Watkins v. Revak

Opinion

DAVID DEAN WATKINS, Case No.: 3:19-cv-1000-JAH-WVG CDCR #V-04739, ORDER DISMISSING FIRST Plaintiff, AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR vs. FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM AND FOR SEEKING DAMAGES FROM JUDGE BERNARD REVAK; IMMUNE DEFENDANT PURSUANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA; TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) AND § 1915A(b) Defendants. I. Procedural History On May 28, 2019, David Dean Watkins (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“SATF”) located in Corcoran, California, and proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl., ECF No. 1. / / / Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when he filed his Complaint; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). On July 3, 2019, the Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but simultaneously DISMISSED his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and for seeking money damages against immune defendants. (ECF No. 3 at 9-10.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended pleading in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. (Id.) On August 2, 2019, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 4.) II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) A. Standard of Review Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a pre- answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context- specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant- unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015). C. Discussion 1. Heck Bar Plaintiff’s FAC is far from clear, but it appears is that he is challenging his conviction following a jury trial in 2003. (See FAC at 3.) Plaintiff requests that this Court “reduce” his sentence and order a “new trial in the interest of justice.” (FAC at 7.) He also seeks $155,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. (See id.) First, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief based on claims that he was wrongfully convicted, he may not pursue those claims in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, without first showing his conviction has already been invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held: in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 486-87; Washington v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2016). “Suits challenging the validity of the prisoner’s continued incarceration lie within ‘the heart of habeas corpus,’ whereas ‘a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added), quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973) (holding that a writ of habeas corpus is “explicitly and historically designed” to provide a state prisoner with the “exclusive” means to “attack the validity of his confinement” in federal court). Because Plaintiff seeks damages based on an allegedly unlawful sentence, he may not proceed pursuant to § 1983, unless that conviction and/or sentence has already been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 855-56 (“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983.’”), quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489. Thus, because Plaintiff does not claim to have already invalidated his sentence by way of direct appeal, executive order, or through the issuance of either a state or federal court writ of habeas corpus, Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, his current FAC must be dismissed in its entirety for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. 2. Rooker Feldman Doctrine Additionally, it appears that Plaintiff is seeking a ruling from this Court essentially overturning a California State Court decision. However, this is not a viable form of relief in this action. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that “‘a losing party in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States District Court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’” Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)); see District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 & 486 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). Review of state court decisions may only be conducted in the United States Supreme Court. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476 & 486; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; see 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar applies even if the complaint raises federal constitutional issues. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16 & 486; Henrichs v. Valley View Development, 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007). More specifically, the bar applies if the challenge to the state court decision is brought as a § 1983 civil rights action. See Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1995); Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986). A complaint challenges a state court decision if the constitutional claims presented to the district court are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision in a judicial proceeding. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16. “[T]he federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987)(Marshall, J., concurring); see also Worldwide Church of God, 805 F.2d at 891-92. Because Plaintiff appears to seek this Court’s assistance in overturning orders made by state court judges based on the same claims brought in this action, his claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court proceedings, and are barred by the Rooker- Feldman doctrine. 4. Eleventh Amendment Plaintiff also names the “State of California” as a Defendant. (Compl. at 1, 2.) The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state, absent the state’s affirmative waiver of its immunity or congressional abrogation of that immunity. Krainski v. Nev. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the State or its agencies for all types of relief, absent unequivocal consent by the state.”) (internal citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “[t]he State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court, and the Supreme Court has held that § 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Brown v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67, 71 (1989) (“We cannot conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard the well-established immunity of a State from being sued without its consent. […] We hold that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”). Accordingly, the Court dismisses the State of California as a party to this action sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. F. Leave to Amend Plaintiff has already been provided a short and plain statement of his pleading deficiencies, as well as an opportunity to amend those claims to no avail. See ECF No. 3. Therefore, the Court denies further leave to amend as futile. See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood, 759, F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) (“‘Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of ... leave to amend.’”) (quoting Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995)); Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the plaintiff has previously been granted leave to amend and has subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its claims, [t]he district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original)). Conclusion and Order Accordingly, the Court: 1) DISMISSES this civil action without further leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and H§ 1915A(b); 2) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), and 3) | DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter a final judgment of dismissal and to close the file. Dated: August 22, 2019 Hoy. JOHN A. HOUSTON United States District Judge 7 ok oe