Washington v. Illinois Power Co.

581 N.E.2d 644, 144 Ill. 2d 395, 163 Ill. Dec. 490, 1991 Ill. LEXIS 100
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 17, 1991
Docket70564
StatusPublished
Cited by65 cases

This text of 581 N.E.2d 644 (Washington v. Illinois Power Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Washington v. Illinois Power Co., 581 N.E.2d 644, 144 Ill. 2d 395, 163 Ill. Dec. 490, 1991 Ill. LEXIS 100 (Ill. 1991).

Opinion

JUSTICE CLARK

delivered the opinion of the court:

In November 1987, appellees Jacob and Lillie Washington sued appellant Illinois Power Company in the circuit court of Madison County for damages sustained as a result of the death of their 11-year-old son, Jacob Jr., whose death occurred in Bond County. Appellant moved to dismiss the action on forum non conveniens grounds or, alternatively, to transfer the action to Bond County. The motion was denied by the circuit court and the appellate court affirmed, with one justice dissenting (200 Ill. App. 3d 939). We allowed appellant’s petition for leave to appeal to this court (134 Ill. 2d R. 315).

Appellees allege that appellant owned and maintained three electrical power lines which ran through a tree in front of appellees’ home. Appellees allege that at least one of the lines was uninsulated and that- on July 31, 1987, Jacob Jr., while climbing the tree, came into contact with the uninsulated line and was electrocuted. His mother witnessed the incident. Appellees further allege that as a result of the emotional and psychological injuries brought on by witnessing her son’s death, Mrs. Washington has been hospitalized in St. Louis, Missouri. Her treating physicians maintain practices in St. Louis and St. Clair County, Illinois.

Whether appellant is liable for damages arising as a result of Jacob Jr.’s death is not presently at issue. We are here concerned only with the propriety of appellees’ choice of forum. The law is well settled that the trial court is afforded very broad discretion in determining whether particular circumstances warrant a transfer of a cause from its jurisdiction to another court’s under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. (See, e.g., Wieser v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 359, 365; Jones v. Searle Laboratories (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 366.) The trial court’s decision will be reversed on review only upon showing that, in deciding as it did, the court clearly abused that discretion. (Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno (1981), 454 U.S. 235, 257, 70 L. Ed. 2d 419, 436, 102 S. Ct. 252, 266.) With this in mind, our review of the record leads us to hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s forum non conveniens motion.

The Illinois venue statute provides that an action may be commenced in the county of residence of any defendant who is joined in good faith or in the county in which the cause of action arose. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 — 101.) However, the doctrine of forum non conveniens allows the court in which the action was filed to decline jurisdiction and direct the lawsuit.to an alternative forum which the court determines can better serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice. Wieser v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 359.

In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert (1947), 330 U.S. 501, 91 L. Ed. 1055, 67 S. Ct. 839, the United States Supreme Court established a balancing test of sorts, where the private interests at stake in litigating an action in one forum are weighed against the competing public interests. The Court observed that the interest most likely to be pressed is the private interest of the litigant and, in that regard, the important considerations include:

“the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” (Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508, 91 L. Ed. at 1062, 67 S. Ct. at 843.)

Public factors to be considered include the status of the court docket where the action was filed, imposition of jury duty on the community, and the local interest in having a localized controversy resolved at home. With these considerations in mind, the Court concluded that “unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508, 91 L. Ed. at 1062, 67 S. Ct. at 843.

This court has on many prior occasions been asked to review a trial court’s ruling on a forum non conveniens motion. Until 1983, application of the doctrine was limited to motions for interstate transfers. Then, in Torres v. Walsh (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 338, this court held that the forum non conveniens doctrine also applied to intrastate transfers. The court stated that the same considerations of convenience and fairness are applicable in deciding the question of forum for trial in an intrastate analysis. Torres, 98 Ill. 2d at 351.

This court has routinely held that “[a] plaintiff’s right to select the forum is a substantial one, and unless the factors weigh strongly in favor of transfer, ‘ “the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” ’ ” (Griffith v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc. (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 101, 106 (quoting Jones v. Searle Laboratories (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 366, 372-73, and Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508, 91 L. Ed. at 1062, 67 S. Ct. at 843).) However, the Supreme Court has recognized that the rule giving preference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum is not entitled to the same weight or consideration in all cases. (Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno (1981), 454 U.S. 235, 255-56, 70 L. Ed. 2d 419, 435-36, 102 S. Ct. 252, 266.) When a plaintiff does not reside in the county in which he files suit, his choice of forum is entitled to less deference.

In the present case, appellees are residents of Bond County. They have chosen to sue in a county in which they are not residents, Madison County. Appellant is a public utility engaged in the sale of electric energy in Illinois. For purposes of venue, the residence of a corporation is any county in which it has its registered office or is doing business. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2— 102(a).) The record does not indicate the county in which appellant’s registered office is located, but the company does provide service to both Madison and Bond Counties.

Mrs. Washington’s two treating physicians have offices in St. Louis, Missouri, and St. Clair County, Illinois, which, the record indicates, are closer to Madison County than to Bond County. Although proximity is a factor to consider, it is only one in the list of considerations repeatedly discussed by this court. See Bland v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 217, 227 (“Mileage is but one factor of convenience. ‘If central emphasis were placed on any one factor, the forum non conveniens doctrine would lose much of the very flexibility that makes it so valuable.’ [Citations]”).

Moreover, the location of a treating physician was a factor in this court’s opinion in Bland v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. where we reversed an order denying a forum non conveniens motion. In that case, the plaintiff filed an action in Madison County and the defendant sought to have the cause transferred to Macon County. Two of the plaintiff’s treating physicians had offices in Madison County.

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Bluebook (online)
581 N.E.2d 644, 144 Ill. 2d 395, 163 Ill. Dec. 490, 1991 Ill. LEXIS 100, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/washington-v-illinois-power-co-ill-1991.