Watkins v. Yancey

495 S.W.2d 366, 1973 Tex. App. LEXIS 2947
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 8, 1973
Docket8158
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 495 S.W.2d 366 (Watkins v. Yancey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Watkins v. Yancey, 495 S.W.2d 366, 1973 Tex. App. LEXIS 2947 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973).

Opinion

CHADICK, Chief Justice.

“This suit was brought by Robert Yan-cey, and six other residents of the State of Texas, either residing in or owning lots in Dal-Castle Addition to the City of Garland, Dallas County, Texas, against Leo Watkins and two other named trustees of the Southgate Baptist Church for the purpose of determining and declaring the three (3) lots in Dal-Castle Addition owned by the Appellant Trustees restricted to residential use only and further declaring the foundation constructed by Appellants to be in violation of the restriction, and to require the removal of the foundation from the property. * * * *

“A trial before a jury resulted in a judgment declaring the three (3) lots to be restricted to residential use only and [such deed restriction to be] binding upon Appellants and all successors in title, declaring the structure commenced by Appellants for use as a church to be a violation of the residential only restriction, permanently restraining Appellants and all successors in title from completing any structure for use other than as a single family residence upon such land, and commanding Appellants and all successors to remove the foundation of the church within not more than sixty (60) days.” The foregoing extract from appellees’ brief appears to be substantially correct and with an explanatory interpolation is adopted as a statement of the case. More detail will be added as found necessary in the course of discussion. The plaintiffs in the trial court are appellees here; the defendants are appellants.

The appellants have briefed ten points of error. These ten have been combined into groups for discussion in appellants’ brief, the first three embraced in the first group and the last seven constituting the second. The ten points are as follows:

“First Point — The Trial Court erred in that it did not grant a new trial because there was jury misconduct in that jury discussed matters outside of record.
“Second Point — The Trial Court erred in that there is no evidence to support the jury finding on issue No. 9, that Garland Revival Center did not begin to operate as a church in 1963.
“Third Point — The Trial Court erred in refusing to grant Defendant motion for verdict non obstante veredicto because as a matter of law based on un-controverted evidence the Appellees were barred by the two year and four year statute of limitations.
“Fourth Point — The Trial Court erred in that there is no evidence to support the finding in issue No. 8, that the plan of development has not been abandoned.
“Fifth Point — The Trial Court erred in refusing to grant Defendant’s motion for verdict non obstante veredicto because all the evidence showed the plan of development abandoned.
“Sixth Point — The Trial Court erred in refusing to set aside the jury finding in special issue No. 13, to the effect that the Appellees had not failed to enforce Deed restrictions in Dal Castle Estates.
*368 “Seventh Point — The Trial Court erred in failing to disregard jury finding to special issue No. 18, in that there is no evidence to support the jury finding.
“Eighth Point — The Trial Court erred in not holding that Appellee, Southwest Development Corporation had waived its right to enforce Deed restrictions by its failure to act upon open and obvious violations.
Ninth Point — The Trial Court erred in not holding that Appellee Yancey, et al, had waived their right to enforce Deed restrictions because they purchased their respective lots at a time when there was an open and obvious violation of the Deed restrictions.
“Tenth Point — The Trial Court erred in failure to hold Appellees estopped from enforcing Deed restrictions, because the Appellees prior failure to enforce Deed Restrictions led Appellants to believe that the Appellees would not enforce the Deed restrictions.”

A different grouping of the points will be made in the discussion that follows.

For convenience, consideration will begin with the second point. Special Issue No. 9 and the jury’s verdict thereon is as follows:

“SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 9 — Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that in 1963 Garland Revival Center began operation as a church in a building on Lot 1, Block D, of Dal-Cas-tle Addition ?
Answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’
ANSWER: No”

In this issue the trial court cast the burden upon the appellants to prove by a preponderance of the evidence “that in 1963 Garland Revival Center began operation as a church in a building on Lot 1, Block D, of Dal-Castle Addition.” The jury’s “No” answer constituted a refusal to find such fact, and nothing more. C. & R. Transport Inc. v. Campbell, 406 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.Sup.1966); Pacific Coast Engineering Co. v. Trinity Const. Co., 410 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.Civ.App.Waco 1967, writ ref’d, n. r. e.); Smith v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 433 S.W.2d 217 (Tex.Civ.App.Tyler 1968, writ ref’d, n. r. e.) ; Weiser v. Hampton, 445 S.W.2d 224 (Tex.Civ.App.Houston 1st, 1969, writ ref’d, n. r. e.); Osborne v. English, 458 S.W.2d 209 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston 1st 1970, writ ref’d, n. r. e.); Rose v. Sher, 483 S.W.2d 297 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston 14th, writ ref’d, n. r. e.). The second point as worded does not present a material question for review by this court. The jury simply refused to find that in 1963 Garland Revival Center began operation as a church. The jury’s refusal to find the ‘Revival Center began’ does not constitute a finding as stated in the point of error that the ‘Revival Center did not begin.’ Nor does the trial court judgment rest upon the finding recited in the point. See Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence,” 38 Tex.Law Rev. 361-364. The point is overruled.

A principal contention advanced in the statement and argument under the third point of error is that the evidence shows as a matter of law that a church, Garland Revival Center, was established upon a lot in the addition in 1963 and that such use of the lot violated the residential use only deed restriction. Proof was introduced that a building was located on one of the restricted lots as early as 1953. The building, or lot, had a sign on it bearing the inscription, “Garland Revival Center.” One witness heard “lots of singing” emanating from the building. Another saw “about five cars” parked around the building when services were held in it. Numerous witnesses saw the building; some called it a church building, others did not, one called it a barn.

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Bluebook (online)
495 S.W.2d 366, 1973 Tex. App. LEXIS 2947, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/watkins-v-yancey-texapp-1973.