Washington v. Freedom of Expression LLC

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided October 9, 2024·No. 2:21-cv-01318·Unknown

Opinion

WO

Malaika Washington, et al., No. CV-21-01318-PHX-MTL

Plaintiffs, ORDER

v.

Freedom of Expression LLC, et al.,

Defendants. Before the Court is Defendants Freedom of Expression LLC, Wisnowsky Incorporated, and Todd Borowsky’s (collectively “Defendants”) Application for an Award of Reasonable Expenses as a Sanction Against Certain Plaintiffs. (Doc. 214.) The Application is fully briefed. (Docs. 214, 218, 219.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant the Application in part and deny the Application in part. The Court has previously set forth the factual background of this Motion. (Doc. 210.) As relevant here, Plaintiffs and Defendants were involved in a discovery dispute concerning Plaintiffs’ responses to Written Deposition Question 26 (“Question 26”). (Id. at 2.) The Court resolved the dispute by ordering Plaintiffs to “provide full answers, while stating objections, to Defendants’ written deposition questions no later than January 10, 2024.” (Doc. 185.) Despite the Court’s Order, twelve Plaintiffs still failed to provide sufficient information under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 210 at 6-7.) Defendants asked the Court to dismiss the twelve Plaintiffs as a sanction for violating the Court’s discovery order. (Id. at 4.) The Court instead ordered the twelve Plaintiffs to pay Defendants’ reasonable expenses related to the litigation over Question 26. (Id. at 10.) Specifically, the Court ordered: The Court will award Defendants’ reasonable expenses related to the litigation of this discovery issue, beginning on October 31, 2023, the date that the Court issued its Amended Scheduling Order permitting limited additional discovery, up to and including Defendants’ fee application following this Order. The reasonable expenses will be paid by the [twelve] Late Disclosing Plaintiffs.

(Id. at 10-11.) Defendants submitted their fee application requesting $31,775.25 in fees based on 94.25 billable hours. (Docs. 214, 215.) Plaintiffs responded on May 28, 2024, arguing that “Defendants’ billing entries are overwhelmingly irrelevant, duplicative, excessive, and unnecessary.” (Doc. 218 at 1.) Defendants filed their reply on June 04, 2024. (Doc. 219.) II. LEGAL STANDARD Federal district courts “possess certain ‘inherent powers,’ not conferred by rule or statute, ‘to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 107 (2017) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)). One aspect of the court’s inherent power is “the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991). A permissible sanction includes “instructing a party that has acted in bad faith to reimburse legal fees and costs incurred by the other side.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 581 U.S. at 107. Such a sanction, however, “must be compensatory rather than punitive in nature.” Id. at 108. A sanction of attorney’s fees and costs is compensatory when it “shift[s] only those attorney’s fees incurred because of the misconduct at issue.” Id.; see also Am. Unites for Kids v. Rousseau, 985 F.3d 1075, 1089 (9th Cir. 2021). To determine if a fee occurred because of a party’s misconduct, the court asks if its sanctions “cover[] the legal bills that the litigation abuse occasioned,” or if the fees “would have occurred without the misconduct.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 581 U.S. at 108. A party requesting attorney’s fees pursuant to a sanction order must ensure their request is reasonable. To determine the reasonableness of a requested fee award, the court uses the lodestar approach. Coe v. Hirsch, No. CV-21-00478-PHX SMM (MTM), 2022 WL 508841, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 21, 2022); see also Pelayo v. Platinum Limousine Servs., Inc., 804 Fed. Appx. 522, 524 (9th Cir. 2020). “Under this approach, a ‘presumptively reasonable’ fee award ‘is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.’” Coe, 2022 WL 508841, at *1 (quoting Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973 982 (9th Cir. 2008)). A. Relevance of the Requested Attorneys’ Fees Plaintiffs bring three challenges under Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. 1. Separate Arbitration Proceeding Plaintiffs first challenge the following time entries, which they claim relate to a separate arbitration proceeding before the American Arbitration Association: EXCHANGE E-MAILS WITH OPPOSING 1/30/24 TQS 2.10 $735.00 COUNSEL AND D. WILENCHIK REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST THAT WE WITHDRAW OUR MOTION TO DISMISS (.6); BEGIN DRAFTING SETTLEMENT MEMORANDUM (1.5) REVIEW E-MAIL FROM COUNSEL TO 2/2/24 MAB 0.10 $17.50 ARBITRATOR REGARDING (Doc. 218 at 4.) Defendants agree these entries were submitted in error. (Doc. 219 at 1.) Accordingly, the Court deducts 1.50 hours from the January 1, 2024, entry and 0.10 hours from the February 2, 2024, entry. Defendants’ fee request is reduced by $542.50. 2. Events Arising During the Normal Course of Litigation Plaintiffs next challenge five entries that they claim would have arisen during the normal course of litigation and are wholly irrespective of the sanctionable conduct. (Doc. 218 at 5.) Those entries are: TELECONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING 12/7/23 TQS 0.70 $245.00 COUNSEL RE HIS REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO COMPLETE DISCOVERY RESPONSES. (0.2). EXCHANGE EMAILS WITH D. WILENCHIK AND M. WORTHINGTON RE THE SAME AND SEND EMAIL TO OPPOSING COUNSEL AGREEING TO MUTUAL EXTENSION OF DEADLINE FOR WRITTEN DISCOVERY RESPONSES ONLY (0.5) EXCHANGE E-MAILS WITH OPPOSING 12/8/23 TQS 0.30 $105.00 COUNSEL RE DISCOVERY ISSUES PREPARE, REVISE, FINALIZE, AND FILE 12/11/23 TQS 2.80 $980.00 RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL RULE 30(B)(6) DEPOSITION PREPARE NOTICE OF ERRATA 12/12/23 TQS 0.50 $175.00 ADDRESSING ERROR IN RESPONSE TO MOTION TO COMPEL BY PLAINTIFFS REVIEW COURT'S DENIAL OF 12/14/23 TQS 1.80 $630.00 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION AND EXCHANGE E-MAILS WITH CLIENT REGARDING (.3); BEGIN REVIEWING PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSES TO DEPOSITION QUESTIONS AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION (1.5) (Id.) Defendants argue their review of Plaintiffs’ responses to deposition questions and requests for production were “absolutely necessary . . . to properly frame Defendants’ arguments to the Court.” (Doc. 219 at 2.) Defendants also argue their review of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel a Rule 30(B)(6) Deposition was part of an attempt by Plaintiffs to “stonewall[] Defendants on critical, legitimate written deposition questions.” (Id.) Defendants conclude with an overarching point: they “would not have incurred any of the fees sought in the Fee App[lication] if Plaintiffs had simply done what they had agreed and stipulated they would do in the first place.” (Id.) Sanctions under the Court’s inherent powers generally must “shift only those attorney’s fees incurred because of the misconduct at issue.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 581 U.S. at 108. In December 2023, Plaintiffs failed to meaningfully respond to Question 26. (Docs. 172, 180, 181.) That prompted the ensuing discovery dispute leading to these sanctions. (Docs. 181, 210 at 2.) The December responses were, however, Plaintiffs first response to the written deposition questions submitted by Defendants. That means the legal fees arising from Defendants’ review of the December re

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Related

Link v. Wabash Railroad
370 U.S. 626 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Hensley v. Eckerhart
461 U.S. 424 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.
501 U.S. 32 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc.
523 F.3d 973 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger
581 U.S. 101 (Supreme Court, 2017)
America Unites for Kids v. Sylvia Rousseau
985 F.3d 1075 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)