Case: 18-11383 Date Filed: 10/28/2019 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-11383 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:16-cv-00158-JRH-GRS
WASEEM DAKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, SCOTT L. POFF,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia ________________________
(October 28, 2019)
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-11383 Date Filed: 10/28/2019 Page: 2 of 7
Waseem Daker petitions for rehearing of our August 7, 2019, opinion that
affirmed the denial of his motion for recusal and the dismissal of his complaint.
We GRANT the part of Daker’s petition that challenges our determination that he
waived review of the order denying his motion for recusal, but we DENY the
remainder of Daker’s petition and leave unchanged our opinion that affirmed the
dismissal of Daker’s complaint. We VACATE and WITHDRAW our earlier
opinion and substitute the following revised opinion that affirms the denial of
Daker’s motion for recusal on the merits.
Daker, a Georgia prisoner, appeals pro se the dismissal of his complaint that
a federal official violated his civil rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the denial of his
motion for recusal. After a magistrate judge denied Daker’s motion for recusal, the
district court dismissed Daker’s complaint with prejudice after determining that he
was ineligible to proceed in forma pauperis with three actions or appeals that
counted as strikes against him under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g). We affirm the denial of Daker’s motion for recusal and the dismissal of
his complaint. But because a prisoner disqualified from proceeding as a pauper
under section 1915(g) should have his complaint dismissed without prejudice, we
vacate the order of dismissal and remand with instructions for the district court to
dismiss Daker’s complaint without prejudice.
2 Case: 18-11383 Date Filed: 10/28/2019 Page: 3 of 7
The magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to recuse from
Daker’s case. Daker alleged that the magistrate judge was biased or prejudiced
against him. 28 U.S.C. § 144. But neither the magistrate judge’s adverse rulings,
see United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004), his familiarity
with Daker’s litigation, or his statement about sanctioning Daker for frivolous
filings, see Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1334 (11th Cir. 2000), manifested
any partiality or antagonism against Daker. “[J]udicial remarks . . . that are critical
or disapproving of, or even hostile to, . . the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do
not support a bias or partiality challenge” unless “they reveal an opinion that
derives from an extrajudicial source . . . .” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,
555 (1994). The remarks Daker complained of revealed no personal bias.
The magistrate judge also did not abuse his discretion by denying Daker’s
motion to recuse every district court judge in the Southern District of Georgia.
Daker alleged that, “due to the close working relationship between the judges and
the Clerk, the judges are likely to have bias in favor of the Clerk” or appear to be
biased. 28 U.S.C. § 455. “A charge of partiality must be supported by some factual
basis” and not simply “be based on ‘unsupported, irrational or highly tenuous
speculation.’” United States v. Cerceda, 188 F.3d 1291, 1292 (11th Cir. 1999).
Daker’s conjecture that the district court judges might be, or might appear to be,
partial was insufficient to warrant their recusal.
3 Case: 18-11383 Date Filed: 10/28/2019 Page: 4 of 7
The district court did not err by dismissing Daker’s complaint on the ground
that he was ineligible to proceed in forma pauperis. The Prison Litigation Reform
Act bars a prisoner from proceeding as an indigent if he “has, on 3 or more prior
occasions, while incarcerated . . ., brought an action or appeal . . . that was
dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Three of the five actions
and appeals relied on by the district court—Daker v. Nat’l Broad. Co., No. 15-330
(2d Cir. May 22, 2015); Daker v. Warren, No. 13-11630 (11th Cir. Mar. 4, 2014);
and Daker v. Mokwa, No. 14-cv-395 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2014)—qualified as
strikes. In National Broadcasting, the Second Circuit dismissed Daker’s appeal on
the ground that “it ‘lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.’ Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989),” which is the definition the Neitzke Court
gave “a complaint . . . [that] is frivolous,” id. In Warren, we expressly dismissed
Daker’s interlocutory appeal on a “find[ing] that [it] [was] frivolous.” And in
Mokwa, the district court dismissed Daker’s “amended complaint . . . as frivolous
and for failure to state a claim,” after which the Ninth Circuit dismissed Daker’s
“appeal [a]s frivolous,” Daker v. Mokwa, No. 14-55653 (June 11, 2014). Although
the dismissal without prejudice of two civil actions that Daker filed in the Northern
District of Georgia—Daker v. Robinson, No. 12-cv-00118, and Daker v. Dawes,
No. 12-cv-00119—did not count as strikes because they were dismissed for failure
4 Case: 18-11383 Date Filed: 10/28/2019 Page: 5 of 7
to pay a filing fee, Daker already had accumulated the requisite three strikes to
deny his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Daker argues that he is entitled to proceed as an indigent under the exception
for a “prisoner [who] is under imminent danger of serious physical injury,” id., but
we disagree. Daker never alleged in his complaint that he faced “a present
imminent danger to proceed under section 1915(g) . . . .” Brown v. Johnson, 387
F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2004). Daker alleged that the Clerk violated his rights
by returning his civil complaint on the basis that venue was incorrect. One year
later, Daker moved to amend his complaint to add a claim of imminent danger in
response to the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss Daker’s complaint.
Daker did not seek written consent from the Clerk or request leave to amend his
pleading, and the district court did not consider Daker’s motion to amend. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a).
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Case: 18-11383 Date Filed: 10/28/2019 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-11383 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:16-cv-00158-JRH-GRS
WASEEM DAKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, SCOTT L. POFF,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia ________________________
(October 28, 2019)
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-11383 Date Filed: 10/28/2019 Page: 2 of 7
Waseem Daker petitions for rehearing of our August 7, 2019, opinion that
affirmed the denial of his motion for recusal and the dismissal of his complaint.
We GRANT the part of Daker’s petition that challenges our determination that he
waived review of the order denying his motion for recusal, but we DENY the
remainder of Daker’s petition and leave unchanged our opinion that affirmed the
dismissal of Daker’s complaint. We VACATE and WITHDRAW our earlier
opinion and substitute the following revised opinion that affirms the denial of
Daker’s motion for recusal on the merits.
Daker, a Georgia prisoner, appeals pro se the dismissal of his complaint that
a federal official violated his civil rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the denial of his
motion for recusal. After a magistrate judge denied Daker’s motion for recusal, the
district court dismissed Daker’s complaint with prejudice after determining that he
was ineligible to proceed in forma pauperis with three actions or appeals that
counted as strikes against him under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g). We affirm the denial of Daker’s motion for recusal and the dismissal of
his complaint. But because a prisoner disqualified from proceeding as a pauper
under section 1915(g) should have his complaint dismissed without prejudice, we
vacate the order of dismissal and remand with instructions for the district court to
dismiss Daker’s complaint without prejudice.
2 Case: 18-11383 Date Filed: 10/28/2019 Page: 3 of 7
The magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to recuse from
Daker’s case. Daker alleged that the magistrate judge was biased or prejudiced
against him. 28 U.S.C. § 144. But neither the magistrate judge’s adverse rulings,
see United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004), his familiarity
with Daker’s litigation, or his statement about sanctioning Daker for frivolous
filings, see Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1334 (11th Cir. 2000), manifested
any partiality or antagonism against Daker. “[J]udicial remarks . . . that are critical
or disapproving of, or even hostile to, . . the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do
not support a bias or partiality challenge” unless “they reveal an opinion that
derives from an extrajudicial source . . . .” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,
555 (1994). The remarks Daker complained of revealed no personal bias.
The magistrate judge also did not abuse his discretion by denying Daker’s
motion to recuse every district court judge in the Southern District of Georgia.
Daker alleged that, “due to the close working relationship between the judges and
the Clerk, the judges are likely to have bias in favor of the Clerk” or appear to be
biased. 28 U.S.C. § 455. “A charge of partiality must be supported by some factual
basis” and not simply “be based on ‘unsupported, irrational or highly tenuous
speculation.’” United States v. Cerceda, 188 F.3d 1291, 1292 (11th Cir. 1999).
Daker’s conjecture that the district court judges might be, or might appear to be,
partial was insufficient to warrant their recusal.
3 Case: 18-11383 Date Filed: 10/28/2019 Page: 4 of 7
The district court did not err by dismissing Daker’s complaint on the ground
that he was ineligible to proceed in forma pauperis. The Prison Litigation Reform
Act bars a prisoner from proceeding as an indigent if he “has, on 3 or more prior
occasions, while incarcerated . . ., brought an action or appeal . . . that was
dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Three of the five actions
and appeals relied on by the district court—Daker v. Nat’l Broad. Co., No. 15-330
(2d Cir. May 22, 2015); Daker v. Warren, No. 13-11630 (11th Cir. Mar. 4, 2014);
and Daker v. Mokwa, No. 14-cv-395 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2014)—qualified as
strikes. In National Broadcasting, the Second Circuit dismissed Daker’s appeal on
the ground that “it ‘lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.’ Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989),” which is the definition the Neitzke Court
gave “a complaint . . . [that] is frivolous,” id. In Warren, we expressly dismissed
Daker’s interlocutory appeal on a “find[ing] that [it] [was] frivolous.” And in
Mokwa, the district court dismissed Daker’s “amended complaint . . . as frivolous
and for failure to state a claim,” after which the Ninth Circuit dismissed Daker’s
“appeal [a]s frivolous,” Daker v. Mokwa, No. 14-55653 (June 11, 2014). Although
the dismissal without prejudice of two civil actions that Daker filed in the Northern
District of Georgia—Daker v. Robinson, No. 12-cv-00118, and Daker v. Dawes,
No. 12-cv-00119—did not count as strikes because they were dismissed for failure
4 Case: 18-11383 Date Filed: 10/28/2019 Page: 5 of 7
to pay a filing fee, Daker already had accumulated the requisite three strikes to
deny his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Daker argues that he is entitled to proceed as an indigent under the exception
for a “prisoner [who] is under imminent danger of serious physical injury,” id., but
we disagree. Daker never alleged in his complaint that he faced “a present
imminent danger to proceed under section 1915(g) . . . .” Brown v. Johnson, 387
F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2004). Daker alleged that the Clerk violated his rights
by returning his civil complaint on the basis that venue was incorrect. One year
later, Daker moved to amend his complaint to add a claim of imminent danger in
response to the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss Daker’s complaint.
Daker did not seek written consent from the Clerk or request leave to amend his
pleading, and the district court did not consider Daker’s motion to amend. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a). And Daker failed to allege “a present imminent danger” in his
proposed amended complaint. Daker alleged that he had been exposed to fecal
matter, received inadequate dental care, and had been denied outdoor exercise, but
those hardships did not endanger Daker. Daker’s allegation that using unsanitary
and damaged clippers on his beard might increase his risk of contracting an
infectious disease was too speculative to constitute imminent harm. And Daker’s
allegations that he had been denied medication and treatment for nerve damage and
5 Case: 18-11383 Date Filed: 10/28/2019 Page: 6 of 7
weight issues related to events in the past, which do not qualify for the imminent
danger exception. See Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999).
Daker challenges the constitutionality of section 1915(g), but his arguments
fail. Section 1915(g) does not infringe on a prisoner’s freedom of speech under the
First Amendment because denying a prisoner the right to proceed in forma
pauperis does not censor what issues he can litigate. Daker argues that section
1915(g) violates his right to access the courts under the First Amendment and his
right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment, but those arguments are
foreclosed by Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719 (11th Cir. 1998), abrogated in part on
different grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (exhaustion). In Rivera,
we held that section 1915(g) does not thwart prisoners from having “adequate,
effective, and meaningful” access to the courts “to prevent grave bodily harm,” id.
at 724, or violate a prisoner’s right to equal protection because requiring the
payment of a reasonable filing fee bears a rational relation to the legitimate
governmental interest of deterring frivolous litigation, id. at 727–28. Rivera does
not conflict with Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1071, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986),
in which we held that a district court could not prohibit a prisoner from filing a pro
se complaint, or with Cofield v. Alabama Public Service Commission, 936 F.2d
512, 518 (11th Cir. 1991), in which we held that a district court could not deny a
prisoner in forma pauperis status prospectively.
6 Case: 18-11383 Date Filed: 10/28/2019 Page: 7 of 7
The district court erred by dismissing Daker’s complaint with prejudice.
“[T]he proper procedure is for the district court to dismiss the complaint without
prejudice when it denies the prisoner leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant
to the three strikes provision of § 1915(g).” Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234,
1236 (11th Cir. 2002). That error requires us to vacate the order of dismissal and to
remand the case for the district court to dismiss Daker’s complaint without
prejudice.
We AFFIRM the denial of Daker’s motion for recusal. We also AFFIRM
the dismissal of Daker’s complaint, but we VACATE the order of dismissal and
REMAND with instructions for the district court to dismiss the complaint without