Watkins v. Piggly Wiggly Bird Co.

31 F.2d 889, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 3579
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedMarch 18, 1929
DocketNo. 8095
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 31 F.2d 889 (Watkins v. Piggly Wiggly Bird Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Watkins v. Piggly Wiggly Bird Co., 31 F.2d 889, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 3579 (8th Cir. 1929).

Opinion

JOHNSON, District Judge.

A motion of defendant for judgment on the pleadings was sustained in the court below, and the ease is in this court to review that ruling. It appears from the pleadings that defendant was operating a grocery store in Sedalia, Mo. The front door of the building in which the business was carried on opened upon the sidewalk of the street. The level of the floor of the building adjacent to the street was above the level of the sidewalk, how 'much is not alleged. A screen door swinging outward was maintained at the street entrance to the store.

Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that:

“The door was so constructed that the drop or step down from the floor level to the sidewalk level was flush with the door and the defendant maintained a screen on said door, which screen Was solid across the bottom part thereof so- that it could not be seen from the inside of said door, when said screen was closed, that the drop or step down from the doorway to-the sidewalk was even with the door. Plaintiff states that it is the usual practice in construction when the floor level is higher than the sidewalk to construct a step or platform beyond the doorway so that one steps onto a level surface when passing through the door and it is dangerous to so construct a door so that when the door or screen thereon is opened one immediately steps to a lower level.”

On July 8, 1926, plaintiff entered the store from the street for the purpose of purchasing groceries. She alleged in her complaint that: “When the plaintiff had completed her business, she passed through the front door of said store to go outside, and pushed open the screen door, which swung outward, and at the same time took a step forward in the usual manner pursued by people passing through a door, but because of the screen and the wooden part on the-bottom of the screen, the plaintiff could not see when she stepped forward that she was stepping to lower level and as a result she was thrown down and forward in such manner that her right shoulder was dislocated and the large muscle in her forearm was tom [890]*890loose and her arm, head, neck, shoulder and back were lacerated, bruised and injured.”

Then follows the allegation that: “The defendant, in maintaining said door and screen in the condition aforesaid, was negligent; and said negligence directly resulted in plaintiff’s injuries.”

In its answer, the defendant denied generally all the allegations of the complaint except the allegations that it was a corporation in the grocery business at Sedalia, and that plaintiff entered the store at the time and for the purpose alleged in her complaint. In its answer, the defendant alleged affirmatively : “That whatever injuries plaintiff may have sustained happened in consequence of and were occasioned solely by the want' of due and proper care, watchfulness and attention on her part, while she was in and upon the premises of the defendant and by reason of her failure to be watchful for her own safety; in this, that the only entrance to defendant’s store and the one through which plaintiff passed in entering defendant’s store, is on Ohio Street in the City of Sedalia, Missouri; that plaintiff had been a resident of Sedalia for many years and was thoroughly familar with the entrance to defendant’s store and had used said entrance on numerous occasions before the 8th day of July, 1926; that on the said 8th day of July, 1926, and during the day time, plaintiff had entered defendant’s store, using the entrance described in plaintiff’s petition, had remained in said store but a short while, and in leaving said store, with full knowledge at the time of the condition of said doorway, conducted herself in such a negligent and careless‘manner as to cause such injuries as she may have sustained, without any negligence or carelessness or want of due and proper care on the part of defendant, its agents or servants thereto in any wise contributing.”

In her reply plaintiff denied, admitted, and alleged as follows:

Denied: “That her injuries were occasioned or contributed to by any want of due care or by any negligence upon her own part, that she failed to be watchful for her own safety, that she was familiar with the entrance to defendant’s store, that she had used said entrance on numerous occasions before the date when she was injured, that she left the store with full knowledge of the condition of said doorway, that she conducted herself in a negligent or careless manner.”
Admitted: “That she entered defendant’s store and used the entrance described in the petition on the day that she was injured.”
Alleged: “That the screen on defendant’s said doorway to its store opened outward and that when she entered said store she was compelled to pull said screen open toward her and to step back from the step which was flush with said screen when it was closed, and when she had pulled said screen door toward her and thus stepped back she could see the step in the doorway without giving it any particular attention, and when said screen was open and she had stepped back therefrom, then said step was noticeable to persons walking in the ordinary manner, but with said screen so opened there was nothing about said step which would attract the attention of the plaintiff to the fact that it was dangerously located; that said step was not dangerous with said screen open and was not calculated while said screen was open to cause a person entering said store and exercising ordinary care to notice that it was so located that it would be dangerous to one leaving the store when the screen was shut. By reason of said facts it was not the duty of plaintiff to notice that said step was so located as to be dangerous to persons leaving the store when the screen was shut and she did not notice such danger, and she did not charge her mind with the peculiar location of the step with reference to the screen. That when she left said store she was not apprehending any danger and had not noticed that said step was flush with the closed sereen door and she had no reason to apprehend that said step was dangerously located.”

The first question presented is, Do the facts alleged in plaintiff’s complaint and reply make out a ease of negligence against the defendant?

The second question presented is, Do'the facts alleged in the complaint and reply of plaintiffs show that her own want of care was the sole or a contributing cause of her injuries?

It will be noted that the rise from the sidewalk to the level of the store entrance is not stated nor complained of as unusual or dangerous; nor is it alleged that the light was insufficient at the time of plaintiff’s injuries, nor that anything about the entrance was out of repair.

In his brief, counsel for plaintiff says:

“Plaintiff in • error desires that the court clearly understand that plaintiff does not contend that it is negligence to maintain a step in order to connect different floor levels. This is such common ordinary construction that no person can be held liable for negligence merely because he maintains a step.”
He then adds: “But if the step is in an [891]*891unusual position so that one will not be on the lookout for the step even before he sees it, and if in addition thereto, the location of the step is so concealed that it cannot be seen in time to avoid danger, then the question of negligence should at least be submitted to the jury.”

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Bluebook (online)
31 F.2d 889, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 3579, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/watkins-v-piggly-wiggly-bird-co-ca8-1929.