the complaint due to the

Watsons’ failure to perfect service upon Clair G. Brown, Jr. Because the

Watsons violated Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b), we affirm.

On December 6, 2016, Mrs. Watson drove Mr. Watson’s car into an

intersection. According to Mrs. Watson, at the same time, Mr. Brown ran the

red light, struck the front, driver side of Mr. Watson’s car, and injured Mrs.

Watson. Nearly two years later, the Watsons filed a complaint for negligence

per se against Mr. Brown. The trial court expounded on the numerous service

attempts as follows: J-S43045-24

[T]he complaint was never served on the Defendants. Service was unsuccessfully attempted on numerous occasions by the [sheriff], with affidavits of non-service being filed on January 1, 2019, March 7, 2019, and November 4, 2019. As the complaint was not served, the [Watsons] filed a praecipe to reinstate the complaint 18 times, over almost two years, from the original filing of the complaint on December 5, 2018 through November 30, 2020 . . .

Clair Brown, Jr., died on [April] 4, 2020. [The Watsons’] counsel was unaware of his death. [On October 13, 2020, Mrs. Brown raised her husband’s estate, and the register of wills issued letters testamentary to Mrs. Brown, naming her the Executrix of the Estate. See In re Estate of Brown, 46-2020-X2673 (C.C.P. Montgomery 2020). The Watsons] did not reinstate the complaint between November 30, 2020 and September 2, 2022, with another almost two years passing without effectuating service.

* * *

On August 26, 2022, [the Watsons] filed a motion for alternative service, which was replete with justification for [the Watsons’] inability to continue with their efforts to serve [Mr. Brown] or move the case forward since November of 2020. During this two year timeframe, [they] did not make any additional efforts to serve the complaint or locate [Mr. Brown] between reinstating the complaint on November 30, 2020 and the August 26, 2022 motion for alternative service . . . However, at the time [the Watsons] filed their motion for alternate service on August 26, 2022, [they] were unaware that [Mr. Brown] had been dead for over two years. Subsequently, the Honorable Joseph Smyth, unaware that [Mr. Brown] was deceased, granted [the] motion for alternate service on August 26, 2022.

On September 2, 2022, [the Watsons] filed a praecipe to reinstate the complaint followed by an affidavit of service, confirming its publication on October 18, 2022. After alternative service was effectuated, [defense] counsel entered his appearance on behalf of [Mr. Brown] and filed preliminary objections. [A year passed, while the Watsons filed a suggestion of death for Mr. Brown. After several more months of inactivity, they eventually substituted Mrs. Brown, as the Executrix of Mr. Brown’s Estate, as the named defendant. Mrs. Brown renewed the preliminary objection of her late husband, i.e., that service of

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process was improper, and, therefore, the trial court lacked in personam jurisdiction over her.]

In the [trial c]ourt’s detailed decision . . . [it] sustained the preliminary objection for lack of service as [Mr. Brown] was never served. [The court] found the [Watsons] lacked due diligence in the failure to reinstate the complaint, [they] did not make a good faith effort to serve [Mr. Brown], and [the Watsons’] claims of constructive service and justification for failing to continually reinstate the complaint lacked credibility and failed legally. The court also found that the defense [was] prejudiced.

The court issued its decision sustaining the preliminary objections and dismissing the complaint with prejudice on January 10, 2024. [The Watsons] filed an appeal on February 9, 2024.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/30/24, at 1-3.

The trial court directed the Watsons to file “a concise statement of the

errors complained of on appeal,” under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). T.C.O., 2/12/14,

at 1 (emphasis added). That order warned the Watsons that “any issue not

properly included in a statement timely filed and served pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) ‘shall be deemed waived,’ Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iv).” Id. (emphasis

added).

Instead of properly filing a concise statement of errors, the Watsons

served the trial court with a six-page document, raising 23 issues. See

Watsons’ 1925(b) Statement at 1-6. Their statement included details for

several of the issues, as well as quotations from various cases that they

claimed the trial court misapplied.

Unsurprisingly, the trial court did not appreciate receiving a voluminous

statement of errors for an appeal involving a single preliminary objection and

basic concepts of proper service of a complaint. The court found the statement

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to be procedurally flawed, because it was “excessively long and repetitive in

its assertion of errors.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/30/24, at 6. Given that the

statement was “neither concise nor clear in its assertions,” the trial court

found that the Watsons “waived all claims of alleged error” on appeal. Id.

We agree.

“The issue of waiver presents a question of law, and, as such, our

standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Trigg v.

Children's Hosp. of Pittsburgh of UPMC, 229 A.3d 260, 269 (Pa. 2020).

Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) provides, in relevant part, “If the

judge entering the [appealed-from] order . . . desires clarification of the errors

complained of on appeal, the judge may enter an order directing the appellant

to file of record in the trial court and serve on the judge a concise statement

of the errors complained of on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Critically, “The

statement shall set forth only those errors that the appellant intends to

assert.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(i) (emphasis added). “The statement should

not be redundant or provide lengthy explanations as to any error. Where non-

redundant, non-frivolous issues are set forth in an appropriately concise

manner, the number of errors raised will not alone be grounds for finding

waiver.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(iv).

In applying that rule, this Court has explained, “Rule 1925 is a crucial

component of the appellate process because it allows the trial court to identify

and focus on those issues the parties plan to raise on appeal.” Kanter v.

Epstein, 866 A.2d 394, 400 (Pa. Super. 2004). Our precedents clearly state

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that Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) is not satisfied by simply filing any statement. Rather,

the statement must be “concise” and coherent as to permit the trial court to

understand the specific issues being raised on appeal.

Specifically, we have held that when appellants raise an “outrageous”

number of issues in their 1925(b) statement, the appellants have “deliberately

circumvented the meaning and purpose of Rule 1925(b) and have thereby

effectively precluded appellate review of the issues they now seek to raise.”

Kanter, 866 A.2d at 401 (finding waiver where counsel raised 50 issues in a

simple, breach-of-contract case for an unpaid referral fee). We have further

noted that such “voluminous” statements do not identify the issues that

appellants actually intend to raise on appeal because the briefing limitations

contained in Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) make the raising of so many issues impossible.

Id. “Further, this type of extravagant 1925(b) statement makes it all but

impossible for the trial court to provide a comprehensive analysis of the

issues.” Jones v. Jones, 878 A.2d 86, 90 (Pa. Super. 2005).

The proceedings before the trial court consisted almost entirely of paper

filings – indeed, the matter never progressed passed the filing of preliminary

objections and a response. The in-court portion of this case involved 40

minutes of oral argument with no testimony or evidence presented. Thus,

raising 23 issues and subissues deviates widely from the requirement that the

statement be concise, in light of the simplicity of the issue before the trial

court: namely, whether the Watsons properly served their complaint on Mr.

Brown under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

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Admittedly, a lengthy statement may not always be the consequence of

bad faith. See, e.g., Eiser v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 938

A.2d 417, 421, 422 (Pa. 2007) (plurality) (stating that “while the number of

issues raised in the subject Rule 1925(b) statement may have been the result

of a poorly reasoned appellate strategy, because the trial court did not find

that appellants acted in bad faith, there was no violation of a Rule of Appellate

Procedure”) (reviewing 24 errors listed in the concise statement). However,

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania distinguished Eiser from Kanter, because

the issues in Eiser were far more complex than a straightforward breach-of-

contract action. Id., at 421-22. Eiser involved a complex, multi-count

lawsuit, with numerous defendants, resulting in many trial court rulings. A

dozen counts were raised, which blamed Mr. Eiser’s habitual smoking and

consequently his lung cancer on the tobacco industry.

We have relied upon that distinction in other cases where there were

complex legal issues and, therefore, a voluminous 1925(b) statement was

reasonable in light of the cases being appealed. See Maya v. Johnson &

Johnson, 97 A.3d 1203, 1211, n. 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (allowing an eleven

page, 23 paragraph statement, in a products liability case with a nine-week

jury trial and $10,000,000 verdict, where a three-year-old child suffered

numerous, horrific, medical problems after an allergic reaction to over-the-

counter children’s Motrin) and Boehm v. Riversource Life Ins. Co., 117

A.3d 308, 319, n. 3 (Pa. Super. 2015) (allowing 36 claims of error, following

a jury trial on fraud and a non-jury trial on the Uniform Trade Practice and

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Consumer Protection Law with multiple experts and highly technical concepts

arising from the sale of a variable-whole-life-insurance policy).

By contrast to those cases and cases like them, this appeal involves the

straightforward question of proper service of a complaint. It does not present

the legal complexity that caused the Eiser Court to deviate from this Court’s

rationale in Kanter. The numerosity of the Watsons’ complaints in the

statement was a litany of grievances rehashing their theories in opposition to

the preliminary objections point by excruciating point. Many of the issues

were redundant in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(iv) and were an obvious

attempt to overwhelm the trial court, instead of aiding it in understanding the

few issues that the Watsons actually intended to raise in this Court. Consistent

with Kanter, supra, these violations lead us to agree with the trial court that

waiver is appropriate.

Appellants who file a 1925(b) statement, brimming with over 20 points

of error, following a 40-minute-long, oral argument regarding one preliminary

objection, do so either out of extreme ignorance of the appellate process or

as an act of deliberate disrespect for the trial court’s time and finite judicial

resources. In either case, such appellants have no real intention or hope of

litigating 23 issues on appeal due to the briefing-word-count limits that our

Rules of Appellate Procedure impose. “A principal brief shall not exceed

14,000 words . . . .” Pa.R.A.P. 2135(a)(1).

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In fact, the Watsons reduced their merit issues on appeal from the 23

that they raised in their 1925(b) statement to four.1 We can only conclude

that the Watsons packed their 1925(b) statement with 23 issues solely to

exasperate the trial court and waste its time. The Watsons were uninterested

in helping the trial court facilitate a meaningful appellate review as to any of

the issues in their excessive 1925(b) statement.

Instead, they presented the trial court with redundant issues and

subissues, included lengthy explanations, as well frivolous issues that they

never planned to raise or argue in this Court. The Watsons did so in clear

violation of Rule 1925(b)(4)(i),(iv). We cannot condone such action.

____________________________________________

1 The Watsons’ four merit issues are:

1. Did the trial court err when it determined that [the Watsons] failed to put [Mr. Brown] on notice of the claims and failed to serve [him] with the complaint?

2. Did the trial court err when it determined that [the Watsons] failed to make a good faith effort to give notice of the complaint?

3. Did the trial court err when it determined that [the defense] suffered prejudice by the alleged failure to place [Mr. Brown] on notice of the claims?

4. Did the trial court err when it neglected to consider the general principles, authoritative statutes, and governing case law holding that the court rules should be liberally construed to ensure a just determination of the matter and to protect the substantial rights of the parties?

Watsons’ Brief at 5-6.

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To discourage appellate counsel from filing needlessly voluminous Rule

1925(b) statements in the future, we impose the waiver result prescribed in

Kanter, supra.

Appellate issues dismissed as waived.

Judgment affirmed.

Judge Bowes and Judge Stabile concur in result.

Date: 2/07/2025

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