PER CURIAM.
Robert Brian Waterhouse, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. On January 4, 2012, the Governor signed a death warrant for Waterhouse, with the execution scheduled for February 15, 2012. Waterhouse subsequently sought postconviction relief in the circuit court, presenting two claims. The circuit court summarily denied relief on one claim and ordered an evidentiary hearing on the other. Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied relief on Water-house’s second claim. For the reasons [87] discussed below, we now affirm the circuit court’s orders and deny Waterhouse’s request for a stay of execution.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 2, 1980, Robert Water-house was convicted of the first-degree murder of Deborah Kammerer. The facts of the murder were stated in the opinion of this Court affirming the judgment and sentence of death in the initial direct appeal:
On the morning of January 3, 1980, the St. Petersburg police responded to the call of a citizen who had discovered the dead body of a woman lying face down in the mud flats at low tide on the shore of Tampa Bay. An examination of the body revealed severe lacerations on the head and bruises around the throat. Examination of the body also revealed— and this fact is recited not for its sensationalism but because it became relevant in the course of the police investigation — that a blood-soaked tampon had been stuffed in the victim’s mouth. The victim’s wounds were such that they were probably made with a hard instrument such as a steel tire changing tool. Examination of the body also revealed lacerations of the rectum. The cause of death was determined to have been drowning, and there was evidence to indicate that the body had been dragged from a grassy area on the shore into the water at high tide. The body when discovered was completely unclothed. Several items of clothing were gathered from along the shore at the scene.
The body showed evidence of thirty lacerations and thirty-six bruises. Hemorrhaging indicated the victim was alive, and defense wounds indicated she was conscious, at the time these lacerations and bruises were inflicted. Acid phosphotase was found in the victim’s rectum in sufficient amount to strongly indicate the presence of semen there. Also, the lacerations in this area indicated that the victim had been battered by the insertion of a large object. The medical examiner was also able to determine that at the time of the murder the victim was having her menstrual period.
After several days of investigation the police were unable to identify the victim, so they announced the situation to the public. They then received an anonymous telephone call simply informing them of appellant’s automobile tag number and advising them to investigate it.
The police also learned the identity of the victim from two of her neighbors. These two acquaintances, Yohan Wenz and Carol Byers, testified at trial that they went to the ABC lounge with the victim on Wednesday night, January 2, 1980. They testified that they later left the lounge and that Ms. Kammerer remained there at that time. Kyoe Ginn, who was working there as a bartender that night, testified that the victim came into the bar with a man and a woman, that they later left, that Ms. Kammerer then began talking with appellant (who was known to the witness) and that at about 1:00 a.m. appellant and Kammerer left the bar together.
On the evening of January 7, 1980, police officers asked appellant to voluntarily go with them to police headquarters for an interview. At this time he said that he did not know any girl named Debbie and that he went to the ABC lounge on January 2 but did not leave with a woman. After this interview appellant was allowed to leave but his car was impounded for searching pursuant to warrant. The automobile was searched on January 8 and appellant was arrested on January 9.
[88] Detectives Murry and Hitchcox arrested appellant. In the car on the way to the police station, after advising appellant of his rights, Hitchcox asked him, “We were right the other night, weren’t we, when we talked to you about being involved in this case?” Appellant responded simply, “Might.” Shown a picture of Deborah Kammerer, appellant this time admitted that he did in fact know her.
On the afternoon of January 9, the detectives again interviewed appellant. Detective Murry testified concerning this interview. She said that appellant became emotionally upset and said repeatedly that his life was over, that he was going to the electric chair. He said that he wanted to talk to his interviewers as people and not as police officers. He then said that he had some personal problems with alcohol, sex, and violence.
The two detectives interrogated appellant again on January 10. Again appellant said he wanted to talk to them as people rather than as police officers. Detective Murry testified that appellant again indicated that he experienced a problem involving sexual activity. He said that when he drinks a lot, it is like something snaps and he then finds himself doing things that he knows are terrible and bad, and that he cannot control his behavior on such occasions. Appellant also told the officers that when he wanted to engage in sexual activity with a woman but learned that she was having her menstrual period, he would become frustrated and angry and that this is what had happened the previous Wednesday night [i.e., the night of the murder]. He also said that he had had a lot to drink on Wednesday night.
Inspection of the interior of appellant’s car revealed the presence of visible blood stains, and a luminol test revealed that a large quantity of blood had been in the car but had been wiped up. Analysis of the blood in the car and comparison with known blood samples of appellant and the victim revealed that the blood in appellant’s car could have come from the victim but was not appellant’s blood.
A forensic blood analyst testified that it is possible through analysis of blood stains on certain surfaces to make estimates concerning the direction and velocity of motion of the blood making the stains. This witness concluded from her analysis that the blood in appellant’s car was deposited in the course of a violent attack.
A forensic hair analyst testified that hairs found in appellant’s car were consistent in their characteristics with known hair samples from the victim.
A forensic fiber analyst testified that fibers found in the debris adhering to the victim’s coat were similar to fibers from the fabric of the seat cover in appellant’s car. Also, fibers were found in the car that had the same characteristics as fibers from the victim’s coat and pants.
Appellant was employed as a plaster and drywall worker. His foreman testified at trial that on the morning of January 3, appellant arrived at work asking for the day off. He appeared to have a hangover and said he was feeling rough. The witness said that at this time appellant had scratches on his face. The witness also said that appellant had told him that he liked anal intercourse and liked being with women who allowed themselves to be hit and slapped.
Waterhouse v. State, 429 So.2d 301, 302-04 (Fla.1983) (Waterhouse I), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977, 104 S.Ct. 415, 78 L.Ed.2d 352 (1983). The jury recommended, and the trial court imposed, a sentence of death. [89] See id. at 302. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. See id. The Court also affirmed the denial of Waterhouse’s initial rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief. See Waterhouse v. State, 522 So.2d 341, 342 (Fla.1988) (Waterhouse II). However, the Court granted Waterhouse’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and vacated his death sentence because the trial court failed to instruct the jury to consider evidence of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances in violation of Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). See Waterhouse II, 522 So.2d at 344.
After a resentencing proceeding, a unanimous jury again recommended a sentence of death, and the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation. On appeal, this Court affirmed the sentence. See Waterhouse v. State, 596 So.2d 1008, 1018 (Fla.) (Waterhouse III), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 957, 113 S.Ct. 418, 121 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992). The Court subsequently affirmed an order that summarily denied Waterhouse relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, see Waterhouse v. State, 792 So.2d 1176, 1196 (Fla.2001) (Waterhouse IV), and denied a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Waterhouse, see Waterhouse v. Moore, 838 So.2d 480, 484 (Fla.2002) (Waterhouse V). Finally, in October 2006, this Court affirmed an order that denied a motion for postconviction DNA testing filed by Waterhouse pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853. See Waterhouse v. State, 942 So.2d 414 (Fla.2006) (table decision).
On January 4, 2012, the Governor signed a death warrant for Waterhouse, with the execution scheduled for February 15, 2012. Following the signing of the death warrant, Waterhouse filed a successive motion for postconviction relief, asserting two claims.
1. Execution of an inmate should be constitutionally prohibited when a person under sentence of death who has consistently maintained his innocence, and who in good faith has filed a motion for postconviction DNA testing to establish his innocence, is precluded from obtaining testing due to the destruction of evidence through the negligence of a government agency in violation of state law.
2. Waterhouse was denied an adversarial testing during his capital trial due to the failure of the State to disclose a material witness under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 [83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215] (1963), and the presentation of false testimony under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 [92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104] (1972), in light of the affidavit of Leglio Sotolongo which, in the alternative, may also be construed as newly discovered evidence.
Waterhouse also sought a stay of execution.
With regard to the first claim, Water-house stated that in the context of a prior rule 3.853 motion for postconviction DNA testing, it was determined that the Office of the Clerk of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida had destroyed “all evidence in this case” in violation of section 43.195, Florida Statutes (1987).1 Waterhouse contended [90] that as a result of this negligent destruction, he is precluded from establishing his innocence of the murder through DNA testing. Waterhouse asserted that the negligent destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence by a state agency should operate as a bar to execution under the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Florida and United States Constitutions. In support of this assertion, Waterhouse referenced two states — North Carolina and Virginia — where executions allegedly were precluded due to the destruction of evidence. Waterhouse claimed that this issue is different from that which he previously presented in his rule 8.858 motion:
The issue of retroactivity is inapplicable as this presents a question of first impression and seeks the recognition of a fundamental constitutional right for the first time. The claim has not been previously raised because until the warrant was signed the issue was not ripe for review.
Waterhouse’s second claim arises from an affidavit signed by Leglio Sotolongo on January 9, 2012. According to the affidavit, Sotolongo was employed as a doorman at the ABC lounge. He was at the lounge on the night of the murder, but cannot remember if he was actually working that night. Sotolongo averred that he remembers that night particularly because Waterhouse repaid money that he had previously borrowed from Sotolongo. So-tolongo states that Waterhouse arrived at the ABC lounge at approximately 7-8 p.m. After the murder, Sotolongo informed the police that he saw Waterhouse leave with two men. Sotolongo states, “I cannot be precise regarding the time, but it was before closing time, which was 2:00 A.M.” He also stated that, from her position at the center bar, bartender and State witness Kyoe Ginn would not have been able to see the exit door to the lounge. According to Sotolongo, although he informed Detective Gary Hitchcox that he saw Waterhouse leave the lounge with two men, the police report prepared by Hitchcox instead stated that Sotolongo did not “remember when Mr. Waterhouse left the lounge.” Sotolongo states that this portion of Hitchcox’s police report “is false.” Sotolongo also states that after his interview with Hitchcox, Sotolongo and Leon Vasquez, a bouncer who was working at the ABC lounge on the night of the murder, encountered the detective at Murphy’s Bar. According to the affidavit:
Detective Hitchcox came up to us and got into our faces. The Detective accused us of trying to protect a murderer. The situation was such that there was almost a physical altercation, but there wasn’t, and we left the bar.
Waterhouse’s motion sets forth Sotolongo’s address and phone number, and states that had Sotolongo been contacted, he would have been available to testify at the time of trial and the postconviction proceedings.
Waterhouse argued that, in failing to disclose Sotolongo’s exculpatory statement, the State committed a Brady violation. Waterhouse asserted that Soto-longo’s testimony would have not only impeached that of bartender Ginn, who testified that she saw Waterhouse leave with the victim, but would have also corroborated the testimony of defense witness Leon Vasquez, who testified that he saw Waterhouse leave the lounge with two men. Waterhouse next argued that, by knowingly permitting bartender Ginn to falsely testify that she saw the victim and Waterhouse leave together, the State committed a Giglio violation. Finally, [91] and in the alternative, Waterhouse contended that the affidavit of Sotolongo constituted newly discovered evidence, which could not have been discovered previously due to the false statement in Detective Hitchcox’s police report. According to Waterhouse, impeachment of bartender Ginn was critical to Water-house’s defense and, if Sotolongo had been allowed to testify, the outcome of the trial would have been different.
Waterhouse attached to his motion nearly identical affidavits of guilt-phase defense counsel. The trial level attorneys averred that they relied upon Detective Hitchcox’s report being an accurate and truthful statement from Sotolongo. Because they relied upon the veracity of the report, “apparently no one from the defense team contacted or spoke with Mr. Sotolongo prior to trial.” Both attorneys stated that, had they been aware of Soto-longo’s statement, they would have presented him as a witness “for the purpose of impeaching Ms. Ginn and to corroborate other defense testimony [i.e., that of Leon Vasquez].”
On January 13, 2012, the postconviction court held a rule 3.851 case management conference on Waterhouse’s successive motion. After that hearing, the court issued an order that summarily denied the destruction of evidence claim as improperly pled, procedurally barred, successive, and untimely. The postconviction court first held that, since Waterhouse is seeking the recognition of a new fundamental right, rather than retroactive application of an established fundamental right, this claim is not properly pled under rule 3.851(d)(2)(B). The court next found that the issue presented in this first claim “[has] already been litigated and considered in the courts through Waterhouse’s prior motion for postconviction DNA testing and subsequent appeal. Therefore, the current iteration of the claim is barred from review.” The postconviction court also concluded that this claim is not timely because even though Waterhouse chose not to raise this claim until the warrant was signed, “nothing prevented [him] from addressing this matter years earlier.” Lastly, with regard to Waterhouse’s reliance on recent actions in North Carolina and Virginia, the postconviction court found that “[t]he decisions of the executive branches in other states have no legal bearing upon this court.”
The postconviction court granted an evi-dentiary hearing on the second claim, which was based upon the affidavit of Leg-lio Sotolongo. In ordering an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court relied upon Mungin v. State, 79 So.3d 726 (Fla.2011), in which this Court reversed a summary denial of Brady and Giglio claims and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.2
The Evidentiary Hearing
The postconviction court held the evi-dentiary hearing on January 17, 2012. Waterhouse advised the court by telephone that he chose to waive his personal appearance at the hearing. The testimony of Leglio Sotolongo was presented by Wa-terhouse, and Detective Gary Hitchcox was presented as a witness by the State. Waterhouse’s guilt-phase trial counsel did not testify during the evidentiary hearing. Instead, the State and Waterhouse stipulated that trial counsel would have testified consistent with affidavits filed with the court.
[92] Sotolongo testified that in 1980, he was moonlighting as a doorman at the ABC lounge in St. Petersburg. Detective Hitchcox questioned Sotolongo in reference to the homicide. While Sotolongo did not recall Hitchcox showing him a photo of the victim, Sotolongo stated that he would not dispute that this occurred if Hitchcox testified to this fact. Sotolongo testified that it was his belief that he was working at the ABC lounge on the night of the murder; however, when shown Detective Hitchcox’s report — which stated that Soto-longo was at the bar, but not working that night — Sotolongo testified, “If I said it to [Hitchcox] way back then, then that recollection, if true, is probably more accurate than not.”
Although Sotolongo stated in his affidavit that he remembers the night of January 2, 1980, because Waterhouse paid So-tolongo money that he had previously borrowed, Sotolongo testified during the evidentiary hearing that Waterhouse may have actually repaid him the previous night. While Sotolongo was certain that he saw Waterhouse leave the ABC lounge with two males that night, he had difficulty specifying the time that this occurred, as evidenced by the following exchange during cross-examination:
Q: Now, and you’re fairly clear in your affidavit. [Y]ou say you saw him leave the lounge. You can’t be precise as to what time he left?
A: That’s correct.
Q: Okay. But it was before closing?
A: Yes.
Q: That’s pretty fair to say, correct? I mean, he was going to have left before closing, right?
A: Agreed.
Q: Okay. But you don’t know if that was 12:15,12:30?
A: Correct.
Q: Because if you were working, you would have been there that late. But it’s possible that you left early that night, right?
A: I didn’t leave early that night, but it is possible. You’re right. I mean, that is almost counter-indication [sic].
Q: Well, I guess what I’m asking then, what time did you leave that night?
A: I don’t know exactly. If I was working, then I left past 2:00.
Q: Okay. And if you weren’t working, you could have left—
A: Earlier.
Q: 12:00,1:00,10:00,11:00?
A: No. No. No.
Q: Okay. Well, let’s talk some parameters here. What time could you have— could you have left at midnight?
A: I remember him leaving that bar towards the end of the shift.
Q: Okay. You weren’t working. So towards the end of the night?
A: Well, sir, like I said, I believe that I was working that evening.
Q: Okay.
A: But you indicate that I stated that I might not have.
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A: ... let me word it this way, towards the end of the evening.
Q: But you can’t say when that was.
A: Correct.
Q: You can’t tell if it’s quarter to 12:00, quarter after 12:00,12:30,1:00?
A: You are correct.
Q: And if you weren’t working, is it possible that you weren’t there at the end of the evening? Let’s just say that you saw Mr. Waterhouse leave.
A: Right.
Q: Is it possible after he left you left but the bar hadn’t closed—
[93] A: No.
Q: —if you weren’t working?
A: I was there the whole evening.
Q: From start to finish?
A: Yes.
Q: You’re sure.
A: I’m not positive.
Q: Okay. So I will ask you again.
A: Yes.
Q: Is it possible now—
A: No. I understand. I understand. And believe me, from the sound that I just made, I’m not being facetious. It is. It is a long time ago, and you’re correct. Forgive me.
Sotolongo also admitted that his memory was better thirty-two years ago than it is now.
Sotolongo testified that from her position at the bar, bartender Kyoe Ginn would not have been able to see the exit at which Sotolongo was supposedly working that night, which was also the exit through which Sotolongo observed Waterhouse leave. However, Sotolongo acknowledged that there was a second exit to the lounge, and it was possible that Ginn could see that other exit. Sotolongo also conceded that if he was checking identifications at the exit referenced in his affidavit, he would not have been able to see what was happening in the lounge. Sotolongo stated that he knew bouncer Leon Vasquez, and that Vasquez testified during trial that he had seen Waterhouse leave the lounge with two men. When asked by the post-conviction court why Sotolongo did not seek out the defense attorneys during Wa-terhouse’s trial, Sotolongo replied, “I thought things would evolve the way they’re supposed to. Since I gave my statement to the detective, I thought that my testimony probably wasn’t needed, and that’s why I wasn’t called to testify.”
Detective Gary Hitchcox admitted that he did not have an independent recollection of the interview with Sotolongo, and he was testifying to what was provided in his 1980 report. However, Hitchcox explained that, during his time with the police department, when he conducted an interview, he would take notes on a notepad and then dictate his report from those notes. According to the report, Sotolongo told Hitchcox that he was at the ABC lounge on the night of the murder from 10:00 p.m. until 1:00 a.m. Hitchcox denied that during the interview Sotolongo ever stated he saw Waterhouse leave the bar with two men and testified that Sotolon-go’s affidavit is false.3 Hitchcox testified that if Sotolongo had informed him of this fact during the interview, he would have “Absolutely” included it in his report.
On cross-examination, Hitchcox admitted that the notes he took during the interview with Sotolongo no longer exist. When asked if he would have omitted information from his report about Sotolongo observing Waterhouse leave the lounge, Hitchcox replied:
[T]wo men leaving with the suspect would be very important. We would want to pursue that. I would — that would be something that I would get excited about as an investigator. [Soto-longo] told me he didn’t see [Water-house] leave, and there was nothing said about leaving with two men. That would have been in the report.
When asked why he did not write a report about bouncer Leon Vasquez, Hitchcox stated that he did not recall interviewing Vasquez. When presented with his 1980 [94] trial testimony during which he testified that he interviewed Vasquez, Hitcheox stated:
[T]he only thing that I can tell you about that is I testified to interviewing Vasquez. I would think that there would be a police report indicating that I interviewed him with the same type of setup: Me interviewing, where it happened, when I talked to him, what he said. And I don’t have that.
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So my testimony at that trial had to be from my knowledge back what, 32 years ago, of some type of documentation which would be maybe a police report, something to that effect,, and what I testified to in court would have been my knowledge of either my report, another report, a deposition, something to reflect my memory, or perhaps just from memory.
When asked by the postconviction court whether other officers were investigating the murder and taking statements from witnesses, Hitcheox replied in the affirmative. On redirect, Hitcheox testified that he would have been privy to any reports that other detectives compiled about Vasquez.
After testimony concluded, but before closing statements, the State argued that Waterhouse’s postconviction counsel had failed to demonstrate due diligence in discovering Sotolongo and, therefore, the rule 3.851 motion was untimely. In making this assertion, the State noted that Water-house’s current counsel had represented Waterhouse since 2003. According to the State, Waterhouse’s current counsel must “show that he did everything he could going through this file, looked at all these witnesses, and could not find this witness. He’s not made that representation.” Counsel for Waterhouse responded as follows:
[Sjimilar to what the Defense attorney[sic] said in their affidavit, that I in reading [Detective Hitchcox’s report] would sit there and read it and take it on face value that that’s what [Sotolon-go’s] statement said. And as a Defense attorney frankly — and I think the Supreme Court recognizes this in Mungin, and what disturbed them in Mungin was the fact that they felt officers of .the Court, attorneys, should be able to rely on police reports. And it would disturb them that attorneys are put in a position of relying on police reports that aren’t true.
And so I would have read that. I have read the discovery in the ease. I would have accepted it on face value just like [defense counsel] did. So that’s the answer.
During closing statements, counsel for Wa-terhouse abandoned the Giglio claim.
Order Denying Successive Postconviction Relief
On January 20, 2012, the postconviction court entered an order denying relief on Waterhouse’s second claim. First, the postconviction court found that Water-house had satisfied the first prong of the standard for newly discovered evidence, concluding that Waterhouse had established that Sotolongo’s testimony was unknown by Waterhouse, his counsel, or the circuit court at the time of trial and could not have been discovered by due diligence.4 The postconviction court relied on Mungin in reaching this conclusion:
[95] As alluded to by the Court in Mwngin, it is difficult to discern how counsel would have known of the substance of Sotolon-go’s testimony, as stated in the January 9, 2012 affidavit, if they had relied upon the truthfulness of Hitchcox’s police report. Mwngin further leads this [e]ourt to conclude that due diligence surely does not require that counsel allocate limited pre-trial resources in investigating a witness that is reported by police to have said something contrary to what the witness now claims.
See Mungin, 79 So.3d at 737 (“We are troubled by the possibility that a false police report was submitted and then relied on by defense counsel.”).
However, the postconviction court further held that Waterhouse had failed to establish the second prong of a claim for relief based upon newly discovered evidence “because Sotolongo’s testimony is not of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial in that it would not give rise to a reasonable doubt as to Waterhouse’s culpability.” In reaching this conclusion, the postconviction court comprehensively detailed the facts that provided both direct and circumstantial evidence of Waterhouse’s guilt. In addition to the facts detailed by this Court in Waterhouse I, see 429 So.2d at 302-04, the postconviction court discussed additional facts from the trial court record:
1. Waterhouse informed police that nobody had used his vehicle for at least two weeks prior to the murder.
2. During the January 9, 1980, interview with police, in addition to stating that his life was over and that he was going to the electric chair, Wa-terhouse also stated that “nothing will bring her back.”
3. On January 10, 1980, Waterhouse discussed his problems with alcohol and violence with the police, explaining that “this problem would just come over him very quickly, like flipping a switch.” Waterhouse advised the police that on the night of the murder he consumed eight or nine beers before arriving at the ABC lounge and four or five white russians while at the lounge. After admitting to this heavy alcohol consumption, Waterhouse asked the police, “why do you think I quit drinking since Wednesday night?”
4. During trial, bartender Kyoe Ginn testified that after the night of the murder, Waterhouse only drank orange juice when he came to the ABC lounge and left the lounge pri- or to closing.
5. During the January 10 interview, Waterhouse admitted that he knew the victim for at least six months prior to the murder, and that they had engaged in sexual intercourse on approximately three occasions.
6. Robert Van Vuren, the foreman at Waterhouse’s place of employment, testified that, in addition to Water-house appearing at work on the day after the murder with scratches on his face, Waterhouse seemed to be wearing makeup on January 7, 1980, i.e., four days after the murder, in an effort to cover the scratches. Van Vuren also testified that he had previously seen a tire tool in Water-house’s vehicle.5
7. Inmate Kenneth Young testified with regard to an incident that occurred in the jail while Young’s trial was pending. According to Young, Waterhouse held a shank to the [96] throat of another inmate and ordered everyone else, except the captive inmate, out of the room. Young testified that Waterhouse left the room a few minutes later and stated, “I wonder how he’d like a Coke bottle up his ass like I gave her.” The medical examiner testified during trial that the victim’s rectum was damaged consistent with a foreign object, such as a Coke bottle, being inserted. The police found a Coke bottle inside Waterhouse’s vehicle.
8. When Waterhouse learned that Van Vuren would be called as a witness to testify that Waterhouse appeared at work on January 3 with scratches on his face, Waterhouse told Inmate Young that Van Vuren was incorrect. Waterhouse instead told Young that he was so scratched up that he did not go to work at all that day.
9. Kenneth Norwood, who lived with Waterhouse at the time of the murder, testified that on January 3, he saw Waterhouse washing his car, and it appeared that he was cleaning the interior of the vehicle.
The postconviction court concluded that, in light of the testimony and evidence presented during trial, “Sotolongo’s testimony would probably not produce an acquittal on retrial.” The postconviction court further found that Sotolongo’s testimony that he saw Waterhouse leave the lounge with two men “was not reliable because of the long passage of time, the fact that his memory when interviewed by Hitchcox was closer to the time of the event, and his memory at the time of the January 12, 2012 evidentiary hearing was admittedly weaker.” The postconviction court also noted that the testimony of Sotolongo was cumulative to that of bouncer Leon Vasquez, which left open the time frame that Waterhouse could have returned to the lounge later that evening. Finally, the court noted that “Vasquez’s testimony was contrary to [bartender] Ginn’s testimony and it was the jury’s function to weigh the credibility of these witnesses in accepting or rejecting the testimony relied upon in reaching a verdict.”
With regard to the Brady claim, the postconviction court held that Waterhouse was not entitled to relief. First, the court found that Sotolongo’s testimony would have impeached the testimony of bartender Ginn, and corroborated the testimony of bouncer Vasquez, thereby satisfying the first prong of Brady. However, the court determined that this evidence had not been suppressed by the State and, therefore, failed the second prong of a Brady claim. In reaching this conclusion, the court found that Waterhouse failed to establish the police report was, in fact, falsified:
[T]he description of Sotolongo’s interview by Hitchcox is more reliable since it was reduced to writing at the time of the interview. Additionally, the passage of time and Sotolongo’s weak recollection militate against the reliability of Sotolongo’s statements.
Finally, the postconviction court found that, even if Waterhouse had met the second prong of Brady, Waterhouse failed to demonstrate entitlement to relief because he could not establish prejudice under the third prong of Brady due to the “other uncontroverted evidence presented by the State, including Waterhouse’s own incriminating statements, and the physical and circumstantial evidence against him.”
Waterhouse filed his Notice of Appeal on January 20, 2012. On January 23, the State filed a notice of cross-appeal, challenging the postconviction court’s determination that Waterhouse’s second claim was timely filed pursuant to rule 3.851(d)(2)(A).
[97] ANALYSIS
Destruction of Evidence Claim
Standard of Review
In his first claim, Waterhouse appeals the summary denial of his claim that his execution should be barred because he was unable to obtain DNA testing of certain exhibits due to their premature destruction by the Clerk’s Office of the Sixth Judicial Circuit. We have explained that “[t]he decision of whether to grant an evi-dentiary hearing on a rule 8.851 motion is ultimately based on the written materials before the court, and the ruling of the postconviction trial court on that issue is tantamount to a pure question of law subject to de novo review.” Troy v. State, 57 So.3d 828, 884 (Fla.2011) (quoting Davis v. State, 26 So.3d 519, 526 (Fla.2009)).
Sufficiency of the Pleading
Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(d)(1), “[a]ny motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be filed by the prisoner within 1 year after the judgment and sentence become final.” A claim is properly raised in a rule 3.851 motion beyond the time limits articulated in subdivision (d)(1) only where:
(A) the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant or the movant’s attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, or
(B) the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established within the period provided for in subdivision (d)(1) and has been held to apply retroactively, or
(C) postconviction counsel, through neglect, failed to file the motion.
Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2). As noted by the postconviction court’s summary denial order, Waterhouse’s claim does not satisfy any subdivision of rule 3.851(d)(2) and is, therefore, improperly included in the present successive motion.6 First, Waterhouse has been aware of the destruction of evidence from his case since at least October 15, 2003, when the State announced in its response to Waterhouse’s Rule 3.853 Motion for Postconviction DNA Testing that the evidence at issue had been erroneously destroyed. Second, Waterhouse himself acknowledges that he is not seeking relief under an existing fundamental right, but instead “seeks the recognition of a fundamental constitutional right for the first time.” Waterhouse does not rely upon a single case in which such a right has previously been recognized. Accordingly, the destruction of evidence claim raised by Waterhouse is not properly pled in a successive rule 3.851 motion, and the postcon-viction court properly denied Waterhouse’s first claim on this basis.
Procedural Bars
Further, we agree with the postconviction court that this claim is also procedurally barred, successive, and untimely. A prior challenge to the destruction of DNA evidence in this case was thoroughly litigated and resolved against Waterhouse.
On September 30, 2003, Waterhouse filed a rule 3.853 motion for postconviction DNA testing. In the motion, Waterhouse listed the following evidentiary items to be tested for DNA:
alleged areas of blood found in [Water-house’s] motor vehicle, alleged areas of blood on [Waterhouse’s] clothing, serology evidence recovered from the victim at the autopsy, the clothing of the victim, and hair evidence.
Waterhouse asserted that the State utilized the evidence he listed for testing to [98] support its claim that Waterhouse raped and killed the victim. Waterhouse explained that DNA testing would either exonerate him of the crime or mitigate his sentence as follows:
The Defendant is innocent. The DNA testing requested by this motion will exonerate the Defendant of the crimes for which he was sentenced. The State’s case was based largely on circumstantial evidence. A major component of the State’s circumstantial evidence was the above-described Exhibits and the testimony related thereto. Without this evidence the Defendant would have been exonerated. DNA testing of these items would negate the evidentiary value of these items for the State, and would establish affirmative evidence that the Defendant is innocent. The results of the DNA testing of this physical evidence would be admissible at trial. The nature of this evidence is such that there is no question that the evidence containing the tested DNA is authentic and would be admissible at a future hearing.
On October 15, 2003, the State responded that “the exhibits that Defendant Water-house wishes to test are no longer in the possession of the Clerk of Court, having been destroyed in 1988.” The State described how the evidence was prematurely destroyed:
As best the State can reconstruct the events, the Clerk of Court submitted an order to Judge Robert Beach in 1983 that authorized destruction of evidence held by the Clerk for a large number of criminal cases. The cases were identified in [sic] by case number in an appended list of approximately forty pages. The actual order signed by Judge Beach did not refer to case number 80-192 and did not authorize destruction of the evidence introduced in the Waterhouse case. Destruction of evidence on the list apparently began in 1986 and continued through at least 1988. The Clerk’s office employees handling the destruction apparently worked from an earlier list or draft of the order which differed from the final version and which included the Waterhouse case number even though it was a death penalty case and had still been pending appeal at the time of Judge Beach’s order. As a result the Clerk’s office erroneously destroyed the Waterhouse evidence in 1988.
(Footnote omitted.)7 The State Attorney for the Sixth Judicial Circuit added that he was “confident that the State Attorney’s Office would never have concurred with the destruction of evidence in any capital case.” Since the evidence that Waterhouse sought to be tested had been destroyed, the State requested that the postconviction court deny the motion for postconviction DNA testing.
On May 5, 2004, Sixth Judicial Circuit Court Judge R. Timothy Peters ordered that an evidentiary hearing be held to determine the circumstances surrounding the destruction of the evidence. In this order, Judge Peters stated that Water-house’s rule 3.853 motion “appearfed] to be facially sufficient.” In response to a request by the State that Judge Beach — the judge who presided over Waterhouse’s trial and prior postconviction proceedings— [99] preside over the evidentiary hearing, the order entered by Judge Peters provided:
[T]his court is concerned that, given the arguments presented, Judge Beach may be a witness with respect to the facts and circumstances of the destruction of the evidence. At the least, Judge Beach should be available to either the State or the defense should they choose to call him as a witness. Therefore, Judge R. Timothy Peters ... shall preside over this hearing.