WASHINGTON v. CHRYSLER CAPITAL CORPORATION

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 8, 2021
Docket5:19-cv-00143
StatusUnknown

This text of WASHINGTON v. CHRYSLER CAPITAL CORPORATION (WASHINGTON v. CHRYSLER CAPITAL CORPORATION) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
WASHINGTON v. CHRYSLER CAPITAL CORPORATION, (E.D. Pa. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA DEJA WASHINGTON, Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION FEDLOAN SERVICING NO. 19-143 Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

SCHMEHL, J. /s/ JLS SEPTEMBER 8, 2021

Plaintiff brought this action, claiming Defendant FedLoan Servicing (“FedLoan”) violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s- 2(b) by reporting inaccurate and misleading information on her credit report and by failing to conduct a good faith investigation into the allegedly inaccurate reporting.1 Presently before the Court is the motion of FedLoan for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted. STANDARD OF REVIEW A court shall grant a motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is “genuine” if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423

1 The Complaint also named Chrysler Capital Corp and TransUnion, LLC as Defendants, but the Plaintiff has reached a settlement agreement with both. (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A factual dispute is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Under Rule 56, the Court must view the evidence presented on the motion

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, “[u]nsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions are insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2010). The movant bears the initial responsibility for informing the Court of the basis for the motion for summary judgment and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a particular issue, the moving party’s initial burden can be met simply by “pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. After the moving party has met the initial burden, the non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuinely disputed factual issue for trial by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party fails to rebut by making a factual showing “sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. FACTS The following facts, taken from FedLoan’s Undisputed Statement of Facts

(ECF 39-13), are not in dispute: 1. The Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (“PHEAA”) is a statutorily created instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, with its principal place of business in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, which conducts its federal student loan servicing activities under the business name FedLoan. 24 P.S. §§ 5101 – 5199.9. (Answer and Affirmative Defenses of Defendant FedLoan Servicing at ¶ 6.) 2. On June 21, 2007, Plaintiff signed and submitted a Federal Student Loan Master Promissory Note to receive student loans under the Federal Family Education Loan Program (“FFELP”).

3. Plaintiff received FFELP student loans pursuant to the Master Promissory Note and federal student loans to finance her post-secondary education from 2007 through 2012. (Deposition of Deja Washington, November 5, 2019, at p. 12:16-20, included within “Exhibit 1” to FedLoan’s Motion for Summary Judgment.) 4. On June 17, 2016, Plaintiff signed and submitted a Federal Direct Consolidation Loan Application and Promissory Note to consolidate her student loans, including the FFELP loans and federal student loans Plaintiff received to finance her education. (FedLoan’s Request for Admissions to Plaintiff at ¶ 4, and Federal Direct Consolidation Loan Application and Promissory Note attached as Exhibit D, included within “Exhibit 7” to FedLoan’s Motion for Summary Judgment.) 5. By letter dated July 30, 2016, FedLoan notified Plaintiff that the

consolidation of her student loans was completed, and identified the loans that were included within her Direct Consolidation Loan. (FedLoan’s response to Washington’s Request for Production of Documents, pp. 319– 321, included within “Exhibit 4” to FedLoan’s Motion for Summary Judgment.) 6. Plaintiff’s Direct Consolidation Loan was disbursed on July 29, 2016, and consisted of a subsidized portion with a balance of $25,882.29 and an unsubsidized portion of $31,915.65, for a total amount of $57,797.94. (FedLoan’s response to Washington’s Request for Production of Documents, p. 321, included within “Exhibit 4” to FedLoan’s Motion for

Summary Judgment.) 7. . Upon Plaintiff’s Direct Consolidation Loan being disbursed by the Department of Education (“DOE”), FedLoan began servicing Plaintiff’s Direct Consolidation Loan. (FedLoan’s response to Washington’s Request for Production of Documents, pp. 324-326, included within “Exhibit 4” to FedLoan’s Motion for Summary Judgment.) 8. Plaintiff’s first payment due date on her Direct Consolidation Loan was September 26, 2016. (FedLoan’s response to Washington’s Request for Production of Documents, p. 260, included within “Exhibit 4” to FedLoan’s Motion for Summary Judgment.) 9. Plaintiff did not make the required payment on her Direct Consolidation Loan by September 26, 2016. (FedLoan’s response to Washington’s

Request for Production of Documents, pp. 333-335, included within “Exhibit 4” to FedLoan’s Motion for Summary Judgment.) 10. By letter dated October 19, 2016, FedLoan notified Plaintiff that she was delinquent on her Direct Consolidation Loan, and requested that she make payments to bring her loan current. (FedLoan’s response to Washington’s Request for Production of Documents, pp. 333-335, included within “Exhibit 4” to FedLoan’s Motion for Summary Judgment.) 11. Plaintiff did not make any payments on her Direct Consolidation Loan subsequent to the October 19, 2016 letter. (FedLoan’s response to Washington’s Request for Production of Documents, pp. 256-260, included

within “Exhibit 4” to FedLoan’s Motion for Summary Judgment.) 12. By letter dated December 3, 2016, FedLoan again notified Plaintiff that she was delinquent on her Direct Consolidation Loan, and requested that she make payments to bring her loan current. (FedLoan’s response to Washington’s Request for Production of Documents, pp. 338-340, included within “Exhibit 4” to FedLoan’s Motion for Summary Judgment.) 13.

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