Washington v. Central of Georgia Railway Company

174 F. Supp. 33, 44 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2601, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3229
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Georgia
DecidedJune 27, 1958
DocketCiv. 711
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 174 F. Supp. 33 (Washington v. Central of Georgia Railway Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Washington v. Central of Georgia Railway Company, 174 F. Supp. 33, 44 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2601, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3229 (M.D. Ga. 1958).

Opinion

BOOTLE, District Judge.

The above action was instituted in this Court on December 12th, 1949, by a number of Negro firemen on the Central of Georgia Railway Company to strike down racial discrimination then practiced under the Southeastern Carriers’ Conference Agreement of February 18th, 1941 limiting Negro firemen, euphemistically referred to therein as non-promotable firemen, to 50% in each class of service. The action accomplished its purpose in that on March 25th, 1952, Judge A. B. Conger signed a consent decree permanently enjoining all defendants, including the Central and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen,

“(a) from enforcing the Southeastern Carriers’ Conference Agreement of February 18, 1941, or any other written or oral agreements, or carrying on any practices under such agreements, insofar as said agreements or practices discriminate, on the ground of their race or color, against Negro firemen in their employment or occupation as firemen on steam locomotives, or as helpers on Diesel locomotives, or (b) from denying to plaintiffs or other members of their class their respective rights to assignments as firemen on steam locomotives or as helpers on diesel locomotives based upon seniority and qualifications because they are Negroes or because they have not been permitted or required to take or pass examinations to qualify as engineers * *

On December 18, 1957, A1 Marshall, Major Simpson, Will Covington, Jim Mullins and Marion Vincent, five Negro firemen employed by the Central, filed their motion to intervene in said case and to be permitted to file their petition against the Central and the Brotherhood for a rule to show cause why they should not be held in civil contempt for certain alleged violations of said injunction. The intervention was allowed, the petition filed and rule to show cause issued.

The interveners have made the following showing. Their employment by Central antedates the injunction and they are entitled to the benefits thereof. The Brotherhood is their exclusive bargaining representative with the Central under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. They are excluded from membership in the Brotherhood because of their color. Due to the long standing rule applicable on the Central that engineers must have experience as firemen and that Negroes may not become engineers, Negro firemen have become the .senior firemen having the right to choice runs and all other rights accompanying high seniority. One of the choice runs on the Central is the freight run from Columbus, Georgia to Birmingham, Alabama on the Columbus Division. For 20 years or more prior to March, 1957, this run was worked for the most part by five Negro firemen with top seniority who shared its mileage. As of the time of the filing of this intervention these runs were held by the five interveners and their mileage averaged about 3760 miles in a 30 day month and 3610 miles in 3. *35 31 day month, the smaller mileage in the longer month being due to the men’s being “held off” so as not to exceed the maximum of 3800 miles per month, as prescribed in the Schedule of Wages, Rules and Regulations hereinafter mentioned.

On or about March 1, 1957, pursuant to an agreement between the Brotherhood and the Central a “swing man” was added to this regular assigned run. He takes the fifth run of each man four times a month causing each of the five men to lose mileage and pay. Since the swing man has been added each of these five regular assigned jobs loses 628 miles per month representing a loss of pay of something like $100 per month for each man. Intervener Marshall testified that it reduced his monthly pay from approximately $650 to approximately $580.

Upon the basic facts above found the parties rest radically diverse contentions. Interveners say that in adding this swing man and in thus taking mileage and pay from them, the Brotherhood and the Central have flagrantly violated the injunctive decree of this Court in that they have thus been “enforcing * * * written or oral agreements [and] carrying on * * * practices [which] discriminate, on the ground of their race or color, against Negro firemen in their employment or occupation as firemen on steam locomotives or as helpers on diesel locomotives * *

The Central and the Brotherhood, on the other hand, emphatically deny both the alleged intent to discriminate and the alleged fact of discrimination.

Interveners’ counsel succinctly outlined their contentions as follows: “We do not contend * * * that these outstanding Federal decrees [similar decrees were issued in other Courts] prevent any reduction in the pay and privileges of Negro firemen of any kind. Any reduction which is made equally across the board, affecting all, certainly is not a discrimination against Negro firemen. We do not claim that the injunctions have insulated these men in a position where they can come to a federal court and resist any type of reduction in their pay or mileage. That is certainly not what was intended, but we say that discriminatory reduction where we can show that the Negroes have been selected for the application of an adverse rule such as this one and that whites are not similarly subjected, that, we say, of course, is the exact discrimination which the very terms of the consent decree prohibit * * * I have thought about just what discrimination means, and what it takes to prove it, and I think What I mean in this case by discrimination is the selective — the racially selective application of reduction in job rights. That is what I mean, and I think that is what we intend to prove; the curtailments in the privileges and payment of jobs effected against Negroes but not against whites basically, and I think that is the kind of discrimination covered and the kind we will show has been effected in this case.”

Interveners claim the existence of certain matters “in aggravation of this discriminatory reduction in their mileage”, namely, that (1) they were “frozen” in these reduced mileage jobs and denied their contractual right to shift to another job; (2) this inroad upon their seniority privileges and pay and mileage was totally racially selective in the sense that no comparable reduction of the pay of white firemen was made on the Columbus division or other divisions of the Central; (3) their pay loss necessarily goes to white firemen and (4) a system of discrimination has been built into the railroad industry in that only white firemen were promo table to jobs as engineers; that thus an engineer, always a white man, may have seniority as a fireman, engineer, hostler and hostler helper, whereas a Negro fireman has seniority only as a fireman and that consequently a demoted engineer who is “back firing”, in competition with inter-veners, has the possibility of supplementing his pay as a fireman with pay earned in another capacity, whereas such possibility is not open to interveners.

*36 Counsel for the Brotherhood, after denying discrimination and discriminatory intent, deny also that interveners have a right to run a greater mileage per month than other firemen generally run and deny that adjusting their mileage to bring them in line with mileage run by other firemen constituted hostile discrimination in any legal sense of the word.

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174 F. Supp. 33, 44 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2601, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3229, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/washington-v-central-of-georgia-railway-company-gamd-1958.