Washington v. Farley

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Kentucky
DecidedNovember 16, 2023
Docket3:23-cv-00483
StatusUnknown

This text of Washington v. Farley (Washington v. Farley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Washington v. Farley, (W.D. Ky. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION

ROBBIE WASHINGTON Plaintiff

v. Civil Action No. 3:23-cv-00483-RGJ

JIM FARLEY Defendant

* * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Robbie Washington initiated this pro se action by filing a complaint. [DE 1]. For the reasons stated herein, the Court will dismiss this action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and order Plaintiff to show cause why the Court should not issue an injunction barring her from proceeding in forma pauperis in all future actions in this Court. I. Plaintiff filed an application to proceed without the prepayment of fees. [DE 3]. Plaintiff reported in her application that she has zero income, zero expenses, and writes zeros for all of the other information requested in the application. Id. Plaintiff also attached some bank account information. However, Plaintiff provided no explanation for how she is able to live with no income or expenses. Upon review of the application, the Court determined that the application did not provide sufficient information to show whether Plaintiff qualified to proceed in forma pauperis or must be required to pay the $402 filing fee. The Court denied the application without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a new application in which she provided the requested information and, if necessary, provided an explanation for how she is able to live with no income or expenses. [DE 4]. The Court also warned Plaintiff “that failure to comply with [the] Order within 30 days will result in dismissal of this action” and potentially “the imposition of sanctions, including but not limited to prefiling restrictions” because she has repeatedly filed applications to proceed in forma pauperis with zeros listed for income, expenses, and all other information in direct noncompliance with the Court’s prior Orders. [Id. at 1–2]. More than 30 days have passed, and Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court’s Order. II.

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the involuntary dismissal of an action if a plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with an order of the court. See Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) recognizes the power of the district court to enter a sua sponte order of dismissal.”). “[W]hile pro se litigants may be entitled to some latitude when dealing with sophisticated legal issues, acknowledging their lack of formal training, there is no cause for extending this margin to straightforward procedural requirements that a layperson can comprehend as easily as a lawyer.” Id. “[T]he lenient treatment of pro se litigants has limits. Where, for example, a pro se litigant fails to comply with an easily understood court- imposed deadline, there is no basis for treating that party more generously than a represented

litigant.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Jourdan, 951 F.2d at 110). Courts have an inherent power “acting on their own initiative, to clear their calendars of cases that have remained dormant because of the inaction or dilatoriness of the parties seeking relief.” Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962). The Court has issued a straightforward Order directing Plaintiff to file a new application to proceed with prepayment of fees and warning her that failure to comply would result in the dismissal of this action. Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s prior Order warrants the dismissal of this case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Therefore, by separate Order, the Court will dismiss the instant action.

2 III. Additionally, the Court finds that Plaintiff has abused the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis by repeatedly seeking in forma pauperis status without a properly supported application to proceed without the prepayment of fees, even after the Court warned her not to do so. The Court will direct Plaintiff to show cause why an injunction should not be entered barring her from

proceeding in forma pauperis in any future action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. Congress first enacted an in forma pauperis statute in 1892 “to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). Proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege, not a right. Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 603 (6th Cir. 1998). Federal courts may revoke or deny the privilege of proceeding without paying the filing fees that apply to other plaintiffs when a litigant abuses the privilege by repeatedly filing frivolous, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184–85 (1989) (per curiam); Maxberry v. S.E.C., 879 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).

When a litigant abuses this privilege by repeatedly filing such lawsuits, federal courts have the inherent power to deter such suits by imposing appropriate sanctions, including restrictions on future access to the judicial system. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–45 (1991); Filipas v. Lemons, 835 F.2d 1145, 1146 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Iwachiw v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 396 F.3d 525, 528 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). While the Sixth Circuit has stated that an individual cannot be absolutely foreclosed from initiating an action or filing an appeal in federal court, Ortman v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 807, 811 (6th Cir. 1996), the Court may impose prefiling restrictions on an individual with a history of repetitive or vexatious litigation. Id.; Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 269 (6th Cir. 1998) (“There is nothing unusual about imposing

3 prefiling restrictions in matters with a history of repetitive or vexatious litigation.”). A district court may properly require prolific litigators to obtain leave of court before accepting any further complaints for filing, see Filipas, 835 F.2d at 1146, and may deny a vexatious litigant permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See, e.g., Reneer v. Sewell, 975 F.2d 258, 260–61 (6th Cir. 1992). The imposition of these prospective orders has been upheld where a litigant has demonstrated a

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Related

Link v. Wabash Railroad
370 U.S. 626 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.
501 U.S. 32 (Supreme Court, 1991)
James M. Jourdan, Jr. v. John Jabe and L. Boyd
951 F.2d 108 (Sixth Circuit, 1991)
Torrance Pilgrim v. John Littlefield
92 F.3d 413 (Sixth Circuit, 1996)
Ortman v. Thomas
99 F.3d 807 (Sixth Circuit, 1996)
Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
141 F.3d 264 (Sixth Circuit, 1998)
In re McDonald
489 U.S. 180 (Supreme Court, 1989)

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Bluebook (online)
Washington v. Farley, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/washington-v-farley-kywd-2023.