Washington Capital Ventures, LLC v. Dynamicsoft, Inc.

373 F. Supp. 2d 360, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10777, 2005 WL 1322712
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 1, 2005
Docket04 Civ. 8878(VM)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 373 F. Supp. 2d 360 (Washington Capital Ventures, LLC v. Dynamicsoft, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Washington Capital Ventures, LLC v. Dynamicsoft, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 360, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10777, 2005 WL 1322712 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER

MARRERO, District Judge.

Defendant dynamicsoft, Inc. (“dynamic-soft”) has moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss two counts of a three-count Amended Complaint seeking damages and contract reformation on the basis of an alleged fraud perpetrated by dynamicsoft (collectively, the “fraud claims”). Plaintiff Washington Capital Ventures, LLC (“WCV”) has opposed the motion. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants dynamic-soft’s motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

The parties to this action are WCV, a venture capital firm providing consulting *362 services to financially distressed companies, and dynamicsoft, a firm specializing in software infrastructure solutions for electronic networks. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-3.) In 2002, dynamicsoft retained WCV’s consulting services in an attempt to improve the financial performance of the firm. Two WCV consultants, Lev Volftsun (“Volftsun”) and Ian Landy (“Landy”), began working for dynamicsoft as its Chief Executive (“CEO”) and Chief Operating Officer (“COO”), respectively. The compensation package negotiated by Volftsun and Landy on behalf of WCV with dynam-icsoft did not involve a fixed salary. Instead, the payment consisted exclusively of dynamicsoft common stock that could be purchased by WCV pursuant to a warrant agreement and sold pursuant to put options exercisable in certain situations, e.g., the sale of dynamicsoft, which the parties termed a “Liquidity Event.” 1 (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4-6.)

In August of 2002, dynamicsoft’s Board of Directors passed a resolution relating to the compensation package for WCV’s consulting services. (See Consent to Action in Lieu of a Special Meeting of the Board of Directors of dynamicsoft, Inc. dated August 21, 2002 (“Resolution”) at 1, attached as Ex. C to Lonergan Aff.) The Resolution allegedly reflected the compensation terms negotiated by dynamicsoft and WCV. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 7.) According to the Resolution, the Board of Directors granted WCV the rights to certain securities as follows:

WHEREAS, Lev Volftsun and Ian Lan-dy are employees of Washington Capital Ventures and are supplying consulting services to dynamicsoft [sic] NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Board will grant Washington Capital Ventures a warrant for the purchase of 1,292,900 shares of common stock at $0.30 per share, and be it further
RESOLVED, that the Board will grant Washington Capital Ventures two put options which will be exercisable upon a Liquidity Event. The first put will allow WCV to sell 491,302 shares back to the Company and participate pari pasu with the E holders in the liquidation preference. The second put will be for the remaining 801,598 shares and will participate pari pasu with the A, B, C, and C-l preferences. If WCV does not exercise the puts, their shares will be treated as common shares.

(Resolution at 1.)

The Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) of dynamicsoft then allegedly caused two documents to be prepared based on the transaction authorized by the Board of Directors through the Resolution. (Am. ComplV 9.) The first document, a warrant agreement for the purchase of dynamicsoft shares, is not alleged to be inconsistent with the terms authorized by the Resolution. (See Warrant for the Purchase of Shares of Common Stock of dynamicsoft, Inc. dated September 11, 2002 (“Warrant Agreement”) § 3(b) at 8, attached as Ex. B to Lonergan Aff.; Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) The second document prepared pursuant to the CFO’s alleged instructions is the Put Agreement, which is not attached to, but is extensively referenced in, the Amended Complaint. This document contains two formulae to calculate the buy-back price of the two put options:

*363 The First Warrant Share Price shall be equal to:

(i) $.30 x (the Series E Preference Amount to be paid upon the closing of the Liquidity Event 4- the Series E Preference Amount), up to a maximum of $.30;
plus
(ii) an amount equal to the proceeds from the Liquidity Event distributable with respect to each share of Common Stock.

The Second Warrant Share Price shall be equal to:

(i) $.30 x (the Series A, B, C and C-l Preference Amount to be paid upon closing of the Liquidity Event 4- the Series A, B, C and C-l Preference Amount), up to a maximum of $.30;
plus
(ii) an amount equal to the proceeds from the Liquidity Event distributable with respect to each share of Common Stock.

(Put Agreement Ex. A at 6.)

According to the Amended Complaint, upon indication by the CFO that the Put Agreement “reflected the terms of the Resolution” (Am.CompV 10), Volftsun signed the agreement on behalf of WCV without reading the language of the document. (See id.) Dynamicsoft alleges that “because of the nature of their relationship, Volftsun trusted the CFO’s representations, relied on them, and executed the documents.” (Id.) At the same time, Volft-sun also exercised the purchase options WCV received pursuant to the Warrant Agreement for a total cost of $387,870. (See id. ¶ 11.)

Some time after WCV’s purchase of dy-namicsoft stock was completed, dynamic-soft was acquired by Cisco Systems, Inc. (“Cisco”). (Id. ¶ 19.) The parties do not dispute that pursuant to the terms of the Cisco sale, the value of the put options under the Put Agreement is $216,498, a net loss of over $150,000 compared to the price paid by WCV to purchase the shares through the Warrant Agreement. 2 (See id. ¶ 14.) WCV alleges that if the Put Agreement had reflected the terms contemplated by the Resolution, the put options would be valued at over $1.4 million under the terms of the Cisco sale. (See id. ¶ 14.)

WCV alleges that the formulae contained in the Put Agreement constitute a fraudulent departure from the terms of the Resolution. According to the Amended Complaint, the CFO’s alleged misrepresentations intentionally overlooked material differences between the formulae in the Put Agreement and the terms of the Resolution. (See id. ¶ 16.) On this basis, WCV seeks damages or the reformation of the Put Agreement in order to conform to the terms of the Resolution. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24-28.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the standard of review applicable to a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a “complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can *364

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Bluebook (online)
373 F. Supp. 2d 360, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10777, 2005 WL 1322712, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/washington-capital-ventures-llc-v-dynamicsoft-inc-nysd-2005.