Waters v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc.

District Court, S.D. Florida·Decided January 29, 2024·No. 1:22-cv-22913·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 22-cv-22913-BLOOM/Torres

MARIETTE WATERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CELEBRITY CRUISES, INC. a Foreign Corporation.

Defendant. ________________________________/

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN OPINIONS OF DEFENDANT’S HIV EXPERT

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff Mariette Waters’ (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Exclude Certain Opinions of Defendant’s HIV Expert, Jeffrey Klausner, MD, (“Motion”), ECF No. [53]. Defendant filed a Response (“Response”), ECF No. [67], and Plaintiff filed a Reply, (“Reply”), ECF No. [73]. The Court has reviewed the Motion, the supporting and opposing submissions, the record, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion is granted. I. BACKGROUND The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts. Plaintiff seeks to preclude certain testimony and opinions of the Defendant’s HIV expert, Dr. Jeffrey Klausner, MD. Plaintiff seeks to preclude statements that the specific model of HIV rapid test used to test the blood donors in this case (the MedMira Multiplo HBc/HIV/HCV test) has received approval by any regulatory body in any country in the world. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks to preclude Dr. Klausner from testifying that the study he conducted in Peru, regarding a different type of HIV rapid test, has bearing on the sensitivity or reliability of the subject test used by Defendant in this matter. II. LEGAL STANDARD Daubert Analysis

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. When a party proffers the testimony of an expert under Rule 702, the party offering the expert testimony bears the burden of laying the proper foundation, and that party must demonstrate admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence. See Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 400 F.3d 1286, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2005); Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 1999). To determine whether expert testimony or any report prepared by an expert may be admitted, the Court engages in a three-part inquiry, which includes whether: (1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters the expert intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his or her conclusions is sufficiently reliable; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence

or to determine a fact in issue. See City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit refers to each of these requirements as the “qualifications,” “reliability,” and “helpfulness” prongs. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). While some overlap exists among these requirements, the court must individually analyze each concept. See id. Under Daubert, a district court must take on the role of gatekeeper, but this role “is not intended to supplant the adversary system or the role of the jury.” Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel- Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Consistent with this function, the district court must “ensure that speculative, unreliable expert testimony does not reach the jury.” McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002). “[I]t is not the role of the district court to make ultimate conclusions as to the persuasiveness of the proffered evidence.” Quiet Tech., 326 F.3d at 1341 (citations and quotation

marks omitted). Thus, the district court cannot exclude an expert based on a belief that the expert lacks personal credibility. Rink, 400 F.3d at 1293 n.7. On the contrary, “vigorous cross- examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Quiet Tech., 326 F.3d at 1341 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596). “Thus, ‘[o]n cross-examination, the opposing counsel is given the opportunity to ferret out the opinion’s weaknesses to ensure the jury properly evaluates the testimony’s weight and credibility.’” Vision I Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Aspen Specialty Ins. Co., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (quoting Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 662 (11th Cir. 1988)). Ultimately, “a district court enjoys ‘considerable leeway’ in making” evidentiary determinations such as these. Cook ex rel. Est. of Tessier v. Sheriff of

Monroe Cnty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1103 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1258). III. DISCUSSION Plaintiff seeks to preclude: (1) testimony from Defendant’s HIV expert, Dr. Jeffrey Klausner, MD, that the HIV rapid test, “the MedMira Multiplo HBc/HIV/HCV test, has been approved by any regulatory body in any country in the world;” and (2) testimony from Dr. Klausner “that the study he conducted in Peru (“Peru Study”) regarding a different type of HIV rapid test has any bearing on the reliability or sensitivity of the subject rapid test.” ECF No. [53] at 3, 6. A. Testimony that the HIV rapid test has been approved

Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Klausner testified that he believed the particular model HIV rapid test Defendant used on the blood donors, the MedMira Multiple HBc/HIV/HCV test (“Subject Test”), had regulatory approval in Canada and the European Union through the regulatory bodies in those countries. ECF No. [53] at 3. Regarding approval in the European Union, Dr. Klausner testified that he thought he saw the relevant marking on the Subject Test box. However, when presented with the box during deposition, the box did not have the relevant marking. Id. at 4. Dr. Klausner then conceded it was his belief that the Subject Test had approval in the European Union, but he did not know, and had no opinion on European regulatory approval. Id. Regarding regulatory approval in Canada, Dr. Klausner testified that he believed he saw documents indicating approval for the Subject Test by Health Canada, the regulatory body for Canada. Id. When asked whether he had any basis, or could point to any data, document, or evidence that the Subject Test had that approval, Dr. Klausner replied, no. Id. at 5. Plaintiff argues that Daubert requires an expert to have a “sufficient basis” for its

testimonial evidence. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993); See also Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). Here, Plaintiff argues that the expert has no basis, warranting preclusion of his testimony on this topic at trial. Defendant responds that Dr.

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