Washington Female Seminary v. Washington Borough

18 Pa. Super. 555, 1902 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 21, 1902
DocketAppeal, No. 10
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 18 Pa. Super. 555 (Washington Female Seminary v. Washington Borough) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Washington Female Seminary v. Washington Borough, 18 Pa. Super. 555, 1902 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2 (Pa. Ct. App. 1902).

Opinion

Opinion by

W. D. Porter, J.,

The council of the defendant borough, on May 15, 1899, enacted an ordinance “ establishing the curb lines on South Lincoln street, between Strawberry alley and Maiden street.” The plaintiff is the owner of the entire frontage on the west side of Lincoln street between the street and alley named. The curb line established by the ordinance in question was a straight line drawn between the points of intersection of Strawberry alley and Maiden street, respectively, with the curb on the west side of Lincoln street as the same had prior to that [557]*557time been constructed and maintained by the plaintiff. The line upon which the plaintiff was then maintaining the curb on the west side of the street, and in accordance with which they had constructed their sidewalk, curved out to the eastward between the points named and bears the same relation to the line sought to be established by the ordinance which a bow does to its string. The plaintiff had moved back its fence at the time of the construction of the old curb to correspond with the line thereof, and had laid a sidewalk between the line of the fence and the curb. The curb line sought to be established by the ordinance would cut away a part of the steps of the new seminary building and necessitate the reconstruction thereof, and would throw the greater part of the present sidewalk into the cartway of the street, at one point taking the entire width thereof and actually encroaching upon the property of which' the plaintiff has remained in exclusive possession. The plaintiff was given written notice to comply with the terms of this ordinance in twenty days thereafter, or in default the borough authorities would cause said work to be done and collect the cost thereof with twenty per centum advance. This bill was then filed to restrain the defendants from carrying the ordinance into execution. The learned judge of the court below dismissed the bill, and from that decree the plaintiff appeals.

There are a number of assignments of error, but the record presents for consideration only three questions. First. Was the borough estopped from establishing a curb line different from that which the plaintiffs after an alleged compromise agreement with the borough authorities had been induced to accept, .and upon which, in compliance ’ with that agreement, they had constructed the curb and sidewalk? Second. Is the curb line which the defendant now seeks to establish within the lines of the public highway, or does it encroach upon the private property of the plaintiff ? Third. Is the ordinance unreasonable, burdensome and void, even if the proposed curb line is within the line of the highway, because it takes away the entire sidewalk, from the plaintiffs and places upon the opposite side of the street a foot walk of unusual width ?

The facts upon which the plaintiff asserts that the defendant should be held to be estopped are not disputed. They were conclusively established by evidence, their existence was rec[558]*558ognized in the opinion filed by the learned judge of the court below and they were admitted at the argument in this court. In the year 1890, the borough of Washington caused an official survey and map of all its streets and alleys to be made, and it was found that Lincoln street at the point of its intersection with Maiden street was not, as actually open upon the ground, of the width of forty feet, which was the width ascribed to it in certain ancient deeds. There stood upon the northeast corner of these streets an old building, which according to the testimony of every witness called and every documentpresented in the present case, unquestionably encroached upon Lincoln street, but the borough authorities made no attempt to cause that building to be removed, nor did they undertake any legal proceeding to widen the street. Sometime prior to this, probably about 1884 or 1885, the plaintiffs had been induced by some arrangement with the borough authorities to surrender a small triangle of ground at the extreme corner of Maiden and Lincoln streets, to relieve the situation, but they had for many years maintained a fence along the west side of Lincoln street upon a line which is certainly to the eastward of a considerable portion of the curb line which the borough now seeks to establish, and no evidence was produced in this case which even remotely tended to establish that Lincoln street, or any part of it, ever had been opened upon the ground west of that old fence. This was the condition of affairs in 1890 when the borough authorities undertook to induce the trustees of the seminary to make some concession in the interest of the public. The borough council referred the matter to a committee, with direction to meet the borough engineer and the trustees of the seminary. That committee met the borough engineer and the representatives of the trustees of the seminary upon the ground and the committee entered into an agreement with the trustees that the western curb line of Lincoln street should be established and maintained upon the curved line, in accordance with which the curb and sidewalk were afterwards constructed, and the trustees agreed to surrender the ground necessary for the carrying of this agreement into execution. In accordance with this agreement the plaintiff 'moved back its fence six or seven feet to the westward, at the corner of Maiden street, and placed it upon a curved line so as to give the width necessary [559]*559for a sidewalk between it and the curb line which had been thus agreed upon. The plaintiff was afterwards notified by certain officers of the borough to grade, pave and curb the side-walk on South Lincoln street, and did so upon the lines which had been agreed upon. The action of the committee never was confirmed by an ordinance of the borough council. The learned judge of the court below was of opinion that these facts were not sufficient to estop the borough council from ascertaining the true location of the public highway and establishing the curb line in accordance with that location, and with that conclusion we concur. We are by no means prepared to say that had the borough council by ordinance approved the agreement, into which the committee had entered, it would not have become binding upon the borough, but it is not necessary to consider that question for no such ordinance was adopted. The committee of councils was without authority to bind the borough, and any agreement which they made could only become effective for that purpose by the ratification, evidenced by some unequivocal act, of an authority competent in that behalf to represent the borough. The ordinance of May 15, 1899, and the answer filed by the defendant in the present case constitute a direct and unequivocal repudiation by the proper borough authorities of the unauthorized act of the agents of the borough, the committee of council in 1890. That agreement' goes for nothing, by it the borough neither gained nor lost any right. The borough having repudiated the bargain made by its agent, must surrender the property which its agent unlawfully procured ; if it attempts to assert any right under the contract, then it must make the contract good. The plaintiff has the right to restore the old fence line and take possession of the property which it surrendered upon the faith of the agreement with the committee of council, unless some valid reason, not founded in said agreement, for the denial of that right be established.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

J. A. & W. A. Hess, Inc. v. Hazle Township
400 A.2d 1277 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1979)
J. A. & W. A. Hess, Inc. v. Hazle Township
363 A.2d 844 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1976)
Golden v. Rollins
98 So. 2d 409 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1957)
Luzerne Township v. Fayette County
199 A. 327 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1938)
Borough of Summerhill v. Sherbine
88 Pa. Super. 419 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1926)
Borough of Milford v. Burnett
87 Pa. Super. 588 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1926)
State Road
84 A. 686 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1912)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
18 Pa. Super. 555, 1902 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/washington-female-seminary-v-washington-borough-pasuperct-1902.