Wathaniel L. Woods v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
This text of Wathaniel L. Woods v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Wathaniel L. Woods v. Commonwealth of Kentucky) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
RENDERED: MARCH 10, 2023; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-1318-MR
WATHANIEL L. WOODS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE ERIC JOSEPH HANER, JUDGE ACTION NOS. 17-CR-002707 AND 17-CR-000935
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CETRULO, DIXON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
DIXON, JUDGE: Wathaniel L. Woods appeals the denial of his motion to
reconsider the order denying his motion to extend the time to file his RCr1 11.42
1 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure. motion, entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court on September 14, 2021.2 Following
a careful review of the record, briefs, and law, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 5, 2017, Wathaniel L. Woods was indicted for myriad
criminal offenses, including murder. With the assistance of counsel, Woods
entered a guilty plea, which was accepted by the trial court. On June 18, 2018, the
judgment of conviction was entered, and Woods was sentenced to 35 years in
prison. The judgment became final ten days later, on June 28, 2018.
In late 2019, Woods – pro se – began reaching out to the Jefferson
Circuit Clerk and Commonwealth Attorney’s Office to obtain copies of his
indictment, grand jury minutes, and hearing tapes/transcripts in preparation for his
appeal. The clerk advised Woods that it could provide copies so long as Woods
paid for them,3 but the Commonwealth Attorney’s Office declined to provide the
documentation under KRS4 61.878(1)(h), and because the case had been finally
adjudicated. In March 2020, Woods also contacted the trial judge seeking similar
2 Technically, Woods’ appeal stems from the order denying his motion to extend time to file his RCr 11.42 motion. 3 The record contains no receipt of payment. 4 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-2- documentation, as well as the Louisville Metro Public Defender.5 In April 2020,
Woods petitioned the trial court via a writ to compel the Commonwealth to
produce the grand jury minutes. Woods’ writ was denied because the trial court
had no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.
In July 2021, Woods moved the trial court to extend the time to file an
RCr 11.42 motion. Woods claimed: the courts were closed from March 14, 2020,
to April 2021; he was quarantined for 30 days in November 2020; and his
institution was “locked down” from October 2020 to February 2021. The trial
court denied Woods’ motion because it was filed after the statute of limitations had
expired and Woods failed to allege how the time allotted to file his motion was
insufficient. Woods moved the trial court to reconsider its order, but the motion
was denied. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As established in Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405, 411-12
(Ky. 2002):
[t]he Strickland standard sets forth a two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel:
[f]irst, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning
5 Woods received a copy of his True Bill from the Louisville Metro Public Defender’s Office on August 28, 2020.
-3- as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984).
Both Strickland prongs must be met before relief may be granted. In the instant
case, however, we need not determine whether Woods’ counsel’s performance was
ineffective because Woods filed neither a timely RCr 11.42 motion nor a timely
motion to extend the time to file an RCr 11.42 motion.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
On appeal, Woods argues he was denied access to resources and the
court during the COVID-19 pandemic and was given the runaround by the offices
of the Commonwealth when he sought to obtain documentation to file an RCr
11.42 motion. The court noted these difficulties did not prevent him from reaching
out to the court or the offices of the Commonwealth or vice versa, nor did these
difficulties prevent him from filing a motion requesting an extension to file an RCr
11.42 motion.
“Section 10 of RCr 11.42 imposes a three-year limitations period
‘after the judgment becomes final’ for filing motions under that rule.” Roach v.
Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Ky. 2012). Had Woods filed his motion to
-4- extend the time for filing his RCr 11.42 motion one month earlier, he would have
been within the statute of limitations. Nevertheless, Woods has offered no valid
reason why he failed to do so. 6 Nor has he presented any reason to grant such an
extraordinary request.7 In fact, Woods admits in his brief that “a good part of his
time was wasted[.]”
6 In full, RCr 11.42(10) provides:
Any motion under this rule shall be filed within three years after the judgment becomes final, unless the motion alleges and the movant proves either:
(a) that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(b) that the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established within the period provided for herein and has been held to apply retroactively.
If the judgment becomes final before the effective date of this rule, the time for filing the motion shall commence upon the effective date of this rule. If the motion qualifies under one of the foregoing exceptions to the three year time limit, the motion shall be filed within three years after the event establishing the exception occurred. Nothing in this section shall preclude the Commonwealth from relying upon the defense of laches to bar a motion upon the ground of unreasonable delay in filing when the delay has prejudiced the Commonwealth’s opportunity to present relevant evidence to contradict or impeach the movant’s evidence. 7 “Equitable tolling is used sparingly and only if two requirements are met. First, the petitioner must establish that he has been pursuing his rights diligently. And second, the petitioner must show that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Jones v. United States, 689 F.3d 621, 627 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Generally, to qualify as extraordinary circumstances, the petitioner must show more than just his status as pro se or his limited access to a law library.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
-5- The trial court “lost jurisdiction over Appellant’s case ten days after
entry of the final judgment. Silverburg v. Commonwealth, 587 S.W.2d 241, 244
(Ky. 1979). As Appellant’s motion was filed outside the three-year statute of
limitations period mandated in RCr 11.42, it was insufficient to reinvested [sic]
jurisdiction. See e.g. Bowling, supra.” Bush v.
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