Washington Law Offices v. Hoff

2026 IL App (1st) 250834-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 27, 2026
• Docket: 1-25-0834
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 250834-U No. 1-25-0834

SIXTH DIVISION March 27, 2026

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________

WASHINGTON LAW OFFICES, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) Cook County. ) Plaintiff-Appellant ) v. ) ) No. 2024 M1107873 CANDEE HOFF, ) ) Defendant-Appellee. ) The Honorable ) Gerardo Tristan, Jr., ) Judge Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hyman and Gamrath concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm the order entering judgment in favor of defendant-appellee where (1) nothing in the record supports plaintiff-appellant’s claim that dismissal was premised on a “misnomer” and (2) without a transcript of the bench trial, the record is insufficient to evaluate the court’s factual findings.

¶2 Plaintiff Washington Law Offices (Washington) appeals from the circuit court’s order

dismissing its action against defendant Candee Hoff. For the following reasons, we affirm. No. 1-25-0834

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 This is an action by plaintiff Washington (a law firm) against Hoff, its former client. On

March 21, 2024, Washington filed a complaint against Hoff, alleging that it previously

represented Hoff in “a lawsuit filed against her for an eviction action.” 1 The complaint set forth a

single count for breach of contract against Hoff for failure to pay legal fees. The caption of the

complaint mistakenly spelled Hoff’s last name as “Hoof”, although the correct spelling appeared

elsewhere in the complaint and in documents attached thereto.

¶5 Attached to the complaint was an engagement letter from Washington to Hoff dated

September 9, 2023, reflecting that Hoff retained Washington to represent her in unspecified

litigation. 2 The letter set forth a fee arrangement by which Hoff would pay $3000 for

Washington to “draft a motion to dismiss and one appearance in court,” subsequent court

appearances would each cost $500, and Washington would otherwise charge $375 per hour in

the representation. The agreement was electronically signed by Hoff.

¶6 According to Washington, its efforts on behalf of Hoff lead to dismissal of the underlying

case, but Hoff refused to pay the full balance owed despite being sent numerous invoices. The

complaint attached an invoice reflecting a balance due of $1,264.35, including amounts billed by

Washington for two court appearances in the underlying case, time spent on client emails, and

late fees. Washington’s prayer for relief sought recovery of the “Past due balance of $1,264.35.”

¶7 The record reflects that Hoff was served on April 2, 2024. On May 14, 2024, the court

entered an order reflecting that the case was “assigned to mandatory arbitration.”

1 Hoff claims the nature of the underlying representation was a “dispute over a security deposit.” 2 Under “Scope of Legal Services to be Performed,” the letter stated that Washington’s firm would perform services “set forth in Schedule A.” However, the attached “Schedule A”, simply said: “The Firm will represent the Client in his/her capacity. The Firm will: 1) Litigation.”

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¶8 The appellate record contains no transcript of the arbitration hearing. However, the record

contains a “Mandatory Arbitration Award” reflected that, after a hearing on September 16, 2024,

a panel of three arbitrators entered an award in favor of Hoff and against Washington. Shortly

thereafter, Washington filed a “Notice of Rejection of Award” on a form that “request[ed] a trial

before the court.”

¶9 On October 2, 2024, Washington filed a motion for default judgment based on Hoff’s

failure to answer the complaint. The trial court subsequently entered an order allowing Hoff until

November 25 to file an appearance to avoid default. On November 18, Hoff (proceeding pro se)

filed an appearance and an answer. Hoff’s answer admitted the existence of the letter agreement

but denied that she owed any amount to Washington.

¶ 10 Following a hearing on March 20, 2025, the court entered an order stating: “This matter

is set for an IN-PERSON Bench Trial on April 7, 2025” and directed the parties to exchange trial

exhibits. There is no transcript or other report of the proceedings on April 7. However, on that

date, the court entered an order stating (in handwriting):

“This matter having c[o]me before this Court upon the trial on

April 7, 2025. Plaintiff Washington Law Offices and counsel

appearing in person and Defendant Candee Hoff appearing in

person. After a bench trial the court has found in favor of the

Defendant Candee Hoff. The court has found that the Plaintiff has

not met its burden that the Complaint is deficient. This matter is

immediately appealable.”

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¶ 11 On May 5, 2025, Washington filed a notice of appeal from the April 7, 2025 judgment. In

it, Washington averred that “the trial court’s ruling was based on a misnomer in the Defendant’s

last name on the complaint, which stated ‘Hoof’ instead of the correct last name ‘Hoff.’

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On appeal, Washington challenges the April 7, 2025 judgment in defendant’s favor.

Significantly, the parties dispute the nature of that judgment and the trial court’s basis for it.

Washington’s brief characterizes the judgment as a “sua sponte” dismissal of its complaint

“predicated exclusively on a clerical misnomer” in the spelling of defendant’s name as “Hoof”

instead of Hoff. Washington proceeds to argue at length that dismissal of a complaint based on a

“misnomer” is improper under Illinois law, because a party should be able to correct such a

clerical error without prejudice to its case.

¶ 14 Apart from arguments based on the unfairness of dismissal based on a “misnomer,”

Washington otherwise claims that the trial court erred because it “did not render a determination

on the merits” on the breach of contract claim for unpaid legal fees. Washington claims that the

“trial record contains substantial evidence” supporting its claim for unpaid fees, including

invoices. Washington asserts that its “principal testified under oath during the trial” to

substantiate that the firm was owed for the amounts reflected in the invoices. Washington does

not cite to any trial transcript or other form of record of proceedings pursuant to Rule 323. See

Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(c) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 15 Hoff’s pro se appellee brief tells a very different version of events. She denies that the

judge dismiss the case because of any “typo” in the spelling of her name. Rather, she asserts that

the trial court ruled in her favor after hearing testimony from the parties and reviewing “over 50

pages of exhibits.” Elsewhere, Hoff asserts that she paid Washington $7,055.48 for the

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underlying representation, but that she fired Washington’s firm in late February 2025. Hoff

claims the $1,264.35 invoice relied upon by Washington “included bogus Court appearances.”

¶ 16 In additional to affirming the dismissal, Hoff also requests that we order the plaintiff to

cease using debt collection agencies to harass her, and requests sanctions.

¶ 17 As discussed below, the state of the record compels us to affirm the judgment in Hoff’s

favor.

¶ 18 Nothing in the Record Indicates that Dismissal Was Premised on a “Misnomer”

¶ 19 Insofar as Washington’s appeal argues the trial court erred in dismissing its case based on

a “misnomer,” we must reject it for a simple reason: there is simply no supporting evidence in

the appellate record.

¶ 20 It is well-settled that the appellant (here, plaintiff Washington) has the “burden to present

a sufficiently complete record” to support its claims of error. Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc.,

217 Ill. 2d 144, 156 (2005). “[I]n the absence of such a record on appeal, it will be presumed

that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual

basis.” Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). “When there is a gap in the record that

could have a material impact on the outcome of the case, the reviewing court will presume that

the missing evidence supported the judgment of the trial court and resolve any doubts against the

appellant. [Citations.]” Midwest Builder Distributing Inc., v. Lord and Essex, Inc., 383 Ill. App.

3d 645, 655 (2007).

¶ 21 Although the bulk of Washington’s brief claims the trial court dismissed the action based

on a “misnomer,” it cites no portion of the record supporting that premise, and we have found

none in reviewing the common law record. Importantly, there is no transcript or other report of

proceedings from which we can discern the court’s findings in connection with its April 7, 2025

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judgment. Corral, 217 Ill. 2d at 156 (“An issue relating to a circuit court’ factual findings and

basis for its legal conclusions obviously cannot be reviewed absent a report or record of the

proceeding.”) And there is nothing in the common law record to indicate that the judgment had

anything to do with a misspelling of Hoff’s name. To the contrary, the record on appeal states

that the court held a “bench trial,” rather than dismissing the case outright. Indeed, the latter

portion of Washington’s brief acknowledges that its representative “testified under oath during

the trial.”

¶ 22 As Washington identifies zero record support for its claim that the case was dismissed

based on any “misnomer,” we must reject any related arguments claiming error on this basis. See

id. (“Without an adequate record preserving the claimed error, the reviewing court must presume

the circuit court had a sufficient factual basis for its holding and that its order conforms with the

law.”)

¶ 23 The Record Is Insufficient To Find That Judgment In Hoff’s Favor After

Trial Was Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence

¶ 24 This brings us to Washington’s contention that the trial court “did not render a

determination on the merits” on its breach of contract claim. Notably, this portion of

Washington’s brief acknowledges that there was, in fact, a bench trial. Washington says the “trial

record contains substantial evidence substantiating” its claim of breach of contract, and that

“Plaintiff’s principal testified under oath during the trial” as to the amounts owed.

¶ 25 Washington directs our attention to invoices sent to Hoff as evidence that the court

should have found in its favor. Significantly, however, there is no trial transcript or other record

of proceedings from which to glean the content of trial testimony or specific findings of the trial

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court. Given the scant record in this case, we have no basis to find error in the court’s judgment

in Hoff’s favor.

¶ 26 The deferential standard of review is well-settled. “After a bench trial, we reverse a

judgment only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. [Citation.] A decision is

against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or

when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Cadle Properties of Illinois, Inc. v. Fortune Investments, LLC, 2021 IL

App (1st) 200556, ¶ 23. This standard “affords great deference to the trial court because the trial

court is in a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of the witnesses, observe

witnesses’ demeanor, and resolve conflicts in their testimony.” Id.

¶ 27 Here, the trial court entered an order reflecting that it conducted a bench trial before both

parties and “found that the Plaintiff has not met its burden that the Complaint is deficient.” This

is consistent with the contention in Hoff’s brief that the court heard testimony from both parties.

¶ 28 In its reply brief, Washington denies that the trial court “conducted a full bench trial”,

emphasizing that the April 7, 2025 written order lacks “reference to any substantive evaluation

of the evidence or the parties’ respective positions.” Washington appears to suggest that we

should find error because the trial court did not set forth its evidentiary findings in the written

order.

¶ 29 The fundamental problem with Washington’s position is that it ignores that it the

appellant’s burden to supply a sufficiently complete record of trial proceedings to support a

claim of error. Corral, 217 Ill. 2d at 156. “Where the issue on appeal relates to the conduct of a

hearing or proceeding, this issue is not subject to review absent a report or record of the

proceeding.” Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 432 (2001). “[I]n the absence of a record of

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what occurred in the trial court, we will presume that the trial court acted in conformity with the

law and with sufficient factual basis.” Trapani Const. Co., Inc. v. Elliot Group, Inc., 2016 IL

App (1st) 143734, ¶ 32.

¶ 30 Without a transcript or other record of proceedings from the trial date, we cannot know

the contents of the witness testimony, or any specific credibility findings by the trial court. In

turn, we cannot evaluate whether any factual findings were against the manifest weight of the

evidence. See e.g., In re Anya Y., 2012 IL App (1st) 111741, ¶¶ 5-6 (without the benefit of a trial

transcript, this court cannot evaluate factual findings at bench trial); Direct Auto Insurance

Company v. Grigsby, 2020 IL App (1st) 182642-U, ¶ 38 (“Because defendants failed to provide

a transcript of the evidence presented at trial or a suitable alternative, we are unable to review the

decision below and must presume that the trial court had a sufficient factual basis for its

holding.)

¶ 31 Given the state of the record, we must presume that the court’s order entering judgment

for Hoff had a factual basis and that it conformed with the law. Thus, we must affirm the

judgment in Hoff’s favor and against Washington.

¶ 32 Hoff’s Request for Relief

¶ 33 Before we conclude, we briefly note that Hoff’s appellee brief requests that we order

plaintiff to “cease and desist” from using debt collection agencies to contact her about the

amounts allegedly due for legal services. Hoff also suggests that we impose sanctions.

¶ 34 We cannot address the merits of these claims, as our jurisdiction in this appeal is limited

to review of the April 7, 2025 order identified in Washington’s notice of appeal. See Schittino v.

Village of Niles, 2024 IL App (1st) 230926, ¶ 21 (explaining “The appellate court is one of

limited review” and “we may review only those judgments and orders that appellant identified in

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their notice of appeal.” (citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(b)(2)(eff. July 1, 2017)). If Hoff desires further

relief from Washington beyond the dismissal of the underlying complaint, she must act first in

the circuit court.

¶ 35 CONCLUSION

¶ 36 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County is affirmed.

¶ 37 Affirmed.

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