Washington v. District of Columbia

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: February 6, 2023
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-0036
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

EDWARD D. WASHINGTON, Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 23-0036 (CKK)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION (February 6, 2023)

Plaintiff Edward D. Washington (“Washington”), a limousine driver based in the

Commonwealth of Virginia, seeks preliminary injunctive relief ordering the District of Columbia

to cease ticketing him for failure to comply with certain motor vehicle regulations while his state

administrative appeal of other tickets is resolved. Plaintiff’s pleadings are not the model of

clarity, and his complaint contains only a few sentences of allegations. As far as the Court can

tell, it appears Plaintiff argues that the federal Real Interstate Driver Equity (“RIDE”) Act

preempts the District of Columbia from ticketing Plaintiff for failure to comply with the District

of Columbia’s regulatory requirement that out-of-state drivers first register with the D.C.

Department of For-Hire Vehicles before providing for-hire transportation entirely within the

District of Columbia.

Ultimately, Plaintiff requests that the Court enjoin the District of Columbia’s ticketing

regime as entirely preempted by the RIDE Act. Because the RIDE Act does not preempt the

tickets assessed and Plaintiff does not face irreparable injury, the Court DENIES his [2] Motion

for Temporary Restraining Order. Moreover, because his complaint is so devoid of merit, the

Court DISMISSES it on its own authority.

1 The provision of federal law Plaintiff considers is quite short. In relevant part, it bars any

“State or its political subdivision thereof[,]” other than a driver’s home jurisdiction, from

“enact[ing] or enforc[ing] any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision . . . requiring a

license or a fee . . . [for] providing pre-arranged ground transportation service[s],” (i.e., driving a

for-hire car) under two circumstances. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(d)(1). First, a state cannot require a

license for for-hire transportation “from one State, including intermediate stops, to a destination

in another state.” Id. (d)(1)(C)(i). Second, a state cannot require a license or charge a fee for

for-hire transportation “from one State, including intermediate stops in another State, to a

destination in the original State.” Id. (C)(ii). Therefore, under this statute, the several States and

their localities remain free to require a license or charge a fee for intrastate for-hire ground

transportation.

District of Columbia law requires for-hire drivers to first obtain a license from DFHV

before “operat[ing] . . . in the District.” D.C. Code. § 50-301.13(c) (West 2023). Failure to

obtain a license may result in fees and impoundment of a vehicle until those fees are paid to the

District. 31 DCMR § 828.8 (West 2023). Although the precise facts are difficult to glean from

Plaintiff’s pleadings, construing them as liberally as possible, it appears Plaintiff owns his own

limousine registered in the Commonwealth of Virginia and contracts with a Virginia company to

provide ground transportation in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia. ECF No. 10-

1 (sealed). Plaintiff did not, and has not, obtained a license in the District of Columbia. On

January 5, 2023, a DFHV enforcement officer stopped Plaintiff and issued two tickets upon

inspection of Plaintiff’s manifest. ECF No. 4-1. The ticket was predicated on two trips: one

from “1499 Mass Ave NW” to “400 N. Capitol St., NW” and the other from “22 M St, NE” to

“400 N. Capitol St., NW.” Id. Plaintiff does not contest that all three addresses are in the

2 District of Columbia. Nor does he claim that those two trips involved an intermediate stop in

another State.

A. Preliminary Relief

To warrant a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff “must establish [1] that he is likely to

succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of the equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction

is in the public interest.” Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Where, as

here, the government is a party to the litigation, these two factors merge and are “one and the

same, because the government’s interest is the public’s interest.” Pursuing Am.’s Greatness v.

FEC, 831 F.3d 500, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2016). When seeking such relief, “the movant has the burden

to show that all four factors, taken together, weigh in favor of the injunction.” Abdullah v.

Obama, 753 F.3d 193, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2014). “The four factors have typically been evaluated on

a ‘sliding scale,’” whereby if “the movant makes an unusually strong showing on one of the

factors, then [he] does not necessarily have to make as strong a showing on another factor.”

Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291-92 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Plaintiff

succeeds on none of these factors.

As to likelihood of success on the merits, because both tickets are predicated on travel

entirely within the District of Columbia, their enforcement clearly is not preempted by federal

law. To the extent that Plaintiff is concerned that the District of Columbia might ticket him for

trips involving stops outside of the District of Columbia, such hypothetical injury is too remote

to endow Plaintiff with standing to press such a claim. See Church v. Biden, 573 F. Supp. 3d

118, 133-34 (D.D.C. 2021).

Finally, in a supplemental reply, Plaintiff attaches a list of tickets assessed in 2018. ECF

3 No. 10-2 at 2-6. Plaintiff does not claim that these tickets involved interstate transportation, and

the tickets themselves identify only the location in which they were assessed (all within the

District of Columbia). To the extent Plaintiff seeks to rest his complaint on those tickets, they

have all been “suspended,” such that no payment is due to the District of Columbia. Id. at 3-6.

In addition to the lack of injury, Plaintiff does not plead that these tickets were at all related in

interstate transportation. Therefore, Plaintiff also lacks standing to challenge any hypothetical

violation of the RIDE Act based on those tickets as well. See Church, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 134.

As such, Plaintiff has not demonstrated the requisite likelihood of success on the merits to

warrant preliminary relief. See id.

Nor can Plaintiff establish likely (much less certain) irreparable harm. The entirety of

the alleged harm here is pecuniary: the financial effects of tickets and impoundment. Monetary

harm is insufficient to warrant preliminary relief. See id. at 142-43. It appears that Plaintiff also

implies that the District of Columbia’s ticketing regime prevents him from operating in the

District of Columbia. Not so. He need only pay a $650 registration fee to obtain a license to

provide transportation wholly within the District of Columbia. DFHV, Administrative Issuance:

Non-District Limousine Program § IV(4) (Jan. 20, 2023) available at

https://dfhv.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/dc%20taxi/page_content/attachments/NDL%20Pro

gram%20AI-2023-01%20%28replaces%20AI-2022-02%29_.pdf. That, too, is economic harm,

and also constitutes the kind of “corrective relief” that remains available to Plaintiff to avoid his

fear of the loss of a substantial portion of his business. See Mexichem Specialty Resins, Inc. v.

EPA, 787 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2015). As such, Plaintiff has not demonstrated irreparable

injury.

Lastly, the public interest weighs decidedly in the District of Columbia’s favor. The

4 District of Columbia has a weighty interest in the enforcement of its own laws, including those

governing transportation. See Cmte. of 100 on Fed. City v. Foxx, 87 F. Supp. 3d 191, 220

(D.D.C. 2015). Plaintiff’s interest in avoiding further pecuniary harm is all the weaker given his

preemption claim clearly fails. See CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 58 F.3d

738, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

As such, preliminary relief is not warranted here.

B. Dismissal

Because, even taking all Plaintiff’s allegations as true, he stands no chance of success on

his sole claim of preemption, the Court will dismiss his complaint on its own authority.

Although sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim is not common, a court may do so if,

“‘taking all the material allegations of the complaint as admitted and construing them in the

plaintiff’s favor,’ the court determines that the plaintiff’s complaint could not possibly entitle

him to relief.” Epps v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 719 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting

Razzoli v. Fed. Bureau of Prison, 230 F.3d 371, 373-74 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). When a “claimant

cannot possibly win relief,” the Court may go further to dismiss the case, rather than affording a

plaintiff a futile attempt at amendment. Id. Nevertheless, before doing so, a court must assure

itself that the “procedure used [in dismissing the complaint] is fair.” Id.

As to the last point first, dismissal here is only partially sua sponte because the Court

afforded Plaintiff two rounds of briefing to press his preemption claim on the merits. Plaintiff’s

complaint was particularly devoid of facts. Without characterizing or attaching the challenged

tickets to the complaint, Plaintiff summarily argued in his complaint that “[t]he District of

Columbia does not recognize Public Law 107-298 [the RIDE ACT],” and, on January 5, 2023,

Plaintiff “was issued a $500 infraction [and towed] for not having the [requisite] DC permit.”

5 Compl. ECF No. 1 at 4-5. Plaintiff’s pending Motion consisted of just one line, “PROHIBIT

FURTHER INFRACTIONS UNTIL MY CASE IS HEARD IN COURT.” Rather, than

summarily denying the Motion, the Court ordered expedited briefing. When Plaintiff alleged no

more than economic harm in this initial round of briefing, the Court afforded him a second

opportunity to describe the tickets he received and the alleged harm with particularity.

On this full record, the Court now construes all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, mindful

that he is proceeding pro se. As discussed further above, the entirety of Plaintiff’s complaint

rests on two tickets issued on January 5, 2023. See ECF No. 4-1 at 3; ECF No. 5-1 at 3-4; ECF

No. 10-2 at 2. Plaintiff does not allege that he has received more tickets, much less that those

tickets were issued for interstate transportation. See Pl.’s Resp. to Jan. 6, 2023 Minute Order,

ECF No. 7 at 2. The record makes it abundantly clear that those tickets applied to transportation

entirely within the District of Columbia, a fact which Plaintiff has conceded over two rounds of

briefing. See Phrasavang v. Deutsche Bank, 656 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D.D.C. 2009) (failure to

respond to factual or legal argument in reply concedes that argument). The law is equally clear

that the District of Columbia is not preempted from regulating transportation by out-of-state

drivers occurring entirely within the District of Columbia. See 49 U.S.C. § 14501(d)(1)(C); State

v. Bickford, 117 A.3d 686, 691 (N.H. 2015) . Because the tickets that form the basis of

Plaintiff’s complaint apply exclusively to intrastate transportation, taking all the material

allegations of the complaint as admitted and construing them in the plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff

nevertheless cannot possibly win relief. Therefore, the Court sua sponte dismisses his complaint.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s [2] Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order, DISMISSES Plaintiff’s [1] Complaint for failure to state a claim, and

6 DENIES AS MOOT Defendant’s [11] Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint . An

appropriate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: February 6, 2023 /s/ COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge