Waterhouse v. Comer

55 F. 149, 19 L.R.A. 403, 1893 U.S. App. LEXIS 2538
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the Southern District of Georgia
DecidedApril 8, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 55 F. 149 (Waterhouse v. Comer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the Southern District of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Waterhouse v. Comer, 55 F. 149, 19 L.R.A. 403, 1893 U.S. App. LEXIS 2538 (circtsdga 1893).

Opinion

SPEEB, District Judge.

Cases are frequent where persons intrusted with corporate properties have applied to the courts for the prevention or redress of grievances threatened or inflicted by labor organizations. This is the first instance of which we have any information where members of such an association have by concerted action, in an orderly way, sought the arbitrament of a court to adjust a controversy relative to the wages and conditions of their employment. The recent application to this court of the Order of Bailway Telegraphers, with similar purpose, was an attempt of this character. It was defeated in limine. The telegraphers, as a body, had abandoned the service of the receiver before they presented their petition. In the mean time, other telegraphers, with equal [151]*151right to employment by the receiver, had bean engaged, and were performing the functions the striking telegraphers had surrendered, and, notwithstanding the solicitude of the court to spare a large number of intelligent young men ihe distress resulting from their indiscreet action, it was found to be impracticable. The members of1 the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, who have presented this petition, have a proper standing in court. There are 250 locomotive engineers in the employment of the receiver, upon the various divisions of the Central Balitead ¿k Banking Company of Georgia» Of these 211 are members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, and the petitioners are a commit tee from that membership. They recite in their petition the facts that they have been for several years working under contracts made between a general committee of the brotherhood and the officers of the railroad. Since the 1st day oí 1 December, 1893, they have been working under the contract, of which, they attach a copy, and since that time the properties have been intrusted to the control of Hugh M. Comer, as the receiver of the court This contract expired on the 1st day of December, 1892. A few days prior to that time they gave notice to George D. Wadley, general superintendent of the company, that they desired certain changes in the contract. They state further that they have remained in the servlet-* of the company, although. Hie superintendent and receiver refused to enter into any new contract or consider the old contract longer in force, unless ordered so to do by the court.

Pending the adjustment of the controversy, which was postponed for 90 days by virtue of a clause of the contract, which entitled the receiver to notice for that period, and of which lie claimed the benefit, the court has continued the contract in force.

We have also caused several conferences between the receiver and the engineers, with the hope that an amicable agreement might follow. This expectation has been defeated by a strike on the ftavannah, Americas & Montgomery Bailmid, the refusal of one of the engineers to haul a train to which a car of that company was attached, his immediate discharge, and the friction between the receiver and the engineers which resulted therefrom. The engineers then applied to the court. They set forth the object;; o£ their order, the advantages of a contract with their employers, and that such contracts are of force upon a very large proportion of the principal railroads of the country. They state that since it has been shown to them that the properties in the hands of the receiver are embarrassed financially, they are content to work in Ms service without any increase of wages, although they insist that the rate is less than that paid by competing and connecting lines, and they pray that the receiver be directed to continue in force the contract under which they were working at the time the receiver was appointed, subject to such, modifications and changes as may be made by the order of the court. They annex a, copy of this contract.

The receiver answers: First. That the Grand 'National Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers is not incorporated, and that many of its rules and regulations, which have a bearing upon any con[152]*152tract its members might make, are withheld from th'e public. This places him at a disadvantage, and renders uncertain the attitude of the brotherhood in any difficulty which might arise in connection with the contract. Second. That a number of the locomotive engineers employed by him are not members of the brotherhood, and that it is not proper for him to contract in this way with certain employes, while others are employed without such a contract. Third. That such a contract renders it impossible for the officers charged with the operation of the property to have such freedom in its administration as is necessary to its prompt and efficient management. Fourth. As a common carrier, the railroad under his control is liable for damages which may result from the disorganization of its service. That the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers is bound by secret obligations to withdraw from the service of railroad companies in a body, causing great damage. Fifth. That he should be at full liberty to select the best men and means of managing the business, without regard to organizations of any kind. That his superintendent has prepared a proper schedule of wages and conditions for the employment of engineers and firemen, a copy of which is attached. Sixth. If he should contract with the brotherhood, it would be holding out a premium for his employes to become members of that order, which respondent states is not to the interest of his trust. That the brotherhood renders it impossible for the officers of the railroad to come into direct contact with the employes, and. prevents such free intercourse as is necessary to good and efficient service. That no contracts have been entered into with the Order of Railway Conductors and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, and that he has had no difficulty with the conductors and firemen. He denies that it is usual and customary for railroad companies of the United States to make such contracts with the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers.

It will be observed that much of the receiver’s answer is an argument against the propriety and policy of contracts of any character between the officers of railway corporations and the representatives of labor organizations. The gravity and importance of the considerations thus presented are exceedingly great. The control, under any circumstances, by the courts, of contracts between representatives of the immense values invested with corporations engaged in the public duty of transportation, and the laborers employed in the same service, will doubtless appear to many as novel and dangerous. It is well, however, to consider if a proper provision, by appeal to the courts, in the frequent and destructive conflicts between organized capital and organized labor will not afford the simplest, most satisfactory and effective method for the settlement of such controversies. Is it not the only method by which the public, and, indeed, the parties themselves, can be protected from the inevitable hardship and loss which all must endure from the frequently recurring strikes?

It will not be wise for those engaged with the maintenance of public order to ignore the immensity of the changes in the relations of the employing and the employed classes, occasioned by the phe[153]*153'hoiiienal development of commerce and the prevalence of labor organizations.

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Bluebook (online)
55 F. 149, 19 L.R.A. 403, 1893 U.S. App. LEXIS 2538, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/waterhouse-v-comer-circtsdga-1893.