Case: 19-2195 Document: 17 Page: 1 Filed: 04/10/2020
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________
PATRICIA WATKINS, Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondent ______________________
2019-2195 ______________________
Petition for review of a decision of the Bureau of Justice Assistance in PSOB Claim No. 2014-002. ______________________
Decided: April 10, 2020 ______________________
PATRICIA WATKINS, Jackson, MS, pro se.
LAUREN MOORE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing- ton, DC, for respondent. Also represented by JOSEPH H. HUNT, TARA K. HOGAN, ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR. ______________________
Before PROST, Chief Judge, MAYER and TARANTO, Circuit Judges. Case: 19-2195 Document: 17 Page: 2 Filed: 04/10/2020
PER CURIAM. Patricia Watkins (“Watkins”) appeals the final deter- mination of the Director of the Bureau of Justice Assis- tance (“BJA”) denying her claim seeking a death benefit pursuant to the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Act of 1976 (“PSOBA”), Pub. L. No. 94-430, 90 Stat. 1346 (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §§ 10281–88). We affirm. I. BACKGROUND In August 2013, Leo Watkins (“Officer Watkins”) was employed both by the Hinds Community College Police De- partment and the City of Raymond, Mississippi Police De- partment (“Raymond Police Department”). A. 2. On August 2, 2013, he “fell unconscious while on a lunch break from performing traffic and crowd control at graduation ceremonies for Hinds Community College.” A. 1. Although Officer Watkins was rushed to the hospital, he never re- gained consciousness and died on August 19, 2013. A. 3. His death certificate lists his cause of death as “cardiopul- monary failure due to brain hemorrhage due to hyperten- sion.” A. 7. Watkins, who is Officer Watkins’ sister, subsequently filed a claim seeking a death benefit pursuant to the PSOBA. * After the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Office denied her claim, A. 22–24, Watkins requested a hearing officer determination pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 32.17. Wat- kins was permitted to submit evidence in support of her claim when she appeared before the hearing officer. A. 25. The hearing officer determined that although Officer Wat- kins “was a long-term, dedicated police officer,” there was insufficient evidence to establish that his death was the
* The BJA determined that Officer Watkins was not married and had no children at the time of his death. A. 4–5. Case: 19-2195 Document: 17 Page: 3 Filed: 04/10/2020
WATKINS v. DOJ 3
direct and proximate result of an injury sustained in the line of duty. A. 34. Watkins then appealed to the BJA. She presented ev- idence that Officer Watkins had responded to a domestic disturbance call when he was on duty with the Raymond Police Department on March 6, 2013. A. 7. As Officer Wat- kins was attempting to make an arrest, the suspect pushed him “against a wall . . . causing his head to hit the wall with sufficient force to break the drywall.” A. 7 (footnote omit- ted). Watkins supplied photographs showing that Officer Watkins sustained bruises on his head as a result of this incident and testified that he had complained of headaches for several months after the incident occurred. A. 7. On April 11, 2019, the BJA denied Watkins’ claim. A. 1–17. It explained that a claimant seeking a PSOBA death benefit “must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the decedent was a public safety officer, who died as the direct and proximate result of an injury sustained in the line of duty.” A. 4 (footnotes, citation and internal quo- tation marks omitted). Although the BJA agreed with the hearing officer that Officer Watkins was a public safety of- ficer, A. 5, it concluded that there was no “competent med- ical evidence” showing that Officer Watkins’ fatal stroke was the direct and proximate result of the head injury he sustained in March 2013. A. 8. The BJA determined, moreover, that Watkins was not entitled to rely on 34 U.S.C. § 10281(k), which creates a rebuttable presumption that a stroke suffered by a public safety officer while en- gaged in “nonroutine stressful or strenuous physical law enforcement . . . activity” qualifies as a personal injury “sustained in the line of duty” for PSOBA purposes. See A. 9–11. The BJA concluded that Officer Watkins’ duties in the period immediately prior to his stroke did not involve nonroutine or strenuous physical law enforcement activity. A. 11–12. According to the BJA, “in the 24-hour period pre- ceding the onset of his fatal stroke, Officer Watkins con- ducted routine patrol activities and did not engage in any Case: 19-2195 Document: 17 Page: 4 Filed: 04/10/2020
activity that would constitute nonroutine stressful or strenuous physical law enforcement activity within the meaning of the [PSOBA] and its implementing regula- tions.” A. 11. Watkins then filed a timely appeal with this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 34 U.S.C. § 10287. II. DISCUSSION This court’s authority to review a decision by the BJA to deny a claim for a PSOBA death benefit is limited. “We review the BJA’s application of its own regulations to de- termine ‘(1) whether there has been substantial compliance with statutory requirements and provisions of implement- ing regulations; (2) whether there has been any arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the government officials involved; and (3) whether substantial evidence supports the decision denying the claim.’” Li v. Dep’t of Justice, 947 F.3d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting Amber-Messick v. United States, 483 F.3d 1316, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). The PSOBA provides a one-time cash payment to the survivors of public safety officers who are killed as the re- sult of injuries sustained in the line of duty. 34 U.S.C. § 10281(a); see Amber-Messick, 483 F.3d at 1318. For a sur- vivor to qualify for this benefit, at least three requirements must be satisfied. First, the public safety officer must have suffered a “personal injury” within the meaning of the PSOBA. 34 U.S.C. § 10281(a). Second, the personal injury must have been suffered “in the line of duty,” and, finally, the officer’s death must have been the “direct and proxi- mate result” of that injury. Id.; see Cassella v. United States, 469 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006). On appeal, Watkins argues that her brother died as a result of the blow to the head he sustained in March 2013 while making an arrest. See Pet. Corrected Informal Br. 1–2; see also Pet. Mem. in Lieu of Reply Br. 1–5. Substan- tial evidence, however, supports the BJA’s determination Case: 19-2195 Document: 17 Page: 5 Filed: 04/10/2020
WATKINS v. DOJ 5
that Officer Watkins’ August 2013 death was not the “di- rect and proximate result,” 34 U.S.C. § 10281(a), of the head trauma he suffered in March 2013. See, e.g., Consolo v. Fed. Mar.
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Case: 19-2195 Document: 17 Page: 1 Filed: 04/10/2020
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________
PATRICIA WATKINS, Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondent ______________________
2019-2195 ______________________
Petition for review of a decision of the Bureau of Justice Assistance in PSOB Claim No. 2014-002. ______________________
Decided: April 10, 2020 ______________________
PATRICIA WATKINS, Jackson, MS, pro se.
LAUREN MOORE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing- ton, DC, for respondent. Also represented by JOSEPH H. HUNT, TARA K. HOGAN, ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR. ______________________
Before PROST, Chief Judge, MAYER and TARANTO, Circuit Judges. Case: 19-2195 Document: 17 Page: 2 Filed: 04/10/2020
PER CURIAM. Patricia Watkins (“Watkins”) appeals the final deter- mination of the Director of the Bureau of Justice Assis- tance (“BJA”) denying her claim seeking a death benefit pursuant to the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Act of 1976 (“PSOBA”), Pub. L. No. 94-430, 90 Stat. 1346 (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §§ 10281–88). We affirm. I. BACKGROUND In August 2013, Leo Watkins (“Officer Watkins”) was employed both by the Hinds Community College Police De- partment and the City of Raymond, Mississippi Police De- partment (“Raymond Police Department”). A. 2. On August 2, 2013, he “fell unconscious while on a lunch break from performing traffic and crowd control at graduation ceremonies for Hinds Community College.” A. 1. Although Officer Watkins was rushed to the hospital, he never re- gained consciousness and died on August 19, 2013. A. 3. His death certificate lists his cause of death as “cardiopul- monary failure due to brain hemorrhage due to hyperten- sion.” A. 7. Watkins, who is Officer Watkins’ sister, subsequently filed a claim seeking a death benefit pursuant to the PSOBA. * After the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Office denied her claim, A. 22–24, Watkins requested a hearing officer determination pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 32.17. Wat- kins was permitted to submit evidence in support of her claim when she appeared before the hearing officer. A. 25. The hearing officer determined that although Officer Wat- kins “was a long-term, dedicated police officer,” there was insufficient evidence to establish that his death was the
* The BJA determined that Officer Watkins was not married and had no children at the time of his death. A. 4–5. Case: 19-2195 Document: 17 Page: 3 Filed: 04/10/2020
WATKINS v. DOJ 3
direct and proximate result of an injury sustained in the line of duty. A. 34. Watkins then appealed to the BJA. She presented ev- idence that Officer Watkins had responded to a domestic disturbance call when he was on duty with the Raymond Police Department on March 6, 2013. A. 7. As Officer Wat- kins was attempting to make an arrest, the suspect pushed him “against a wall . . . causing his head to hit the wall with sufficient force to break the drywall.” A. 7 (footnote omit- ted). Watkins supplied photographs showing that Officer Watkins sustained bruises on his head as a result of this incident and testified that he had complained of headaches for several months after the incident occurred. A. 7. On April 11, 2019, the BJA denied Watkins’ claim. A. 1–17. It explained that a claimant seeking a PSOBA death benefit “must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the decedent was a public safety officer, who died as the direct and proximate result of an injury sustained in the line of duty.” A. 4 (footnotes, citation and internal quo- tation marks omitted). Although the BJA agreed with the hearing officer that Officer Watkins was a public safety of- ficer, A. 5, it concluded that there was no “competent med- ical evidence” showing that Officer Watkins’ fatal stroke was the direct and proximate result of the head injury he sustained in March 2013. A. 8. The BJA determined, moreover, that Watkins was not entitled to rely on 34 U.S.C. § 10281(k), which creates a rebuttable presumption that a stroke suffered by a public safety officer while en- gaged in “nonroutine stressful or strenuous physical law enforcement . . . activity” qualifies as a personal injury “sustained in the line of duty” for PSOBA purposes. See A. 9–11. The BJA concluded that Officer Watkins’ duties in the period immediately prior to his stroke did not involve nonroutine or strenuous physical law enforcement activity. A. 11–12. According to the BJA, “in the 24-hour period pre- ceding the onset of his fatal stroke, Officer Watkins con- ducted routine patrol activities and did not engage in any Case: 19-2195 Document: 17 Page: 4 Filed: 04/10/2020
activity that would constitute nonroutine stressful or strenuous physical law enforcement activity within the meaning of the [PSOBA] and its implementing regula- tions.” A. 11. Watkins then filed a timely appeal with this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 34 U.S.C. § 10287. II. DISCUSSION This court’s authority to review a decision by the BJA to deny a claim for a PSOBA death benefit is limited. “We review the BJA’s application of its own regulations to de- termine ‘(1) whether there has been substantial compliance with statutory requirements and provisions of implement- ing regulations; (2) whether there has been any arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the government officials involved; and (3) whether substantial evidence supports the decision denying the claim.’” Li v. Dep’t of Justice, 947 F.3d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting Amber-Messick v. United States, 483 F.3d 1316, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). The PSOBA provides a one-time cash payment to the survivors of public safety officers who are killed as the re- sult of injuries sustained in the line of duty. 34 U.S.C. § 10281(a); see Amber-Messick, 483 F.3d at 1318. For a sur- vivor to qualify for this benefit, at least three requirements must be satisfied. First, the public safety officer must have suffered a “personal injury” within the meaning of the PSOBA. 34 U.S.C. § 10281(a). Second, the personal injury must have been suffered “in the line of duty,” and, finally, the officer’s death must have been the “direct and proxi- mate result” of that injury. Id.; see Cassella v. United States, 469 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006). On appeal, Watkins argues that her brother died as a result of the blow to the head he sustained in March 2013 while making an arrest. See Pet. Corrected Informal Br. 1–2; see also Pet. Mem. in Lieu of Reply Br. 1–5. Substan- tial evidence, however, supports the BJA’s determination Case: 19-2195 Document: 17 Page: 5 Filed: 04/10/2020
WATKINS v. DOJ 5
that Officer Watkins’ August 2013 death was not the “di- rect and proximate result,” 34 U.S.C. § 10281(a), of the head trauma he suffered in March 2013. See, e.g., Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 619–20 (1966) (“[S]ub- stantial evidence” is “such relevant evidence as a reasona- ble mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” (citation and internal quotation marks omit- ted)); Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Substantial ev- idence review asks whether a reasonable fact finder could have arrived at the agency’s decision and requires exami- nation of the record as a whole, taking into account evi- dence that both justifies and detracts from an agency’s decision.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In concluding that the head injury Officer Watkins sus- tained in March 2013 was not the direct and proximate cause of his death, the BJA relied on the opinion of Stephen J. Cina, M.D., an independent forensic pathologist, who concluded that “[t]he injuries received [by Officer Watkins] in March 2013 did not contribute to [his] death.” A. 7. Cina stated that there was “no evidence that [Officer Watkins] injured his brain or bled into the membranes around his brain when he received blunt force injuries to his head in March of 2013” and that it was “[m]ore likely than not [that] the superficial blunt force injuries received in March 2013 [were] completely unrelated to his stroke in August 2013.” A. 7–8; see also A. 38–39. Cina explained that Of- ficer Watkins suffered from “longstanding, poorly con- trolled hypertension,” and concluded that his stroke “was part of a natural disease process, namely high blood pres- sure.” A. 39. Significantly, moreover, the medical records associated with Officer Watkins’ hospitalization in the period prior to his death contain no indication that his death was caused by his March 2013 head injury. A. 8. As the BJA correctly noted, “[h]ospital treatment records from . . . Officer Wat- kins’ attending physician . . . make no mention of a head Case: 19-2195 Document: 17 Page: 6 Filed: 04/10/2020
injury” and the causes of death listed on his treatment dis- charge summary do not include traumatic head injury. A. 8 (footnote omitted). Under such circumstances, the BJA had ample support for its conclusion that Watkins failed to establish that it was more likely than not that her brother’s August 2013 death was directly and proximately caused by the head injury he sustained in March 2013. A. 8–9; see 28 C.F.R. § 32.5(a) (“Except as otherwise may be expressly provided in the [PSOBA] or this part, a claimant has the burden of persuasion as to all material issues of fact, and by the standard of proof of ‘more likely than not.’”). On appeal, Watkins argues that the BJA “failed to con- sider the facts about [Officer Watkins’] blunt force trauma head injury . . . that was sustained while answering a do- mestic disturbance call on March 6, 2013.” Pet. Mem. in Lieu of Reply Br. 4. We disagree. The BJA carefully con- sidered the record evidence showing that Officer Watkins had suffered a blow to the head while making an arrest in March 2013 and concluded that this head injury was “sus- tained in the line of duty.” A. 7. As the BJA correctly de- termined, however, Watkins did not present “competent medical evidence” showing that her brother’s August 2013 fatal stroke was “directly and proximately caused” by the head injury he sustained in March 2013. A. 8. Watkins also points to an autopsy report prepared by Matthias Okoye, M.D., and asserts that it establishes that the cause of Officer Watkins’ death was the head injury he sustained in March 2013. Pet. Corrected Inf. Br. 2. Be- cause Okoye’s autopsy report was not presented to the BJA, however, it is “not part of the record on appeal and [is] not properly before us.” Turman–Kent v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 657 F.3d 1280, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see, e.g., Oshiver v. OPM, 896 F.2d 540, 542 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“We will not consider the new evidence contained in the supple- mental papers because that evidence was not presented to the Board.”). We note, moreover, that Okoye conducted his Case: 19-2195 Document: 17 Page: 7 Filed: 04/10/2020
WATKINS v. DOJ 7
autopsy in October 2019, more than six years after Officer Watkins’ death. III. CONCLUSION We have considered Watkins’ remaining arguments but do not find them persuasive. Accordingly, the final de- termination of the Director of the Bureau of Justice Assis- tance is affirmed. AFFIRMED COSTS No costs.