Washington v. JTS 1517

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJanuary 2, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-01426
StatusUnknown

This text of Washington v. JTS 1517 (Washington v. JTS 1517) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Washington v. JTS 1517, (E.D. Wis. 2025).

Opinion

EUANSITTEERDN S DTAISTTERSI CDTIS OTFR WICITS CCOONUSRITN

TIRON WASHINGTON, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 24-cv-1426-bhl

LT. JTS #1517, SGT JM #1201, SGT BB #1244 CAPTAIN S. BERAMIS, DESIREE INGRAM, NURSE FRATER, DAVID W. ZOERNER, THOMAS EYE CARE, DONNA BRUINELLE BEARD, DR. PILESKI-PERONA, and KENOSHA COUNTY,

Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Tiron Washington, Jr., who is currently confined at the Kenosha County Jail and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. On November 19, 2024, he paid the $405 civil case filing fee. The Court will now screen the complaint, as required by 28 U.S.C. §1915A. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity and must dismiss any complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In screening a Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused. “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a

complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT According to Washington, on September 3, 2024, he was examined offsite at Thomas Eye

Care for complaints of eye pain and vision challenges. Washington asserts he spoke with Dr. Donna Bruinelle Beard, who told him that he had or was at risk of developing glaucoma, which could be treated with medicated eye drops. Washington was informed by jail medical staff that Dr. Pileski-Perona is the person who performed the eye exam before he spoke with Dr. Beard. Washington asserts that on October 7, 2024, he wrote to medical staff asking about the eye drops that had been prescribed. On October 23, 2024, he wrote a grievance complaining about eye pain even with his glasses on and again asked for the medicated eye drops. About a week later, on October 29, 2024, an officer (who is not a Defendant) and Defendant Nurse Frater allegedly spoke to Washington at his cell and informed him that his grievance would be denied because he did not need medicated eye drops. Washington explains that medical staff tried to tell him that the eye doctor had told him something different than he remembered her telling him. Washington remembers Dr. Beard telling him he had glaucoma and needed medicated eyedrops to stop the progression or he may eventually go blind. Washington further states that, contrary to what Dr. Beard told him, medical staff at the

jail have told him that he does not have symptoms of glaucoma. Washington explains that his eyesight has gotten worse, his eyes ache and water, and he suffers from serious headaches. According to Washington, Defendants JM #1201, LT JTS #1517, BB #1244, Desiree Ingram, and Nurse Frater all signed the grievance denying his request for medicated eye drops. He also asserts that they have refused to contact Dr. Beard to obtain more information about his condition. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS Because Washington was a pretrial detainee at the relevant time, the Fourteenth Amendment’s objective unreasonableness standard applies to his allegations that Defendants failed to adequately respond to his complaints of eye pain and vision challenges. Under that

standard, once a pretrial detainee shows that a jail official’s failure to act was purposeful and intentional, the sole question is an objective one: Did the defendant “take reasonable available measures to abate the risk of serious harm?” Pittman v. Madison Cnty., 108 F.4th 561, 566, 572 (7th Cir. 2024). “The objective reasonableness of a decision to deny medical care . . . does not consider the defendant’s subjective views about risk of harm and necessity of treatment. Instead, the proper inquiry turns on whether a reasonable [jail official] in the defendant’s shoes would have recognized that the plaintiff was seriously ill or injured and thus needed medical care.” Id. at 570. Thus, to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment standard, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendant acted purposefully, knowingly or perhaps recklessly, without regard to her subjective awareness of the risk of inaction, and (2) the defendant’s response to the medical condition was objectively unreasonable. Pittman, 108 F.4th at 570–572. With the foregoing standard in mind, the Court will allow Washington to proceed on medical care claims against Sgt. JM #1201, Lt. JTS #1517, Sgt. BB #1244, Desiree Ingram, and Nurse Frater based on allegations that they downplayed Washington’s complaints of eye pain and vision problems and refused to provide medicated eyedrops as recommended by the eye specialist

and/or refused to contact the eye specialist to clarify her orders despite Washington insisting the written orders were inconsistent with what she told him. Washington also states a state law claim for indemnification against Kenosha County under Wis. Stat. §895.46. See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Chicago, 120 F.3d 681, 685-87 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the position that a claim for indemnification is premature until a judgment is entered). Washington does not, however, state a claim against Captain S. Beramis or Sheriff David Zoerner based on allegations that they “are held responsible for allowing this to happen to [him] on their watch.” Dkt. No. 1 at 8. The doctrine of respondeat superior cannot be used to hold a supervisor liable for the misconduct of a subordinate. Gentry v.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Leonte Williams v. Vipin Shah
927 F.3d 476 (Seventh Circuit, 2019)

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Washington v. JTS 1517, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/washington-v-jts-1517-wied-2025.