Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
May 20, 2025
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
WASHINGTON AND RICE, LLC, No. 59630-0-II
Respondent,
v.
ROBERT L. STALLWORTH and LADEDRIA UNPUBLISHED OPINION STALLWORTH, husband and wife,
Appellants.
VELJACIC, A.C.J. — This case arises out of an action for breach of contract related to a
lease for residential property. Washington and Rice, LLC leased a residential property to Robert
and Ladedria Stallworth. The Stallworths defaulted on their lease payments and moved out.
Washington and Rice filed a lawsuit seeking unpaid rent, attorney fees, and costs. The trial court
granted summary judgment in Washington and Rice’s favor and ordered the Stallworths to pay the
outstanding rent along with attorney fees and costs. On appeal, the Stallworths argue that the
judgment is not authorized because they were not offered a payment plan or rent reduction as
statutorily required. They further argue that attorney fees and costs are not statutorily authorized.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
FACTS
The Stallworths rented residential property from Washington and Rice from 2019 to 2022.
The parties’ rental agreement provided that if the Stallworths missed any payments, they would 59630-0-II
“pay all costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees, expended or incurred by [Washington and Rice] by
reason of any default or breach by [the Stallworths] of any of the terms of this Agreement.” Clerk’s
Papers (CP) at 42.
In November 2021, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Stallworths stopped making their
rent payments. In 2022, Washington and Rice decided to sell the property and notified the
Stallworths. The Stallworths vacated the property in July 2022. Washington and Rice then filed
a breach of contract suit against the Stallworths for unpaid rent. 1 The complaint did not address
unlawful detainer. And the summons, which accompanied the complaint, was a standard civil
summons rather than the unlawful detainer summons outlined in RCW 59.18.365.
Washington and Rice moved for summary judgment, arguing that there were no genuine
issues of material facts because the Stallworths breached the lease and Washington and Rice
sustained damages. The motion was supported by the declaration of Sandra Parmalee, Washington
and Rice’s property manager.
In response to the summary judgment motion, the Stallworths submitted a declaration,
stating that Washington and Rice violated RCW 59.12.030(3) because it waited for the time
restrictions to pass and then filed its motion for summary judgement. They also claimed that they
were essential and senior workers, that there was mold in the building, and that some residents
were informed of abatement of rental payments when the COVID-19 rent moratorium was
implemented. The Stallworths acknowledged that they were notified that Washington and Rice
was selling the property, and that they moved out soon after.
1 Washington and Rice first attempted to seek recovery of lost rent through a rental assistance agency that was working with the Stallworths. However, the Stallworths did not submit the required information to the rental assistance agency, preventing the processing of rental assistance funds on their behalf.
2 59630-0-II
On September 22, 2023, the trial court granted Washington and Rice’s motion for summary
judgment and notified the parties that a judgment would be entered at a later time.
Washington and Rice’s attorney submitted a declaration regarding attorney fees and costs.
The Stallworths submitted a statement that the principal judgment amount should be reduced
because they were not offered a reasonable payment plan under the “Rent Moratorium” in effect
while they were renting the property. CP at 70. Their final argument appears to contain a
substantial typographical error, as it suggests attorney fees, costs, and interest should not be
awarded pursuant to “Thursday September 28, 2023 Washington State Supreme Court.” CP at 70.
The significance of this is uncertain.
On October 2, 2023, the trial court entered a judgment for Washington and Rice, awarding
it $16,557.94 in back rent, $6,090.00 in attorney fees, and $548.00 in costs.
The Stallworths appealed the trial court’s October 2, 2023 judgment.2
ANALYSIS
I. JUDGMENT
The Stallworths first argue that the trial court erred in awarding Washington and Rice
$16,557.94 in back rent when Washington and Rice failed to offer the Stallworths a rent reduction
or a payment plan as required by former RCW 59.18.630 (2021) and RCW 59.21.030(3). We
disagree.
We review the question of whether damages are proper de novo. Pierce v. Bill & Melinda
Gates Found., 15 Wn. App. 2d 419, 436, 475 P.3d 1011 (2020). The Stallworths rely on former
2 Washington and Rice notes that the Stallworths appealed only the October 2, 2023 judgment not the underlying order granting Washington and Rice’s motion for summary judgment. While we will review an order not designated in a notice of appeal if it prejudicially affects the decision designated in the notice under RAP 2.4(b), the Stallworths arguments relate to the October 2, 2023 judgment. Therefore, we see no procedural bar to addressing their arguments on the merits.
3 59630-0-II
RCW 59.18.630 and RCW 59.21.030(3) to support their argument that the trial court erred in
awarding damages to Washington and Rice.
Former RCW 59.18.630 regulated the actions of landlords during our prior governor’s
eviction moratorium. Heston v. Christensen, 30 Wn. App. 2d 511, 517, 548 P.3d 961 (2024). The
statute required landlords to offer tenants a reasonable schedule for repayment of unpaid rent prior
to “proceed[ing] with an unlawful detainer action as set forth in RCW 59.12.030.” “An ‘unlawful
detainer’ is a summary proceeding that provides an expediated form of relief to recover rental
premises and resolve claims of possession between landlords and tenants.” Housing Auth. of
County of King v. Knight, ___ Wn.3d ___, ___, 563 P.3d 1058, 1061 (2025).
RCW 59.21.030(3) relates to mobile home park closure notice requirements. The
Stallworths do not clarify how this statute is relevant to the issue at hand.
Nevertheless, Washington and Rice brought a lawsuit for breach of contract, not unlawful
detainer.
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Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
May 20, 2025
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
WASHINGTON AND RICE, LLC, No. 59630-0-II
Respondent,
v.
ROBERT L. STALLWORTH and LADEDRIA UNPUBLISHED OPINION STALLWORTH, husband and wife,
Appellants.
VELJACIC, A.C.J. — This case arises out of an action for breach of contract related to a
lease for residential property. Washington and Rice, LLC leased a residential property to Robert
and Ladedria Stallworth. The Stallworths defaulted on their lease payments and moved out.
Washington and Rice filed a lawsuit seeking unpaid rent, attorney fees, and costs. The trial court
granted summary judgment in Washington and Rice’s favor and ordered the Stallworths to pay the
outstanding rent along with attorney fees and costs. On appeal, the Stallworths argue that the
judgment is not authorized because they were not offered a payment plan or rent reduction as
statutorily required. They further argue that attorney fees and costs are not statutorily authorized.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
FACTS
The Stallworths rented residential property from Washington and Rice from 2019 to 2022.
The parties’ rental agreement provided that if the Stallworths missed any payments, they would 59630-0-II
“pay all costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees, expended or incurred by [Washington and Rice] by
reason of any default or breach by [the Stallworths] of any of the terms of this Agreement.” Clerk’s
Papers (CP) at 42.
In November 2021, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Stallworths stopped making their
rent payments. In 2022, Washington and Rice decided to sell the property and notified the
Stallworths. The Stallworths vacated the property in July 2022. Washington and Rice then filed
a breach of contract suit against the Stallworths for unpaid rent. 1 The complaint did not address
unlawful detainer. And the summons, which accompanied the complaint, was a standard civil
summons rather than the unlawful detainer summons outlined in RCW 59.18.365.
Washington and Rice moved for summary judgment, arguing that there were no genuine
issues of material facts because the Stallworths breached the lease and Washington and Rice
sustained damages. The motion was supported by the declaration of Sandra Parmalee, Washington
and Rice’s property manager.
In response to the summary judgment motion, the Stallworths submitted a declaration,
stating that Washington and Rice violated RCW 59.12.030(3) because it waited for the time
restrictions to pass and then filed its motion for summary judgement. They also claimed that they
were essential and senior workers, that there was mold in the building, and that some residents
were informed of abatement of rental payments when the COVID-19 rent moratorium was
implemented. The Stallworths acknowledged that they were notified that Washington and Rice
was selling the property, and that they moved out soon after.
1 Washington and Rice first attempted to seek recovery of lost rent through a rental assistance agency that was working with the Stallworths. However, the Stallworths did not submit the required information to the rental assistance agency, preventing the processing of rental assistance funds on their behalf.
2 59630-0-II
On September 22, 2023, the trial court granted Washington and Rice’s motion for summary
judgment and notified the parties that a judgment would be entered at a later time.
Washington and Rice’s attorney submitted a declaration regarding attorney fees and costs.
The Stallworths submitted a statement that the principal judgment amount should be reduced
because they were not offered a reasonable payment plan under the “Rent Moratorium” in effect
while they were renting the property. CP at 70. Their final argument appears to contain a
substantial typographical error, as it suggests attorney fees, costs, and interest should not be
awarded pursuant to “Thursday September 28, 2023 Washington State Supreme Court.” CP at 70.
The significance of this is uncertain.
On October 2, 2023, the trial court entered a judgment for Washington and Rice, awarding
it $16,557.94 in back rent, $6,090.00 in attorney fees, and $548.00 in costs.
The Stallworths appealed the trial court’s October 2, 2023 judgment.2
ANALYSIS
I. JUDGMENT
The Stallworths first argue that the trial court erred in awarding Washington and Rice
$16,557.94 in back rent when Washington and Rice failed to offer the Stallworths a rent reduction
or a payment plan as required by former RCW 59.18.630 (2021) and RCW 59.21.030(3). We
disagree.
We review the question of whether damages are proper de novo. Pierce v. Bill & Melinda
Gates Found., 15 Wn. App. 2d 419, 436, 475 P.3d 1011 (2020). The Stallworths rely on former
2 Washington and Rice notes that the Stallworths appealed only the October 2, 2023 judgment not the underlying order granting Washington and Rice’s motion for summary judgment. While we will review an order not designated in a notice of appeal if it prejudicially affects the decision designated in the notice under RAP 2.4(b), the Stallworths arguments relate to the October 2, 2023 judgment. Therefore, we see no procedural bar to addressing their arguments on the merits.
3 59630-0-II
RCW 59.18.630 and RCW 59.21.030(3) to support their argument that the trial court erred in
awarding damages to Washington and Rice.
Former RCW 59.18.630 regulated the actions of landlords during our prior governor’s
eviction moratorium. Heston v. Christensen, 30 Wn. App. 2d 511, 517, 548 P.3d 961 (2024). The
statute required landlords to offer tenants a reasonable schedule for repayment of unpaid rent prior
to “proceed[ing] with an unlawful detainer action as set forth in RCW 59.12.030.” “An ‘unlawful
detainer’ is a summary proceeding that provides an expediated form of relief to recover rental
premises and resolve claims of possession between landlords and tenants.” Housing Auth. of
County of King v. Knight, ___ Wn.3d ___, ___, 563 P.3d 1058, 1061 (2025).
RCW 59.21.030(3) relates to mobile home park closure notice requirements. The
Stallworths do not clarify how this statute is relevant to the issue at hand.
Nevertheless, Washington and Rice brought a lawsuit for breach of contract, not unlawful
detainer. The Stallworths do not demonstrate how either former RCW 59.18.630 or RCW
59.21.030(3) limit a judgment in a breach of contract action. Accordingly, they fail to show that
the trial court erred in entering judgment for back rent to Washington and Rice.
II. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS BELOW
The Stallworths next argue that the trial court erred in awarding Washington and Rice its
attorney fees and costs. We disagree.
Similar to our review of whether a judgment is lawful, we review the legal basis for the
award of attorney fees and costs de novo. Niccum v. Enquist, 175 Wn.2d 441, 446, 286 P.3d 966
(2012). The Stallworths rely on former RCW 59.18.660(3)(b) to support their argument that the
trial court erred in awarding attorney fees and costs.
4 59630-0-II
Former RCW 59.18.660, was known as the Eviction Resolution Pilot Program (ERPP).
The ERPP required landlords to participate in an “eviction resolution program” before filing an
unlawful detainer action for nonpayment of rent. Former RCW 59.18.660(2). The legislature
charged dispute resolution centers, situated in each county, with administering the program.
Former RCW 59.18.660(1). Until such a center certified a plaintiff-landlord’s participation in the
program, the statute prevented any trial court from hearing that landlord’s unlawful detainer action
for nonpayment of rent. Former RCW 59.18.660(5). By its terms, former RCW 59.18.660 expired
July 1, 2023. Former RCW 59.18.660(9).
There are no provisions in former RCW 59.18.660 that address attorney fees and costs. It
is assumed that the Stallworths intended to cite former RCW 59.18.630(3)(b), which provided that
landlords may recover “rent only” and “not any late fees, attorneys’ fees, or any other fees and
charges.” But, as discussed above, former RCW 59.18.630(3)(b) related to unlawful detainer
actions and not breach of contract actions.
The parties’ rental agreement states that the Stallworths agree “to pay all costs, expenses,
and attorney’s fees, expended or incurred by [Washington and Rice] by reason of any default or
breach by [the Stallworths] of any of the terms of this Agreement.” CP at 42. Based on the parties’
agreement, the trial court had a legal basis to award attorney fees and costs. Nothing in former
RCW 59.18.660 or former RCW 59.18.630(3)(b) limits that legal basis. Accordingly, the trial
court did not err in awarding attorney fees and costs.
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Washington and Rice requests attorney fees on appeal based on RAP 18.1(a). Under RAP
18.1(a), we may award attorney fees “[i]f applicable law grants to a party the right to recover
reasonable attorney fees.” This includes fee provisions in leases awarding attorney fees to the
5 59630-0-II
prevailing party. City of Puyallup v. Hogan, 168 Wn. App. 406, 430, 277 P.3d 49 (2012). As
discussed above, the parties’ rental agreement contains an attorney fee provision, allowing
Washington and Rice to recover fees for breach of the agreement. Contractual provisions awarding
attorney fees to the prevailing party also support an award of appellate attorney fees. Thompson
v. Lennox, 151 Wn. App. 479, 484, 212 P.3d 597 (2009). Based on the attorney fee provision in
the parties’ rental agreement lease, we award Washington and Rice attorney fees on appeal under
RAP 18.1(a).
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s October 2, 2023 judgment in favor of Washington and Rice.
Attorney fees are awarded under RAP 18.1(a) in an amount to be set by our commissioner.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
Veljacic, A.C.J.
We concur:
Price, J.
Che, J.