Warshaw v. Monroy

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Warshaw v. Monroy

515 So. 2d 307, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 2524, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 10797

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedNovember 3, 1987

DocketNos. 87-96, 87-593

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 515 So. 2d 307 (Warshaw v. Monroy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Warshaw v. Monroy, 515 So. 2d 307, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 2524, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 10797 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

We affirm the final judgment awarding damages to the plaintiffs. Although the record before us amply supports an award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986), the order assessing such fees contains no express finding, as it must, see Muckenfuss v. Deltona Corp., 508 So.2d 340 (Fla.1987); Whitten v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., 410 So.2d 501 (Fla.1982), that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue raised by the defendant, the losing party. Thus, the order on attorney’s fees is technically deficient and must be reversed; the cause is therefore remanded to the trial court to make the appropriate finding based on the record. Apgar & Markham Construction v. Macasphalt, Inc., 424 So.2d 41 (Fla.2d DCA 1982); City of Miami Beach v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 380 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). See Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1983) (remand appropriate where trial court fails to make requisite findings to support award under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes).

Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.

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PER CURIAM.

We affirm the final judgment awarding damages to the plaintiffs. Although the record before us amply supports an award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986), the order assessing such fees contains no express finding, as it must, see Muckenfuss v. Deltona Corp., 508 So.2d 340 (Fla.1987); Whitten v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., 410 So.2d 501 (Fla.1982), that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue raised by the defendant, the losing party. Thus, the order on attorney’s fees is technically deficient and must be reversed; the cause is therefore remanded to the trial court to make the appropriate finding based on the record. Apgar & Markham Construction v. Macasphalt, Inc., 424 So.2d 41 (Fla.2d DCA 1982); City of Miami Beach v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 380 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). See Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1983) (remand appropriate where trial court fails to make requisite findings to support award under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes).

Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.

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515 So. 2d 307, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 2524, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 10797, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/warshaw-v-monroy-fladistctapp-1987.

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